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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The literature identifies seven major areas conditioning tax reforms which are of 
particular interest for this study: political factors, institutional framework, social support 
and state legitimisation, informality, avoidance and evasion, tax policy and 
administration, economic factors, and external actors. 
 
Nine different tax reforms have been identified as case studies to investigate the drivers 
and constraints that condition tax reforms. The analysis builds on existing studies on 
each particular reform under consideration as well as other available literature, political 
and institutional analyses, statistical data and indicators. Field missions were also 
conducted in the nine countries. The analysis has been implemented following a 
comparative structure.  
 
In order to ensure comparability, the case studies have been selected according to the 
following criteria: geographic distribution; comparable reforms; non natural-resource 
rich countries; country size and population; development level; tax-effort and tax-
revenue determinants; and consultation with tax experts in the different regions. 
 
The final selection has comprised tax reforms implemented in two South American 
countries (Uruguay and Paraguay); one Asian country (the Philippines); three sub-
Saharan African countries (Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya); one Southern Neighbourhood 
country (Morocco); one Eastern neighbourhood country (Armenia); and one Caribbean 
country (the Dominican Republic).  
 
2. Case studies 
 
1. The introduction of Personal Income Tax (PIT) in Paraguay. In 2003, the 
Paraguayan Government tried to pass a broad reform of the public sector, which 
included the introduction of a PIT. This reform was expected to be implemented in 
2006, but a number of the original goals and measures were soon abandoned. In 
particular, the PIT was not introduced until 2012, and even then, it presented many 
differences compared to its original design. Although it can be considered as the first 
step towards taxing personal income in Paraguay, the current PIT shows important 
shortcomings: low revenue, a design closer to a tax on savings rather that to a tax on 
personal income, a very limited number of taxpayers, etc. Several factors limited the 
effectiveness of the reform: no majority in the Parliament; political instability; 
unbalanced distribution of powers; high fragmentation inside political parties; strong 
political influence of the private sector; low government effectiveness; powerful elites; 
a very negative perception of how public revenue is managed; and a significant 
economic boom that relaxed the need of a raising-revenue tax reform, among others.   
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2. The introduction of Personal Income Tax in Uruguay. Prior to the introduction of 
the PIT in Uruguay with the 2006/07 reform, some types of income were taxed but not 
all. The absence of a real PIT was particularly detrimental in several aspects: low 
revenue collected by personal income taxation, low progressivity and redistributive 
capacity of the tax system, and lack of personal income taxation culture, etc. Broadly 
speaking, the reform was successful: a real PIT was implemented in July 2007, and 
some remarkable changes in personal income taxation occurred in the following years. 
Several factors contributed to the effectiveness of the reform: pragmatism, political 
stability, political parties less captured by the elites than in other Latin American 
countries; a new ruling left-wing coalition of parties with majority in the two Chambers 
that broke the traditional two-party system; strong support from the President; high 
institutional quality of the country; the institutionalisation and transparency of the 
reform process; a deep reform in the tax administration; a favourable economic context 
when the reform was implemented; technical and financial support from external actors, 
etc. 
 
3. The 2005 Value-Added Tax (VAT) reform in Morocco. Although the 2005 VAT 
reform was not made public or legislated through an ad-hoc law, Moroccan Authorities 
publicly stated that the overall objectives were to reduce the number of rates to two 
(plus the zero rate), to reduce the number of exemptions, and to rationalise the use of 
reduced rates. The first objective has not been achieved yet. Regarding the second 
objective, some exemptions have been eliminated but many others are still operative. In 
addition, the lack of a clear rationale in exemptions and reduced rates is still present. 
Several factors influenced the outcome of the reform: an unbalanced distribution of 
power; a weak and very fragmented political party system; strong economic interests of 
the political elites; no long term strategies regarding tax reforms; lack of transparency of 
the process; lack of transparency on the role and assistance of the EU to implement the 
reform; lack of analysis on the impact of the reform and information to researchers; 
inadequate social spending, etc. 
 
4. The introduction and subsequent policy changes of the VAT in Uganda. The 
VAT was introduced in Uganda in 1996, replacing the Sales Tax and the Commercial 
Transactions Levy (CTL). The aim was to widen the sales and CTL tax base to include 
all goods and services and make the tax system more equitable for businesses and 
consumers. Compared to the original goals of the reform, although some positive results 
are found, the reform showed many deficiencies: low revenue, gradual extension of the 
exempt and zero-rated lists, poor tax compliance, etc. Different factors shaped this 
reform: high informality; strong influence of vested interests (political and economic 
elites); low institutional quality; lack of taxpaying culture; a tax system perceived as 
unfair; inadequate levels and quality of public expenditures; culture of corruption in the 
Tax Administration; lack of public trust in the government; the VAT introduction 
perceived as threatening small traders; institutionalised but moot consultation process; 
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high levels of tax avoidance and tax evasion; continuous modernisation of the Tax 
Administration; and strong political support. 
 
5. The 2012 PIT and VAT reform in the Dominican Republic. Although the reform 
introduced changes in many areas of the tax system, concerning the PIT, some changes 
in the rate schedule were implemented, a dual scheme was introduced, and some 
deductions were limited. With regard to the VAT, the standard rate was increased, a 
reduced rate was introduced, and many exemptions were eliminated. The reform shows 
mixed results, as a number of major and positive changes have been implemented, but 
the tax system still faces traditional structural problems. In addition, some of the 
changes initially passed in the reform Law were later eliminated or postponed. The main 
factors that influenced the effectiveness of this reform are: an unexpected dramatic 
increase in public spending and deficit; low government effectiveness; insufficient 
accountability and lack of transparency regarding budget policy; low quality level of 
public spending and low social spending; strong social opposition to the reform fuelled 
by corruption and judiciary scandals; considerable predominance of the executive 
branch among powers; the failure of formal negotiations between the Government and 
the rest of actors involved in the reform; high tax benefits; majority in Congress of the 
ruling political; a dramatic increase in the President’s popularity; and the decision to 
allocate 4% of GDP to public education.   
 
6. The introduction of the VAT in Rwanda and ensuing reforms. The VAT was 
introduced in Rwanda in 2001, with the aim to increase revenue generation and expand 
the tax base. Broadly speaking the reform was successful: actual revenue is larger than 
targeted, efficiency is high, and the system is remarkably stable. The following factors 
shaped the reform: joint political will of public authorities, private sector and 
international organisations to introduce the VAT; stability of the design of the reform; 
political stability; a relative low level of lobbying and corruption; a unique decision 
making process consisting in a bottom up and multi-level consultation of all the 
concerned actors; culture of accountability; and transparency regarding the use of 
revenue, among others.  
 
7. The VAT reforms in Kenya in the past decade. The reform package launched in 
2003 was aimed at ensuring equity, further widening the tax base, promoting increased 
investment, and reducing the tax compliance burden. Among other measures, the 
number of VAT rates was reduced to three with the highest rate set at 16%; a system of 
VAT withholding was introduced; the threshold turnover was increased; certain 
supplies were zero rated; and a VAT on rent charged on non-residential property was 
introduced. Compared to the original goals of the reform, the reform was generally 
successful, although the VAT performance is undermined by the difficulty to improve 
tax compliance. The main factors that had a bearing on the effectiveness of these 
reforms are: a political system dominated by the Executive, Government control of state 
resources and institutions; elite dominance and patronage politics; elite capture of fiscal 
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governance; poor timing of the reforms; low institutional quality; lack of taxpaying 
culture and tax morale; social perception that institutions were serving the country’s 
elite; serious integrity concerns within the Parliament; lack of public trust in the 
government; tax system is perceived as unfair; no legitimacy of the public expenditure; 
no institutionalised consultation process; withholding of information by the 
Government; and a large informal sector and high levels of tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. 
 
8. The introduction of the VAT in Armenia. Rather than aiming at simply unravelling 
deficiencies in the existing tax system, the Government of Armenia called for the 
establishment of a tax system for an economy moving from a centrally planned to a 
market economy. Armenia, as most European or South-Caucasian ex-communist 
countries adopted VAT in 1992. It was initially based on the origin principle with a 
standard rate of 28%, although very quickly Armenia shifted to the destination principle 
and the rate was reduced to 20%. The reform was moderately successful. On the one 
hand, an increasing upward trend can be observed in terms of both GDP share and 
efficiency indicators. On the other hand, tax privileges granted to some social groups 
undermine both the revenue and the process of VAT in Armenia. The reform process 
was characterised by: a powerful elite; high level of lobbying and corruption; low 
quality of the decision making process; lack of culture of accountability; low degree of 
tax morale; and high level of informality, among other factors. 
 
9. The VAT reforms in the Philippines since 2005. The VAT reforms were a part of a 
broad revenue mobilisation package and of fiscal measures aimed at putting the public 
sector deficit and debt on a sustainable path. The VAT rate was raised from 10% to 
12%, exemptions were limited, and measures to strengthen the government’s cash flow 
and to simplify the VAT administration were adopted. Overall, the VAT reform appears 
to have been successful. The main factors that conditioned this reform were: strong 
leadership from the President; threat of a fiscal crisis; large influence of the Congress; 
elite capture and patronage politics; high levels of corruption and low levels of 
accountability; lack of adequate, transparent, consultation process; participation and 
support of vocal civil society groups, the academia, donors, and the business 
community; high levels of tax avoidance and tax evasion; inefficiencies in the court 
system; and the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs tend to be 
characterised by perennial resource and capacity constraints and they are perceived 
quite ineffective by the public. 
 
3. Effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms: lessons drawn from the case studies 
 
Although each reform under study has its own specificities, it is possible to identify a 
number of commonalities that help us understand why some tax reforms succeed while 
others fail. In particular, such commonalities are used to investigate the feasibility and 
effectiveness of tax reforms through an operational analysis. 
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Several precisions must be highlighted. First, a tax reform will be defined in this context 
as a significant change in the tax system. We propose a number of indicators to quantify 
that change. Second, a tax reform is considered as effective if the actual changes 
brought to the tax system are close enough to the targeted changes that were initially 
foreseen. Therefore, effectiveness is not about the relation between the means and 
ultimate goals of the reform (efficiency), but rather between the targeted and the actual 
changes in the tax system. Third, feasibility of a tax reform is determined by the set of 
factors that are expected to impact on its effectiveness. Feasibility is analysed following 
an operational multifactor approach, consisting in identifying and assessing those 
factors that influence the effectiveness of tax reforms. These factors have been grouped 
in three categories: the scope, the context, and the process of the reform. The first one 
refers to the depth and direction of a tax reform. The second one is related to those 
factors that shape the framework in which the reform takes place, and the third one 
deals with the organisation of the reform process itself.  
 
Various factors shape the context of a tax reform and can influence the effectiveness of 
the reform. Most of them are not individually crucial for an effective reform, but they 
can help understand why a given tax reform is more likely to succeed. Furthermore, 
some factors can have simultaneous opposite effects in terms of effectiveness, so that at 
the end of the day the net impact is rather ambiguous and reform-specific. These factors 
have been divided into three groups: political, institutional, and socio-economic factors. 
A tax reform process is understood in this study as the succession of activities and 
decisions taken by reformers to achieve their intended change of the tax system. The 
main elements that shape a reform process are: participants, timing, issues, and the 
organisation of discussions and negotiations.   
 
Particular caution must be taken regarding the interpretation of results obtained. First, 
because the nine case studies constitute a very limited sample, the conclusions that can 
be drawn from this analysis therefore rest on a weak ground and would need to be 
completed by further cases. Second, because of the inherent limitations of several of the 
indicators used in this analysis to quantify the potential factors that can influence tax 
reforms. Third, because of the lack of  information regarding certain factors.  
 
From our analysis, the following results emerge regarding the effectiveness of the nine 
tax reforms under consideration. First, all case studies in this research can be described 
as proper tax reforms, since they all implied significant targeted changes in their 
respective tax system. Three of these reforms can be considered as clearly effective, 
since actual changes that were brought to the tax system were close enough to the 
intended and targeted changes (Uruguay, Rwanda, and the Philippines). On the 
contrary, three cases appear to be clearly negative, since actual changes differ to a large 
extent from the original goals (Paraguay, Morocco, and Uganda). The remaining three 
present mixed results, and can be considered as mostly positive even though significant 
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differences exist between the actual and targeted changes (the Dominican Republic, 
Kenya, and Armenia) 
 
With the respect to the factors that condition the feasibility of tax reforms, a first finding 
is that the number of actors involved seems to be irrelevant for tax reforms. In all case 
studies, an increasing number of actors is expected to have a negative (or unclear) 
influence in terms of feasibility, but no link is found between the success/failure of the 
reform and the amount of actors.  
 
On the other hand, a tax reform is more likely to be effective if it has a favourable 
design (i.e. a reform that is neutral or that reduces taxes) but the opposite is not true, 
since necessarily unfavourable designs can be found in successful reforms and mostly 
successful reforms.  
 
Broadly speaking, the political context matters in a tax reform, but not all political 
factors are equally decisive. While the effect of the political regime is unclear, three 
other political factors seem to be more relevant: “majority in the parliament”, “ideology 
of the Government” (compared to previous Governments), and “balance of power”.  
From our analysis, it seems that a reform is more likely to be successful if the ruling 
party has majority in the Parliament and if its political orientation clearly differs from 
that of previous Governments. On the other hand, countries where power is well 
balanced (notably thanks to sound institutionalised constraints on the decision-making 
powers of chief executives) have clearly or mostly produced successful reforms 
 
Regarding elites, they are scarcely responsive and accountable in almost all countries of 
this sample, and then no firm conclusions can be drawn. However, it seems that when 
the elites have sufficient power to block reforms, a stronger impulse is required in other 
contextual areas, and the process through which the reform is pushed forward becomes 
more important. 
 
In general, the institutional framework does not have a clear effect on the feasibility of 
tax reforms, although it must be remarked that some institutional aspects of political 
nature have been categorised as political factors. In particular, corruption is high in all 
countries analysed, except Uruguay and to a lesser extent Rwanda, and therefore no 
sound conclusions can be drawn. The same applies to informality, evasion, and 
avoidance, since they are high in all countries of the sample. The effect of the “use of 
public resources” and the “quality of the administration” is mostly unclear, but more 
information and indicators would be needed in this respect.  
 
According to our findings, a number of economic factors seem to be irrelevant, in 
particular “social cohesion” and “major change of the economic system”. Regarding 
social cohesion, it is low in almost all countries of this sample, and then no firm 
conclusions can be drawn. Changes in the economic system have occurred in successful 
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reforms, moderately successful reforms, and failed reforms. These changes seem to fuel 
tax reforms, but they do not suffice to make them sustainable over time.  
 
On the other hand, there are socio-economic factors that seem to influence tax reforms; 
in particular, “economic and fiscal crisis” and “education”. Countries where there is a 
relatively educated population have clearly or mostly produced successful reforms, 
while reforms have failed in countries with a less educated population. With regard to 
fiscal crisis, they tend to fuel tax reforms, while a sound fiscal balance tends to hinder 
them. 
 
With respect to the process of tax reforms, it must be first noted that there is insufficient 
information to evaluate the influence of independent commissions in tax reforms. 
However they were present in both, successful and failed reforms. Regarding 
international agreements and/or support, they were found in clearly successful reforms 
(Rwanda and the Philippines), in mostly successful reforms (Dominican Republic and 
Armenia), and in failed reforms (Paraguay, Morocco and Uganda). External actors can 
support the tax reform in various ways: through agreements that imply specific 
commitments by the government with regard to the tax reforms, and/or through 
technical assistance. In most cases, the role of external actors is rather limited, and 
domestic factors are much more relevant. Informality, evasion, and avoidance were high 
in all countries of the sample. 
 
Broadly speaking, the timing of a tax reform process largely conditions its results. In 
particular, processes initiated at the beginning of the electoral mandate are found in 
clearly successful reforms and in mostly successful reforms, while the process of two 
out of the three failed reforms did not start in the beginning of the electoral mandate. 
The process of successful reforms also tends to be launched during periods of high 
popularity of the Government or the President. However, information was not available 
to reach sound conclusions in this respect. An information campaign also tends to have 
a positive influence on the success of a tax reform. On the contrary, a prior tax 
administration reform does not seem to be a crucial factor, since it took place both in 
successful reforms and in failed reforms.  
 
The separation of issues in the reform process (i.e. negotiations on the general lines of 
the reform are separated from negotiations on more specific aspects) seems to have a 
positive influence on the reform. This separation of issues was made in successful 
reforms, while it was not in failed reforms. While sound conclusions cannot be made 
due to lack of information, it seems that efforts aimed at linking the tax reform to other 
policy aspects (e.g. increase in social spending, earmarking, etc) seem to have a positive 
influence on the results of the reform. This linkage was made in successful reforms and 
in moderately successful reforms, while it was absent in failed reforms.     
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The institutionalisation of the reform process does not have a clear effect. On the 
contrary, transparency of the decision-making process seems to condition the feasibility 
of a tax reform. The three clearly successful reforms have followed a transparent 
decision-making process, while no such transparency was ensured in the three failed 
reforms. Furthermore, all the three moderately successful reforms have had an 
institutionalisation of the reform process but a non-transparent decision-making process.  
 
No sound conclusions can be made with respect to “bilateral vs. multilateral 
negotiations”. Again, it seems that the effect of this factor is conditioned to the 
transparency of the decision-making process. Regarding the effect of the number and 
organisation of forums, the effect is unclear.  
 
Finally, with respect to legal restrictions in the negotiation process (a fiscal 
responsibility law-type, publishing of tax expenditures); results are not clear either; 
mainly because no hard constraints were present in any of these nine tax reforms.    
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2. AREAS AND FACTORS CONDITIONING TAX REFORMS: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The aim of this literature review is to identify those areas and factors that seem to 
condition the success or failure of tax reforms in developing countries. The hypotheses 
identified in the literature review will be articulated and tested in the case studies in a 
more detailed fashion.  
 
In particular, the Terms of Reference mention that: 
 
“It can be assumed that five different broad issues impact on feasibility and 
effectiveness of tax policy changes: the first is the political process for reaching an 
agreement on a change of tax policy parameters and the way conflicts are solved; the 
second is the capacity to strengthen and adapt the tax administration to new tasks; the 
third is to get the right mix of tax legitimacy and control to ensure the respect for tax 
law by tax payers in a given socio-cultural context; the fourth is the economic structure 
and the macroeconomic challenge, including the degree of openness to trade and 
foreign investment; the fifth, is the policy advice provided by international institutions, 
including requirements to strengthen international tax cooperation.”  
 
At this aim, the literature review in this specific report is not structured in an academic 
fashion, but at the aim of highlighting testable hypothesis related to the drivers and 
constraints of tax reforms in developing countries stemming from the literature in 
different fields. This review is mainly referred to empirical research and six topics have 
been privileged: 
 
- The political economy of taxation and tax reforms 
- Governance, corruption and state building 
- Tax avoidance, tax evasion and related issues  
- Tax administration 
- Taxation and aid 
- Taxation and economic constraints 
 
 
Before presenting the most relevant ideas and hypotheses in each field, three points 
must be stressed. First, it is important to clarify what a tax reform is. By the tax system 
of a country we mean the set of rules governing the computation of the tax bases for the 
various taxes at work in the country, those governing the determination of the tax rates 
and tax liabilities of the taxpayers as well as the organisation of the collection of tax 
revenues; the tax system also includes the provisions of international tax treaties signed 
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by the country and of other international arrangements accepted by the country. By a tax 
reform we mean any substantial change in the tax system.  
 
Second, by success or failure of a reform we primarily refer to the attainment by the 
country, within a reasonable period of time, of the objectives of the reform for the 
authorities which have decided the reform; in that respect any reform has to be judged 
on the basis of its objectives for its decider. Yet, the problem is that the stated or official 
objectives do not always fit the actual objectives of the reform, or that the objectives of 
the reform may be revised between the time of the (announcement of the) reform and 
that of its appraisal. Furthermore, even if the goals are met, they can be too modest, 
given the capabilities of the country. Therefore it may be useful to appraise a reform not 
only according to the objectives of the reform, but also with respect to the results that 
could be reasonably expected, given the shortcomings of the tax system that the reform 
was intended to overcome, and the outcomes achieved in other countries with similar 
characteristics. On the other hand, the assessment of the reform must be made with 
regard to several aspects: changes in the tax revenue, changes in the tax structure, 
changes in the equity of the tax system, changes in the size and structure of the tax base, 
changes the tax incentive regime, and changes in tax-related institutional issues (tax 
morale, tax administration, tax law rationalisation, tax transparency, etc.). 
 
Finally, it must be reminded, following Tanzi and Zee (2001), that “setting up an 
efficient and fair tax system is, however, far from simple, particularly for developing 
countries that want to become integrated in the international economy”, since they face 
“formidable challenges when they attempt to establish efficient tax systems:  
 
- First, most workers in these countries are typically employed in agriculture or in 
small, informal enterprises. As they are seldom paid a regular, fixed wage, their 
earnings fluctuate, and many are paid in cash, "off the books." The base for an 
income tax is therefore hard to calculate. Nor do workers in these countries 
typically spend their earnings in large stores that keep accurate records of sales 
and inventories. As a result, modern means of raising revenue, such as income 
taxes and consumer taxes, play a diminished role in these economies, and the 
possibility that the government will achieve high tax levels is virtually excluded.  
 
- Second, it is difficult to create an efficient tax administration without a well-
educated and well-trained staff, when money is lacking to pay good wages to tax 
officials and to computerize the operation (or even to provide efficient telephone 
and mail services), and when taxpayers have limited ability to keep accounts. As 
a result, governments often take the path of least resistance, developing tax 
systems that allow them to exploit whatever options are available rather than 
establishing rational, modern, and efficient tax systems.  
 
- Third, because of the informal structure of the economy in many developing 
countries and because of financial limitations, statistical and tax offices have 
difficulty in generating reliable statistics. This lack of data prevents 
policymakers from assessing the potential impact of major changes to the tax 
system. As a result, marginal changes are often preferred over major structural 
changes, even when the latter are clearly preferable. This perpetuates inefficient 
tax structures.  
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- Fourth, income tends to be unevenly distributed within developing countries. 
Although raising high tax revenues in this situation ideally calls for the rich to 
be taxed more heavily than the poor, the economic and political power of rich 
taxpayers often allows them to prevent fiscal reforms that would increase their 
tax burdens. This explains in part why many developing countries have not fully 
exploited personal income and property taxes and why their tax systems rarely 
achieve satisfactory progressivity (in other words, where the rich pay 
proportionately more taxes). “ 
 
 
1.1 The political economy of taxation and tax reforms 
 
For long, the political economy of tax reforms has remained an under-explored 
question. While formal tax structures and tax administrations have been transformed in 
many countries, levels of tax collection have tended to be surprisingly stable over time. 
The difficulty of dramatically altering levels of collection is partly explained by issues 
common to most public sector reform programmes, among them the need for political 
will, local ownership, contextually appropriate design and effective sequencing in 
implementation (Boesen 2004; Heredia and Schneider 2003; Stevens and Teggeman 
2004). 
  
However, two more basic issues lie at the heart of the tax reform challenge: 
 
- First, certain types of tax changes confront strong vested interests that stand to lose 
from any proposed changes. These vested interests are often economic and political 
elites who are particularly able to block reform (Bird 1989, 1992a, 1992b). 
 
- Second, it is difficult to mobilise public support for tax reform. Tax reform tends to be 
perceived as threatening even by those who, in fact, stand to benefit, owing largely to 
limited trust in government (Ascher 1989; Bates 1989). 
 
According to the classic median voter model, it can be expected that high inequality 
together with democracy yield higher taxation on the wealthy and thus, higher 
redistribution.  However, at least for some countries and regions, this has not been the 
case. This can be partially due to an over-representation and power of the elites in the 
decision-making processes (Gomez-Sabaini and O’Farrell, 2009), which in turn may 
obey to legislative malapportionment (Ardanaz and Scartascini, 2012), that is a 
discrepancy between the share of legislative seats and the share of population held by 
electoral districts, to the financing of political parties by business groups (Di John, 
2010), etc. In addition, the economic elites can also distort tax reforms by plaguing 
them with tax benefits or leading to a systemic failure of the justice system.  
 
On the other hand, the renewal of political economy has the merit to introduce power 
and rent seeking motivation in public and social choice, departing from the usual 
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assumption from welfare economics that political authorities maximizes the social 
welfare of, say, the so-called representative individual. That also creates a bridge 
between political science and economics.  
 
Castanheira et al. (2012) have surveyed several political economic theories of tax 
systems and reforms and identified testable predictions from these analyses. Among 
others, they have identified that: (1) policymakers may have an incentive to introduce 
targeted reforms, even when broad reforms are more efficient; (2) a higher number of 
political parties in the ruling coalition should increase the number of reforms; (3) 
reforming is easier with governments that are more pro-status-quo; and (4) reforms 
should be more likely in periods of economic crisis. Confronting those theory-based 
predictions, results provide evidence that political variables carry more weight in 
triggering reforms than economic explanatory variables. In particular, most reforms are 
targeted and the number of parties in the coalition is always a better predictor of reforms 
than either the economic business cycle, the rate of activity in the labour market, or 
other socioeconomic variables. Also, pro-status-quo governments tend to pass more 
reforms than a priori pro-reforms governments. However, other authors have stated hat 
successful reforms are most likely to occur during periods of significant political and 
economic change, since such episodes of crisis often disrupt networks of resistance to 
reform and create the urgency needed for greater cooperation (Bates 1989; Ascher 1989; 
Mahon 2004; Durand and Thorp 1998). In contrast, reforms are not found to be more 
likely in periods of economic crisis.  
 
Political instability, for instance, lowers incentives for the incumbent government to 
invest in developing administrative capacity (Gordon and Li, 2005) 
 
Although limited to Corporate Income Tax, Gérard and Ruiz (2009) show that tax rates 
depend on the structure of governance of the country (quality of the institutions, single 
vs. multi-level country, presidential vs. parliamentary, majority vs. fractioned assembly) 
and the political orientation of the parties in power, and Gérard and van Malderen 
(2012) that local tax rates are influenced by the parties at power in the municipality and 
the electoral cycle.  
 
More related to developing countries is Di John (2006), who considers taxation as one 
of the principal lenses in measuring state capacity, state formation and power relations 
in a society. This paper critically examines three main approaches (economic, 
administrative and political economy) to understanding taxation. It also examines 
differences in tax composition across middle-income developing regions and finds that 
Latin American economies tax upper income groups much less than in East Asia and 
Eastern Europe, and explores the political economy and policy implications of these 
differences. The paper also examines issues of tax reform in low income/post-war 
economies and explores the problem that capital flight poses for less developed 
countries. 
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Also related to Political Economy and Latin America is Profeta and Scabrosetti (2007). 
That paper focuses on taxation and investigates the “puzzling” evidence that enormous 
changes in the political organisation of Latin American countries, mainly the 
democratisation process, have not been associated with a raise in the fiscal pressure. 
After assessing this evidence, the authors try to provide possible explanations of this 
“puzzle”. This is not an easy task. All possible arguments that may be mentioned have 
perhaps a role in this complex evidence and the best explanation has to be thought as a 
combination of them. Specific elements which characterize Latin America may have 
played a role in keeping the fiscal pressure low despite the democratic transition: (i) the 
quality of democracy, with a low level of representation and a relevant weight of lobby, 
elites, interest groups; (ii) the development of financial institutions; (iii) the heritage of 
populist economic policies. Moreover international organisations, such as IMF and 
World Bank, have played a crucial role in the design of fiscal systems and fiscal reforms 
in many Latin American countries. The tax systems in place thus strongly reflect the 
plans of these external organisations, not necessarily in line with the preferences of their 
democratic societies. But it also reflects administrative weaknesses and errors of design, 
importing inappropriately from the experience of developed countries. Thresholds may 
have been set far too low, for instance (Gordon and Li, 2005) 
 
 
1.2 Taxation and governance 
 
There is now a substantial research literature about the connections between taxation 
and governance. But the issue is still only on the margins of the development policy 
debate. First, we must define in broad terms what we mean by governance. According 
to Moore (2007), good governance has three main operational dimensions, which tend 
to complement and reinforce one another: 
 
1) The responsiveness of states to citizens, i.e. an orientation to meeting citizens’ needs. 
 
2) The accountability of states to citizens, where this implies the existence of 
institutionalised mechanisms 
 
3) The capability (political and administrative) of states to determine and respond to 
citizens’ needs and wants 
 
It can be expected that a poor institutional quality will hardly constrain revenue 
mobilisation and tax reforms. Lack of transparency and accountability, corruption, 
political instability or a poor quality of the tax administration can severely affect tax 
collection, the design of the tax system, and the implementation of adequate tax 
reforms. As stated by Bird et al. (2004), dominant policy ideas, economic and social 
interests, and institutions shape tax policies and outcomes. Recent empirical research 
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has paid special attention to this link between institutional and political factors and tax 
revenue. Thus, Bird et al. (2004) found that corruption, rule of law and entry regulations 
determine revenues. Ghura (1998), Gupta et al. (2004), Gupta (2007), Pessino and 
Fenochietto (2010), Le et al. (2008 and 2012), and Drummond et al. (2012) show that 
corruption has a negative effect. Gupta (2007) also found that political stability 
influences tax revenue, while Le et al. (2008 and 2012) found that the same result for 
the quality of bureaucracy.  
 
In particular, in developing countries, the problem of corruption tends to be more 
pronounced within tax administrations compared to other entities in government given 
that their function places them in a position to extract rents from both firms and the 
general public (World Bank, 2010). Additionally, there is often an overall lack of fiscal 
citizenship characterised by the absence of citizens’ knowledge of the importance of 
their tax contributions and tax obligations and the weak tax morale. 
 
Recent research has notably focused on the role of taxation as a central strategy for 
state-building. State-building has been defined as “an endogenous process to develop 
capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relationships” 
(OECD, 2008). This means that taxation and governance are interconnected, so vicious 
or virtuous circles between both can emerge. In other words, adequate tax reforms are 
more likely to occur in countries with an appropriate tax system. 
 
Some authors have pointed out that tax reforms are easier to implement and reach better 
outcomes if they include some kind of earmarking; that is, if the new revenue is 
translated into socially productive public expenditure (See Keen, 2012). However, 
earmarking can also foster corruption and inflexibility. The perception about the 
fairness of the reform is, to some extent, related to this issue. An equity-improving 
reform can be more successful and facilitate the dialogue and its acceptance by 
taxpayers. On the contrary, a very unequal income distribution can condition revenue 
mobilisation, since 1) it reduces the legitimacy of public institutions to collect taxes and 
the social disposition to pay them; 2) economic elites, usually reluctant to pay taxes, 
will have more power to resist any increasing-resources tax reform in very unequal 
societies; 3) informality tends to be larger in very unequal countries; and 4) a more 
equal income distribution can facilitate tax collection and voluntary taxpayer 
compliance. 
 
Although income distribution has not been widely considered as a factor conditioning 
tax revenue in empirical research, it turned out to be a crucial determinant in those 
studies contemplating this possibility. For example, Gupta (2007) finds that as the 
weight of direct taxes increases, so does total revenue. According to his interpretation, 
since indirect taxes tend to be regressive, they exacerbate inequality and reduce the tax 
base. Alonso and Garcimartín (2011) find that, after income per head, income 
distribution is the most powerful explanatory variable of tax revenue differences across 
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countries. Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) and Bird et al. (2004) also find a positive 
impact of equality on revenues.  
 
Research has also demonstrated the relationship between taxation and governance and 
the role of tax bargaining in constructing effective and accountable public authority. 
Tax reforms can provide incentives for citizens/taxpayers and governments to enter into 
a "tax bargain" or fiscal contract which are mutually beneficial (increased compliance, 
increased responsiveness). The more of their income they pay in tax, the more citizens 
are likely to be politically engaged and demanding in relation to government (Prichard, 
2010). But the opposite can also be true. As stated by Moore (2007), such tax bargains 
can be mutually beneficial, as citizens receive improved governance while the 
government receives larger, more predictable and more easily collected tax revenues.  
 
Recent research by Prichard (2010) points to two general processes that seem to be 
particularly important in practice. The first process, which can be termed direct tax 
bargaining, involves governments making relatively explicit concessions to citizens in 
response to the threat, or emergence, of public resistance to taxation. The second 
process is more indirect, and covers cases in which taxpayer resistance to taxation by an 
unresponsive government undermines the stability of the government, leading to future 
reform. In particular, ongoing research suggests that constructive tax bargaining may be 
more likely when:  
 
• Diverse taxpayers perceive themselves to have common interests, and will thus 
pursue a broad tax bargain rather than narrow benefits; 
• There is a high degree of mutual trust amongst taxpayers; 
• Taxpayers are well organised politically and thus have the strength and unity to 
bargain constructively with government; 
• Levels of awareness and education are high, so as to encourage political 
engagement; 
• Links between taxation and expenditure are relatively clear to taxpayers; 
• Voluntary compliance is relatively important, thus providing stronger incentives 
for governments to seek a tax bargain; and 
• There is a minimum level of trust between taxpayers and government in order to 
facilitate bargaining. 
 
 
1.2.1 Taxation and governance. The case of resource rich countries 
 
Abundant natural resource countries are a particular case with respect to the 
taxation/governance nexus. Governments in these countries can be tempted to replace 
tax revenues by revenues from natural resource sectors by means of royalties, state-
owned firms, or even non-transparent means. As a consequence, natural resource 
abundance can become a curse. In particular, Ross (2004) suggests that there are at least 
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three mechanisms through which oil dependence might generate legitimacy problems 
for governments: (1) high corruption levels; (2) resulting from the first, slow economic 
growth; and (3) the trend towards authoritarianism. There is now strong evidence that 
large oil and mineral revenues are associated with low levels of democracy and with 
states unbound by law (Bornhorst et al., 2009, Moore 2007, McGuirk, 2010, Bird et al., 
2008). Capacity in tax administration is also more problematic (Knack, 2009) and there 
emerge needs for states to enhance tax policy efficiency and administration (Levi, 1988; 
Bates and Da-Hsiang, 1985).  
 
However, empirical studies do not yield a clear-cut answer about the impact of natural 
resources on tax revenue mobilisation. Thus, while Tanzi (1989) or Alm et al. (2004) 
find a positive impact of mining, Leuthold (1991) or Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997) 
find the opposite result. More recently, a negative impact of natural resources on tax 
revenue can be found in Botlhole (2012), Bornhorst et al. (2008) or Drummond et al. 
(2012). It is interesting to note that Drummond et al. (2012) find that the impact of 
natural resources on revenue depends on institutional quality; in other words, while it 
can be negative in a low institutional quality framework, it can be positive if the quality 
of institutions is good enough. 
 
 
1.3 Tax avoidance, tax evasion and related issues 
 
Tax avoidance – or evasion – and resulting low tax revenue, or at least lower than 
expected, is a central topic in taxation and in particular for the study of the pros and 
cons of a tax reform.  
 
Gérard (2012) addresses those issues in a critical survey contribution through a 
threefold approach i.e. (1) the seminal Allingham-Sandmo (1972) (AS) model, which in 
some sense argues that taxpaying 'homo economicus' cheats rationally; (2) the view that 
people are honest because cheating makes them ashamed; that view is at the very root 
of the tax morale literature; and (3) a cynical view according to which people are honest 
because they are unable to cheat.  
 
That quotation from Kleven et al. (2011) illustrates quite well the view at the roots of 
tax morale i.e.  that “an Allingham-Sandmo-type setting predicts much less compliance 
than we observe in practice, at least in developed countries. (…) the AS model misses 
important aspects of the real-world reporting environment (…) several authors have 
argued that observed compliance levels can only be explained by accounting for 
psychological or cultural aspects of the reporting decision.” The cost of evading income 
has many dimensions: it is pushed up by socioeconomic and psychological elements, as 
well as by morale sentiments, and the evasion then goes down or, in other words, 
compliance increases. 
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Tax morale literature is represented by Alm and Torgler (2006), who “estimate the 
determinants of an individual’s intrinsic willingness to pay taxes – what is sometimes 
termed 'tax morale' –” and observe “a strong negative correlation between the size of 
shadow economy and the degree of tax morale”. Frey and Torgler (2007) find a high 
correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale, and also observe a strong 
positive correlation between institutional quality and tax morale. 
  
Related to developing countries, and specifically Latin-America, is Torgler (2005), 
whose findings indicate that there is a significant correlation between tax morale and the 
size of shadow economy. Furthermore, people who said they knew/have heard about 
practised tax avoidance have significantly lower tax morale than others. Looking at 
individuals’ perception of reasons for tax evasion he found that the tax burden, lacking 
honesty, and corruption are seen as the main factors. He observed significantly lower 
tax morale in South America/Mexico than in the Central American/Caribbean area. 
Furthermore, trust in the president and the officials, the belief that other individuals 
obey the law and a pro democratic attitude have a significant positive effect on tax 
morale. 
 
More recently Kleven et al. (2011) adopt another point of view when they note that 
“While we do not deny the importance of psychological and cultural aspects (…) we 
show that the key distinction in the taxpayer’s reporting decision is whether income is 
subject to third-party reporting or if it is solely self-reported. (…) For self-reported 
income, our empirical results fit remarkably well with the basic AS model: tax evasion 
is substantial and responds negatively to an increase in the perceived probability of 
detection (…).”  
 
Two groups then need to be distinguished, one group consisting of taxpayers who report 
their taxable income by themselves, and another one consisting of taxpayers whose 
income is reported by a third-party, most usually the employer. Should we assume no 
collusion between the employer and the employee to pay compensations in black 
money, the cost of evasion is large for the latter group. However we cannot ignore that, 
in some countries at least, such collusion is systematically at work in some sectors. That 
collusion between the worker and the beneficiary of the work is also extensively 
developed in industries and services where the beneficiary is a private individual not 
subject to books examination and auditing. In those cases the worker is most often a 
self-employed deemed to report her taxable income spontaneously. Then, since the cost 
of evading is smaller for self-reporting people than for taxpayers subject to third-party 
reporting, tax evasion is larger in the former group.  
 
Then, as the authors write, “third-party reporting is a very effective enforcement device. 
Given that audits are very costly and eliminate only a part of tax evasion, enforcement 
resources may be better spent on expanding third-party reporting than on audits of self-
reported income”. 
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Developing countries are facing growing challenges that stem not only from businesses 
taking advantage of loopholes in domestic laws to avoid tax, but also alarmingly from 
businesses that are increasingly using sophisticated tax avoidance schemes involving 
cross-border structuring and transfer pricing manipulations to evade their tax 
obligations (ITD, 2010; SARS, 2012). Transfer-pricing abuse, i.e. manipulating 
financial transactions in multinational enterprises with the view to reduce corporate 
income tax liabilities, is a major obstacle not only to effective revenue mobilisation but 
also to development and poverty alleviation (OECD, 2011). 
 
Finally, complex and ambiguous tax laws in developing countries often lead to non-
compliance with tax laws, since taxpayers find it hard to meet their tax obligations 
(Shekidele, 2009; IMF, 2009).  Furthermore, the complexity of tax procedures tends to 
impede the improvement of the business climate and the promotion of private 
investment in developing countries (ADB, 2011). 
 
1.4 Tax Policy and Tax Administration 
 
According to the literature, changes of tax legislation, regulation and administrative 
changes undertaken to reform an existing taxation instrument or introduce a new one in 
developing countries do not often tackle the issue of the proliferation of tax incentives 
and exemptions accompanying those changes. This oversight often acutely affects 
revenue collection in those countries as revenue is lost where there is no adequate 
monitoring of the tax incentives and exemptions (Heller, 1997; The Anchor, 2008; 
Kloeden, 2011). Furthermore, exemptions generally imply substantial losses of revenue, 
add administrative and compliance problems, deviate from the principle of uniformity 
of treatment of all consumption expenditures, damage the integrity of the tax system, 
facilitate evasion and corruption and are hard to remove once they are established 
(European Commission; Cruce, 2011). 
 
At the same time, developing countries also face the issues related to the abuse of the 
incentives system and the lack of coordination between the various government 
agencies that grant the incentives and the revenue authorities that are required to 
administer the incentives. The abuse of the incentives system is particularly prevalent in 
the extractive industry (mining, oil and gas) in resource-rich countries and in the value-
added tax (VAT) system (Oxfam, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, tax incentives and exemptions have been over-emphasised as investment 
promotion tools by developing countries, especially in the context of double tax 
agreements (DTAs) and memorandum of understanding (MOUs), although they have 
not necessarily delivered in terms of attracting huge investments (ITD, 2010; Kayaga, 
2007; IMF, 2009).  
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Finally, there is in general a great lacuna in the quantification and analysis of tax 
expenditures made through the tax systems in developing countries, which tends to limit 
the analysis of the extent to which tax expenditures erode tax collections in those 
countries (OECD, 2011). 
 
According to the literature, in developing countries where the revenue administration 
functions are in general the responsibility of directorates (e.g. tax and customs) located 
within the Ministry of Finance (MoF), these directorates do not possess powers to 
negotiate and set conditions of service for staff and do not have legal protection from 
political interference (ITD, 2010). According to Heller (1997), Fjeldstad (2007), and 
Fjeldstad and Moore (2009), it is important to separate revenue bodies from the civil 
service as it would increase effectiveness and efficiency in revenue collection via 
financial and administrative independence and managerial autonomy. Specifically, a 
semi-autonomous revenue authority, through its capability to set and offer competitive 
salary scales and its autonomy to recruit, promote, and dismiss staff, should be able to 
attract a higher qualified staff and thus increase productivity as well as revenue 
collections. Finally, a semi-autonomous revenue body should also be able to secure an 
independent source of funding through the general government budget appropriations 
approved by the Parliament or by appropriation of a fixed share of the revenues it 
collects (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009). Yet, it must be noted that “autonomous or a semi-
autonomous revenue authorities  have not always lived up to the high expectations held 
by some, but, with political will, can provide a framework for sustained progress” (IMF, 
2011). 
 
Additionally, the implementation of a sufficient level of tax revenue is in general 
hampered by the fact that tax functions within tax administrations are not streamlined 
(IMF, 2010b). For example, a general tax directorate could be created that would bring 
together under one hat the general directorate of direct and indirect taxes, the general 
directorate for registration and stamp duty, the general directorate of land registration 
and topographical works, and the land ownership and mortgage registry (AEO, 2010b). 
According to the literature, strengthening the cooperation among revenue administration 
bodies (Tax and Customs) would facilitate the collection of information and bring more 
taxpayers into the tax net (AEO, 2010a). 
 
Furthermore, when tax administration is the responsibility of a tax directorate that is 
located within the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the relations between the Ministry and 
the tax authorities are a frequent source of tension. In particular, concerns have been 
raised in the following areas: limited possibilities to establish differential and 
competitive salary scales in order to attract and retain skilled staff, political interference 
(especially in appointment issues), and tensions and lack of clear responsibility in the 
formulation of tax policy; overall, there is a lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
of the tax administrations in these countries (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009). 
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Developing countries tend to be characterised by an increased trend toward 
segmentation according to taxpayer’s size: large taxpayers’ office (LTO) and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  This “taxpayer segment” model of the 
organisational structure of revenue administrations in the region should allow better 
management of risks and compliance issues across taxpayers (ITD, 2010; IMF, 2010a). 
 
In general, fiscal courts or tax tribunals handling tax disputes would to an extent play a 
key role in adjusting impartial verdicts that support revenue collection in developing 
countries (Ngategize, 2012). From the literature reviewed, it can be said that the driving 
force behind the creation of commercial courts is the desire by judiciaries to facilitate 
the resolution of business and commercial disputes in a quick, efficient and effective 
manner that ensures the judiciaries in effect become a catalyst for economic growth 
(Odoki, 2010). 
 
Historically, many revenue authorities have addressed compliance risks only in terms of 
enforcement programmes. In order to address tax compliance risks more effectively, 
more advanced revenue authorities have recently adopted a strategic approach by 
applying modern risk management techniques with the objective of to achieve as good a 
compliance outcome as possible (i.e., to maximize the overall level of compliance with 
the tax laws). In order for risk identification and assessment systems to be effective, 
they must have sufficient data with which to assess compliance risk. These data may be 
derived from many sources, including operational programme data (e.g. feedback from 
audits), tax return entries (including financial statement information), and external data 
(e.g. bank interest details, company registration data, or publications) (OECD, 2011). 
However, this evolution towards a more systematic compliance assessment and risk 
management can be hampered by an inadequate and limited system of centralised 
collection and exchange of information, internally as well as externally (OECD, 2011). 
 
On the other hand, developing countries often face the political and cultural challenges 
of applying effective penalties to tax evaders (e.g. lack of political will in enforcing 
revenue laws) and the challenge of implementing effective procedures to enforce 
collection of unpaid taxes. 
 
In developing countries, there is an overall lack of protection of taxpayers’ rights. In 
general, taxpayers are not aware or informed of their rights set out in the law, other 
statutes, or in administrative documents, which would encourage them to engage in 
legal proceedings or to take legal action against the tax administrations when required. 
In cases when tax appeals and dispute resolution mechanisms are formally established, 
the process is usually long and expensive for both the taxpayer and the tax 
administrations (Gill, 2003; Kunbuor, 2006; Paygar, 2010). A good appeal process is 
essential for improving voluntary compliance, as it increases the taxpayers' trust in the 
fairness of the revenue administration (Gill, 2003). 
 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
21 
 
 
Revenue administrations in developing countries are in general characterised by low 
taxpayer education which affects voluntary tax compliance, as well as by an absence of 
compliance strategies to ensure tax compliance by taxpayers. Increasing the levels of 
understanding of the tax laws, the obligations and the benefits derived from tax 
compliance is crucial to bring about improved compliance (Nthakosekome, 2012). It is 
also essential to establish and implement high-quality services to taxpayers as an 
incentive for improving their tax compliance (The Anchor, 2008; IMF, 2010b). 
 
In the area of human resource management, tax administrations in developing countries 
often experience a lack of succession planning, that is building the capacity of staff at 
various levels in the revenue authority for an easy takeover of functions when others 
retired. This seems to be one of the causes of the weakness in the tax administrative 
capacity in those countries. There is also the challenge of staff retention as tax 
administrations suffer from a loss of staff to the private sector, i.e. mainly to 
accountancy, audit and tax firms in private practice as well as to corporate entities 
within tax departments. This challenge mainly stemmed from poor remuneration within 
revenue authorities as well as the lack of staff incentive schemes. Overall, tax 
administration staff is in general unmotivated and dissatisfied mainly due to unclear 
promotion and career development paths, inadequate reward or incentive programs, and 
often non-competitive staff remuneration levels. Specifically, the lack of staff capacity 
combined with the absence of succession planning, the lack of career planning, and 
inadequate conditions of service within the tax administrations tend to negatively affect 
staff morale, as staff is disillusioned as regards their progression to the top in the 
organisational structure of the revenue institution. Furthermore, manpower planning, i.e. 
recruiting adequate qualified professionals to carry out organisational activities 
remained a problem of tax administrations in developing countries. Moreover, the lack 
of funding to undertake training and capacity building programs to equip and resource 
their personnel has also been identified as hampering the administrative capacity of tax 
administrations across these countries (IF, 2008; ADB, 2011; Cruce, 2011; OECD, 
2011; Kloeden, 2011). Tax administrations in developing countries must put in place a 
human resources management strategy that ensures that critical skills and expertise 
receive market-related compensation and the appropriate levels of training and 
development to ensure their retention (SARS, 2012; OECD, 2011). 
 
Human resources management must also deal with corruption. The fight against it in the 
tax administration requires leadership (political and managerial), internal audit, staff 
investigation functions, visible implementation of a code of ethics, and processes that 
limit rent-seeking opportunities (minimizing contact between taxpayers and tax 
officials) (IMF, 2011).  
 
As the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has become an important 
tool in the functioning of modern tax administrations, efficient, adaptable and 
responsive strategic planning and management of IT services became crucial (CIAT, 
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2009). In some developing countries it has to a large extent, become a priority to 
transform the tax administrations’ process from a complex, paper-based and labour 
intensive process to a simplified, automated and electronic one with the objectives of 
reducing taxpayer compliance costs, improving processing turnaround times and service 
levels, increasing efficiencies, and releasing resources to focus on higher value-adding 
activities, such as audit (SARS, 2011; ZRA, 2011). Furthermore, general computer 
literacy is on average low in developing countries owing to the low skills base; this 
makes IT training very crucial in improving productivity (IMF, 2012) 
 
 
1.5 Taxation and aid 
 
Concerning developing countries, much attention has been paid in last years to the 
impact of foreign aid on tax revenue mobilisation, being the expected impact 
ambiguous. On the one hand, foreign aid can be a substitute for domestic taxation, 
reducing government incentives to levy taxes, to implement tax reforms, and to improve 
tax administrations. But, on the other hand, aid could strengthen developing countries’ 
tax systems by means of financial and technical assistance. Empirical research does not 
provide a clear-cut answer either. Thus, with regard to country case studies, Swaroop et 
al. (2000) found no significant relationship between aid and tax revenue in India, and 
Iqbal (1997) and McGillivray (2000) found a similar result for Pakistan. Yet, a negative 
impact can be found in Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) for Pakistan, in Pack and Pack 
(1993) for the Dominican republic, in Rubino (1997) for Indonesia, in McGillivray and 
Ahmed (1999) for the Philippines, in Mavrotas and Outtara (2003) for Ivory Coast, and 
in Fagernäs and Roberts (2004) for Zambia. On the contrary, a positive relation between 
aid and tax revenue is found in Pack and Pack (1990) for Indonesia, in Gupta (1993) for 
India, in Osei et al. (2005) for Ghana, in Fagernäs and Roberts (2004) for Malawi and 
Uganda, and in Franco-Rodríguez (2000) for Costa Rica. Cross-country studies also 
show mixed results. Thus, according to Bräutigam and Knack (2004) and Lloyd et al. 
(2009) (for some of the countries of their sample) aid reduces tax revenue in the 
recipient country. Yet the opposite result can be found in Gupta (2007), Brun et al. 
(2007), and Clist and Morrissey (2011) (in this case, since the late 1980s). Finally, 
Morrissey et al. (2007), Teera and Hudson (2004), Ouattara (2006), Remmer (2004), 
Drummond et al. (2012), and Alonso and Garcimartín (2011) do not find any effect of 
aid on tax revenues. 
 
This literature has suggested that the impact of aid on taxes can differ according to the 
different components of aid. Thus, Khan and Hoshino (1992) show that grants reduce 
tax effort, while loans increase it; Mavrotas (2002a and b) suggests that project aid has a 
lower negative impact on taxes than program aid; Mavrotas and Ouattara (2006) show 
that the effect of project and program aid on tax revenues is negative, but it is not in the 
case of technical assistance or food aid. Gupta et al. (2004) show that, while loans have 
a positive effect, the opposite is true in the case of grants, while according to Gambaro 
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et al (2007) grants have a positive effect but loans are irrelevant. Yet, according to Brun 
et al. (2007) or Morrissey et al. (2007), grants or loans have the same impact. Other 
studies have suggested that the impact of aid can be positive but with decreasing returns 
(Clist and Morrisey, 2011); that is, the effect can be negative for highly aid-dependant 
countries 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that some works have pointed out that the impact of aid 
on taxes depends on the institutional quality of the recipient country. For example, 
Gupta et al. (2003) show that the impact of aid on tax revenue tends to me more 
negative in countries with a high level of corruption. According to Bräutigam (2000), 
aid reduces institutional quality and, by doing so, tax revenue. Brun et al. (2007) 
indicate that the quality of bureaucracy determines to what extent aid increases tax 
revenues.  
 
 
1.6 Taxation and economic constraints 
 
Obviously the issue of the relation between taxation, growth, inequality and 
macroeconomic goals is crucial. It is addressed, among others, by Weller and Rao 
(2008). For them, financial instability has increased for many economies in the face of 
greater capital mobility. Eliminating capital flows, especially portfolio investment 
flows, may reduce volatility, but it could also result in domestic capital constraints. To 
overcome this dilemma, policymakers may consider alternatives, such as progressive 
income taxation, that could raise domestic funds. In this paper, they find that 
progressive taxation provides policymakers with the ability to conduct countercyclical 
fiscal policies, which in turn contributes significantly to economic stability. In turn, no 
evidence occurs that progressive taxation adversely affects economic stability by 
reducing growth. We find, though, that the possibility to raise progressiveness is 
constrained by capital mobility and by the level of government spending. Finally, 
policymakers, who may consider consumption taxes, when tax enforcement is 
ineffective, would see no additional gains in terms of economic stability from the 
implementation of a VAT in combination with progressive income taxation. 
 
Output composition may affect tax revenue mobilisation and tax reforms. In this sense, 
much attention has been paid to the agricultural sector. Since this is a hard-to-tax sector, 
characterised in many countries by a myriad of micro and informal transactions, it is 
expected that the larger its weight in GDP, the lower the level of total tax revenue. The 
negative impact of agriculture on tax revenue has been supported by some empirical 
works: Chelliah (1971), Chelliah et al. (1975), Tanzi (1992), Leuthold (1991), Stotsky 
and WoldeMariam (1997); and more recently, Botlhole (2012), Pessino and Fenochietto 
(2010), Le et al. (2008 and 2012), Gupta (2007), Bornhorst et al (2008), Drummond et 
al. (2012), Clist and Morrisey (2011). However, it must be noted in some works no 
significant impact of agricultural on revenue is found (Gambaro et al, 2007; Alonso and 
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Garcimartín, 2011; Benedek et al., 2012; Morrissey et al., 2007). Conversely, the share 
of industry in GDP is supposed to have a positive effect on revenues, since it is an 
easier-to-tax sector. This can be found for example in Morrissey et al (2007), but some 
other works do not find evidence supporting this hypothesis (Botlhole, 2012; Gambaro 
et al., 2007; Benedek et al., 2012; Morrissey et. al, 2007; Clist and Morrisey, 2011). 
 
Macroeconomic instability can also affect tax revenue mobilisation and tax reforms. 
This is the case of inflation, although is effect is unclear, both theoretically and 
empirically. On the one hand, a negative impact can be expected due to: 1) the Tanzi-
Olivera effect (a decrease in real terms of tax revenue due to the lag between tax 
payments and tax obligations); 2) to the fact that some excise duties are levied at 
specific rates that may not necessarily be adjusted with inflation; and 3) to the potential 
replacement by taxpayers of their assets, in order to protect the real value of their 
wealth, in favour of those that escape taxes (land, jewels, and foreign capital). But, on 
the other hand, in progressive tax systems inflation can increase tax collection, since tax 
rates can be adjusted to inflation with a significant lag. Many empirical studies find a 
negative impact of inflation on tax revenue (Ghura, 1998; Pessino and Fenochietto, 
2010; Brun et al., 2007; Drummond et al., 2012), but some others do not find a clear 
effect (Alonso and Garcimartín, 2011).  
 
Some works have paid attention to macro economic instability by using other variables 
apart from inflation. For example, Brun et al. (2007) find that both, primary deficit and 
debt service have a positive impact on revenues, arguing that more resources are needed 
to finance the budget, while Remmer (2004) finds that the debt service does not have 
any impact on revenues.  
 
Trade openness has also been traditionally supposed to affect tax revenue, but again its 
effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, since they take place at specific locations, 
imports and exports are easy to tax. Therefore, a higher openness rate can be expected 
to be associated with larger tax revenues. Besides, trade openness may induce higher 
growth rates, and as a result, higher tax revenues. But on the other hand, low 
international trade taxes may increase the observed openness rate, and thereby both 
variables would be inversely related. In fact, while according to Lotz and Morss (1967), 
Bahl (2003), Pessino and Fenochietto (2010), Le et al  (2008 and 2012), Bird et al. 
(2004), Remmer (2004), Drummond et al. (2012), both variables are positively related, 
Tanzi (1992), Gupta (2007), Morrissey et al (2007), and Clist and Morrisey (2011) 
show that this positive relation occurs between taxes and imports. Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam (1997) indicate that tax revenue is positively related only to taxes, while 
Clist and Morrisey (2011) find the opposite result: the impact of exports is negative. 
Ouattara (2006) finds that both variables have a positive effect, while for Benedek et al. 
(2012) the overall effect of trade is negative. Finally, Botlhole (2012), Bird et al. (2008), 
Bornhorst et al (2008) find no significant effect, and for Gambaro et al (2007) and 
Alonso and Garcimartín (2011) the effect is unclear.   
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On the other hand, economic and fiscal crises may fuel tax reforms due to the necessity 
to increase revenues.1 
 
In sum, the literature review provides seven major areas conditioning tax reforms of 
particular interest to this research:  
 
1. Political factors 
 
A meaningful tax reform is a long and political process. Sustaining political support for 
reform is essential. Without the political will to implement, both policy and 
administrative changes, formal changes in law and structure may have limited impact or 
prove unsustainable. The main structural characteristics of the political regime and the 
political context are likely to condition tax reforms.  
 
2. Institutional framework  
 
Institutional quality seems to be crucial for the success of tax reforms. Transparency, 
accountability, political stability, dialogue, corruption, and other institutional factors can 
determine the success of tax reforms.  
  
3. Social support and state legitimisation 
 
State legitimisation, social support, and/or the inclusion of some elements to increase 
both factors seem to be areas influencing the success of tax reforms. 
 
4. Informality, avoidance, and evasion 
 
A high level of shadow economy, tax avoidance, and tax evasion may hamper tax 
reforms. 
 
5. Tax policy and administration 
 
The quality of tax policy and tax-related bodies (and the administration in general) are 
likely to condition tax reforms.  
 
6. Economic factors 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 See for example, Castanheira et al. (2012) 
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The economic characteristics and context of a country may constrain or fuel tax 
reforms. 
 
7. External actors 
 
The participation of external organisations (regional and/or international) and/or donors 
may influence tax reforms. 
 
In addition to these major areas, the literature review also allows us to identify relevant 
issues and factors for each of them. These issues can be classified according to its 
contextual or structural nature. In other words, some of the factors behind the success or 
failure of tax reforms belong to the political, institutional, social or economic structure 
of the country under analysis, while others refer to the particular context in which the 
reform took place. The relevant issues (contextual and structural) identified in the 
literature for each of the hypotheses above are shown in the following section.    
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3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CASE STUDIES: A 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
 
2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE CASE-STUDY REPORTS 
 
This study is aimed at investigating the feasibility and effectiveness of tax reforms in 
developing countries by identifying their main drivers and constraints in nine particular 
tax reforms. Based on the literature on tax reforms above, studies on each particular 
reform, political and institutional analyses, statistical data and indicators, and work in 
the field, all case studies have been analysed following the same structure:  
 
1. Country outlook 
 
The reports first provide a brief description of the economic and political situation of 
the country, paying particular attention to the characteristics of the tax system.  
 
2. Description of the reform  
 
The second section of the reports describes the reform. It is divided into three 
subsections: 1) major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform; 2) the causes of the 
reform; and 3) the main changes introduced by the reform.  
 
3. Evaluation of the reform 
 
This evaluation is carried out by comparing actual results with 1) official results; and 2) 
standards of tax reforms. 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform  
 
This section is the main part of the report and it is devoted to analyze the factors that 
conditioned the reform, its design and implementation, and how they shaped it. It is 
divided into seven major areas:  
 
1 Political factors 
 
The reports show a) If and how the main structural characteristics of the political regime 
conditioned the reform and the process of decision-taking; and b) if and how the 
political context conditioned the reform  
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2. Institutional framework  
 
The reports provide a) a brief evaluation of the institutional quality of the country in 
different fields; and b) an analysis of how the institutional framework conditioned the 
reform.  
  
3. Social support and state legitimisation 
 
The level of social support to the reform, the interests and opinions of different social 
groups, and if and how social goals were included in the reform are examined in this 
sub-section. 
 
4 Informality, avoidance, and evasion 
 
The reports analyze if and how the level of the shadow economy, avoidance, and 
evasion conditioned the design and implementation of the reform; and how the tools 
existing in the country to prevent evasion and avoidance facilitated or hampered the 
reform. 
 
5. Tax policy and administration 
 
How tax policy and the institutionalisation of tax-related bodies conditioned the reform, 
with a particular attention to the Tax Administration, are examined in this sub-section  
 
6. Economic factors 
 
The reports indicate if and how the economic characteristics of the country and the 
economic context in which the reform took place conditioned it 
 
7. External actors 
 
Finally, the reports investigate if and how the participation of external actors influenced 
the design and the implementation of the reform and helped to reduce tensions and/or 
reach agreements between the different actors involved 
 
 
 
A common template (see next table) has been used to develop the case studies and field 
missions, although specificities were taken into account.  
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Case Study Template 
IDENTIFICATION OF DRIVERS AND CONSTRAINTS TO SUCCESS/FAILURE OF THE TAX REFORMS 
Area Questions to be raised Indicators 
 Structural Contextual  
1. Political factors 
 
If and how the main structural 
characteristics of the political 
regime conditioned the reform 
and the process of decision-
taking; and if and how the 
political context conditioned the 
reform  
 
 
 
1. What is the structure of 
governance of the country: 
authoritarian vs. democratic 
regime; single vs. multi-level 
country; presidential vs. 
parliamentary regime; majority vs. 
fractioned assembly? 
 
2. How balanced is power between 
the executive, the legislative, and 
the judiciary? 
 
3. How high is political stability in 
the country?  
 
4. How high is the quality of 
democracy? 
 
5. How responsive and 
accountable are the elites? 
 
 
1. Was the reform designed by a 
Government belonging to a 
single political party with a 
substantial majority in the 
parliament or by a coalition? 
 
2. Which was the political 
orientation of the parties in 
power? And the moment of 
electoral cycle in which the 
reform took place? 
 
3. Are the elites over-
represented in the decision-
making processes? 
 
4. Were the economic and 
political elites able to constrain 
or even block the reform? 
 
5. Did the reform occur in a 
period of significant political 
change? 
 
 
 
1. Polity IV dataset of the 
Center for Systemic Peace 
 
2. BTI reports 
 
3. International Country 
Risk Guide Indexes: 
Government Stability, 
Democratic 
Accountability 
 
4. Governance Indicators 
(World Bank): Voice and 
Accountability 
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6. How political parties are 
financed? 
 
7. Does the reforming party 
differ from previous ruling 
parties? 
2. Institutional framework  
 
If and how institutional quality 
conditioned the success of the tax 
reforms: transparency, 
accountability, political stability, 
dialogue, corruption, etc. 
 
 
 
1. How high is corruption?  
 
2. How high is regulatory quality?  
 
3. How good is the use of public 
resources? 
 
4. Is there a strong interaction 
between the tax authorities, local 
academics, and the media? 
 
4. How high is the education level 
of the country? 
 
 
1. How did the authorities and 
the media explain and cover the 
reform? Was there a bias in the 
media? 
 
2. Has the reform process been 
institutionalised? How? 
(bilateral vs. multilateral 
negotiations; number and 
organisation of forums; legal 
restrictions; information 
availability.) 
 
3. Has the decision-making 
process been open and 
transparent? 
 
4. Did the reform occur in a 
context of major changes in the 
political and/or economic 
system? 
 
 
 
1. International Country 
Risk Guide Indexes:, Law 
and Order,  Bureaucracy 
Quality 
 
2. Governance Indicators 
(World Bank): Voice and 
Accountability, Political 
Stability & Absence of 
Violence, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law 
 
3. Corruption Perception 
Index  
 
4. Educational Attainment 
of the Total Population 
Aged 25 and Over (Barro 
& Lee index) 
 
5. Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment 
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5. Did independent commissions 
participate in the reform 
process? 
indicators: Transparency, 
Accountability, and 
Corruption in the Public 
Sector 
3. Social support:  
 
If the reform was socially 
supported, if it occurred in a 
context of broad state 
legitimisation, if it included some 
elements to increase state 
legitimisation and reduce 
inequalities. 
 
 
1. Are there social, religious or 
ethnic tensions? 
 
2. What is the education level of 
the country? 
 
1. Broadly speaking, have tax 
reforms traditionally been very 
controversial in the country? Are 
they usually perceived as unfair?  
 
2. Have previous reforms been a 
success or a failure? 
 
3. How high are inequalities in the 
country? 
 
4. How the relationship between 
the government and the private 
sector (trade unions, corporations, 
etc.) regarding tax issues is 
institutionalised? Did civil society 
organisations participate in the 
reform?  
 
1. Was the reform perceived as 
threatening even by those who, 
in fact, stand to benefit, owing 
largely to limited trust in 
government?  
 
2. Was there a link between the 
reform and the goals of 
spending? 
 
3. Did the reform include some 
elements to reduce inequalities?  
 
4. Did citizens participate in the 
decision-making process? 
 
5. Was the public involved in 
public debates around the tax 
reform? 
 
6. Did the reform include some 
kind of earmarking? Did it imply 
compensations for the potential 
losers? 
 
1. Gini index and 
progressivity and 
redistribution indexes (if 
available) 
 
2. International Country 
Risk Guide Indexes: 
Ethnic and Religious 
Tensions  
 
3. Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment 
indicators (World Bank): 
Policies for Social 
Inclusion/Equity 
 
4. Actionable Governance 
Indicators (World Bank): 
Media credibility as 
sources of information, 
Public Access to 
Information 
 
5. Social spending as a 
percentage of total 
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spending (World Bank) 
4. Tax avoidance and tax 
evasion 
 
If and how the level of shadow 
economy, tax avoidance and/or 
domestic tax evasion conditioned 
the reform 
 
 
 
 
1. How high is shadow economy 
in the country in comparison to 
other countries in the region and to 
other countries with a similar 
development level? 
 
2. How low is tax morale among 
taxpayers in comparison to other 
countries in the region and to other 
countries with a similar 
development level? 
 
3. Is there a concerted and long-
term plan to prevent evasion 
 
4. Is there a high level of third 
party reporting in the tax system? 
 
5. Is there a systemic failure of the 
courts to convict tax evaders? 
 
6. Does the tax administration 
have effective tools to combat 
transfer mispricing (transfer 
pricing rules and regulations, 
reference guidelines, advanced 
  
 
 
1. Shadow economy 
estimates (Schneider and 
others) 
 
2. Tax evasion estimates 
(if available) 
 
3. USAID Fiscal Reform 
and Economic 
Governance Project: 
Collecting Taxes: VAT 
gross compliance.  
 
4. Tax morale indicators 
(if available) 
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pricing agreements, formal tax 
treaty agreements, strong regional 
and international cooperation, 
sound information sharing, etc.)?  
5. Tax Policy and Tax 
Administration 
 
If and how the consistency of tax 
policy in the past and the quality 
of the tax administration, tax-
related bodies, and the 
administration in general 
conditioned the reform 
 
 
 
1. Broadly speaking, have tax 
reforms in the past been 
consistent?  
 
2. How high is tax fatigue among 
taxpayers due an excessive 
number of tax reforms? 
  
3. Are tax laws simple and clear? 
 
4. Is the overall tax incentive and 
exemption system characterised 
by proliferation, abuse, lack of 
coordination, and lack of 
quantification?   
 
5. Is the tax administration an 
Autonomous or Semi-
Autonomous Revenue Authority?  
 
6. How high is cooperation among 
revenue administration bodies 
(Tax and Customs)? And between 
 
 
 
1. Has the tax administration 
been reformed prior to the 
implementation of the tax 
reform? If no, was it necessary 
for the success of the tax 
reform? 
 
 
 
1. Doing Business 
indicators (World Bank): 
Tax payments (number), 
Time to prepare and pay 
taxes (hours) 
 
2. Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment 
indicators (World Bank): 
Quality of Revenue 
Mobilisation, Quality of 
Public Administration 
 
3. USAID Fiscal Reform 
and Economic 
Governance Project: 
Collecting Taxes: Tax 
administration costs as % 
of tax administration total 
revenues, The number of 
tax administration 
personnel for every 1,000 
people living in the 
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the tax authorities and various 
stakeholders (Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Interior and the 
Ministry of Commerce)? And 
between the revenue 
administration and the Ministry of 
Finance? 
 
7. How tax policy is analysed? Is 
there a dedicated unit within the 
Ministry of Finance, working 
closely with the revenue 
administration, Customs and other 
agencies? 
 
8. What is the revenue 
administration management 
structure? I.e. are all main taxes 
administered by a unified 
management structure within a 
single department or agency? 
 
9. Is the organisational structure of 
the revenue administration based 
on the “taxpayer segment” model? 
 
10. Are the enforcement 
procedures effective? 
 
11. Are taxpayers’ rights 
country, Number of active 
taxpayers per tax 
administration employee. 
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protected? Is the taxpayer service 
adequate? 
 
12. Is the efficient human 
resources management in the tax 
administration efficient? Are 
measures to minimize corruption 
in the tax administration effective? 
 
13. Does the tax administration 
have adequate internal controls for 
prevention or detection of 
corruption (e.g. Internal Audit and 
Anti-Corruption Measures, such as 
Integrity Trainings, Ethical Code, 
etc.)? 
 
6. Economic conditions 
 
If and how the economic 
conditions (structure and context) 
conditioned the reform, 
 
 
 
1. What is the development level 
of the country? 
 
2. How is the composition of 
output in the country?  
 
3. How the tax system can be 
ranged in comparison to other 
countries in the region and to other 
countries with a similar 
development level? 
 
 
1. Was the reform designed and 
implemented within a package 
of broader macroeconomic 
reforms?  
 
2. Did the reform take place in a 
context of macroeconomic 
instability and/or fiscal crisis? 
 
3. Major social and/or economic 
 
 
1. GDP per capita, PPP 
 
2. Tax effort 
 
2. Agriculture, value 
added (% of GDP) 
 
3. Urban population (% of 
total)   
 
4. Macroeconomic 
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4. Has geography conditioned the 
tax system?  
policy changes Stability Index (World 
Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report) 
 
5. Openness rate 
 
6. Geographic conditions: 
landlocked, island, size, 
density, latitude 
7. External actors  
 
If and how the participation of 
external organisations (regional 
or/and international) and/or 
donors influenced the reform 
 
 
1. How dependant on international 
aid is the country? Has foreign aid 
been a substitute for domestic 
taxation? Has aid be devoted to 
strengthen the tax system in the 
past? 
 
 
 
 
1. Has the reform been 
supported by international 
organisations or foreign 
countries? How? 
 
2. Was the reform due to an 
external incentive (such as an 
integration agreement or access 
to the WTO), external pressures, 
conditionality, etc.? 
 
 
1. Aid as a percentage of 
GDP 
 
2. Aid variability 
 
3. Aid composition 
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2.2 THE IDENTIFICATION OF CASE STUDIES.  
 
The case studies have been selected according to the following criteria: 
 
1) Geographic distribution. The Terms of Reference indicated a particular geographic 
distribution of the case studies: three in Latin America and Asia (at least one in one of 
these continents and two in the other); two in Southern Neighbourhood; two in Eastern 
Neighbourhood; and two in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although this geographic distribution 
has been respected to the maximum extent possible, some impediments arisen during 
the research have forced us to replace one Eastern Neighbourhood country by a 
Caribbean country, and one Southern Neighbourhood country by a sub-Saharan African 
country.  
 
2) Comparable reforms. In order ensure comparability between cases, we have 
restricted the candidates sample mainly to those countries where a PIT or a VAT reform 
has taken place. 
 
3) Non natural-resource rich countries. Since natural resource-rich countries show 
significant particularities regarding taxation, we have excluded very resource-rich 
countries, also to ensure comparability. 
 
4) Country size and population. The analysis of taxation and tax reforms in very big 
countries in terms of size and population is usually more problematic and more 
resource-consuming for the analysis. Given the time constraints of this research, we 
have also excluded this type of countries. 
 
5) Development level. For reasons of comparability, our candidates sample mainly 
includes low and lower-middle income countries. However, we have also considered 
some upper- middle income countries that can be interesting candidates and where 
income level does not seem to be a crucial factor in the success or failure of the 
pertinent tax reform.      
 
6)  The analysis of the tax-effort and tax-revenue determinants literature1 and the use of 
some institutional indexes and tax/GDP ratios.  
 
7) Consultation with tax experts in the different regions. 
 
 
The final selection has comprised: 
 
• Two South American countries (Uruguay and Paraguay ; Personal Income Tax) 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 In particular, the following studies have been analysed: Pessino and Fenochietto (2010), Botlhole 
(2012), Gambaro et al (2007), Le et al  (2008), Bird et al. (2004), Brun et al. (2007), Remmer (2004), Le 
et al  (2012), Bird et al. (2008), Gupta (2007), Bornhorst et al. (2008), Drummond et al. (2012), Benedek 
et al (2012), Morrissey et al (2007), Alonso and Garcimartín (2011), Clist and Morrisey (2011),  and 
Ouattara (2006) 
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• One Asian country (The Philippines; Value-Added Tax) 
 
• Three sub-Saharan African countries (Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya; Value-
Added Tax);  
 
• One Southern Neighbourhood country (Morocco; Value-Added Tax) 
 
• One Eastern neighbourhood country (Armenia; Value-Added Tax). 
 
• One Caribbean country (The Dominican Republic; Personal Income Tax and 
Value-Added Tax);  
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4. CASE STUDIES 
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN PARAGUAY 
THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN PARAGUAY. SUMMARY 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• To reform the tax 
system  
 
• To introduce a 
personal income tax 
Mostly 
negative 
• Given the constraints faced by the reform, its original 
design was too ambitious 
 
• Political instability 
 
• Unbalanced distribution of powers 
 
• High fragmentation inside political parties 
 
• Strong political influence of the private sector.  
 
• Lack of regulation of private financing to political 
parties 
 
• Non-transparent negotiation process, only open to the 
business community and the elites. 
 
• Low government effectiveness 
 
• High degree of poverty and high proportion of the 
rural population, which facilitates the power of the 
elites 
 
• A very negative perception of how public revenue is 
managed. 
 
• A significant economic boom that relaxed the need of 
a raising-revenue tax reform.   
 
 
 
 
1. Economic Outlook 
 
Paraguay is classified by the World Bank as a lower middle-income country. In 2011, 
income per head reached US$ 3,629, while the Latin American average was US$ 6,836. 
In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, those figures amount to US$ 5,500 in Paraguay 
and US$ 9,667 in Latin America (LA). Only five countries in the region are poorer than 
Paraguay: Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Compared to the rest of 
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Mercosur countries, income per head in Paraguay is about two thirds lower1. In addition, 
income per head in constant and PPP terms has grown since 2000 by 2.3% per year 
(LA: 2.9%; rest of Mercosur: 3.1%). However, Paraguay is currently the fastest-
growing country in the Americas (GDP is forecasted to grow by 13% in 2013).  
 
Paraguay is not only one of the poorest countries in LA, but it is also one of the most 
unequal societies in the region. According to latest data available, the Gini index 
reaches 52.4, while the Latin American average is 49.3. Nevertheless, it must be noted 
that, following a general trend in the region, income distribution has improved in recent 
years. The Poverty Headcount Ratio at national poverty line (% of population) is 33.6% 
on average for the period 2008/11, below the Latin American average (37.2%), but well 
above the rest of Mercosur (24.8%). Since 2000 it has decreased by ten points.  
 
The Paraguayan economy is highly oriented to the primary sector. The share of this 
sector in total output reached 22.1% in 2008/11, twice the average of Latin American 
and of Mercosur. Two other characteristics of the Paraguayan economy are also worth 
highlighting. First, hydroelectric production is very high. All of Paraguay's electric 
production in 2009 came from hydroelectric sources. Paraguay shares with Brazil and 
Argentina two major hydroelectric power stations: Itaipú and Yacyretá, respectively. 
Second, Paraguay is a highly open country. The openness rate is 106% (73% in LA) and 
re-exporting to Brazil has traditionally been a buoyant activity (smuggling included).  
 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic Outlook 
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
GDP per head. 2011.  (PPP US $) 5,500 9,667 11,926 
Gini Index  52.4 49.3 49.2 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
(2008/11) 
22.1 10.0 11.8 
Openness rate (2008/11) 106.6 73.3 58.1 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
With respect to the main features of the Paraguayan tax system, it must be first 
remarked that total tax revenue is low: 16.6% of GDP in 2006/10, while the Latin 
American and Mercosur averages are 20.2% and 27.7%, respectively. Only four 
countries in the region are below Paraguay: El Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican 
Republic, and Mexico. According to some studies, Paraguay is identified as a low tax 
effort country: given the socioeconomic characteristics of the country, the tax revenue 
potential has not been fully exploited (Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010; Le et al., 2008 
and 2012, von Haldenwang and Ivanyna, 2010; Alonso and Garcimartín, 2011).  
 
In addition, although total tax revenue has increased during the last decade, the pace has 
been slower than in other countries in the region. Thus, comparing the first with the 
second half of the 2000’s, total tax revenue has augmented by 1.9 percentage points of 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 Throughout this report, only the four original Mercosur countries will be considered. 
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GDP in Paraguay, 2.3 in LA, and 3.5 in Mercosur. During the same period, GDP grew 
by 3.2% per year in Paraguay, 3.8% in LA and 3.1% in Mercosur. 
 
On the other hand, natural resource revenue is significant in Paraguay, notably thanks to 
the two hydroelectric plants mentioned above. It represents 2.8% of GDP in 2006/10 
(2.8% in LA and 0% in the rest of Mercosur countries), showing an upward trend over 
the last years. In addition, electricity selling prices have been recently renegotiated with 
Brazil, which implies higher revenues in the future.  
 
The tax structure in Paraguay is also specific. The most important taxes in terms of 
revenue are the VAT (37.0% of total tax revenue in 2006/10), social contributions 
(22.7%), and the corporate income tax (13.9%). On the contrary, property taxes only 
represent 1.4% of total tax revenue, while the personal income tax has not been 
introduced until 2012. Indirect taxes are much more relevant in Paraguay than in other 
countries of the region: they amount to 58.9% of total tax revenue, while they account 
for 49.8% in LA and 49.5% in Mercosur. 
 
 
Table 2. Tax Revenue Statistics (2006/10 average) 
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
Total Tax Revenue (% GDP) 16.6 20.2 27.7 
Total Tax Revenue Growth (first vs. 
second half of the 2000’s) 
(percentage points of GDP) 
1.9 2.3 3.5 
Tax Structure (% of total revenue)    
Indirect Taxes  58.9 49.8 49.5 
VAT  37.0 34.5 35.6 
Excise Taxes 12.5 9.5 7.3 
Direct Taxes 15.3 26.7 19.0 
CIT 14.0 17.7 11.0 
PIT 0.0 6.8 4.8 
Social Contributions 22.7 17.8 21.5 
Source: IDB-CIAT 
 
In sum, the Paraguayan tax system has been traditionally characterised by low tax 
revenues, a high share of indirect taxes, and the absence of a PIT.  
 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform 
 
As stated above, tax revenue in Paraguay is clearly lower than required to deal with the 
development needs of the country and lower than in other countries of the region. As 
from the 1970s, the Stroessner Government has indeed used low income taxes and tax 
exemptions to attract foreign capital and foreign investment. In addition, there is room 
for increasing tax revenues since Paraguay’s fiscal effort is low, as stressed in the tax 
effort literature (Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010; Le et al., 2008 and 2012; Alonso and 
Garcimartín, 2011; Gupta, 2007; Haldenwang and Ivanyna, 2010). On the other hand, 
the tax structure is highly biased towards indirect taxation, about ten percentage points 
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of GDP above the Latin American average, and this bias has been growing over time. 
Conversely, direct taxation is under-represented in the tax structure, and although this 
occurs in all direct tax categories, it is in the PIT where this is most obvious, since 
personal income has not been taxed in Paraguay until 2012.   
 
In fact, it was clear well before its introduction that a PIT was needed in order to 
develop a modern tax system. Although a PIT law was passed in 1971, it was suspended 
that same year, and it is only by the early 2000’s that the idea of introducing a PIT in 
Paraguay was really taking shape. Finally, in 2003 an agreement between the 
Government, the Parliament, and the business community was reached, and the PIT 
Law was passed, but its implementation was again postponed that same year. It is only 
in 2012 that the PIT could be finally introduced.   
 
Leaving aside the absence of a PIT, the tax system in Paraguay has traditionally shown 
several important shortcomings: an excessively privileged farming sector, high fraud 
and evasion, a weak administration, some very clear deficiencies in the tax legislation, 
etc. In fact, the reform that led to the introduction of the PIT included some other major 
changes in the tax system.    
 
2.2. The causes of the reform 
 
Which factors made it eventually possible to reach an agreement on the introduction of 
a PIT more than 40 years after the first attempt? It is obvious that a PIT was necessary, 
but apart from the need to take this step, the following factors were crucial:  
 
1) After a period of high political instability2, the 2003 Presidential elections brought to 
power N. Duarte, a member of the Partido Colorado (Colorado Party). The 
implementation of a tax reform, which included the introduction of a PIT, was in the 
electoral programme and was strongly supported by the Ministry of Finance (D. Borda), 
who led the negotiations.  
 
2) Paraguay experienced a big economic crisis in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
Although the economy started to recover after 2003, in that year the recently elected 
Government had to face a strong fiscal imbalance and a debt crisis, which made more 
visible and urgent the need to implement a tax reform.  
 
3)  As a consequence of the fiscal crisis, Paraguay and the IMF signed in 2003 a Stand- 
by agreement. By signing this agreement, the Government committed to introduce a PIT 
in Paraguay. This was just a recommendation by the IMF, not a mandatory requirement. 
But it was important because it implied commitment by the Government and support 
from the IMF to the reform. 
 
2.3 Main changes introduced by the reform 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Mass  protests in Asunción, with seven people killed by riot police, following the dismissal and exile of 
Raúl Cubas Grau after the murder of vice-president Luis María Argaña, for which Cubas himself was 
implicated. 
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The reform that took place in Paraguay in 2003 was not limited to the introduction of a 
PIT, nor even only to the tax system. It was a much broader reform of the public sector. 
Five areas were contemplated in the reform: the tax system, debt restructuring, the 
customs law, the banking sector, and the pension system. To implement this reform 
package, several agreements between the Government, political parties, the Parliament, 
and the private sector were signed. Two of these agreements were relevant for the tax 
system reform: the Acuerdo para fomentar la formalidad, la competitividad, la equidad 
y la responsabilidad fiscal (Agreement to Promote Formality, Competitiveness, Equity 
and Fiscal Responsibility), signed with the private sector, and the Agenda 
Interinstitucional (Inter-Institutional Agenda), signed with the Parliament. 
 
The aim of both agreements was to introduce some major changes in the tax system in 
order to raise revenue, develop a more efficient system, increase the number of 
taxpayers, and reduce informality. In fact, the design of the tax system was completely 
renovated by developing a system that showed some of the characteristics of a flat tax 
scheme. The CIT rate would be decreased from 30% to 10% (in two phases), the 
different VAT rates would be uniformed at 10%, and a 10% rate PIT would be 
introduced. In addition, the Imagro (a CIT-type tax applied to the farming sector) would 
be reformed by eliminating VAT exemptions and taxing income as in the other sectors.     
 
The reform was expected to be implemented in 2006. Yet, some of the original goals 
and measures were soon abandoned and the PIT was not introduced until 2012, with a 
radical change in its original design. Actually, the PIT that was finally introduced in 
Paraguay is a tax on savings rather than a true PIT. Its main features are: 
 
a) Income ten times inferior to the minimum wage is exempt. This amount will be 
reduced to three times the minimum wage in seven years (at a pace of one minimum 
wage per year). 
  
b) The rates are: gross income ten times above the minimum wage: 10%; gross income 
below: 8%.  
 
c) Half of the dividends, some interest income, and capital gains are taxed, and except 
otherwise proved, all capital gains are assumed to be sourced in taxable income. 
 
d) All personal and family expenses can be deducted from gross income. 
 
e) Taxpayers must submit an annual tax return; there is no withholding system. 
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1 Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by 
national authorities 
 
As stated above, the PIT finally introduced in 2012 has major differences with respect 
to its original design. Since all personal and family expenses are deductible, it is a tax 
on savings, rather than a tax on income. In fact, it has been presented as a tool to fight 
evasion and informality, not to collect revenue and redistribute income. The number of 
taxpayers in 2012 (the PIT law came into force in August) was only 20,000, and an 
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extra 40,000 are expected to be recorded in 2013, when the tax will be operative the 
whole year. That represents only 0.6% of the total population of Paraguay, an extremely 
low figure, even for Latin American standards. Regarding revenue, about €2 million 
were collected in 2012. The expected annual revenue in the future amounts to €40, 
which only represents 0.2% of GDP (about 1.3% in LA and 2.0% in Mercosur). 
 
Therefore, the original design has been distorted to such an extent that the impact of the 
PIT finally introduced is extremely low, and, as mentioned, this tax has been presented 
as a mere tool to fight evasion and informality. This goal is supposed to be achieved by 
two different means. On the one hand, since capital gains are included in the PIT, the 
origin of personal income will be more transparent. On the other, expenses are 
deductible in the PIT only as long as the pertinent receipts are submitted, thus reducing 
fraud in the VAT. Yet, there are important obstacles to achieve this goal. First, after 
negotiations with the private sector, the obligation to present a property declaration was 
eliminated. Second, the tax administration does not have the capacity to verify the 
submission of receipts. Third, personal expense deduction creates an incentive for 
receipt trading between those citizens who are subject to the tax and those who are not. 
Third, the incentive to buy in formal markets does not exist for those taxpayers subject 
to the 8% PIT rate, since the VAT rate is 10%. In this sense, it must be noted that the 
8% rate was not in the original PIT design. 
 
However, if the current PIT is deeply reformed in the future, its introduction in 2012 
will be an important step towards a real PIT in Paraguay. 
 
3.2 Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
The current design of the PIT in Paraguay is far from the international and regional 
standards: 
 
a) As mentioned, this tax is rather a tax on savings than a real personal income tax. In 
addition, while income is consolidated on a territorial basis, expenses are integrated on a 
universal basis.   
 
b) The tax rate schedule is excessively generous. The 10% top rate is applied to incomes 
13 times above the income per head of the country (about € 36,700). The 8% rate will 
be applied in the future (once the transition period has ended) to incomes 4 times above 
the income per head of the country (about € 11,010). The Latin American averages for 
the lowest and highest rates are 1.4 and 9 times the income per head, respectively3. And, 
broadly speaking, Latin American countries are very generous in this regard. 
 
c) Pensions are exempt from the PIT, but social contributions are deductible.  
 
d) The tax is paid on an annual basis; there are neither withholdings nor tax 
prepayments, and therefore no monthly revenues are collected. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 See Barreix et al. (2013). 
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Nevertheless, as a positive element it must be mentioned that some types of capital 
income are taxed (some interest income, capital gains, 50% of dividends).  
 
3.3 Changes in the tax system 
 
As mentioned, the reform initiated in 2003 was not limited to the introduction of a PIT; 
it was a tax reform package that also incorporated major changes in the CIT, VAT, and 
the taxation on the farming sector. The main goals of the reform package were to 
modernise the tax system, to increase the taxation on the farming sector, and to reduce 
informality. 
 
To meet these goals, the CIT rate was lowered from 30% to 20% in 2005 and to 10% in 
2006. The rationale of this remarkable CIT rate reduction was to incentivise companies 
operating in the informal sector to formalise their activities. The reform showed positive 
results in this respect. While the number of taxpayers had increased by 6% per year 
between 2000 and 2004, it grew by 11.1% between 2005 and 2010, and the CIT 
revenue, which represented 1.8% of GDP in the first period, amounted to 2.4% in the 
second half of the 2000’s. However, part of this positive trend can be credited to other 
factors, mainly the economic expansion. On the contrary, taxation on the farming sector 
was kept extremely low. The Imagro revenue (a CIT-type tax on this sector) decreased 
from 0.5% to 0.25% of GDP within the decade , and despite the modifications made to 
the VAT, most of the exemptions granted to this sector remained.  
 
 
Table 3. The 2003 tax reform. Other results 
 2000/2004 
average 
2005/2010 
average 
Number of taxpayers (annual growth) 6.0 11.1 
CIT revenue (% of GDP) 1.8 2.4 
Imagro revenue (% of GDP) 0.5 0.25 
Source: Ministry of Finance and CIAT-IDB Tax database 
 
 
In parallel to the reform of some taxes, the tax administration experienced some 
improvements, especially with regard to human resources management and technical 
capabilities. Yet, the reform of the tax administration was not deep enough to assure its 
sustainability over time. As indicated below, the long-standing problems of nepotism, 
favouritism, and patronage remain major obstacles.   
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform  
 
4.1 Political factors 
 
a) Main structural characteristics of the political regime 
 
Paraguay’s democratic transition began in 1989, after 35 years of dictatorship under 
General Alfredo Stroessner. The fragility of the country’s emerging democratic 
institutions resulted in nearly 15 years of instability, elite power struggles, popular 
uprisings, military mutinies, antigovernment demonstrations, and continued rule by the 
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Colorado Party. Initially, neither the political opposition nor civil society played any 
role in the transition process. Thus, the transition to democracy was characterised by 
extensive continuity among the elites in politics and the bureaucracy (public 
administration, military and judiciary).  
 
According to the 1992 Constitution, Paraguay is a presidential regime whereby the 
President is both head of state and head of government but is very dependent on the 
National Congress. Members of Congress are popularly elected from Paraguay's 17 
departments (states) for 5-year terms that coincide with the President's and vice-
President's 5-year term, which cannot be renewed. Paraguay has enshrined the 
separation of powers and mutual checks and balances in its constitution. This is 
particularly the case when the president does not have a majority in the National 
Congress. The Chambers have the power to suppress presidential vetoes with a simple 
majority, and they can approve a complete modification of the national budget without 
taking into account revenue estimates and constraints. In addition, the legislative power 
has strong discretional powers in administrative issues to control the Government. In 
comparison with the constitutional attributes of other Latin American presidents, the 
Paraguayan president is not a strong president.  
 
The political power in Paraguay has traditionally been in the hands of the Colorado 
Party. This is a conservative party, linked to the interests of big farmers, which during 
its long stay in power (even in the years of dictatorship) developed a network of 
interests and a patronage system. The second most important political party is the 
Liberal Party, originally a more urban party linked to the interests of the commercial 
sector. The third political force is the Union Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos (National 
Union of Ethic Citizens), a new political party created in 2000 by a faction of the 
Partido Colorado (PC). Finally, there is a myriad of minor parties. In fact, the Alianza 
Patriótica (Patriot Alliance) which won the elections in Paraguay in 2008 was 
composed of a broad coalition of left-wing parties and the Liberal Party, as well as 
social organisations. Because of internal problems from the very beginning, the 
coalition finally broke down after President Lugo's impeachment.  
 
On the other hand, there is a high fragmentation inside political parties. Different 
factions have different interests, and even individuals can be highly independent from 
the party guidelines. The voting loyalty to political group is relatively low and Senators 
and Congressmen votes are highly influenced by private interests (personal or captured 
by lobbies). 
 
One of the reasons of the strong political influence of the private sector is the lack of 
regulation of private financing to political parties. Private donations are neither limited 
nor controlled, and in practice it is easy to influence votes, both at a party and at a 
personal level.      
 
To sum up, democracy in Paraguay faces serious problems of representation and capture 
by the elites (BTI, 2012). In fact, Paraguay is the Latin American country where popular 
support for democracy shows the lowest values. On average, only 39.5% of citizens 
believe that democracy is the best political system (58.8% in LA and 57.7% in 
Mercosur). Their country’s democratic quality is scored 4.9 in a 0-10 scale by 
Paraguayans, while the Latin American and Mercosur averages reach 6.0 and 6.3, 
respectively.    
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Table 4. Democracy (2007/10 average) 
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
Percentage of citizens who believe 
that democracy is the best political 
system 
39.5 58.8 57.7 
Perception of the democratic quality 
of the country (0-10)  
4.9 6.0 6.3 
Source: ECLAC 
 
 
b) How the political context conditioned the reform  
 
As stated above, among other reasons, the launch of the tax reform process was possible 
in 2003 because of the newly elected Government and the strong support of the Minister 
of Finance. N. Duarte (Colorado Party) won the presidential elections with 37% of the 
vote, followed by J. C. Franco (24%), belonging to the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party), 
and P. Fadul (21%), of the Movimiento Patria Querida (a conservative and personalist 
political party). The discussions and negotiations on the PIT started at the very 
beginning of Duarte's mandate. However, the Colorado Party did not have the majority 
in any Chamber: (37 out of 80 seats in the Congress and 16 out of 45 in the Senate) and 
was therefore not in a position to force the reform.  
 
In 2008, new elections took place in Paraguay, representing an important step and, for 
the first time, a real democratic transition. Indeed, after 60 years of hegemony, the 
Colorado Party lost the presidential elections for the first time, and Fernando Lugo, a 
former bishop and candidate of a broad coalition of ten parties, won the presidency with 
41% of the vote. The leader of the Liberal Party, L. Franco, was nominated Vice 
President. Yet, the coalition had no majority in the National Congress, where the 
Colorado Party was still the strongest force, while the President’s political party was 
residual. Moreover, the strongest party of his coalition, the Liberal Party, was internally 
divided and supported only part of Lugo's reform agenda. As a result, during his entire 
mandate, Lugo was forced to seek compromise and participate in traditional give-and-
take politics.  
 
After having been postponed twice (in 2006 and in 2007), the new Government had 
fixed a new date for the introduction of the PIT in 2009. But once again, it was 
postponed; and again in 2010. After every attempt to introduce the PIT, its original 
design was modified in order to overcome the opposition of the business community. 
The property declaration requirement was eliminated, some of the anti-fraud and 
evasion measures were removed, and extremely generous deductions were introduced. 
Yet, as happened to the former Government, the new one was unable to pass the PIT 
law. But this time, and after the original design had been so extremely changed, it was 
not due to the opposition of the private sector, but to political reasons.    
 
The Colorado Party, which had initially supported the introduction of the PIT when it 
was in power, now opposed it. The main reason stated for this opposition did not refer 
to the PIT itself, but to the inefficiency of public spending by the new Government. It 
was the same argument used by the private sector. But other reasons could be found 
behind the opposition of the Colorado Party. After so many changes in its original 
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design, the strong opposition from the business community had largely decreased. 
Therefore, since the reform could then be presented as a necessary step for the 
modernisation of the country, which would bring social justice, the Colorado Party 
wanted to reap the political benefits of introducing the PIT. In this sense, it must be 
remarked that the Liberal Party (now in power) opposed the PIT when the former 
Government (Colorado Party) tried to introduce it.  
 
In May 2012, following the so-called Curuguaty events4 during which 11 peasants and 6 
policemen were killed, the Home Secretary resigned and President Lugo was impeached 
in just one day by the Congress on June 21st (with only four votes against). President 
Lugo was officially accused of inefficiency, while many observers believed that this 
was actually the perfect excuse to remove Lugo from power. The Liberal Party itself 
stopped supporting Lugo, and the former Vice President, J. C. Franco then became 
President until the following elections, which were celebrated in April 2013. Most of 
the Latin American countries accused the new Government of breaking down the 
democratic order, and Paraguay was suspended from Mercosur.  
 
The new Government decided to advance the introduction to the PIT, from 2013 to 
2012. Two main reasons made it possible to take this measure after so many years of 
blocking. First, the two main political parties were finally in favour. Second, the 
Government and its supporters wanted to use the PIT as a tool to increase popularity, 
inside and outside the country. 
 
In sum, political factors partially explain why the reform was postponed to 2012. The 
Colorado Party, which supported the introduction of the PIT when in Government, 
opposed it when in opposition. The same sequence occurred with respect to the Liberal 
Party.   
 
However, there is a tradition of vote fragmentation within the parties, capturing of 
group and personal votes by the elites, and also of votes responding to personal rather 
than parties’ interests (BTI, 2012). Some of the deputies opposed the introduction of the 
PIT simply because it negatively affected their personal economic activities.   
 
While the reform did not have a high political cost from a social point of view, it had 
with respect to the elites. The reform was not unpopular, quite the opposite. By the end 
of Lugo’s mandate, the Colorado Party opposed the reform because they wanted to be 
credited for the introduction of the PIT, since they expected to win the next elections. 
And the reform was finally advanced from 2013 to 2012 as a measure to increase 
popularity and legitimacy after Lugo’s impeachment. Yet, the reform was politically 
costly with respect to the confrontation with the elites, whose influence on political 
parties and individual politicians is very strong. The business community was the main 
group opposed to the reform. They did not publicly express their opposition to the 
reform, partially because they knew that the introduction of the PIT was reasonable and 
necessary, but they did everything they could to paralyse it. The postponement of the 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 A group of peasants occupied a parcel of land property of a former senator of the Colorado Party to 
protest against land scarcity. Three weeks later the eviction order was given by the Government and as a 
consequence 11 peasants and 6 policemen were killed, with dozens of people seriously injured. 
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introduction of the PIT and the watering down of the respective law demonstrates the 
power and influence of the economic sectors that are against the widening of the formal 
economy (BTI, 2012).  
 
Finally, it must be noted the relations between the Parliament and the Ministry of 
Finance (who designed and negotiated the PIT with the private sector) deteriorated over 
time. Since the Parliament is very powerful in the political system of Paraguay, it was 
extremely difficult for the Government to introduce the PIT without the support of the 
Chambers, and this deterioration of their relations with the Ministry of Finance also 
contributed to postpone the reform. 
 
4.2 Institutional framework  
  
Paraguay’s institutional quality is lower than both the Latin American and the lower-
middle income countries average. The World Bank Governance Indicators (GI) average 
reaches -0.73 in Paraguay in 2006/10 (in a -2.5/+2-5 scale), while the LA and the lower-
middle income countries averages are -0.2 and -0.51, respectively. The International 
Country Risk Guide Index (sum of all components) amounts to 55.8 in Paraguay (0-100 
scale) and to 63.4 and 59.1, respectively, in the other two groups.  
 
Although institutional quality is low in Paraguay in all the aspects measured by these 
indicators, there are three areas where the scores are particularly low. First, with respect 
to the quality of democracy, the indicator Voice and Accountability of the GI amounts to 
-0.2 in Paraguay and to 0.1 in LA, while the component Democratic Accountability of 
the ICRG is a half of the Latin American average (2 and 4, respectively, in a 0-6 scale). 
The second area is the efficiency of the State. The indicator Government Effectiveness 
(GI) is -1.0 in Paraguay and -0.2 in LA, while the component Bureaucracy Quality 
(ICRG) reaches 1.0 in Paraguay and 1.96 in LA (0-4 scale). Finally, corruption is 
particularly high in Paraguay. The indicator Control of Corruption (GI) is -1,4 in 
Paraguay and -0.2 in LA, the component Corruption (ICRG) reaches 1.1 in Paraguay 
and 2.2 in LA (0-6 scale), and the Corruption Perception Index values are 2.0 in 
Paraguay and 3.4 in LA (0-10 scale). 
 
 
Table 5. Institutional quality. 2006/2010 average 
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
World Bank Governance Indicators (average) (-2.5 to +2.5 
scale) 
-0.73 -0.2 
International Country Risk Guide index (sum of all 
components) (0 to 100 scale) 
55.8 63.4 
Quality of democracy   
Voice and Accountability  (GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) -0.2 0.1 
Democratic Accountability (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale) 2 4 
State Efficiency   
Government Effectiveness (GI) (-2.5 to +2-5 scale) -1.0 -0.2 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) (0 to 4 scale)  1.0 2.0 
Corruption   
Control of Corruption (GI) (-2.5 to 2-5 scale) -1.4 -0.2 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale)  1.1  2.2 
Corruption Perception Index (0-10 scale). 2.0 3.4 
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Source: The World Bank (Governance Indicators), The Political Risk Service Group (ICRG), and 
Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index) 
 
 
While no major ethnic or religious tensions exist in Paraguay (in spite of discrimination 
against indigenous people), the high level of inequality and unequal distribution of 
income have created social tensions in the country. Paraguay is one of the most unequal 
countries in Latin America, which actually makes it one of the most unequal countries 
in the world as well. The Gini index reaches 52.4 in Paraguay and 49.3 in LA. Besides, 
poverty is more concentrated in the rural areas than in other countries of Latin America, 
not only because the poverty rate is higher in rural areas (the urban, rural, and overall 
Poverty headcount ratios at national poverty line are 34.3%, 48.2% and 35.6%, 
respectively), but also because Paraguay is a more rural country than the Latin 
American average.   
 
 
Table 6. Paraguay. Poverty and income distribution 
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
Gini index  52.4 49.3 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of 
population) (2006/11) 
35.6 37.8 
Poverty headcount ratio at rural poverty line (% of rural 
population) (2006/11) 
48.2 51.1 
Poverty headcount ratio at urban poverty line (% of urban 
population) (2006/11) 
34.3 35.9 
Urban population (% of total population)  60.5 71.9 
Source: The World Bank  
 
 
All these aspects that characterise the low level of institutional quality observed in 
Paraguay conditioned the process of the reform and the design of the PIT:  
 
a) Low institutional quality in the political field.  
 
As mentioned, the negotiation process was not transparent, only open to the business 
community and the elites. Even when the results of this process were made public and 
the pertinent agreements signed, the forces opposed to the reform were powerful enough 
to press the Parliament to postpone the introduction of the PIT and to modify its original 
design. This strong influence of the lobbies is facilitated by the organisation and 
functioning of political parties (financing, factions within the parties, etc.).  
 
The main argument used by the private sector to reject the new tax was against the 
property declaration that was mandatory according to the draft Law, a (in order to 
control for capital gains).Given the state of violence and crime in the country, that 
measure created a high risk for their lives and properties. More precisely, kidnapping 
was the main risk mentioned by the opponents to the reform.  
 
Nevertheless, this seemed to be more of an excuse rather than reflecting a real danger. 
While it is true that kidnappings had occurred in those years, Paraguay is not a 
particularly dangerous country. The intentional homicide rate in the period 2000/05 (the 
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years before the PIT should have been introduced) was 23.1 per 100,000 population, 
very similar to the Latin American average, being higher in countries that did actually 
have a PIT. The kidnapping rate in 2003/05 amounted to 0.02 per 100,000 population, 
almost 40 times lower that the Latin American average. Moreover, a property 
declaration was already mandatory in the Imagro (the CIT-type tax for the farming 
sector), and this had not led to an increase of kidnappings.  
 
 
Table 7. Violence and crime 
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
Intentional homicide rate (per 
100,000 population). 2000/05 av. 
23.1 23.2 14,9 
Kidnapping rate (per 100,000 
population). 2003/05 av. 
0.02 0.66 - 
Source: UN Office on drugs and crime 
 
 
The strong opposition of the private sector to the PIT actually stemmed from two 
different reasons. On the one hand, the simple resistance to pay a new tax. On the other 
hand, personal income taxation is a centrepiece of any tax system, and since it would 
close tax loopholes, evasion and fraud would be much more difficult. 
 
b) Corruption 
 
The high level of corruption in Paraguay makes it easier to oppose any reform that 
increases taxes. It also enables the direct influence on the votes in the Parliament. 
 
c) Government Effectiveness 
 
Government effectiveness has traditionally been very low in Paraguay due to several 
factors. First, although there is a career-based system in the public service, there are also 
many public employees directly appointed by the government, top officials, etc. As a 
result, a duplication of positions and a de-professionalisation of the administration 
occur. Second, political parties have traditionally used jobs in the public sector as a 
reward to their affiliates, creating a strong system of patronage (BTI, 2012a). A 
transparent, clear, and enforced legal framework for the civil service does not exist in 
Paraguay. As a consequence, the system of human resources management faces several 
problems: lack of independence of public servants, inefficiencies, lack of monitoring 
and evaluations, etc. Moreover, the management of public sector reforms is hampered 
by a politicised public administration5, which also lacks professionalism.  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 For many years under the Stroessner regime, party membership was a prerequisite for a career in 
government administration or the military.  
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Regarding the tax system, broadly speaking, people perceive it as unfair, extremely 
generous with some sectors (farming), scarcely transparent (no tax expenditures public 
estimates exist), and subject to corruption and arbitrariness.   
 
This low degree of government effectiveness was an obstacle to the reform, since:  
 
a) The argument used by the opponents to the reform during the Lugo Government (no 
more taxes for a Government that wastes public resources) was easier to defend.   
 
b) The implementation of the reform is more complicated, given the shortcomings of 
the Public Administration. In addition, these shortcomings limit the possibilities of the 
PIT design. 
 
d) Social tensions 
 
Trade union activism was low in Paraguay until the very late 1980s, when unions began 
to acquire more political influence, particularly through the Unitary Workers Central 
(CUT), the Paraguayan Workers Confederation (CPT) and the National Workers 
Central (CNT), which now constitute strong political interest groups in Paraguay. The 
new Constitution of 1992 embraced workers' rights, protecting the right to strike and the 
freedom of association. Freedom of association and assembly is guaranteed by the 
constitution. Social dialogue was strengthened under the Government of President 
Lugo.  
 
All citizens enjoy civil rights protections in theory, yet in practice indigenous groups’ 
rights are often neglected by the government (BTI, 2012). This is partly as indigenous 
groups are small (at 108,000 individuals or less than 2% of the population) and partly 
because they are poorly organised. In particular, property interests of the indigenous 
peoples are not adequately protected and many have been displaced from ancestral 
lands. Some 20% of the respondents in the 2008 Latinobarómetro survey identified 
indigenous people as a group most discriminated against in Paraguay.  
 
Levels of extreme poverty are very high, especially in rural areas. At the same time, 
farms smaller than 20 hectares (‘mini-farms’), occupy only 4.3 per cent of farmed land 
even though they represent 84% of the total number of farms in Paraguay. This shows 
the strong inequalities that characterise the country. As a matter of fact, disparities in 
income and land ownership are among the highest in the world and the origin of strong 
tensions.  
 
The high degree of poverty and high proportion of the rural population in Paraguay 
facilitate the power of the elites, exercised even through vote controlling. Moreover, the 
power of the elites fuels the low degree of popular support to democracy that exists in 
Paraguay. In fact, Paraguay shows one of the lowest participation rates in elections in 
LA. In the 2000’s that rate reached 48.7% in Paraguay and 62.6% in LA (64.8% in the 
countries where either voting is not mandatory or it is so, but no penalties are applied). 
Besides, the participation rate has decreased over time.   
 
Table 8. Participation rate in elections 
 1990’s 2000’s 
Paraguay 52.4 48.7 
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Latin America (average) 62.7 62.6 
Latin America (countries where either voting is not 
mandatory or it is so, but no penalties are applied ) 
(average) 
66.5 64.8 
Source: ECLAC 
 
 
Surprisingly, tax morale is high in Paraguay. According to the Latinobarometro, in a 1 
to 10 scale (1= people consider that tax evasion is never justified; 10= they considered it 
completely justified) tax morale in Paraguay reached a value of 2 in 2011, the third 
lowest value (highest tax morale) in LA (the regional average is 2.4).  
 
Regarding the role of the media, although they played a minor role, they created some 
confusion explaining the reform, while criticising the PIT on the grounds of the low 
quality of public spending.  
 
4.3 Social support 
 
The reform did have neither a strong social opposition nor a strong social support. 
Leaving aside the business community, society in general did not have any role in the 
reform, and the public opinion was never very interested in it. This is explained by the 
following reasons: 
 
a) Despite the needs of the country, the low level of tax revenue and public spending 
has disincentivised social demand to increase them. In other words, people are 
accustomed to a low level of public services. 
 
b) The participants in the negotiation process of the reform were basically the Ministries 
of Finance and Industry, the Parliament, and the business community. It was a 
negotiation between the Government and the economic and political elites, without the 
participation of social groups such as trade unions, peasant organisations or the 
academia. One of the reasons for this is the weak network of autonomous organisations in 
civil society, and more generally, a lack of civic culture (BTI, 2012a). Compared to political 
parties, the system of social interest groups is indeed quite weak in Paraguay, as it is 
(politically) fragmented and dominated by only a few positions. Although there is a 
large number of small-scale organisations at the community level (such as 
neighbourhood organisations usually limited to immediate measures6), they are poorly 
interconnected and few ties exist between them and nation-wide associations, thus 
limiting their ability to articulate common interests. Moreover, the question remains to 
whether citizens participate in independent or clientelistic organisations. 
 
c) There is very negative perception in Paraguay of how public revenue is managed. 
First, because, given the low level of revenue, it is difficult to implement ambitious 
public policies (health, education, etc.); second, because the share of social spending in 
total spending is low. It reached 44.1% (51.1% in LA and 64.1% in Mercosur) on 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 Cf. NIMBY syndrome 
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average during the 2000’s. In 2002/04, the years prior to the reform, it was even lower, 
i.e. 39.1%. As a percentage of GDP, social spending reached 8.9% in the 2000’s (8.2% 
up to 2004), while it was 12.9% in LA and 19.0% in Mercosur. Third, the lion’s share 
of public spending corresponds to current expenses (80%). To a large extent, this is due 
to the fact that the compensation of employees amounts to a half of total expenditures 
(less than one third both in LA and Mercosur). Fourth, because no appropriate control, 
monitoring, and planning systems regarding public spending exist in Paraguay. 
 
In 2011, only 21% of population in Paraguay had confidence in the quality of public 
spending (26% in LA and 29% in Mercosur) and only 16% believed that tax revenue 
will be correctly used (21% in LA). This helps to understand why the opponents to the 
reform turned to the argument that no more taxes should be given to governments that 
make a bad use of public revenues. In other words, they did not claim that taxes were 
too high, but that public revenues were managed so badly that the introduction of a new 
tax should be rejected.  
 
 
Table 9. Quality of public spending 
 Paraguay Latin 
America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
Social spending (% of total spending) (2000/2010) 44.1 51.1 64.1 
Social spending (% of GDP) (2000/2010) 8.9 12.9 19.0 
Comp. of employees (% of total expense) 
2000/2010) 
51.4 28.7 25.8 
Percentage of population having confidence in  the 
quality of public spending (2011) 
21 26 29 
Percentage of population believing that tax revenue 
will be correctly used (2005) 
16 21  
Source: Social spending: ECLAC; Compensation of employees: The World Bank; Confidence: 
Latinobarometro 
 
 
d) The reform did not imply strong commitments regarding expenditure. An attempt 
was made in the first round of discussions to link it to an increase in health expenditure, 
but it was rejected. Finally, in order to overcome the opposition of the business 
community, the Government accepted that all PIT revenue will be devoted to capital 
expenditures. In this sense, it must be noted that another argument employed by the 
business community to oppose the reform was the excessive amount of current expenses 
and the bad state of infrastructures; which is true. For example, according to the World 
Bank, road density (km of road per 100 sq. km of land area) is 7.6 in Paraguay (21.2 in 
LA and 23.5 in Mercosur). 
 
e) The redistributive capacity of the public sector is very low in Paraguay, due to low 
public revenues and the design of the tax and public spending systems. The difference 
between gross (pre-tax, pre-transfer) and net (post-tax, post-transfer) Gini indexes 
reaches 1.4 in Paraguay, 2.0 in Mercosur and 2.3 in LA. 
 
 
Table 10. Redistribution 
 Paraguay Latin Mercosur 
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America 
(average) 
(average) 
Difference between gross (pre-tax, pre-transfer) and 
net (post-tax, post-transfer) Gini indexes 
1.4 2.3 2.0 
Source: Solt (2010). 
 
 
f) In addition, poverty reduction policies face a serious problem of coordination in 
Paraguay. 
 
4.4 Avoidance, evasion, and informality 
 
Avoidance, evasion, and informality conditioned the reform in the following aspects: 
 
a) The opposition of the business community to the original PIT design was partially 
due to the obligation to sign a declaration of property. 
 
b) The PIT that has been finally introduced is supposedly aimed at reducing informality 
by the use of extremely generous deductions, and not to raise revenue. In other words, 
the reform is supposedly oriented to sacrifice the PIT for the goals of reducing the 
informal economy and increasing VAT revenue. Yet, the data available show that 
informal economy in Paraguay is not particularly high when compared either to other 
Latin American countries or to other lower-middle income countries: 38% of GDP vs. 
37% in the rest of lower-middle income countries and 40% in LA7.  
 
 
Table 11. Informal economy  
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
Lower-middle 
income 
countries 
(average) 
Informal economy (% of GDP). 38.0 40.0 37.5 
Source: Schneider (2012) 
 
 
On the other hand, the VAT in Paraguay seems quite efficient, compared to other Latin 
American countries. VAT productivity (VAT receipts as % of GDP divided by the 
standard VAT rate) in Paraguay reaches 0.59, while it amounts to 0.45 in Latin America 
and Mercosur. The VAT gross compliance ratio (ratio of actual VAT to a potential VAT 
collection, related to private consumption) is 75.5, one of the highest rate in LA (the 
regional average is 65.3). It is true that these results obey only marginally to the 
relevance of VAT fraud, and that other factors, such as the number of exemptions, 
reduced rates, the weight of consumption in GDP, and the efficiency of the tax 
administration also matter, but they seem to indicate that the VAT in Paraguay works 
acceptably well.  
                                                 
 
 
 
7 However, much caution must be taken with regard to the informal economy estimates, given the 
shortcomings of the methodologies employed and the inconsistencies of the results. 
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Table 12. VAT efficiency 
 Paraguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
VAT productivity (2008/11) 0.59 0.45 0.45 
VAT gross compliance ratio (2008/11) 75.5 65.3 65.6 
Source: USAID, Collecting Taxes 
 
 
 4.5 Tax policy and administration 
 
The reform was not particularly conditioned neither by other areas of tax policy nor by 
the quality of the tax administration. Although some important factors in these areas 
conditioned the PIT design (insufficiencies in the cadastre, bearer shares, bank secrecy, 
etc.), these elements are present in many other developing countries that nevertheless 
introduced a PIT decades ago.  
 
Regarding the institutionalisation of tax-related bodies, the reform was mainly designed 
and negotiated by the Ministry of Finance (the only other government body with some 
participation was the Ministry of Industry). This implied not only that no inter-
departmental tensions emerged, but also that the rest of Ministries did not make any 
relevant contribution to the reform.  In this sense, it must be remarked that since the first 
delay in the introduction of the PIT, the relations between the Ministry of Finance and 
the Parliament worsened.  
 
Regarding the tax administration, it is not an autonomous revenue agency, but a 
secretariat of state within the Ministry of Finance. It is organised along functional lines 
and has a Large Taxpayers Unit. To a certain extent, the tax administration was 
modernised during the reform process, mainly improving some technical aspects. As far 
as human resources management is concerned, the tax administration in Paraguay (as 
the rest of the Administration) has traditionally shown problems of corruption, 
arbitrariness, lack of professionalization of the staff, inefficiencies in the professional 
career system, patronage, etc. Some improvements were made, especially a greater 
professionalization of the staff, but there is still much to be done (according to USAID 
Collecting Taxes data, the tax administration costs as % of tax administration total 
revenues amount to 1.4% in Paraguay and to 1.2 in LA).  
    
There are two other factors in this field that did condition the reform. First, the low 
quality of customs, with serious problems of corruption, inefficiencies, patronage, and 
high costs for the private sector; the second factor is the low quality of the legal system. 
A condition demanded by the private sector to accept the introduction of the PIT was 
the obligation regarding tax issues to exhaust all administrative remedies before 
appealing to criminal courts. The legal system is largely captured by the private sector, 
which facilitates evasion and fraud. 
 
4.6 Economic factors 
 
Paraguay’s economy is highly based on agriculture, which conditions the design and 
effectiveness of personal income taxation, since the large share of the primary sector 
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together with a high concentration of land property, implies low salaries, informal 
economy, a lower share of urban population, etc. In other words, the larger the share of 
this sector in the economy, the lower the number of taxpayers and the tax base tend to 
be. Nevertheless, the design of the PIT introduced in Paraguay is not the unavoidable 
consequence of a rural economy. Some Central American countries with similar 
characteristics have implemented much more ambitious reforms.  
 
On the other hand, the economic context in which the reform took place did influence 
the reform. The country experienced a deep crisis between the late 1990’s and the early 
2000’s. GDP fell by 1.8% per year between 1999 and 2002, the external balance 
recorded a deficit of 1.8% of GDP, interest payments on external debt reached 2.2% of 
GDP, and public deficit amounted to 2.2% of GDP. In sum, although Paraguay had 
traditionally been a stable country in macroeconomic terms, the new Government had to 
deal with a deep economic crisis and strong fiscal imbalances. The possibility of default 
in the near future could not be excluded.  
 
 
Table 13. The economic crisis in the years prior to the reform 
 2000/2002 
average 
2003/2011 
average 
GDP growth -1.8 5.3 
External balance on goods and services (% of GDP)) -7.4 -4.8 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 49.3 36.6 
Interest payments on external debt (% of GNI) 2.2 1.4 
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) -2.7 0.9 
Source: The World Bank 
 
Due to the fiscal crisis faced by the Government in the early 2000’s, the reform was 
originally designed to collect revenue. Nevertheless, the financial needs of the 
Government vanished in the following years as the economy and tax revenue started to 
grow. Between 2004 and 2012 the GDP grew by 5.4% per year (4.8% in LA and 5.0% 
in Mercosur), while tax revenue increased by 2 percentage points of GDP in comparison 
with the period 2000/03. In fact, public deficit turned into surplus since 2004. This 
significant economic boom relaxed the need of a raising-revenue tax reform.   
 
4.7 External actors 
 
As stated above, Paraguay’s Government made a commitment to the IMF in 2003 to 
introduce a PIT in the country. But this was just a recommendation by the IMF, and not 
a mandatory requirement in the stand-by agreement signed between both parties. 
However, it had certain relevance because it implied a commitment of the Government 
and the IMF support to the reform.  
 
However, as part of its confrontation with the government, the National Congress has 
blocked loans from international financial organisations (including loans earmarked for 
the modernisation and strengthening of the tax administration). 
 
Regarding foreign cooperation and aid, it must be remarked that Paraguay is not a 
highly aid dependent country. It currently receives about 0.7% of GNI and this 
percentage is decreasing over time. Regarding the reform, some donors and 
international organisations (the EU and the IDB, among others) provided technical 
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assistance and helped the Government to develop campaigns to convince social actors 
of the need of a personal income tax in the country.  
 
Finally, let us remark that there was an external factor that to some extent helped the 
introduction of the PIT in Paraguay: the perception of the exceptionality of the country, 
especially in the Latin American context, regarding the absence of a personal income 
tax. This perception facilitated the social acceptance of the PIT.   
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THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN URUGUAY 
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN URUGUAY. SUMMARY 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• To reform the tax 
system  
 
• To introduce a 
personal income tax 
Mostly 
positive 
• Pragmatism regarding the feasibility of the reform 
 
• Political stability  
 
• Political parties are less captured by the elites than in 
other Latin American countries and their power is 
weaker 
 
• The reform was implemented by a new a left-wing 
coalition of parties that broke the traditional two-
party system of Uruguay. The ruling coalition had 
majority in the two Chambers 
 
• The reform process started in the beginning of the 
presidential term 
 
• Strong support from the President 
 
• High institutional quality 
 
• A Commission of Experts elaborated the tax reform 
proposal. It was composed of experts from the 
administration and independent tax experts who 
represented different political tendencies and social 
sensitivities  
 
• The negotiation process was very transparent and 
open.   
 
• The “fiscal responsibility dynamic approach” 
followed by the Government in the negotiations 
inside the ruling coalition 
 
• The Government developed an intense information 
campaign about the reform 
 
• Deep reform in the tax administration 
 
• Citizens have a high degree of confidence in the 
quality of public spending 
 
• Favourable economic context when the reform was 
implemented 
 
• Technical and financial support from external actors 
 
 
1. Economic Outlook 
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Uruguay is one of the most developed countries in Latin America. In 2011, income per 
head reached US$ 13,866, while the Latin American (LA) average is US$ 6,836. In 
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, those figures amount to US$ 15,078 and US$ 
9,667, respectively. Only three countries in the region show higher values than 
Uruguay: Argentina, Mexico, and Panama. In addition, income per head in constant and 
PPP terms has grown since 2000 more rapidly than the LA and Mercosur average: 3.5% 
per year (LA: 2.9%; Mercosur: 2.9%).  
 
Although income distribution is unequal compared to developed countries’ standards, 
Uruguay is one of most equal societies in Latin America. According to the latest data 
available by the World Bank, the Gini index reaches 45.3 (49.3 in Latin American and 
49.2 in Mercosur), and, following a general trend in the region, income distribution has 
improved in recent years. The Poverty Headcount Ratio at national poverty line (% of 
population) is 18.9% on average for the period 2008/11, well below the Latin American 
and Mercosur averages (37.2% and 27.1%, respectively). It has decreased by more than 
ten points in the last ten years.  
 
The Uruguayan economy is to some extent oriented to the primary sector. Although the 
share of this sector in total output is very similar to the LA average (10.0% in 2008/11), 
the share of food exports in total merchandise exports is higher: 61.9% versus 37.1%. 
Two other characteristics of the Uruguayan economy are also worth highlighting. First, 
Uruguay is the smallest economy of Mercosur and some trade tensions have emerged 
with some of her partners (especially with Argentina). Second, the financial service 
industry has traditionally been important in Uruguay. The reason is that bank secrecy 
and no taxation on interests existed in Uruguay until recently (the country was 
considered a tax haven).  
 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic Outlook 
 Uruguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
GDP per head. 2011.  (PPP US $) 15,078 9,667 11,926 
Gini Index  45.3 49.3 49.2 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
(2008/11) 
10.9 10.0 11.8 
Food exports (% of merchandise exports) 
(2008/11) 
61.9 37.1 57.6 
Openness rate (2008/11) 58.9 73.3 58.1 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
Regarding the tax system, Uruguay is a high tax revenue country. Total tax revenue 
reached 28.0% of GDP in 2006/10, while the Latin American and Mercosur averages 
are 20.2% and 27.7%, respectively. Only Argentina and Brazil show higher figures in 
Latin America. In fact, some studies have identified Uruguay as a high tax effort 
country: given the socioeconomic characteristics of the country, the tax revenue 
potential has been fully exploited (Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010; Le et al., 2008 and 
2012; Alonso and Garcimartín, 2011). On the other hand, natural resource revenue is 
not significant in Uruguay.  
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The most important taxes in terms of revenue are the VAT (32.3% of total tax revenue 
in 2006/10), social contributions (25.0%), and the corporate income tax (9.0%). Indirect 
taxes amount to 44.3% (49.8% in LA and 49.5% in Mercosur). Finally, it must be noted 
that, as seen below, personal income tax revenue in Uruguay is currently above the LA 
average: 7.1% and 6.8% of total tax revenues, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2. Tax Revenue Statistics (2006/10 average) 
 Uruguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
Total Tax Revenue (% GDP) 28.0 20.2 27.7 
Total Tax Revenue Growth (first vs. 
second half of the 2000’s) 
(percentage points of GDP) 
3.0 2.3 3.5 
Tax Structure (% of total revenue)    
Indirect Taxes  44.3 49.8 49.5 
VAT  32.3 34.5 35.6 
Excise Taxes 7.6 9.5 7.3 
Direct Taxes 21.1 26.7 19.0 
CIT 9.0 17.7 11.0 
PIT 7.1 6.8 4.8 
Social Contributions 25.0 17.8 21.5 
Source: IDB-CIAT 
 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform 
 
Prior to the 2006/07 tax reform, the Uruguayan tax system was characterised by; 1) 
numerous low-yield taxes; 2) high total revenues; 3) a bias towards indirect taxation; 
and 4) the absence of a real personal income tax (PIT); although some types of personal 
income were taxed, such as salaries. Before the tax reform was implemented, it had 
been a common practice in Uruguay for many years to incorporate new tax categories 
into the tax system in order to sustain revenue under adverse economic conditions 
and/or increases in public spending. Many of these taxes generated low revenues and 
were costly and difficult to administer, leading to distortions, inefficiencies, and 
substantial tax exemptions.  
 
Despite all this, total revenue was high. It amounted to 25.0% of GDP in the first half of 
the 2000’s, well above the Latin American average (17.9%). But most of this revenue 
was collected through indirect taxes (48.8%) and social contributions (24.6%), while the 
different taxes on personal income jointly collected 5.5% of total revenue and the 
corporate income tax yielded 7.6%.  
 
The VAT was by far the most important tax in revenue terms, and in practice was 
complemented with another indirect tax: the COFIS (a type of wholesaler’s VAT). The 
VAT rate was the highest in Latin America (23%) and it actually increased to 26% 
when the joint effect of VAT and COFIS (3%) was considered. On the other hand, the 
corporate income tax rate was relatively high (30%) but the tax was plagued with tax 
benefits and distortions. Some activities were clearly privileged.  
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Regarding personal income taxation, Uruguay had actually already introduced a 
personal income tax until it was suppressed in 1974. Although there was not a real PIT 
prior to the 2006/07 reform, some types of income were taxed while others were not. 
Thus, salaries and pensions were taxed, but personal capital income was tax exempt. 
Sole proprietor companies were subject to the corporate income tax, but independent 
professionals paid fixed and low taxes. The absence of a real personal income tax was 
relevant in several aspects. First, total revenue collected by personal income taxation 
was low; second, it reduced the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the overall 
tax system; and third, many families in Uruguay lacked personal taxation culture.  
 
In sum, the pre-reform tax system in Uruguay showed an excessive number of taxes, 
many distortions, and it was clearly unfair.   
 
2.2 The causes of the reform 
 
All the inefficiencies, distortions, and inequalities accumulated by the tax system over 
time made it clear to many observers and political and social actors that a deep reform 
was needed. In addition to the clear need to reform the tax system, other factors fuelled 
the reform and conditioned its objectives and design. 
 
a) Uruguay experienced a major economic crisis in the early 2000’s. GDP and gross 
capital formation decreased by 1.5% and 7.1% per year, respectively, until 2004, when 
the recovery started; the external balance recorded a deficit of 1.6% of GDP; external 
debt stocks increased from 37.3% of GDP in 2000 to 90.0% in 2004, while interest 
payments on external debt raised from 2.4% of GNI to 4.2%; and public deficit 
amounted to 3.6% of GDP in 2000/04.  
 
Table 3. The economic crisis in the years prior to the reform 
 2000/2004 
average 
2005/2007 
average 
GDP growth -1.5 6.0 
Gross capital formation (annual % growth) -7.1 13.1 
External balance on goods and services (% of GDP) -0.5 0.7 
External debt stocks (% of GNI) 68.4 57.4 
Interest payments on external debt (% of GNI) 3.2 3.5 
Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) -3.6 -1.3 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
b) In 2004, a left-wing coalition won the elections, breaking the traditional alternation 
of the two leading parties in Uruguay. The tax reform and the introduction of a real 
personal income tax was an old demand of the coalition; it was actually included in the 
electoral programme of the new Government.   
 
In sum, the 2006/2007 tax reform was fuelled by: 1) the long-standing and clear need to 
reform the tax system; 2) the severe economic crisis of the early 2000’s; and 3) the new 
elected Government and its strong commitment to implement a tax reform and to 
introduce a personal income tax.  
 
2.3 Main changes introduced by the reform 
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Although total tax revenue decreased as a consequence of the economic crisis, Uruguay 
still was a high-tax country. This implied that the reform could not be addressed to 
significantly increase total revenues, but to correct the deficiencies, distortions, and 
inequalities accumulated over time in the tax system. Bearing this in mind, the 
objectives of the government were fourfold: a) to design a revenue-neutral tax reform; 
b) to simplify the tax system; c) to introduce a personal income tax; and 4) to increase 
the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the tax system.  
 
Pursuing these goals, the main changes introduced by the reform were the following: 
 
a) Fifteen taxes were eliminated 
 
b) A personal income tax was introduced. It was designed following a dual scheme, 
where labour income is taxed at progressive rates and capital income at flat rates. 
 
c) Taxation on corporate income was rationalised by replacing four taxes by a single 
corporate income tax (CIT). In addition, the CIT rate was reduced from 30% to 25%. 
 
d) The standard VAT rate was reduced from 23% to 22% and the reduced rate from 
14% to 10%. In addition, the VAT base was enlarged by incorporating some formerly 
exempt products and services.  
 
e) The employers’ social security contribution rates were unified into a single 7% rate. 
Exemptions in agriculture, industry, and transportation were eliminated. 
 
f) The property tax rate was reduced to 0.1%. 
 
Regarding the personal income tax, bank secrecy was a major constraint that the 
designers of the reform had to face.. Since the Government decided at that time (2006) 
to maintain bank secrecy in Uruguay, a comprehensive personal income tax was not 
possible. This constraint was overcome by introducing a dual income tax, where capital 
income is taxed through final withholdings at flat rates. Labour income rates were 
progressive (from 0% to 25%), while capital income was taxed at 3% (interests on 
more-than-one-year deposits in national currency and more-than-three-year bonds and 
other securities), 5% (interests on less-than-one-year deposits), 7% (dividends) or 12% 
(other types of capital income). 
 
Although all these changes in the tax system entered into force in July 2007, some other 
major changes occurred in the following years: bank secrecy was removed, households 
were allowed to file a single PIT return, etc. 
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1 Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by 
national authorities 
 
The designers of the tax reform faced two major constraints. First, tax effort in Uruguay 
was already high, but disposable total government revenues (post interest payments and 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
75 
 
social security expenses) had been decreasing over time (27% between 1994 and 2003; 
Barreix and Roca, 2006), mainly as a consequence of a strong increase in interest 
payments. Thus, the tax burden was considered too high by conservative groups but 
insufficient to finance social policies and public investment by left-wing groups. To 
some extent, both were right. As stated by Barreix and Roca (2006), while the tax 
burden was close to that of developed economies, public services were closer to that of 
developing nations. There was a general perception in the country that there was a gap 
between the amount of taxes paid and the public services received in exchange. As a 
consequence, the reform was forced to be neutral in terms of revenue.  
 
The second constraint was bank secrecy. The Government had decided to maintain it, at 
least in the short term. To remove it could have resulted in a blockage of the reform.  
 
These two constraints led to a reform designed to be neutral in terms of revenue and to 
the introduction of a dual-type personal income tax. The main characteristics of this PIT 
scheme are: 1) labour income is taxed at progressive rates; 2) capital income is taxed at 
a flat rate; and 3) the capital income rate equals the lowest rate on labour income and 
the CIT rate. Although this PIT design could seem unfair from an equity point of view, 
since capital income pays less taxes than labour, it had some very attractive features. 
First, it is often assessed that horizontal equity requires lower rates for capital income. 
Second, it reduces the administrative costs of the tax and facilitates control, since capital 
income can be taxed through final withholdings. Third, it incentivises savings and 
reduces evasion. Finally, in the case of developing countries it is a common practice 
that many types of capital income are tax exempt, so a dual PIT actually raises taxation 
on capital.     
 
Dual taxation has also shortcomings. First, to split business income into capital (subject 
to lower rates) and labour income open the doors to tax arbitrage. Second, although in 
some cases and especially in developing countries, a dual PIT can increase 
progressivity, the social perception can be the opposite, since it is very visible that 
capital income is taxed at lower rates.  
 
In the case of Uruguay, a dual-type personal income tax had two clear advantages over 
the pre-reform situation. First, as stated above, it made the maintaining of bank secrecy 
possible. Second, capital income could be taxed at positive rates. The reform actually 
showed very positive aspects:    
 
1. Regarding the overall tax system, it was simplified to a large extent. Many small, 
costly, and inefficient taxes were eliminated.  
 
2. Neutrality was achieved. The estimated impact of the reform was -0.6% of GDP but 
total tax revenue actually grew by 0.6% of GDP between 2007 and 2008.  
 
3. The PIT was successfully introduced, replacing the mere taxation on labour income 
by a real personal income tax. Personal taxation revenue increased from 0.9% of GDP 
in 2006 to 1.5% in 2007, and 2.4% in 2008 (when the new tax was fully operative). PIT 
revenue in Uruguay is currently one the highest in Latin America. 
 
4. The reform not only succeeded in maintaining the overall level of tax revenue and 
increasing significantly personal taxation revenues, but it also augmented the 
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progressivity and redistributive capacity of the tax system. The share of direct taxes in 
total revenue grew from 19.7% in 2000/07 to 22.6% in 2008/10, while that of personal 
income taxation increased by 3.6%. The overall effect of the changes implemented in 
taxation on consumption and personal income showed that only the wealthiest 20% of 
households had less disposable income after the reform, while the opposite was true for 
the other 80%. In fact, while the pre-reform tax system was regressive and showed a 
negative distributive capacity with regard to the joint effect of taxation on personal 
income and consumption, the opposite was true after the reform. Both, the Kakwani 
index (difference between the Gini index for incomes and the concentration index for 
tax payments) and the Reynolds-Smolenski index (difference between pre and post-tax 
Gini indexes) became positive.     
  
 
Table 4. Distributive effects of the reform. Changes in taxation on consumption and 
personal income 
Decile (households) Disposable income 
variation (%) 
Tax burden (% of income) 
Pre-reform Post-reform 
1 (poorest) 3.6 13.5 10.1 
2 2.9 13.8 10.3 
3 3.0 13.8 10.3 
4 2.8 13.7 10.3 
5 2.7 13.3 10.3 
6 2.2 13.1 10.5 
7 1.8 13.7 11.7 
8 1.3 13.8 12.5 
9 -0.1 13.9 14.3 
10 -4.4 12.8 17.8 
Kakwani index  -0,0088 0,0993 
Reynolds-Smolenski index  -0,0012 0,0167 
Source: González, G. and Vallarino, H. (2006). 
 
 
Regarding the single impact of the personal income tax, progressivity and redistributive 
capacity also improved. The effective tax rates of the richest taxpayers increased 
(compared to the former tax on salaries), while that of the poorest decreased. Eighty per 
cent of the total PIT revenue was credited to the wealthiest 20% of taxpayers. As a 
consequence, progressivity increased significantly (the Kakwani index raised by 0.19 
points). The redistributive capacity also improved, as shown by a 0.02 increase of the 
Reynolds-Smolenski index.     
 
 
Table 5. Distributive effects of the reform. Introduction of the PIT 
Decile (households) Effective rate (% of income) 
Personal Income Tax  Former Tax on Salaries 
1 (poorest) 0.29 0.35 
2 0.52 0.95 
3 0.32 1.27 
4 0.52 1.38 
5 0.85 1.65 
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6 1.18 1.80 
7 1.71 1.95 
8 2.64 2.41 
9 4.28 2.68 
10 9.07 2.85 
Kakwani index 0.3887 0.1973 
Reynolds-Smolenski index 0.0222 0.0047 
Source: González and Vallarino (2006) and Barreix and Roca (2007). 
 
 
5. The PIT introduced in Uruguay had some other positive characteristics. First, it had a 
simple and efficient design. Deductions were limited to social security contributions, 
health insurance contributions, and child allowances. Second, since capital income was 
taxed, Uruguay could keep bank secrecy while avoiding being considered a tax haven. 
Third, the introduction of the PIT contributed to broaden the country’s tax culture. The 
total number of PIT taxpayers in Uruguay currently amounts to 14.0% of total 
population, while the Latin American average is 3.9%.     
 
 
Table 6. Number of PIT Taxpayers (% of total population) 
Uruguay 14,0 
Brazil 10,0 
Chile 9,0 
Costa Rica 4,1 
Argentina 3,8 
Guatemala 3,3 
Ecuador 2,9 
Peru 2,9 
Dominican Republic 2,0 
Bolivia 0,7 
Nicaragua 0,7 
Source: IDB (2013) 
 
 
 
3.2 Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
Although the introduction of the PIT was a clear step ahead in the Uruguayan tax 
system, it had some peculiarities regarding international standards and some 
imperfections that were partially corrected in the following years.   
 
1. PIT rate schedules are usually very generous in Latin America: exempt income is too 
high and top rates are only applied to very high incomes. When PIT was introduced in 
Uruguay, exempt income was very similar to the upper middle-income countries’ 
average (0.6-0.8 times the income per head of the country), remarkably lower than the 
Latin American average (1.4 times). Yet, the top rate (25%) was applied to incomes 12 
times above the income per head of the country, clearly above both the Latin American 
and the upper middle-income countries’ averages (about 9 and 6 times, respectively).  
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2. When the PIT was introduced in Uruguay only individuals were allowed to file tax 
returns. This characteristic was severely criticised in the country. Since 2008, families 
are also allowed to file tax returns.  
 
3. The dual-type PIT introduced in Uruguay showed some differences with respect to 
pure dual taxes. First, in pure dual taxes the capital income rate equals the minimum 
rate applied to labour income and the CIT rate. Yet, in Uruguay there are four capital 
income rates, not only one. Second, they are close to the lowest rate applied to labour 
but far from the CIT rate (25%). In fact, the CIT rate equalled the top labour rate. By 
doing this, tax arbitrage between business income and labour income was prevented (it 
is actually optional for professionals or sole proprietors to pay either the PIT or the 
CIT). Yet, this forced to implement other measures to prevent arbitrage regarding 
interests, which are taxed at a lower rate and are deductible for companies.  
 
4. Due to practical reasons, overseas income was tax exempt, thus creating a strong 
discrimination against domestic-sourced income. Yet, Uruguay introduced in 2010 the 
so-called “reinforced territoriality”, which means that some types of personal overseas 
capital income (interests, rents, dividends, and capital gains) are taxed. 
 
5. As a consequence of the reform, new tax benefits for companies were implemented, 
many of which do not seem to target their goals (increase investment) and are costly in 
terms of revenue. 
 
3.3 Changes in the tax system 
 
All in all, the results of the tax reform were positive. The tax system was rationalised, 
many low-yield and inefficient taxes were eliminated, a PIT was introduced, and the 
progressivity and redistributive capacity of the system improved. Leaving aside what 
has already been mentioned, some other aspects of the reform are noteworthy to 
highlight:  
 
1. Following the Uruguayan example, dual-type PITs have been introduced in other 
Latin American countries: Peru, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, etc. This expansion can be attributed to several 
factors. First, the need to increase tax revenues in countries where they were low in 
general, but specially regarding the personal income tax. Second, the dualisation of PITs 
has improved progressivity and redistribution without creating strong tensions among 
taxpayers. Third, dual taxes are easier to administer and control than comprehensive 
taxes. Finally, capital income has started to being taxed but anonymity has been 
preserved, which is a relevant issue for wealthy taxpayers in many Latin American 
countries.   
 
2. Although bank secrecy hinders the development of efficient and fair tax systems, it 
was preserved in the 2006/07 reform. This was probably unavoidable, since putting an 
end to bank secrecy was a major issue that could have blocked the reform. Yet, three 
years later it was partially removed.  
 
3. One year after the reform was introduced, tax expenditures started to being published.  
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4. Factors conditioning the reform  
 
4.1 Political factors 
 
a) Main structural characteristics of the political regime 
 
Uruguay is a representative democratic republic, where the President is both the head of 
state and the head of government, and is elected for a non-renewable five-year term. 
The Legislative power is exercised by the General Assembly, which has two Chambers: 
the Chamber of Deputies and the Chamber of Senators.  
 
Throughout most of Uruguay's history two parties have been the main political forces in 
the country: the Colorado Party and the National Party. The former is more 
interventionist and has traditionally been associated to the interests of the capital city, 
Montevideo, while the latter is more liberal and closer to the interests of the provinces. 
Currently, there are not deep ideological differences between both parties, which have 
traditionally been characterised by a strong factionalism. In fact, as a consequence of 
this factionalism, it was a common practice in both parties to present several candidates 
to the presidential elections, representing different political and social tendencies. 
However, parties are disciplined in their political behaviour. On the other hand, 
interparty conflicts are moderate, with tendency to reach agreement in major questions.  
 
In the late 1990’s, a left-wing coalition (Frente Amplio; FA) emerged as a real 
contender to the traditional two-party system. The FA candidate had actually won the 
first round of the presidential elections of 1999. In the 2004 elections the FA finally 
came into power.   
 
As stated above, factionalism has traditionally dominated political parties in Uruguay. 
To some extent, this is the consequence of the lack of clear ideological differences 
between parties. On the other hand, there has not been a clear distribution of social 
classes across parties. Quite to the contrary, parties’ members and sympathizers belong 
to different social classes and groups. The wealthy class is not clearly identified with 
any party, and as a consequence, parties are less captured by the elites than in other 
Latin American countries. Although the parties’ financing system is insufficiently 
regulated, companies tend to distribute their donations across all parties.     
 
In sum, Uruguay is one the most stable democracies in Latin America, and although 
wealth concentration is similar to other countries in the region, the power of the elites is 
not as strong. In fact, Uruguay is the Latin American country where popular support for 
democracy shows the highest values. On average, 81% of citizens believe that 
democracy is the best political system (58.8% in LA and 57.7% in Mercosur). Their 
country’s democratic quality is scored 7.5 in a 0-10 scale by Uruguayans, while the 
Latin American and Mercosur averages reach 6.0 and 6.3, respectively. Uruguay also 
shows the highest participation rate in elections in LA (93.1% in the 2000’s), but this is 
partially due to the fact that voting is mandatory. Undoubtedly, the democratic quality 
of the country favoured the political process of the tax reform. 
 
Table 7. Democracy (2007/10 average) 
 Uruguay Latin America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
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Percentage of citizens who believe 
that democracy is the best political 
system 
81.0 58.8 57.7 
Perception of the democratic quality 
of the country (0-10)  
7.5 6.0 6.3 
Source: ECLAC 
 
 
Table 8. Participation rate in elections 
 1990’s 2000’s 
Uruguay 95.3 93.1 
Latin America (average) 62.7 62.6 
Latin America (countries where either voting is not 
mandatory or it is so, but no penalties are applied ) 
(average) 
66.5 64.8 
Source: ECLAC 
 
 
b) How the political context conditioned the reform  
 
The political context in which the reform took place was a key factor to understand its 
success. As mentioned, in 1999 Tabaré Vazquez, the candidate of the left-wing coalition 
Frente Amplio won the first round of the presidential elections with 40% of the vote. 
Yet, the second round was won by J. Batle (54%), and thus the candidate of the 
Colorado Party was elected President. However, these elections were a milestone in the 
history of Uruguay, not only because the left candidate was closest to winning the 
elections, but also because those results implied a breakdown in the traditional two-
party system of Uruguay’s politics. Regarding the Chambers, no party got majority in 
any of them.  
 
Finally, Tabare Vazquez won the 2004 presidential elections with 50.4% of the vote in 
the first round, and the Frente Amplio also won majority in both Chambers: 16 out of 30 
seats in the Senate and 52 out of 99 in the Congress. This victory was crucial to the 
reform as follows:  
 
1. The newly elected President gave strong support to the reform.  
 
2. The tax reform was part of the electoral programme of the Frente Amplio. Moreover, 
they had already declared by the mid-80’s their intention to implement a more equitable, 
efficient, and simple tax system. In 1996, they presented a tax reform proposal in the 
Parliament, and in the 1999 electoral campaign the tax reform was in the centre of the 
political debate. In fact, the defeat of Tabaré Vazquez in 1999 was partially attributed to 
his intention to develop a tax reform and to introduce a personal income tax.  
 
3. Since the Frente Amplio had majority in both Chambers, negotiation with other 
political forces was not necessary. However, the Government made efforts to convince 
and gain the support of the opposition to the reform process by opening discussions. 
The opposition initially tried to present the reform as going against the interests of the 
middle-class, but the strategy did not work, and finally they followed a more 
constructive approach, even voting in favour of some of the most relevant elements of 
the reform.   
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4. On the other hand, the Frente Amplio was a coalition of several parties and it was 
therefore necessary to negotiate the reform within the coalition. In this sense, it must be 
emphasised that different political sensitivities were represented in the coalition, 
ranging from the most left oriented to more centred and pragmatic. To conduct this 
negotiation, the Government followed a so-called “fiscal responsibility dynamic 
approach”, according to which any proposal that reduced tax revenues should be 
accompanied by another proposal that increased them by an equivalent amount. That 
approach was important, since it constrained the demand of sector and social group tax 
benefits. The most left-wing faction of the coalition opposed the original project on 
three main grounds: 1) it was too generous with capital income, which was taxed at 
lower rates than labour; 2) exemptions and deductions were too modest; and 3) more tax 
benefits for productive activities were necessary. The Government eventually agreed to 
increase the rate for capital income from 10% to 12%, and to separate this reform from 
a subsequent reform on incentives to investment and employment. An agreement was 
reached, preserving the substance of the original project. In this sense, it must be 
remarked that, given the shortcomings of the tax administration, the Government 
insisted on the need to design a simple and pragmatic tax system, which meant few 
exemptions and deductions. Only after the implementation of the tax administration 
reform , could a more sophisticated design of the tax system  be developed.    
 
5. The implementation of the reform was also facilitated by the fact that the reform 
process started in the beginning of the presidential term. 
 
4.2 Institutional framework  
  
Along with early democratisation and political stability (exception made of the 
dictatorship that ruled the country between 1973 and 1984), Uruguay has developed one 
of the highest quality institutional frameworks in Latin America. The World Bank 
Governance Indicators (GI) average reaches 0.75 in Uruguay in 2006/10 (in a -2.5/+2-5 
scale), while the LA and the upper-middle income countries average is -0.2. The 
International Country Risk Guide Index (sum of all components) amounts to 70.8 in 
Uruguay (0-100 scale) and to 63.4 and 66.5, respectively, in the other two groups. The 
quality of democracy is also higher in Uruguay. The indicator Voice and Accountability 
of the GI amounts to 1.1 in this country and to 0.1 in LA, while the component 
Democratic Accountability of the ICRG is one point above the Latin American average. 
Political stability is also higher in Uruguay. The indicator Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence of the GI reaches 0.8 in this country and -0.3 in LA, while the 
component Government Stability of the ICRG is 9.0 in Uruguay and 8.4 in Latin 
America. Regarding the efficiency of the State, the indicator Government Effectiveness 
(GI) is 0.5 in Uruguay and -0.2 in LA, while the component Bureaucracy Quality 
(ICRG) is the same (2.0 in a 0-4 scale). Finally, corruption is clearly lower in Uruguay. 
The indicator Control of Corruption (GI) is 0.8 in this country and -0.2 in LA, the 
component Corruption (ICRG) reaches 3.1 in Uruguay and 2.2 in LA (0-6 scale), and 
the Corruption Perception Index values are 6.8 in Uruguay and 3.4 in LA (0-10 scale). 
 
 
Table 9. Institutional quality. 2006/2010 average 
 Uruguay Latin America 
(average) 
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World Bank Governance Indicators (average) (-2.5 to +2.5 
scale) 
0.75 -0.20 
International Country Risk Guide index (sum of all 
components) (0 to 100 scale) 
70.8 63.4 
Quality of democracy   
Voice and Accountability  (GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 1.1 0.1 
Democratic Accountability (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale) 5 4 
Political Stability   
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (GI) (-2.5 
to +2-5 scale) 
0.8 -0.3 
Government Stability (ICRG) (0 to 10 scale) 9.0 7.0 
State Efficiency   
Government Effectiveness (GI) (-2.5 to +2-5 scale) 0.5 -0.2 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) (0 to 4 scale)  2.0 2.0 
Corruption   
Control of Corruption (GI) (-2.5 to 2-5 scale) 0.8 -0.2 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale)  3.1  2.2 
Corruption Perception Index (0-10 scale). 6.8 3.4 
Source: The World Bank (Governance Indicators), The Political Risk Service Group (ICRG), and 
Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index) 
 
 
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that there is a long tradition of organised 
social groups in Uruguay, labour unions and business associations being the most 
influential.  
 
Despite the general high quality of the Uruguayan institutional framework, there are 
also some shortcomings. Two of them must be highlighted. First, the system of 
appointment in the public administration has traditionally been based on a clientelistic 
approach conducted by traditional parties. Public servants have enjoyed certain 
privileges. However, important improvements have been made since the 1990’s, 
incorporating more competitive recruitment procedures. Second, while no relevant 
ethnic or religious tensions exist, social tensions are present as a consequence of a very 
unequal distribution of income. It is true that Uruguay is one of the most equal countries 
in Latin America and that income distribution has been improving over the last years, 
but inequalities are still very high. According to the World Bank, the Gini index reaches 
45.3 in Uruguay and 49.3 in LA. 
 
Table 10. Uruguay. Poverty and income distribution 
 Uruguay Latin America 
(average) 
Gini index  45.3 49.3 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of 
population) (2006/11) 
23.4 37.8 
Source: The World Bank  
 
The relatively high level of institutional quality observed in Uruguay, together with the 
institutional changes implemented by the Frente Amplio Government and the 
shortcomings existing in the public administration, conditioned the process of the 
reform and the original design of the PIT. The institutional framework of the country 
and the institutional approach followed by the Government in the reform process is a 
centrepiece to understand its success.  
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1. The FA Government at the time (as well as the current FA Government) fostered 
social participation and the institutionalisation of reforms (not only in the tax reform, 
but also in other major reforms, such as in the social security system or in education). In 
this sense, it must be recalled that it was the first time that Uruguay was ruled by a left-
wing coalition, with no experience in government, and this had created some mistrust in 
its intentions and capacities.  
 
In particular, the first step made by the government to design the tax reform was to 
appoint a Commission of Experts to elaborate a tax reform proposal. The Commission 
was coordinated by the Vice Secretary of Finance (M. Bergara) and composed of 
independent tax experts who represented different political tendencies and social 
sensitivities, as well as experts from the administration. It is crucial to emphasize that 
these independent experts were neither professional politicians nor official 
representatives of any political party, but they had a good reputation as experts and their 
political tendencies were publicly known.  
 
 
Table 11. Members of the Commission that designed the tax reform 
Name Position 
A. Barreix Principal Fiscal Economist of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (he was not representing the 
IDB) 
Leonardo Costa Private sector 
J. Roca International consultant 
C. Grau Professor. Universidad de la República 
G. Lagomarsino Banco de Previsión Social (social security) 
D. Eibe Ministry of Finance 
H. Villarino Tax administration 
 
 
Since the members of the Commission were prestigious, different political and social 
tendencies were represented, and these experts carried out their task without major 
interferences. The Commission was in charge of elaborating a tax reform proposal 
subject to three constraints imposed by the Government: 1) it had to be neutral in terms 
of revenue; 2) bank secrecy could not be removed; and 3) the tax system should be 
simplified.  
 
It is also worth mentioning that several members of the Commission had already 
published works about the Uruguayan tax system and tax reform proposals prior to their 
appointment. In fact, the design of the PIT finally introduced was a joint proposal of 
two of the members of the Commission: A. Barreix and J. Roca. In addition, not only 
the Academia and private institutions developed and published analysis quantifying the 
impact of the reform, but the Ministry as well.   
 
2. Once an agreement was reached inside the Commission, the Ministry of Finance 
published the proposal in November 2005 entitled Lineamientos básicos para la 
Reforma Tributaria - Documento de Consulta Pública (Tax Reform Guidelines - 
Document for Public Consultation). A period of public consultation was then opened, 
during which social actors (trade unions, business associations, civil organisations, etc.) 
could send their critics, suggestions, and demands to the Ministry of Finance. This 
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consultation process increased the transparency and openness. It also served to 
centralise the negotiation process between the Government and different social groups, 
thereby reducing the space for lobbying and protecting the reform from bilateral and 
less transparent negotiations. 
 
On the other hand, it must also be pointed out that, in order to avoid the obstruction to, 
or the watering down of, the reform, the Government decided to make a clear distinction 
between the tax reform from other growth policies, creating for the latter a different 
process. This avoided too many demands for tax benefits by the business community, 
although costly and inefficient tax benefits were still granted outside the tax reform 
process. 
 
3. The Ministry systematised the results of the public consultation process in a new 
document that was also disseminated. By March 2006, the final tax reform law project 
was submitted to the Parliament and, after some modifications, it was finally passed by 
the end of the year.  
 
 4.3 Social support 
 
As mentioned, Uruguay is one of the most politically stable countries in Latin America 
and, although social tensions exist, they are not as high as in other nations and they are 
mostly resolved through political and social institutions. The high quality of democracy 
and political stability in Uruguay is partially a cause and a consequence of the welfare-
type of state that exists in the country. The share of social spending is one of the highest 
in Latin America (it reached 67.6% in the 2000’s). It reached 21.5% of GDP in the 
2000’s. In addition, Uruguay is by far the LA country where citizens are the most 
confident in the quality of public spending (51% vs. 26% in LA); and the percentage of 
population believing that tax revenue will be correctly used is also well above the Latin 
American average (49% vs. 21%). This helps to understand why the opposition to the 
tax reform was rather limited and did not result in strong conflicts.  
 
 
Table 12. Quality of public spending 
 Uruguay Latin 
America 
(average) 
Mercosur 
(average) 
Social spending (% of total spending) (2000/2010) 67.6 51.1 64.1 
Social spending (% of GDP) (2000/2010) 21.5 12.9 19.0 
Percentage of population having confidence in  the 
quality of public spending (2011) 
51 26 29 
Percentage of population believing that tax revenue 
will be correctly used (2005) 
49 21  
Source: Social spending: ECLAC; Compensation of employees: The World Bank; Confidence: 
Latinobarometro 
 
 
Prior to the reform, there was no strong social demand for the implementation of a PIT. 
Nevertheless, the leftist coalition in power had focused its political programme on 
building a more “social” country, for which the introduction of a PIT was a key 
element. It was necessary then to close the gap between this commitment and the 
political costs that the reform could imply if it turned out to be unpopular. 
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As in any reform that creates winners and losers, there was opposition from a number of 
social groups. The most negatively affected groups were those who received income 
from their professional activities (lawyers, physicians, etc.), since they would pay more 
taxes. Yet, it was difficult for them to justify any opposition. It is true that some 
economists defended their position arguing that the PIT burden would be passed to 
customers and employees, thus penalising the consumption of these services and job 
creation, but since this argument was not very solid they did not have much echo in 
society.  
 
A much more important group opposing the reform was pensioners, who also thought 
that the reform would go against their interests. Broadly speaking, this was not true, 
since they were already taxed under the former tax on salaries and in most cases with 
higher effective rates. Be as it may, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional 
the original PIT passed in the Parliament arguing that pensions could not be considered 
income and therefore could not be subject to the PIT. This was a big shock for the 
reform, but the President who was strongly committed with it decided to go ahead 
nonetheless. Pensions were removed from the PIT and a new and equivalent tax (in 
terms of rates and base) on pensions was created. Both taxes are currently into force in 
Uruguay.   
 
The business community did not strongly oppose the reform, since they benefited from 
the CIT rate cut to 25% and tax benefits were increased.  
 
Those citizens previously subject to the tax on salaries and now to the PIT were the real 
concern to the Government, since it was not clear for them whether they were winners 
or losers. As shown in table 4 above, only the wealthiest 20% were losers, but most of 
the population did not know their individual result, since the reform did not consist of a 
mere rate schedule or deductions change, but in the replacement of a set of income taxes 
by a new tax. This was a key issue, since not only the opposition accused the 
Government of punishing the middle-class through the introduction of the PIT, but also 
because the proposal to introduce a PIT had actually been a main factor in the defeat of 
Tavaré Vazquez in the former presidential elections. According to surveys, about half of 
the population was against the tax, and only less than one third were in favour.  
 
 
Table 13. Opinion about the PIT in surveys 
 Nov-2006 Apr-2007 Sep-2007 
In favour  27 23 29 
Neutral  11 12 12 
Against  47 47 49 
DK/DA  15 18 10 
TOTAL  100 100 100 
Source: Rius (2013). 
 
The weak support of the population to the reform seemed paradoxical since most of the 
population was better off, as shown by several studies (the Ministry itself had already 
published a distributional analysis of the reform). Yet, as some researchers have pointed 
out, these analyses only capture the impact at the group level, and people do not really 
know to which group they belong (Rius, 2013). In other words, most taxpayers, even 
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when informed about general results, did not know their particular situation. Then the 
Government developed an intense information campaign not only in the media, but also 
through the Internet and the tax administration. A key variable of this campaign was 
that citizens could consult their pre and post-reform tax payments, so they could know if 
they would pay more or less taxes.  
 
4.4 Informality, avoidance, and evasion 
 
According to estimates, the informal economy in Uruguay is clearly above both, the 
Latin American and the upper-middle income countries’ average (47.8%, 40%, and 
34.1%). This result can seem surprising, but much caution must be taken regarding 
informal economy estimates, since they often provide inconsistent results. Be as it may, 
it must be noted that the informal economy did not condition the reform.  
 
On the other hand, the deep transformation  carried out in the tax administration prior to 
the tax reform led to remarkable improvements in reducing tax evasion. According to 
official estimates, VAT evasion fell from 20/30% in 2002/03, to about 14% nowadays. 
 
Table 14. Informal economy  
 Uruguay Latin America 
(average) 
Lower-middle 
income 
countries 
(average) 
Informal economy (% of GDP). 47.8 40.0 34.1 
Source: Schneider (2012) 
 
 3.5 Tax policy and administration 
 
Prior to the tax reform, a radical transformation of the tax administration (an Office 
within the Ministry of Finance) was implemented. This process actually started in 2002 
under the Colorado Party Government, as a consequence of the economic crisis in the 
early 2000’s. The introduction of the PIT was indeed postponed for some months, until 
the tax administration was ready for its implementation. The main elements of the tax 
administration reform were the following:  
 
1. The human resource management system was radically transformed. Prior to the 
reform, employees were not subject to exclusive dedication, and it was a common 
practice that tax inspectors also worked part-time for the private sector, which created 
strong conflicts of interest. The reform  forced them to choose between the private 
sector and the tax administration. Internal resistance was strong, but so was the 
commitment of the President to pursue reform. Finally, about half of tax inspectors and 
70% of top officials decided to leave the tax administration for the private sector 
 
2. Given the scarcity of human resources that followed, the tax administration launched 
a recruitment process based on a more competitive approach. The promotion system 
was also changed. 
 
3. Salaries were increased and the remuneration system changed by adding bonuses 
linked to quantitative and qualitative team goals. That amount currently represents 
about 15% of total salary.     
 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
87 
 
4. A major modernisation of information and communication technologies was also 
performed. Investment in technology increased significantly. Human capital formation 
programmes were also intensified.  
 
5. More modern risk control and inspection methods were introduced. 
 
6. An internal audit system and an ethical code were introduced. 
 
7. A large taxpayers unit was created. 
 
In this process of deep and positive reform of the tax administration some elements 
must be remarked. First, the strong commitment of both Governments (the Colorado 
and the Frente Nacional Government). The Director of the tax administration in the 
former Government was actually maintained in his position by the latter. Second, a big 
information campaign was developed, not only in the media but also throughout 
numerous business associations. A tax education campaign was even developed in 
schools, malls and fairs. Third, thanks to this information campaign, to inspections in 
relevant companies, and to penalties, inter alia, the business community and taxpayers 
in general started to realise that times had really changed and that the fight against tax 
evasion and fraud would be harder than it was in the past.     
 
This process of modernisation, which continued during the second half of the 2000’s, 
produced positive results in several fields. First, evasion and fraud were severely cut. 
Second, it generated a radical change in the relation between the tax administration and 
the private sector; prior to the reform, the former was to a large extent captured by the 
latter. Third, the modernisation of the tax administration was a crucial step to implement 
the PIT; it would have been extremely difficult for the old administration to meet this 
goal. Finally, the Uruguayan tax administration has actually started to assist other 
bodies in the Administration and other tax administrations in Latin America in their 
modernisation processes.  
 
Two more elements in this field must be mentioned. First, Customs Administration, 
which has traditionally been very inefficient in Uruguay, was left untouched and is 
currently undergoing a similar process. The unification of both bodies, which would 
produce positive results, cannot be carried out until the quality of Customs is improved. 
Second, there is still no justice court specialised in tax issues, mainly due to the lack of 
funding.   
 
4.6 Economic factors 
 
Economic factors were crucial to the tax reform. First, the major economic crisis 
experienced by Uruguay in the early 2000’s fuelled the reform process. Second, the 
high taxation level of the country imposed the need for a neutral reform in terms of 
revenue. Finally, the strong recovery of the economy since 2004, and especially the 
strong growth of salaries, facilitated the introduction and social acceptance of the PIT. 
Thus, while real wages fell by 22% between 2001 and 2004, they grew by 18% between 
2004 and 2008 (when the PIT was fully operative). As stated above, some sectors of the 
political opposition, the media, and the private sector tried to oppose the reform by 
arguing that the PIT would hurt the middle class, but the high increase experienced by 
wages when the PIT was introduced made this argument less powerful. 
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Figure 1. Real wage index (2008=100) 
 
Source: National Statistics Institute 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 External actors 
 
Uruguay is not an aid dependent country. During the reform process aid received by 
Uruguay represented only about 0.15% of GNI, and it has been decreasing since the 
current world crisis started. In fact, Uruguay has become non-eligible for a number of 
donors. On the other hand, the reform did not take place in a context of a loan 
agreement with international organisations or partners. Nevertheless, external actor still 
played a role in the reform:  
 
a) International assistance and cooperation was very relevant and helpful in the 
modernisation process of the tax administration. The EU funded part of the process and 
Uruguay received also strong technical support from the Spanish Tax Agency, and to a 
lesser extent, from the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Centre of 
Tax Administrations, and the French Tax Authorities.  
 
b) The IMF was invited to participate as an observer in some of the meetings of the 
Commission that designed the main lines of the reform. In this sense, it is important to 
note that the participation of the IMF (even as an observer) was minimised in order to 
avoid a stronger opposition to the reform by left-wing groups.  
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THE 2005 VAT REFORM IN MOROCCO  
 
 
THE 2005 VAT REFORM IN MOROCCO. SUMMARY 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• To reform the VAT 
 
• To develop a more 
transparent and 
efficient Tax System 
 
 
  
 
Mixed 
results, but 
concerning 
VAT, 
mostly 
negative 
• An unbalanced distribution of power 
 
• A weak and very fragmented political party system. 
 
• Strong economic interests of the political elites 
 
• No long term strategies regarding tax reforms. No 
rationale and consistent planning.  
 
• Lack of transparency of the process 
 
• The EU support to the reform by providing assistance 
and obtaining a compromise from the Moroccan 
Authorities to implement it was positive, but it was 
not transparent regarding civil society 
 
• Lack of analysis on the impact of the reform by 
Moroccan institutions. The necessary information to 
implement such studies and analyses is not available 
to researchers 
 
• Social spending remains inadequate.  
 
 
 
1. Economic Outlook 
 
Morocco is a lower middle-income country. Income per head reached US$ 3,053 in 
2011, while the middle-income North African region average is US$ 5,077. In PPP 
terms, those figures amount to US$ 4,952 in Morocco and US$ 9,220 in North Africa 
(NA). Nevertheless, although Morocco is the poorest country in the region, it has also 
been the fastest growing economy in the last decade: income per head in constant and 
PPP terms has grown by 4.5% per year, while the regional average is 2.7%.  
 
Income is very unequally distributed in Morocco. The Gini index reaches 40.9, while 
the North African and the lower-middle income countries averages are 37.7 and 41.4, 
respectively. Land is even much more concentrated (the land concentration Gini index 
is about 0.75; El-Ghonemy, 1999). Nevertheless, poverty is much lower than in other 
developing countries and it has been reduced over the last decade. The Poverty 
Headcount Ratio at national poverty line (% of population) was 9% by the late 2000’s 
(about 15% by the beginning of the decade). Poverty is mainly concentrated in the rural 
areas.  
  
The share of agriculture in total output reached 15.8% in 2008/11, one third higher than 
the North African average. On the other hand, although Morocco is not a very resource 
abundant country, it is rich in phosphates and other minerals, whose price fluctuations 
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have a great impact on the economy. In addition, Morocco’s economy is highly 
dependent on agriculture, tourism, and workers’ remittances.  
 
An important characteristic of Morocco’s economy is that it is highly state-oriented. Not 
only the public sector is the most important employer, investor, and consumer, but 
market competition is hampered by government’s involvement in economic life (BTI 
2012). According to the same BTI reports1, a large part of the economy is controlled by 
members of the Royal Family and people close to the Monarchy.  
 
In the last years Morocco has been successful in adopting openness and macro-stability 
policies. Inflation is low, budget has been acceptably balanced, and significant trade 
agreements have been signed. The openness rate is 70.2%, higher than the North 
African average (60.5%). Yet, some concerns regarding the budget and the balance of 
payments have recently emerged. Public budget recorded a surplus of 1.5% of GDP on 
average during the period 2006/09, while in 2010/11 it recorded a deficit of 3.2%. The 
external deficit on goods and services has grown from 4.1% of GDP in 2000/06 to 
10.9% in 2007/2011, mainly as a consequence of a strong increase in imports (34% of 
GDP in 2000/06 and 44.6% in 2007/2011). 
 
 
1. Macroeconomic Outlook 
 Morocco North Africa 
(middle-income 
countries’ 
average) 
Lower middle-
income 
countries 
(average) 
GDP per head. 2011.  (PPP US $) 4,952 9,220 4042 
Gini Index (1) 40.9 37.7 41.4 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
(2008/11) 
15.8 10.3 19.2 
Openness rate (2008/11) 70.2 60.5 76.9 
Source: The World Bank. (1) No data available for Algeria and Libya 
 
 
Regarding the main characteristics of the Morocco’s tax system, it must be first 
remarked that total tax revenue is high: 23.3% of GDP in 2006/11. Only Algeria shows 
higher figures than Morocco in the region. On the other hand, non-tax revenue in 
Morocco is clearly below the regional average (2.8 and 3.9, respectively). According to 
some studies, Morocco is identified as a high tax-effort country: given the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the country, the tax revenue potential has been fully 
exploited (Eltony, 2002; Le et al., 2008 and 2012, von Haldenwang and Ivanyna, 2010; 
Alonso and Garcimartín, 2011).  
 
 
Table 2. Tax Revenue Statistics  
                                                 
 
 
 
1 See the BTI Morocco country reports. 
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 Morocco North Africa (middle-
income countries’ average) 
Total Tax Revenue (% GDP) (2006/11) 23.3 24.2 
Non Tax Revenue (% GDP) (2006/11) 2.8 3.9 
Tax Effort Index (excluding resource rents) 1.5 0.8 
Source and definitions: Revenues: African Statistical Yearbook, AfDB. Tax Effort Index is calculated by 
dividing its actual tax share by an estimate of how much tax the country should be able to collect given 
the structural characteristics of its economy; source OECD. Libya has been excluded from the sample due 
to the quality of data. 
 
 
The single most important tax in terms of revenue is by far the VAT (34.5% of total tax 
revenue in 2006/11), followed by the corporate income tax (21.9%). Indirect taxes are 
more significant in Morocco than in other countries of the region: according to the 
OECD African Economic Outlook, the direct/indirect taxes ratio reaches 0.80 in 
Morocco and 0.92 in North Africa (regional average excluding Libya). 
 
 
Table 3. Tax Structure (2006/11) 
 % of Total Tax Revenue % of GDP 
Indirect Taxes  53.8 12.7 
VAT  34.5 8.1 
Excise Taxes 11.7 2.7 
Trade 7.6 1.8 
Direct Taxes 40.5 9.6 
CIT 21.9 5.2 
PIT 17.1 4.0 
Other 5.7 1.4 
Total 100 23.6 
Source: Direction General des Impôts 
 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform 
 
In the early 1980’s, Moroccan authorities developed a plan to integrate the country into 
the global economy, liberalising foreign trade and pursuing an export-led growth 
strategy. This liberalisation process of the Moroccan economy was further fuelled by a 
number of free trade agreements signed during the 1990’s and the 2000’s: Association 
Agreement with the EU in 1996, free trade agreements with the US in 2004 and Turkey 
in 2006, the Agadir Agreement with Jordan, Egypt, and Tunisia in 2004, etc. As a 
consequence, trade tax revenues started to decline sharply. While they accounted for 
about 4.5% of GDP in the early 1900’s, they had fallen to 3.2%, by the end of the 
decade and currently stand at about 1.3%.  
 
As in other developing countries experiencing a liberalisation process, Morocco 
initiated a tax reform aimed at broadening the total tax base, decreasing rates, and 
compensating the fall in trade taxes with general consumption taxes. Yet, general 
consumption taxes were at that time very inefficient, complex, distortive (two different 
cumulative taxes were applied to goods and services with 11 different rates), and clearly 
unable to meet this goal. Morocco then decided to introduce a VAT in 1986. The tax 
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reform was successful in terms of total revenue. In 1980-1985, total revenue was about 
19% of GDP, while in 1987-1993 it reached about 21.5%. Nevertheless, the transition 
was atypical, since it took place to a large extent through a higher contribution of the 
corporate income tax. In other words, the VAT did not contribute as expected in the first 
years of the transition.   
 
The main reason behind the failure of the original VAT was that its design showed 
many deficiencies and complexities, which worsened over time:   
 
1. A high number of rates; six different rates were applied in the original VAT (30%, 
19%, 14%, 12%, 7%, and 0%). The 12% and 30% rates were abandoned in 1992 and 
1993, respectively, but to be shortly replaced by a new 10% tax rate in 1997. The 
standard rate was raised to 20% in 1996. Furthermore, there is a specific fixed VAT for 
alcohol and valuable metals (gold, silver, platinum). This high number of rates created 
serious difficulties for the tax administration and the taxpayers: firms are required to 
keep separate records for different purchases, which is, in turn, costly for auditing, and 
the application of self-assessments is more complicated.  
 
2. Tax rates were (and still are) very high. The standard VAT rate in Morocco is 20%, 
while it reaches 16.2% in North African countries and 13.7% in lower-middle income 
countries. Actually, the 14% reduced rate in Morocco is higher than the standard rate in 
these countries. 
 
 
Table 4. VAT standard rate 
 Morocco North Africa 
(middle-income 
countries’ 
average) 
Lower middle-
income 
countries 
(average) 
Rate 20 16.2 13.7 
Source: own calculations based on National Tax Administrations. Note: There is not a real VAT in Egypt, 
while there are not general consumption taxes in Libya 
 
 
3. There are many exemptions in Morocco’s VAT, and they have been growing over 
time. Two types of exemptions exist: those with and those without right to deduction.  
 
4. There has been a lack of rationale in the use of exemptions and reduced rates. While 
there are technical (banking industry), administrative (house renting), practical (hard-to-
tax sectors), foreign trade (exports), and social (merit and basic goods) reasons that 
justify the use of reduced rates and exemptions, there was an apparent lack of logic in 
this respect in Morocco. For example different types of food are subject to different 
rates, and some are exempt (raw sugar and some types of olive oil are tax exempt, while 
other types of cooking oils are taxed at 10%; decorative candles are taxed at 20%, while 
other candles are exempt; powdered milk and canned sardines are taxed at 7%, while 
cooking salt, pasta and rice are taxed at 10%; tea is taxed at 14%, but coffee at 20%; 
lawyer services at 10%, but architect services at 20%). In addition, rates can also vary 
according to how the product is produced (for example, locally produced craft carpets 
are exempt, while other carpets are taxed under the standard rate). Despite the high 
number of rates, the two top rates (20% and 14%) accounted for about 85% of total 
VAT revenue in 2005. 
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5. Many products have been continuously reclassified. For example, in 1998, rice 
(previously exempt) was taxed at 7%, and the list of exempt agricultural inputs was 
enlarged. In 1989, the rate for livestock feed was reduced from 14% to 7%, while in 
1990 fruits (previously exempt) were taxed at 7%, and the rate applied to matches was 
increased from 7% to 19%. In 1992, some professional services (doctors, lawyers, etc), 
which were previously taxed at 12%, were taxed at 7%. In 1995, some medicines and 
driving schools fees were declared exempt and the small cars’ rate was reduced from 
19% to 7%. In 1997, tourism services were taxed at 10%. And many other similar 
examples can be found. 
 
Both, the original classification of products and their continuous modifications 
responded to particular interests. A clear-cut example is agriculture, mostly a tax free 
sector. There are some generally acknowledged reasons to exempt agricultural products, 
and in practice many countries do provide a number of exemptions to agriculture, but 
within limits. For instance, exemptions are usually granted only to small farmers, or 
apply only to agricultural products but not to the agricultural inputs, etc. Morocco’s 
VAT is extremely generous with this sector, seemingly as a consequence of the 
lobbying power of very big landowners. For example, there are many exempt 
agricultural inputs that are only used in large exploitations. However, the King has 
recently announced that agriculture (big farms) will be taxed in 2014, although the 
details are not known yet.   
 
6. The proliferation of rates and exemptions and the continuous reclassification of 
products created many administrative complications, both for the taxpayers and the tax 
administration. First, the neutrality of the VAT is often broken due to exemptions 
without right to deduction. In fact, for some companies, the VAT resembles a turnover 
tax. Second, VAT is only actually reimbursed for those operations taxed at 0% with 
right to deduction, mainly exports. For the rest, it generates a tax credit. This credit has 
been accumulating over time, and it currently amounts to about 0.8% of GDP, which is 
a major problem, both for the Government and for companies. Third, there are 
difficulties in practise in defining what is exempt and what is not (for example, 
decorative candles are taxed at 20%, while non-decorative ones are exempt, but drawing 
the line between both is not easy. The same applies to steam baths which are taxed or 
exempt depending on whether or not they have "modern facilities"). There are no 
further clarifications in the Tax Code, so it is up to the tax administration to decide. 
Fourth, the cost of administering a VAT with so many exemptions and different rates 
was very high. 
 
7. Some VAT rates and exemptions explicitly discriminated against imported goods and 
were used as trade barrier (for example, Moroccan dates, figs, raisins are exempt; small 
cars, produced in Morocco, are taxed at a reduced rate). The use of VAT as a trade 
barrier is contrary to the WTO rules. 
 
8. Tax expenditure was very high. Total tax expenditure amounted to about 2.9% of 
GDP in 2003/05, the VAT being the main contributor (about 52% of total expenditure). 
 
Some of the VAT problems also existed in other taxes. Broadly speaking, rates were 
high. Before 2008, the CIT rate was 35% and was then brought down to 30%,  which is 
still higher than in other developing countries. The PIT top rate was 44% and it was 
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applied to incomes 7.5 times above the average income per head of the country, while in 
lower-middle income countries those figures are 27% and 11 times, respectively2. Both 
taxes were very concentrated on some taxpayers and type of revenues, while other sorts 
of revenue and sectors enjoyed large tax benefits. Thus, about 80% of CIT revenue was 
paid by 5% of companies. The agricultural sector is tax exempt (until 2014, as 
announced recently by the King), and construction, mining, and other sectors receive 
large tax reliefs. In addition, about 60% of companies declared no profits for tax 
purposes on a regular basis. Regarding PIT, most of the revenue came from salaries 
(about 90%), while some professionals and capital income were clearly under-taxed. In 
this sense, it must be remarked that the generous tax benefits granted to some sectors 
shifted the tax burden onto other taxpayers.  
 
In sum, despite yielding high revenues, Morocco’s tax system was characterised by high 
tax expenditure, very generous tax benefits that were granted without clear purposes and 
on an ad hoc rather than rational basis, high costs for the tax administration, plagued 
with inefficiencies, and experiencing continuous modifications.  
 
2.2 The causes of the reform 
 
Although many observers had stressed the need to undertake a deep tax reform in 
Morocco, it was not until that 2005 that the reform was launched. A number of 
economic factors explain this. First, although the economy was performing well in 
terms of growth and revenues, the budget recorded on average a deficit of about 2.4% in 
the first half of the 2000’s. Second, revenues from privatisation and trade taxes were 
expected to fall in the following years. However, the reform was mainly fuelled by two 
external factors. On the one hand, the IMF, upon request of the Moroccan authorities for 
technical assistance, called for an urgent need for tax reform. On the other hand, a tax 
reform, and in particular a VAT reform, was incorporated in the Agreement signed 
between the EU and Morocco within the EU Country Strategy Paper. Although the 
details of this agreement were not made public, Moroccan Authorities publicly stated 
that its main objectives regarding VAT were to cut exemptions and to reduce to two the 
number of rates (plus the zero rate) and eventually to one3. In this sense, it must also be 
noted that the 2005 VAT reform was not legislated through an ad-hoc law, but through 
the annual Budget Law.   
 
2.3 Main changes introduced by the reform 
 
Regarding the number of rates, no change has been introduced so far. There are still 
four rates plus the zero one. With respect to exemptions and product classifications, 
some modifications have been introduced since 2005. Thus, that same year, a number of 
goods that were previously exempt (like cooking salt) were taxed at a rate of 10%, the 
rate of certain goods, such as fluid cooking oil and olive oil for industrial use, was 
increased from 7% to 10%. Some exemptions were limited, such as public steam baths 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Garcimartin (2013) 
3 For example, in 2005 the Director General of the DGI declared that the VAT-reform should be 
programmed for three years and that the number of rates and exemptions should be reduced. 
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(the exemption was abolished for facilities with more modern equipment; now taxed at 
20%) or candles (the exemption was abolished for decorative candles, which became 
taxable at 20%). In 2006, some previously exempt products became taxable: powdered 
milk for human nourishment at a 7% rate, butter (except artisan butter) at 14%, driving 
school fees and gambling at 20%. Some products that were previously taxed at 7% were 
increased to 10% (financial operations; rice flour; pasta; or professional services of 
lawyers, interpreters, or veterinaries). Some other products subject to the 7% rate were 
increased to 20% (such as bicycles and food made for children), while some others were 
increased from 14% to 20% (coffee, jams). In 2007, a special exemption with right to 
deduction was granted to the Al Akhawayne University. On the other hand, the 
exemption of capital goods and equipment was limited to 24 months after the start-up of 
new enterprises. As a measure to harmonise with the rate for electric energy, the rate 
applicable to solar water heaters was reduced from 20% to 14%. In 2009, exemptions 
were introduced for certain medicines (with right to deduction) and for services 
acquired by the Mohammed VI Foundation for the promotion of social work and 
educational training, as well as for up to 50% on the construction of mosques. Highway 
tolls were increased from 7% to 10%. In 2010, the rate applied to petroleum products 
and oil was increased from 7% to 10% and exemptions on interest on loans to local 
governments were abolished and taxed at 10%.  
 
In sum, regarding VAT, some exemptions were eliminated, a few were introduced, and 
certain products were taxed at higher rates.  
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1 Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by 
national authorities 
 
As mentioned, the VAT reform had two main objectives: reducing the number of rates 
to two (plus the zero one) and cutting the number of exemptions. Concerning the first 
objective, it has not been achieved yet. After eight years of changes in the VAT 
legislation, rates are still the same. Regarding the second objective, some exemptions 
have been eliminated but many others are still operative. The overall result of the 
reform is mixed. There have been some advances, but Moroccan VAT is still plagued 
with tax benefits. The lack of a clear rationale in exemptions and reduced rates is still 
present. In particular, the following results must be highlighted:  
 
a) As stated above, the number of rates has not been reduced and there is still a lack of 
rationale in the application of reduced rates to many products. As happened in the past, 
the rationale behind some of the modifications introduced, like the exemption for the 
University of Al Akhawayne, is not clear. 
 
Nevertheless, tax authorities argue that VAT is very productive in Morocco. It collects 
more revenue than in many other developing countries and since the 2005 reform, VAT 
revenues have increased noticeably. In addition, its efficiency has also grown. It is true 
that VAT collects more revenue in Morocco than in many other developing countries, 
but rates are also significantly higher. On the other hand, VAT revenues grew by 13.8% 
per year between 2001 and 2006 (the pre reform years), while they increased by 16.5% 
per year between 2006 and 2011. In other words, their growth rate was accelerated by 
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2.7% after the reform. However, most of this acceleration was due to import VAT 
collection (3.6%), while domestic VAT collection was accelerated at a similar rate than 
final consumption (1.1% and 0.8%, respectively).  
 
 
Table 5. VAT Revenues (annual growth) 
 2001/06 2006/11 Difference 
Total VAT collection 13.8 16.5 2.7 
Import VAT collection  15.6 19.2 3.6 
Domestic VAT collection 11.6 12.8 1.1 
Imports 13.6 13.6 0.0 
Final consumption 7.4 8.2 0.8 
Source: DGI and Haut commissariat au plan du Maroc 
 
Concerning VAT efficiency, it is also true that is has increased noticeably after the 
reform, but the reasons are unclear. The Efficiency ratio (defined as the share of the 
VAT in GDP divided by the standard VAT rate) measures VAT revenue in terms of 
GDP collected by each percent point of the standard VAT rate. This ratio increased 
from 0.28 in 2000/05 to 0.41 in 2006/11. Since VAT is supposed to tax final 
consumption and this is only a part of GDP, the C-Efficiency ratio (defined as the share 
of the VAT in consumption divided by the standard VAT rate) is a more reliable tool to 
measure efficiency. This ratio measures VAT revenue in terms of final consumption 
collected by each percent point of the standard VAT rate, and it should equal one in a 
context of no exemptions, no reduced rates, no evasion, and absolute efficiency of the 
tax administration; in other words, the larger the difference from one, the higher the 
relevance of those factors. The C-Efficiency ratio also increased significantly after the 
reform: from 0.37 in 2000/05 to 0.54 in 2006/11. In fact, it is clearly higher than the 
lower-middle income countries average (about 0.45).       
 
 
Table 6. VAT Efficiency  
 2001/05 2006/11 Difference 
Efficiency ratio 0.28 0.41 0.12 
C-Efficiency ratio  0.37 0.54 0.16 
Source: own calculations based on DGI data 
 
 
The increase in both revenues and the C-efficiency ratio are presented by some 
authorities as a demonstration of the success of the reform. Yet, some doubts emerge. 
First, as mentioned, most of the revenue increase is due to import VAT revenues. 
Second, variations in the C-efficiency ratio not only capture the evolution of exemptions 
and reduced rates (i.e. the VAT reform), but also changes in evasion and in the 
efficiency of the tax administration. In fact, the C-efficiency ratio can be decomposed as 
follows4:  
 
  		  1    	    	, 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 See Barreix et al. (2013) 
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E-Inefficiency represents the amount of VAT inefficiency generated by tax expenditure 
and X-inefficiency stands for the amount of VAT inefficiency created by evasion and 
tax administration inefficiencies. In other words, the reasons why the C-efficiency ratio 
can be different from unity are exemptions and reduced rates (E-inefficiency) and 
evasion and tax administration inefficiencies (X-inefficiency). Therefore, the 
performance of the C-efficiency ratio depends on the evolution of the other two factors. 
In particular, 
 
  		 


	,  and  
 
  		  1    	    	,	
 
TE represents tax expenditure in VAT and PR stands for potential VAT revenues, 
defined as final consumption multiplied by the standard rate. 
 
This decomposition shows that the C-efficiency ratio increased by 0.17 after the reform, 
as stated by some Moroccan authorities and observers, but this increase was totally due 
to a strong decrease in X-inefficiency, since the E-inefficiency ratio actually augmented. 
In other words, the VAT reform (elimination of exemptions and reclassification of 
products) did not contribute at all to the higher VAT efficiency observed since 2005. 
Actually, the opposite is true. Since the X-inefficiency ratio is computed as a residual, it 
not only captures improvements in the Tax Administration, lower evasion, and fraud 
levels, but also some other unknown factors, such as data errors in VAT revenues or 
consumption (in fact, prior to the reform the X-inefficiency ratio seemed surprisingly 
high in Morocco).   
 
 
Table 7. VAT Efficiency decomposition 
 2003/05 2006/11 2009/11 
C-Efficiency ratio 0.38 0.55 0.55 
E-Inefficiency ratio  0.10 0.12 0.12 
X-Inefficiency ratio 0.52 0.32 0.33 
Source: own calculations based on DGI data 
 
The reason why the pure elements of the VAT reform (elimination of exemptions and 
reclassification of products) have not contributed to the observed increase of the VAT 
efficiency ratio lies in tax expenditures, which have actually increased after the reform. 
Between 2003 and 2005, tax expenditures in VAT represented on average 1.54% of 
GDP, while they increased to 1.85% between 2006 and 2011 (although they show a 
downward trend after 2008: 1.82% in 2009/11). In terms of final consumption, the VAT 
expenditure augmentation was even higher: 0.42 points (from 2.03 in 2003/05 to 2.45 in 
2006/11).  
 
Potential revenue (total final consumption multiplied by the standard rate) can be 
decomposed into actual revenue, tax expenditures and X-inefficiencies (evasion, tax 
administration inefficiencies, etc). Between 2003 and 2005, actual VAT revenues 
represented 38.2% of potential revenues, while they increased to 55.2% between 2006 
and 2011. Tax expenditures accounted for 10.1% of potential revenues in 2003/05, 
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while they increased to 12.1% in 2006/11. Finally, X-inefficiencies dropped from 
51.7% to 32.7% between both periods. 
 
 
  Table 8. VAT decomposition 
 2003/05 2006/11 2009/11 
DH. Million 
Potential revenue  76751 108987 115501 
Actual revenue  29353 60514 63882 
Tax expenditure  7780 13341 13950 
X-inefficiency  39618 35132 37669 
% of Potential revenue 
Potential revenue  100.00 100.00 100.00 
Actual revenue  38.17 55.42 55.19 
Tax expenditure  10.13 12.27 12.12 
X-inefficiency  51.70 32.32 32.69 
Source: own calculations based on DGI data 
 
In sum, changes in the list of exemptions and reclassification of products have not 
contributed to the observed increase in VAT revenues. The reform has restrained the 
creation of new exemptions rather than reduced them.  
 
b) A positive consequence of the reform is the publication of an annual tax expenditure 
report, making the tax system more transparent. Total tax expenditures have increased 
after the reform, from 2.9% to 3.9% of GDP. About half of total tax expenditure is 
credited to VAT. Regarding sector distribution, currently the most benefited sectors are 
agriculture (about 21% of total expenditure), food industry (19%), public services 
(15%), and real estate (12%). In this sense, it must be mentioned that the agricultural 
sector was initially supposed to be taxed from 2010, the deadline was first postponed to 
2013, and the King announced that it will eventually become taxable in 2014.  
 
 
 Table 9. Tax Expenditure Structure (2003/05) 
 % of Actual Revenue % of GDP % of Total Tax Expenditure 
VAT  25.7 1.54 53.8 
CIT 22.8 0.71 24.8 
PIT 4.1 0.20 6.9 
Excise Taxes 4.3 0.13 4.4 
Trade 9.3 0.13 4.4 
Other 13.9 0.16 5.7 
Total 14.7 2.9 100 
Source: Direction General des Impôts 
 
 
Table 10. Tax Expenditure Structure (2006/11) 
 % of Actual Revenue % of GDP % of Total Tax Expenditure 
VAT  22.7 1.9 47.2 
CIT 13.8 0.7 18.3 
PIT 13.2 0.5 12.6 
Excise Taxes 7.1 0.2 4.8 
Trade 8.1 0.1 3.5 
Other 39.4 0.5 13.6 
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Total 16.9 3.9 100 
Source: Direction General des Impôts 
 
 
c) Another positive result of the reform is that the reimbursement period for companies 
has been reduced from six to three months in 2008, and a new mechanism is being 
introduced to facilitate reimbursement for qualified companies (according to their tax 
compliance records and other characteristics). Yet, the VAT credit stock accumulated 
over the years remains a major problem. 
 
d) With regard to equity aspects, no significant changes seem to have occurred. The 
modest redistributive effect of the VAT observed in Morocco stems from a general and 
a specific factor. The former is that, although the poor benefit from exemptions and 
reduced rates in basic products, the rich benefit as well, and much more in absolute 
terms, since they spend more. In addition, poor people purchase more intensively than 
rich people in informal markets. The reason behind  the modest redistributive results of 
the VAT in Morocco is that some exemptions and reduced rates are based on equity 
reasons, but many others seem to obey to different reasons. 
 
In 2001, the effective VAT rate for the poorest 20% was 3.9%, while only increased to 
5.2% for the richest 20%. In 2007, it augmented to 4.7% for the poorest and decreased 
to 5.1% for the richest. This implies that the VAT was slightly progressive before the 
reform and mostly neutral after it. The Reynolds-Smolenski index (difference between 
pre and post-tax Gini indexes) became slightly negative after the reform. In sum, the 
reform has shown negative effects in terms of equity. This result could be adequate if at 
the same time it had implied a strong increase in VAT revenues that could be partially 
used to compensate the poor, but this has not been the case, since tax expenses have 
actually increased.  
 
 
Table 11. Distributive effects of the reform. 
Quintile (households) Effective VAT rate  
2001 2007 
1 (poorest) 3.9 4.7 
2 4.2 4.8 
3 4.5 5.0 
4 4.9 5.1 
5 5.2 5.1 
Reynolds-Smolenski index (expenses) 0.22 -0.035 
Source: Soudi (2009).  
 
 
Before and after the VAT was reformed, almost half of products taxed at 0%, 10%, and 
14% were consumed by the wealthiest 20%. On the contrary, the poorest 20% only 
consumed about 5.9% (2.5% before the reform) of the products taxed at 10%, about 
6.5% of the products taxed at 0%, and about 5.9% of the products taxed at 14%. In sum, 
only those products taxed at 7% seemed to follow a distributive logic.  
 
 
Table 12. Consumption Structure. 2001 
 Quintile (households)  
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Products 
taxed at 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
7% 10.1 14.7 18.2 22.9 34.1 100.0 
10% 2.5 5.2 9.6 16.1 66.6 100.0 
14% 5.2 9.0 13.7 21.7 50.3 100.0 
20% 4.7 8.2 12.7 20.9 53.6 100.0 
0% 6.8 10.7 14.8 20.9 46.8 100.0 
Total 6.5 10.3 14.5 21.0 47.8 100.0 
Source: Soudi (2009).  
 
 
Table 13. Consumption Structure. 2007 
 Quintile (households)  
Products 
taxed at 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
7% 11.8 15.1 18.7 22.2 32.1 100.0 
10% 5.9 10.1 14.6 20.4 48.9 100.0 
14% 5.9 9.8 14.2 21.4 48.7 100.0 
20% 5.4 9.6 14.0 20.3 50.8 100.0 
0% 6.5 10.5 14.2 20.2 48.5 100.0 
Total 6.5 10.5 14.5 20.5 48.0 100.0 
Source: Soudi (2009) 
 
 
3.2 Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
The Moroccan VAT is still plagued with distortions. Rates are high compared to other 
developing countries and their number is excessive. VAT expenditure still amounts to 
about 1.8% of GDP, while VAT credit stock is still accumulating. Nevertheless, some 
positive results are also found, such as a reduction in the reimbursement period for those 
companies actually reimbursed.  
 
On the other hand, the continuous reform process that has characterised the Moroccan 
VAT is still ongoing. After the 2005 reform and given its poor results, a new reform is 
currently being discussed in the country. The lack of coherence and tax stability can be 
a source of problems for taxpayers and the tax administration. 
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform  
 
4.1 Political factors 
 
a) Main structural characteristics of the political regime 
 
Morocco is officially a 'Constitutional Monarchy' where political decision-making 
remains centred around the King and his close advisers, commonly called the 
“Makhzen” (broadly composed of the palace and its wide network). While Morocco’s 
political system is evolving from a strongly centralised monarchy to a parliamentary 
system, the King is the central power, in practical and symbolic terms and still retains 
much of the executive power. However, according to independent information provider 
CountryWatch Inc., democratic gestures and programmes do not mean that any real 
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democratisation is taking place. As a matter of fact, according to the Constitution, the 
King is both the highest political and the religious authority. The Monarchy represents a 
principle that is considered to be inviolable and beyond question and open criticism of 
the King and the royal family is a solid taboo in Moroccan politics (FORUM, 2011). 
 
Democratic institutions exist and elections are held regularly. However, the political 
system is divided between those institutions and the Monarch. The “Makhzen” 
maintains control over decisive political decision-making, while the Government and 
the Parliament largely function as technocratic managers of state affairs and provide 
democratic legitimacy (Kausch, 2009). The King chairs the Council of State that 
endorses all legislation before it goes to Parliament, and approves and may dismiss 
government ministers. He presides over the Council of Ministers and appoints the 
government as well as high officials in strategically important ministries. He may 
dissolve Parliament, call elections, and can legislate via royal commissions, can rule by 
decree and can veto any parliamentary or governmental decision. The King is head of 
the military, appoints judges, and is also tied to significant domestic economic 
enterprises.  
 
The co-option of political elites, civil society, the media and the business sector has 
been used by the Makhzen to sideline political opponents (Kausch, 2009). Strong co-
optation has gradually weakened opposition which has translated into a very fragmented 
political party system, which also serves the interests of the Makhzen, and cements the 
supremacy of the monarchy as the central, unifying political power (El Katiri, 2012). 
Since the late 1990s, the Monarchy successfully absorbed large numbers of politicians 
from the political opposition by co-opting major parties and bringing them into 
government. The Monarchy has also rationalised its supporting parties through the 
creation of the Parti Authenticité et Modernité (PAM), also known as the ‘King's party’. 
Members of most parties have been co-opted into successive governments and have put 
aside any calls for political and constitutional reforms. The major political parties 
Istiqlal (Independence), the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (UFSP) and the 
Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS) played the political game, to some degree, 
according to the King's rules.  
 
The degree of institutionalisation of political parties is generally low and parties have 
little control over the members of Parliament, and no voting discipline is enforced (BTI, 
2012). There are widespread complaints that politicians do not consult sufficiently 
within their respective parties before making decisions. According to the results of a 
poll conducted by Maroc2020 in April 2002 regarding political attitudes of the 
Moroccan public, 24% of those surveyed claimed not to be sure of what distinguishes 
political parties from one another and 44% were “not at all aware.” Only one fifth of the 
public considered themselves linked to political parties (5% as militant supporters and 
16% as sympathizers). Only 21% thought political parties completely reflect the needs 
and priorities of Morocco, while 48% said they do to a limited extent, and 37% claimed 
they do not at all (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Fride, 2008). This 
situation has resulted in a relative status quo and apathy that has dominated the 
Moroccan political scene for the past decade (Dennison et al., 2011).  
 
In this political context, tax reforms are difficult to implement without the support of the 
Monarchy and the people close to the King. For the Government, it is difficult to set 
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long-term strategies. In addition, Morocco’s political system is more prone to be 
captured by lobbies than other democracies.   
 
 
b) How the political context conditioned the reform  
 
The parliamentary elections held in 2002 were the first ones since King Mohammed VI 
came to the throne in 1999. These elections were described as generally open and more 
transparent than previous ones, although the turnout was quite low (51%).  The elections 
also introduced the proportional system instead of the majority vote one which had been 
in place beforehand. The Moroccan socialist party (UFSP) obtained the most seats and 
the outgoing government coalition kept a strong majority in the legislature, with the 
USFP remaining the largest party in the House of Representatives (50 seats). Following 
the election, the King appointed the former Minister of Interior, Driss Jettou as Prime 
Minister, and a new Government was formed with the same political parties that had 
supported the coalition as before the election. Thus, there were no major shifts of power 
resulting from these elections. However, the most outstanding feature of these elections 
was the strong gain made by the Islamist party, Justice and Development Party (PJD), 
which doubled its vote share to become the third largest Party in Parliament. 
 
The 2007 elections were also characterised by a record-low turnout (only 37% of 
registered voters). In the 2007 elections for the Chamber of Representatives, the lower 
house of Parliament, the Socialist Union of People’s Forces (USFP), previously the lead 
party in the governing coalition, came in third, while the conservative Independence 
Party (Istiqlal) won majority and the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) 
came second. Following the elections, Istiqlal Party leader Abbas El Fassi became 
Prime Minister. 
 
The government in place from 2007 until 2011 comprised both pro-regime parties and 
former opposition parties. As mentioned above, with the exception of the PJD, all the 
major political parties have played by the rules of the game of the Makhzen, and none 
of them have either had the possibility or the will to challenge the Makhzen’s political 
dominance.  
 
In 2011, the political climate in Morocco was shaken by protests inspired by the Arab 
Spring in neighbouring countries. Although the protests in Morocco were more peaceful 
than in other countries in the region, the demands for reform were very similar, focusing 
on political change, fighting corruption, and a more inclusive development process. 
Demonstrations of students and activists were held across the country on February 20th 
2011. In response to the protests, King Mohammed VI announced in March 2011 the 
launch of a comprehensive process of political, institutional, and social reform that 
eventually led to the revision of the Constitution. While the new Constitution preserves 
many of the King's existing powers, it also requires him to choose the Prime Minister 
from the Party that won the most seats in parliamentary elections, and consult the Prime 
Minister before dissolving Parliament. Other provisions include giving official status to 
the Berber language, calling for gender equality, and emphasising respect for human 
rights. The new Constitution was largely approved in July 2011 in a referendum with 
over 98 percent of the vote. The ensuing constitutional reforms are aimed at improving 
Morocco’s governance framework through greater checks and balances between the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It is a first step towards a redefinition of 
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the social contract between the citizens and the authorities, the balance of powers, and 
the institutionalisation of the political regime.   
 
The revised Constitution also led to early elections held in November 2011, in which 
low turnout and a high rate of protest votes demonstrated that Moroccans are still 
sceptical that the political process can positively impact their lives. The latest legislative 
elections in November 2011 saw a large victory of the PJD, taking nearly 30% of the 
seats. For the first time an Islamist party won legislative elections in Morocco and, 
according to the new rules of the Constitution, Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane 
from the PJD took office in January 2012.  
 
4.2 Institutional framework  
 
According to international indicators, institutional quality in Morocco is relatively high 
compared to other countries in the region and other lower-middle income countries 
(Transparency International, 2010). The World Bank Governance Indicators (GI) 
average reaches -0.35 in Morocco in 2006/10 (in a -2.5/+2-5 scale), while the NA and 
the lower-middle income countries averages are -0.55 and -0.51, respectively. The 
International Country Risk Guide Index (sum of all components) amounts to 70.6 in 
Morocco (0-100 scale) and to 66.6 and 53.0, respectively, in the other two groups. 
However, it must be mentioned that both indices decreased between the first and the 
second half of the 2000’s. Concerning the quality of democracy, the indicator Voice and 
Accountability of the GI amounts to -0.76 in Morocco, higher than the regional average 
(-1.23) but lower than the lower-middle income countries average (-0.42). Nevertheless, 
the component Democratic Accountability of the ICRG is higher in Morocco (4.68) than 
in the other two groups (2.77 and 3.04, respectively). The efficiency of the State is also 
higher in Morocco. The indicator Government Effectiveness (GI) is -0.17 in Morocco, -
0.40 in NA, and -0.55 in the lower middle income countries, while the component 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) reaches 2.0 in Morocco and 1.80 and 0.99 in the other two 
groups, respectively (0-4 scale). Finally, corruption is also lower in Morocco. The 
indicator Control of Corruption (GI) is -0.31 in Morocco, -0.52 in NA, and -0.57 in the 
lower-middle income countries group. The values of the component Corruption (ICRG) 
are 2.92, 2.18, and 1.87, respectively (0-6 scale), and the Corruption Perception Index 
values are 3.321, 3.35, and 2.73 (0-10 scale), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Institutional quality. 2006/2010 average 
 Morocco North Africa 
(middle-
income 
countries’ 
average) 
Lower 
middle-
income 
countries 
(average) 
World Bank Governance Indicators (average) (-2.5 
to +2.5 scale) 
-0.35 -0.55 -0.51 
International Country Risk Guide index (sum of all 
components) (0 to 100 scale) 
70.6 66.6 53.0 
Quality of democracy    
Voice and Accountability  (GI) (-2.5 to +2-5 
scale) 
-0.76 -1.23 -0.42 
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Democratic Accountability (ICRG) (0 to 6 
scale) 
4.68 2.77 3.04 
State Efficiency    
Government Effectiveness (GI) (-2.5 to +2-5 
scale) 
-0.17 -0.40 -0.55 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) (0 to 4 scale)  2.00 1.80 0.99 
Corruption    
Control of Corruption (GI) (-2.5 to 2-5 scale) -0.31 -0.52 -0.57 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale)  2.92  2.18 1.87 
Corruption Perception Index (0-10 scale). 3.32 3.35 2.73 
Source: The World Bank (Governance Indicators), The Political Risk Service Group (ICRG), and 
Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index) 
 
 
Despite its relative high institutional quality when compared to its neighbours and other 
lower-middle income countries, there are some problematic areas that, to some extent, 
explain some of the poor results obtained in the reform. 
 
a) The acute centralisation of decision-making, combined with the fragility of 
representative bodies, such as political parties and trade unions, seem to have made the 
implementation of the VAT reform more difficult and partly explain the limited 
achievement so far. 
 
Legislation may be initiated either by the Prime Minister or by one of the Houses of 
Parliament. A law passed by the Parliament becomes effective only after it has been 
promulgated by royal decree. If the King disagrees with a law, he may return it to the 
Parliament for re-examination or settle the issue through popular referendum. Hence, 
reforms largely depend on the King’s will. 
 
It can be argued that Moroccan taxation has been in constant evolution in recent years, 
as changes were brought annually with the Budget Law in order to provide economic 
incentives to certain sectors, or to respond to the interests and needs of specific 
economic or social groups (Conseil Economique et Social, 2012). All stages of the 
budget process are indeed totally dominated by the Executive; while Parliament 
theoretically exercises its control on public finance, its power is in reality often 
bypassed mainly because of Article 51 of the Constitution (art. 77 in the new 
Constitution) which allows the Government to oppose any proposal of the Parliament 
implying a fall in revenues or an increase in taxes. Since almost any tax measure has 
one of these consequences, this gives a strong power to the Government. The 
Government can also call for a vote of the entirety or a part of the budget, keeping only 
amendments proposed or accepted by the Government. In other words, no amendment 
is receivable without the government's agreement (Cherkaoui, 2001). 
 
As a matter of fact, the Government has often used the provisions of Article 51 of the 
Constitution in order to pass Budget Laws in recent years. The over-use of Art 51 has 
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been criticised, mostly by opposition parties.5 Some have even called for the 
suppression of Art 51 on the grounds that it is an anti-democratic instrument.6  
 
Since the 2005 VAT reform has been mainly implemented through the annual Budget 
Law, this centralisation of decision-making together with the fragility of representative 
bodies has facilitated the status-quo.  
 
b) The elites enjoy a strong power. The Royal House and the people close to it form a 
very effective power with strong economic interests. Some tax benefits (including those 
in VAT) seem to respond to these interests. The under taxation on agriculture or 
construction is a cut-clear example.  
 
Business organisations are highly organised in Morocco and exercise their influence 
through several channels: the media, the Parliament, politicians, and the Royal House. 
Not all sectors have the same influence, and this implies distortions in competition and 
an increase in tax rates for the losers to compensate tax benefits granted to the winners. 
Employer’s associations as well as unions are represented (with right to vote) in the 
upper Chamber. 
 
c) Another key issue is corruption. Although the country is not badly ranked by 
international indicators, given its level of development, corruption is common in the 
Moroccan bureaucracy, in particular in low skilled public employees. In fact, corruption 
in the form of bribes and extortion has become a kind of parallel tax for some taxpayers. 
However, some steps have been taken. An anti-corruption agency was created in 2008. 
It serves as an advisory institution to public, private and non-governmental actors on 
policies to prevent corruption, but it lacks investigative and sanctioning powers to 
adequately pursue corruption.  
 
d) Transparency is another important element. There are still de facto limitations on 
freedom of expression. Morocco was ranked 89th out of 139 countries in 2002 by the 
Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom Index, 120th out of 167 in 2005, 122nd out of 
173 in 2008, 135th out of 179 in 2010, and 136th out of 179 in 2013. In other words, 
freedom of expression has been deteriorating since 2002. In that year the right to order 
the suspension of a publication if it undermines Islam, the Monarchy, “territorial 
integrity” or public order was given to the Prime Minister in the press code. It is also 
worth mentioning that the King has the authority to appoint the heads of public radio 
and television stations and the president and four board members of the High Authority 
for Audio-Visual Communication. According to the BTI (2012), journalist 
imprisonment has increased since 2008.  
 
The new Constitution adopted in 2011 enshrines basic principles of openness, 
transparency and accountability. The basic principles of increased transparency and 
accountability contained in the new Moroccan Constitution now need to be translated 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 See "Parlement : Article 51 : encore et encore!", http://www.maghress.com/fr/challenge/3686  
6 See "Equilibre budgétaire : Faut-il abroger l’article 51 de la Constitution?", 
http://www.financenews.press.ma/portail/?tmpl=component&print=1&option=com_content&id=5995  
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into specific policies and laws. These include the adoption of a new budget law 
introducing performance budgeting and fiscal transparency, a law on access to 
information and a policy on public consultations.  
 
Morocco is considered among the 14 countries out of 100 surveyed in the Open Budget 
study, which made a significant change between 2006 and 2012. The Government is 
developing new regulations that aim at strengthening fiscal transparency by reference to 
the highest international standards, including the Organic Law on the Finance Act and 
the law on access to information. According to the 2012 Open Budget Survey, Morocco 
achieved a score of 38 in 2012 (compared to 28 in 2010). Morocco’s score indicates that 
the Government provides the public with minimal information on the national 
government's budget and financial activities during the course of the budget year. This 
makes it challenging for citizens to hold the government accountable for its 
management of the public’s money.  
 
Regarding the tax reform, transparency has been important in two aspects. On the one 
hand, a very positive element has been the elaboration and publication since 2005 of a 
tax expenditure report. For the first time, the costs of exemptions and reduced rates have 
been transparent, which is a very important element for any reform. On the other hand, a 
negative element is the scarcity of studies and reports about the distributive impact of 
the reform. In any VAT system and reform, it is of paramount importance to know how 
the tax burden is distributed across households and who are the winners and losers of 
the reform. There is only one official study on this issue, elaborated by the Haut 
Commissariat au Plan. This would not be a major concern if researchers and scholars 
could elaborate their own studies, but the necessary information to carry them out is not 
available.  
 
In sum, in spite of progress made, Morocco continues to suffer from a weak legal and 
institutional framework, both in policy and practice. This stems from problems such as 
an absence of checks and balances on executive power, weak conflict of interest 
safeguards, a lack of whistle blower protections, an opaque budgetary process, and 
limited access to information (Johnson and Martini, 2012).   
 
4.3 Social support 
 
Morocco has a long tradition of developing social programmes to fight poverty. In 
particular, the social fund Caisse de Compensation, established in 1941, aims to increase 
the welfare of the poorest through subsidies and stabilisation of the prices of some basic 
goods. In 2001, annual subsidies amounted to 216 MDH (about €20) per head, and in 
2007 they had increased to 522 (about €45). Yet, the distributive impact of these 
subsidies is very limited. Subsidies have increased by 133.7% for the poorest 20% and 
by 148.7% for the wealthiest 20%. In 2001, subsidies accounted for 4.5% of total 
consumption for the former and for 1.8% for the latter. In 2007, these figures increased 
to 7.6% and 3.3%. In other words, subsidies in terms of consumption in 2007 were 1.69 
times those in 2001 for the poorest 20% and 1.83 times for the richest 20%. All in all, 
subsidies are progressive but show a low redistributive capacity. The Kakwani index 
(difference between the Gini index for incomes and the concentration index for 
subsidies) and the Reynolds-Smolenski index (difference between pre and post-
subsidies Gini indexes) are positive. Nevertheless, progressivity has decreased between 
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2001 and 2007, while the redistributive capacity has increased thanks to more generous 
subsidies.  
 
 
Table 15. Subsidies per head  
 Quintile (households)  
MDH per head 1 2 3 4 5 Total 
2001 119.8 163.9 198.6 242.7 355.5 216.1 
2007 280.0 377.3 475.2 593.2 884.1 522.0 
Increase (%) 133.7 130.2 139.3 144.4 148.7 141.6 
% of total 
consumption       
2001 (a) 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.8 1.8 2.6 
2007 (b) 7.6 6.4 5.9 5.2 3.3 4.6 
(b)/(a) 1.69 1.64 1.79 1.86 1.83 1.77 
Source: Soudi (2009) 
 
 
Table 16. Subsidies. Progressivity and redistributive capacity 
 2001 2007 
Kakwani index 0.203 0.198 
Reynolds-Smolenski index 0.006 0.007 
Source: Soudi (2009) 
 
However, since subsidies are not targeted to poor families, but rather to commodities, as 
with the VAT, wealthy citizens also benefit from subsidies, and this has some relevant 
consequences. First, it is a costly approach to redistribute income. In addition, if 
subsidised commodities’ world prices increase, it can seriously damage public finances. 
Second, not all subsidies seem to be progressive, for example fuel subsidies are 
regressive. Third, in the 1980’s there were strong riots against the price increases on 
bread and other basic products. To some extent, this is still present in the minds of 
policy makers, and can influence decisions in regard to certain products, not only with 
respect to subsidies, but also to the VAT. 
 
Social spending remains relatively low in Morocco. Public expenditure on health is 
about 1.9% of GDP, lower than the lower-middle income countries’ average (3.2% in 
2006/10) and the NA countries’ average (2.4%). Social security covers a small fraction 
of workers and for most people health problems can seriously worsen their economic 
situation. Concerning education, although public spending on education is higher in 
Morocco than in the lower-middle income and NA (5.4% of GDP in 2006/10 vs. 4.9% 
and 5.0%, respectively), literacy rate is much lower (54.5% vs. 79.0 and 71.9%, 
respectively). The King himself recognised the poor quality of public education in his 
official speech of August 2013.  
 
4.4 Avoidance, evasion, and informality 
 
Although much caution must be taken regarding informal economy estimates, since 
they often provide inconsistent results, its weight in GDP in Morocco is similar to other 
countries in the region, and lower than the average for lower-middle income countries 
(47.8%, 40%, and 34.1%, respectively). Despite complaints from formal companies 
about evasion and informality, they were not a key element in the reform. On the other 
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hand, the high VAT rates, the excessive number of rates and exemptions, and the lack of 
actual reimbursement for many companies can become an invitation to evasion and 
avoidance.  
 
Table 16. Informal economy  
 Morocco North Africa 
(middle-income 
countries’ 
average) 
Lower middle-
income 
countries 
(average) 
Informal economy (% of GDP). 35.8 35.5 37.5 
Source: Schneider (2012). 
 
 
 4.5 Tax policy and administration 
 
 
Tax policy has traditionally been in a continuous reform process in Morocco, creating 
problems for both the tax administration and the taxpayers. It lacks a rationale and 
consistent planning. On the contrary, it has been largely used to develop investment 
policies and to benefit certain sectors or social groups. This hinders any tax reform, 
since it creates reform fatigue in the tax administration and in the taxpayers and lack of 
trust in tax reforms. In this sense, it must be mentioned that a new Tax Code was 
introduced in 2007. 
 
Regarding the tax administration, it has been going through a reform process since the 
early 2000’s. Broadly speaking, this process has contributed to modernising the tax 
administration and allowed the following changes:  
 
a) Many operations have been decentralised to the regional offices.  
 
b) Large Tax Payers units have been created.  
 
c) Electronic declarations have been introduced 
 
d) Regarding human resources, a broad reform was carried out. Many civil servants 
were offered attractive packages to leave the Administration, while younger and more 
qualified personnel were hired. The recruitment process became more competitive and 
adapted to the needs of the tax administration 
 
e) A new system of risk management has been introduced.  
 
f) A new information technology master plan was introduced. 
 
 
In sum, the Moroccan tax administration was not an obstacle to the VAT reform. The 
technical capabilities of the staff are appropriate and it was modernised following 
international standards. However, a number of negative aspects remain. First, the tax 
administration has a too much power to interpret the tax legislation. Second, although 
efforts to improve the relation with taxpayers have been made, many taxpayers still 
believe that there is arbitrariness regarding tax audits and inspections.   
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4.6 Economic factors 
 
Economic factors were key factors in the reform process, both as cause and engine. The 
introduction of the VAT in Morocco in 1986 and, to some extent, the 2005 VAT reform 
as well, were driven by the deeper integration of Morocco in the global economy and 
the sharp reduction of trade tax revenues. Yet, the economic context did not influence 
the particular design of the reform. It took place in a buoyant economic context, and 
economic factors, such as a fiscal crisis did not condition the reform. A favourable 
economic context should fuel tax reforms that imply social costs, since compensations 
for losers can be more easily financed. But at the same time a good economic context 
makes tax reforms less urgent, and consequently they foster the status quo.  
 
4.7 External actors 
 
Morocco enjoys strong support from the United States, France and Spain, and the EU. 
In October 2008, Morocco became the first country in the southern Mediterranean 
region to be granted the advanced status in the framework of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. The advanced status marks a new phase of privileged relations 
with the EU, including increased economic support and financial cooperation which 
translated into a substantial increase in funding. The National Indicative Programme for 
the three-year period 2011-2013 is close to €580 million, compared to €654 million for 
the four-year period 2007-2010; this is a €30 million increase per year. 
 
External actors have been a key factor in the VAT reform; in particular, the IMF and the 
EU. The former has contributed by providing technical assistance and by making 
recommendations while the EU gave financial assistance and reached a compromise 
with Moroccan Authorities to implement the tax reform. In fact, the 2005 VAT reform 
was part of that compromise. Yet, it must be reminded that the agreement signed 
between both parties was not made public, and that no public official goals were 
explicitly mentioned in the reform.   
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THE INTRODUCTION AND POLICY CHANGES OF THE VALUE-ADDED 
TAX IN UGANDA 
 
THE INTRODUCTION AND SUBSEQUENT POLICY CHANGES OF THE VALUE-
ADDED TAX IN UGANDA 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• To reform the overall 
tax system 
• To introduce a value 
added tax 
 
Mixed 
results 
• High informality. 
• Strong influence of vested interests (political and 
economic elites). 
• Low institutional quality: lack of transparency and 
accountability. 
• Lack of taxpaying culture among taxpayers 
• A tax system perceived as unfair 
• Inadequate levels and quality of public expenditures  
• Culture of corruption’ in the Tax Administration 
• Lack of public trust in the government.  
• Decreasing levels of poverty but increasing inequality. 
• The VAT introduction perceived as threatening small 
traders, owing largely to misunderstanding of the 
impacts of the tax. 
• Institutionalised consultation process but moot 
because stakeholders’ recommendations, interests, 
and opinions (especially the private sector) are 
consistently not taken into account. 
• Distrustful relationship between the government and 
the private sector. 
• Civil society does not usually participate in the tax 
reform processes. 
• High levels of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
• Continuous modernisation of the Tax Administration 
• Strong political support.  
 
 
 
1. Economic Outlook 
 
Uganda is a landlocked country surrounded by Kenya (in the East), South Sudan (in the 
North), the Democratic Republic of Congo (in the West), Tanzania (in the West) and 
Rwanda (in the Southwest). Uganda has a population estimated at 30.7 million 
inhabitants of which half is aged below 15 years according to the 2009/10 Uganda 
National Household Survey (UNHS) (UBOS 2010). According to the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI), Uganda’s population was estimated to be 36.3 
million in 2012. With regard to the spatial distribution of the population, the population 
is predominantly rural (85%) and this has remained the same since 2005/06 (UBOS 
2010). 
 
In 2012, with a gross national income (GNI) per capita of US$440, Uganda was 
classified as low-income country according to the World Bank’s estimates. Its GDP per 
capita in 2012 was US$547, well below the East African Community (EAC) average of 
US$577.80.  
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
113 
 
 
Although Uganda has experienced reduction in poverty levels over the past two 
decades, income inequality has worsened; it went from 36.5% in 1992/93 to 42.6% in 
2009/10 (Uganda MoFPED 2012). According to the World DataBank WDI, the Gini 
index in Uganda was 44.3 in 2009, compared to 47.7 in Kenya, and 50.82 in Rwanda. 
The decline in poverty has mainly been explained by concerted efforts on the part of the 
government of Uganda to combat poverty through the Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP) which was recently succeeded by a National Development Plan (NDP) (AfDB 
2010). However, the number of "insecure non-poor" people has increased from 33.4% 
of the population to 42.9.0% (i.e. approximately 13.2 million people). These are people 
who, while able to meet their basic daily needs, earn incomes that are highly volatile, 
therefore highly likely  to fall back into absolute poverty during economic troubles or 
illness (AEO 2012). 
 
 
Table 1: Macroeconomic outlook 
 Uganda Average SSA 
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), 2011 1 345 3 550.8 
GINI index, 2009 44.3 45.2 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), 2006/10 24.18% 24.35% 
Openness rate (2006/10) 52.65% 79.43% 
Source: The Uganda National Household Survey, various years (Uganda MoFPED 2012), World 
DataBank, World Development Indicators. 
 
 
The per capita GDP has been growing at an average annual rate of 3.6% since the 
beginning of the 2000s. The real GDP growth is projected to reach 4.9% in 2013 and 
5.5% in 2014 (AEO 2012).  
 
With respect to output structure in Uganda, agriculture is the most important economic 
sector regarding the employment, employing over 80% of the work force, but it 
contributed only 23.7% to GDP in 2011/12 compared to 57.0% of GDP in 1990 (AEO 
2012). The Ugandan economy is currently highly oriented toward the service sector 
(mainly wholesale and retail trade; repairs; transport and communications; real estate 
activities) which represented 45.1% of GDP in 2011/12 compared to 11% of GDP in 
1990 (see table below). Since 2001/02, the industry sector’s share in production has 
remained stagnant. It has been suggested that the industry’s contribution could be much 
higher in Uganda if more investment is made in infrastructure, especially given that 
“cheap and effective infrastructure is a pre-requisite for industrialisation” (AfDB 2010). 
 
Uganda continues to rely on primary commodities such as cocoa, coffee, cotton, 
flowers, fish, tea and tobacco as well as cement, which altogether accounted for 40% of 
total exports in 2011. However, the primary commodity export structure might 
significantly change in the next decade, with the recent discovery of oil in the Albertine 
Graben, in western Uganda. Commercially viable oil reserves were first discovered in 
2006 and, since then, approximately 20 major discoveries of oil and gas reserves were 
made. Industry experts estimate that Uganda would produce around 200 000 barrels per 
day by 2020, with this rate expected to be maintained for about 10 years depending on 
technological developments in the oil industry.  
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The Ugandan government has planned to earmark oil revenue, estimated to be around 
US$2 billion to US$3 billion per year during peak production notwithstanding volatility 
of international markets and uncertainty over the exact volume of Uganda’s oil reserves, 
to finance infrastructure investment in transport, energy, agriculture or human 
development. This would create a tremendous opportunity to boost and restructure the 
Ugandan economy should the government be successful in reducing the threat of the 
Dutch disease by either slowing the appreciation of Uganda’s real exchange rate or 
boosting the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector (AEO 2012). Furthermore, it 
will be crucial that oil revenue does not distract the Ugandan government from 
generating revenue from more politically demanding forms of taxation such as 
corporate income tax on other industries, personal income tax, value-added tax and 
excise taxes.  
 
The taxation system in Uganda is composed of: a Personal Income Tax (progressive 
with tax rate of 30%), a Corporate Tax (tax rate of 30%), and a Value Added Tax (tax 
rate of 18%) with exemptions and zero-rating available in certain cases (Uganda 
Revenue Authority 2011). 
 
The tax-to-GDP ratio in Uganda is one of the lowest in Sub-Sahara Africa with an 
average tax revenue that has stagnated between 12% and 13% of GDP over the last 
decade (see table below). This inability to increase the tax revenues is mainly explained 
by a generous tax exemption stem and numerous loopholes in the tax regime (AEO 
2012). 
 
With regard to the tax structure, the most important taxes in Uganda are the income 
taxes (mainly pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) and corporate tax) which represented on average 
30% of net Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) collections between 2006/07 and 
2011/12. During the same period, the VAT represented 15% of the net URA collections 
while taxes on international trade (e.g. petroleum duty, import duty, VAT on imports, 
excise duty, etc.) accounted for 50% of the net URA collections.  
 
 
Table 2: Summary of Uganda's Tax Structure, (UShs. Billion)
1
 
 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
       
Gross Revenues 2813.6 3302.5 3848.3 4369.6 5313.3 6381.1 
Domestic Taxes 1409.3 1623.0 1875.8 2351.3 2816.2 3388.6 
Direct Domestic Taxes 727.4 862.2 1028.9 1303.1 1665.1 1991.9 
Excise duty 185.3 217.0 242.6 274.1 315.6 362.2 
Value Added Tax 412.6 480.7 525.9 671.4 724.2 923.2 
Fees and Licenses 83.9 62.5 78.3 102.7 111.3 111.2 
International trade taxes 1376.4 1633.7 1891.7 1960.7 2441.7 2905.3 
Government taxes 27.9 45.9 80.8 57.5 55.3 76.1 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 Currency equivalents: as of 04 October 2013, 1 EUR = 3,476.45 UGX. 
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Tax Refunds -160.0 -95.5 -105.9 -105.6 -143.6 -168.5 
Net URA collections  
(Gross revenue Excl. 
Govt. taxes & Tax 
Refunds) 
2625.7 3161.1 3661.6 4206.5 5114.3 6136.4 
       
Direct Domestic Taxes (% 
Domestic taxes) 
51.6 53.1 54.9 55.4 59.1 58.8 
Excise duty (% Domestic 
taxes) 
13.2 13.4 12.9 11.7 11.2 10.7 
Value Added Tax (% 
Domestic taxes) 
29.3 29.6 28.0 28.6 25.7 27.2 
       
Direct Domestic Taxes (% 
Net URA collections) 
27.7 27.3 28.1 31.0 32.6 32.5 
Excise duty (% Net URA 
collections) 
7.1 6.9 6.6 6.5 6.2 5.9 
Value Added Tax (% Net 
URA collections) 
15.7 15.2 14.4 16.0 14.2 15.0 
Nominal GD at market 
prices 
21,187.00 24,497.45 29,971.77 34,530.15   
39,051.00  
  
49,087.07  
Tax : GDP ratio 12.39% 12.90% 12.22% 12.18% 13.10% 12.50% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax policy Department. 
 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform 
 
Since 1966, Uganda’s economy has suffered from devastating policies and instability 
that have considerably delayed economic growth and development in the country. In 
particular, under the dictatorial regime of President Idi Amin (1971-79), the economy 
was devastated by policies such as, the expulsion of Asians and the expropriation of 
their assets. The local businesses were placed under the management of the Ugandan 
army officers and supporters of the President, who lacked entrepreneurship skills and 
business acumen. This coupled with the nationalisation of businesses and industry and 
the expansion of the public sector worsened the already declining economy (Weinstein 
2006). Under President Milton Obote (1980-85), the country was plagued by massive 
human rights violations, which resulted in further economic decline. The rule of 
President Yoweri Museveni since 1986 has brought relative stability, economic reforms, 
and economic growth to Uganda (AfDB 2010).2 
 
This prolonged political unrest and civil war, a long period of mismanaged economy 
which ended in 1986, caused a collapse of the revenue collection of the country. By 
1990, tax revenues in Uganda had declined to 5% of GDP, one of the lowest levels in 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 The Uganda Community Tourism Association (UCOTA), Uganda's history, viewed 24 July 2013, 
http://www.ucota.or.ug/about-us/uganda-history. 
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sub-Saharan Africa. Revenue was heavily dependent on export taxes; however, tax 
policy had become volatile, unpredictable and constituted a serious hindrance to trade, 
investment and enterprise. Additionally, during that period, tax administration capacity 
had substantially deteriorated (Kuteesa, et al. 2009).  
 
The tax administration in Uganda, a department of the Ministry of Finance during that 
period, was characterised by low tax collections in an environment of narrow tax base, 
low tax compliance, tax evasion, corruption and collusion between tax administration 
officials and taxpayers. Moreover, decision-making concerning tax issues were heavily 
influenced by rent-seeking behaviours. Information about tax laws, rules, and 
regulations was not generally available or readily accessible even to policymakers and 
administration officials. This situation encouraged corruption, created serious inequities 
in tax outcomes and further undermined revenue collection (Kuteesa, et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, two consumption-based taxes namely the sales tax and commercial 
transaction levy (CTL), the predecessors of the VAT, were imposed on a narrow tax 
base. The sales tax was imposed only on manufacturing products and the CTL was 
imposed on services; thus leading to double taxation. Additionally, efforts to boost non-
trade related tax collection from the sales tax and the commercial transaction levy were 
disappointing with insufficient revenue yield (Lawrence 2011). 
 
2.2 The causes of the reform 
 
Which factors made it possible to reach an agreement of introducing a VAT in Uganda? 
Apart from the need to take this step, the following factors were crucial in leading to the 
reform: 
 
The political instability and civil war (1985-1986) that characterised Uganda since its 
independence in 1962 left the government’s revenue administration in a state of near 
collapse. The introduction of VAT in 1996 despite popular resistance, the most 
significant single reform, was part of a broad reform programme of transforming the 
economy and rebuilding Uganda’s public administration that began during the 1990s. It 
started with the formation of the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) as a semi-
autonomous revenue authority in September 1991. The main objectives of the 
introduction of the URA were to improve revenue performance; improve its human 
resource capacity and breaking the culture of corruption through competitive 
remuneration packages, improved recruitment process, staff development and training 
and ethical conduct; to reduce political interference within the tax administration; and to 
modernise systems (AfDB 2010, Soest 2008). Since 1991, the Uganda Revenue 
Authority has spearheaded revenue administration reforms in the country to make the 
tax system more transparent and productive. In particular, in 1992, the government 
announced that one of its objectives was to achieve fiscal sustainability and reduce its 
dependence on aid by raising the revenue/GDP ratio by one percentage point every year 
(Kuteesa, et al. 2009).  
 
These reforms were mainly the initiative of the IMF and were inspired by the example 
of Ghana. The political leadership during that time collaborated closely with the Bretton 
Woods Institutions and the British Government which provided substantial initial 
technical support (AfDB 2010, Soest 2008).  
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The tax administration reforms were accompanied by adjustments in tax policies. 
Before the creation of the URA, tax revenue was heavily dependent on the export tax on 
coffee and on high import duties. Since 1991, in accordance with the government’s 
liberalisation of the trade regime strategy, the export trade taxes were abolished (Soest 
2008). Consequently, the need to expand the tax base and significantly increase 
revenues, mainly from indirect taxes, led to the introduction of the broader-based VAT 
in July 1996 at a rate of 17% (AfDB 2010). 
 
2.3 Main changes introduced by the reform 
 
As aforementioned, the introduction of VAT in Uganda was part of a much broader 
reform of the public sector. The VAT was introduced in Uganda in 1996. Despite initial 
resistance by traders, strong political support enabled VAT to be implemented. It 
replaced the Sales Tax and the Commercial Transactions Levy (CTL) and as such was 
expected to improve both economic and administrative efficiency. The introduction of 
the VAT was to widen the sales and CTL tax base to include all goods and services and 
make the tax system more equitable for businesses and consumers. A standard rate of 
17% was initially chosen to keep the new tax revenue neutral in the short term, i.e. to 
achieve approximately the same yield from VAT as was previously obtained from sales 
tax and CTL, and thus avoid any increased tax burden and distortions that might 
threaten its public acceptability. In 2005, the VAT rate was increased to 18% with most 
basic goods and services exempted or zero-rated as an attempt to protect the poor 
(Kuteesa, et al. 2009).  
 
The VAT threshold was initially set at UShs 20 million (or approximately 5,755 EUR)3. 
As a result, given that Uganda is mainly a cash economy, many traders, out of the 
population of about 16,000 VAT registered enterprises, were unable to cope with the 
accounting requirements of the new VAT tax system. Subsequently, the VAT threshold 
was increased from UShs 20 million to UShs 50 million (or approximately 14,385 
EUR) in order to reduce the burden of administering an excessively large VAT register 
(Kuteesa, et al. 2009). 
 
With respect to the exemption regime in Uganda, it was already a cause for concern in 
the 1990s. Tax exemptions not only created equity problems, complicated tax 
administration, and resulted in significant revenue losses, but they were also influenced 
by special interest groups and provided opportunities for abuse. In particular, it has been 
argued that many tax incentives and exemptions have been imposed on URA by 
political leaders outside formal tax policy formulation and administration processes 
(AfDB 2010). To achieve more transparency in the exemption process and curb these 
negative effects, the 1996 Value Added Tax Act sharply curtailed the Minister of 
Finance’s discretionary power to grant exemptions. Under the Act certain supplies were 
VAT exempt, such as milk, maize, dental, medical, financial and insurance services, 
passenger transportation etc. (AfDB 2010, Kuteesa, et al. 2009). 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 Currency equivalents: as of 04 October 2013, 1 EUR = 3,476.45 UGX. 
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As aforementioned, the VAT was introduced in a broader tax reform package. In 
particular, the personal income tax and the tax administration experienced major 
changes in the 1990s.  
 
In 1997, the government of Uganda promulgated a new Income Tax Act with the 
objectives of levying tax on a residence basis and promoting simplicity of the tax law. 
Similarly to the VAT Act, the Income Tax Act sharply curtailed discretionary powers to 
grant exemptions. It reduced the personal income tax rates to four main bands (0%, 
10%, 20% and 30%) and set an annual threshold income subject to income tax at UShs 
1,560,000 (or approximately 449 EUR)4. The Income Tax Act also introduced a 
presumptive tax at a rate of 1% for businesses with a turnover of less than UShs 50 
million per annum with the objective to bring business persons in the informal sector 
into the tax system (AfDB 2010, Lawrence 2011, Soest 2008, Teera 2003). 
 
The customs tariff reform took place in 1996 with the aim to increase revenue from 
import duties. It aimed at reducing tariff rates, simplification of tax structure, reduction 
of exemptions and phasing out import bans, import license requirements and pre-
shipment inspection (Lawrence 2011). 
 
Following the establishment of URA, administrative reform focused on breaking the 
culture of corruption by screening staff, strengthening URA’s capacity and, to a limited 
extent, modernising systems. Since then, the URA has undergone further structural and 
institutional reforms as well as a modernisation programme (AfDB 2010). 
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1 Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by 
national authorities 
 
In terms of comparing the objectives of the reform of revenue generation and expansion 
of the tax base with actual results, the results of the VAT reforms are mixed. Although 
the VAT introduction has been successful in expanding the tax base, the anticipated 
VAT yield to reach the regional norm of 5% of GDP did not occur (Kuteesa, et al. 
2009).  
 
Since VAT was intended to be revenue neutral when it was introduced, VAT collections 
during the first two years were about the same as the combined sales tax and CTL 
collections in 1995/96 (at around at 3.3% of GDP). They started to increase in 1998/99 
(3.7% of GDP).5 The highest yield of 4% of GDP was reached in 2005/06. It then fell 
back to 3.7% of GDP in 2006/07. This relatively slow progress is largely attributable to 
the gradual extension of the exempt and zero-rated lists, the numerous loopholes in the 
tax regime, a large portion of the informal sector that falls outside the tax net, and the 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 Currency equivalents: as of 04 October 2013, 1 EUR = 3,476.45 UGX. 
5 The increase in VAT revenue in the initial years is attributed to the entry into the Uganda market of a 
number of international telecommunications and supermarket operators and some administrative 
improvements (AfDB 2010, Soest 2008). 
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fact that administrative capacity and tax compliance did not improve as much as 
expected (AfDB 2010, Kuteesa, et al. 2009, Soest 2008).  
 
The theoretical literature provides two sets of indicators of VAT performance that allow 
comparison across countries: the "C-efficiency ratio" and the "VAT gross compliance 
ratio". The C-efficiency ratio is calculated as the ratio of VAT revenue collection as a 
percentage of total consumption expenditure6 divided by the standard VAT rate. This is 
a traditional measure of the effectiveness of the VAT in raising revenue and an indicator 
of the departure of the VAT from a perfectly enforced tax levied at a uniform rate on all 
consumption, with no exemptions. In other words, the C-efficiency ratio implicitly 
compares the revenue actually collected from VAT with that which would be raised if 
VAT were perfectly enforced and levied at a uniform rate, equal to the standard rate, on 
all consumption, and with no exemptions (potential VAT collections). As such, the 
C-efficiency will be 100% if the VAT is a broad-based, single tax rate, and perfectly 
enforced. Intuitively, any departures from a C-efficiency of 100% would stem from two 
sources: the extent to which the VAT differs in design from a uniform tax on all 
consumption with no exemptions and the extent to which its implementation is 
imperfect7.  However, it is important to note that a C-efficiency closer to 100% does not 
necessarily imply a better VAT; indeed, although the C-efficiency can be increased, for 
example, by denying VAT refunds to exporters, or by introducing exemptions for 
intermediate goods, this will have the effect of undermining the role of the VAT as a tax 
on domestic consumption. 
 
The VAT gross compliance ratio is similar to the C-efficiency ratio except that the 
compliance ratio relates VAT collections to private consumption expenditures rather 
than aggregate consumption expenditures.  
 
The figure below shows the two efficiency measures, C-efficiency ratio and VAT gross 
compliance ratio, for Uganda between the fiscal years 2004/05 and 2011/12. The overall 
trend in Uganda during that period is toward a consistent decrease in the VAT 
performance, especially since a significant drop in VAT efficiency in 2008/09 
coinciding with the spillovers of the global financial crisis. The average C-efficiency 
and VAT compliance ratio during that period were 11.7% and 13.4% respectively in 
comparison to a World average C-efficiency of 51% (Bird and Gendron 2011). 
Compared to Rwanda and Kenya in the East Africa Community, Uganda appears to be a 
low performer on both measures. In Rwanda, the average C-efficiency and VAT 
compliance ratio were 22.8% and 27.8% respectively between 2002 and 2009 compared 
to 39.6% and 48.5% in Kenya between 2007 and 2011. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 This refers to final consumption expenditure aggregated over government, households, and non-profits 
(Keen 2013). A C-efficiency ratio of, say, 20%, implies that if the standard VAT rate is increased by one 
percentage point, the shares of the VAT revenues in total consumption expenditure is expected to increase 
by 0.2 percentage point.  In general, the higher the ratio, the better is the performance of the VAT.   
7 This is linked to two interrelated factors, i.e. the level of tax compliance (tax morale) and the 
effectiveness of the tax administration (Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2010). 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the C-efficiency ratio and VAT gross compliance ratio in 
Uganda 
 
 
Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, and Ministry of Finance, Tax policy Department 
 
 
Overall, despite the aforementioned tax policy and administration reforms undertaken in 
Uganda since the 1990s, Uganda’s tax revenue has remained stagnant over the past 
decades and inadequate to cover government expenditures.8 This inability to increase 
tax revenue is largely attributable to generous tax exemptions and numerous loopholes 
in the tax regime, as well as the structure of Uganda’s economy the biggest proportion 
of which is composed of subsistence or small-scale agricultural and informal sectors. 
Poor tax administration and the inability to curb tax evasion and corruption are other 
contributing factors. This situation has resulted into persistently increasing national 
budget deficit. For 2012/13, the government is forecasting an increase in the non-oil 
domestic revenue to 13.3% of GDP. Even if it is reached, this rate would still be 
considerably lower than other East African and sub-Saharan countries (AEO 2012). 
 
3.2 Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
As described in the previous section, the C-efficiency ratio and VAT gross compliance 
ratio in Uganda are far below the regional and international standards.  
 
The uncharacteristically low efficiency levels may be attributable to a certain number of 
factors such as: the significant number of exemptions given by government to 
businesses over the years; the poor tax compliance culture; the predominance of the 
informal sector and the use of cash in business transactions in the Uganda’s economy; 
the erosion of institutional autonomy and deficiencies in URA’s governance and 
management structures demonstrated for example by the rampant corruption (AfDB 
2010, Kuteesa, et al. 2009, Soest 2008).  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
8 As aforementioned, by 1990, tax revenues in Uganda had declined to 5% of GDP and after 24 years, the 
tax to GDP ratio is about 13.7%. 
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In particular, the VAT system in Uganda is hampered by numerous exemptions that 
tend to be distortionary, opaque, inequitable, and create leakages and an “exemption 
creep” with economic and political elites lobbying for more and more exemptions. 
Additionally, the revenue-generating function of VAT is also hindered by a narrow-
based revenue system and a large informal sector. 
 
The low VAT registration threshold (UShs 50 million) tends to increase the tax 
administration burden and compliance cost without the added benefit of increased 
revenue collection. Given that Uganda’s economy is mainly a cash economy, a large 
number of VAT registered small businesses are unable to cope with the accounting 
rigidity of the VAT system. This also increases opportunities for tax leakages (Kuteesa, 
et al. 2009). A study conducted by the URA mentioned that the VAT threshold must be 
increased to UShs 200 million (or approximately 57,540 EUR)9 to improve 
administration costs and minimise the tax leakages. 
 
Furthermore, the VAT system in Uganda is characterised by an inefficient refunds 
system. Specifically, non-timely refunds exacerbated by inadequate refund 
appropriations lead to a building-up of arrears which constrains the cash-flow of 
businesses and created fertile ground for corruption, as some taxpayers attempt to 
hasten their refund payments through inducements to tax officials. Additionally, lengthy 
audits are conducted to ascertain the accuracy of returns.  
 
Overall, these factors undermined taxpayer confidence in the VAT system and its 
credibility; thus exacerbating tax evasion and tax avoidance (Kuteesa, et al. 2009).  
 
Finally, the VAT system in Uganda has been claimed to lead to an increase in 
commodity prices when all businesses, including those exempt, raise their prices at the 
rate of the tax, thereby triggering long-lasting inflation. However, no studies have been 
conducted to demonstrate that VAT is inflationary in Uganda.  
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform  
 
4.1 Political factors 
 
a) Main structural characteristics of the political regime 
 
Uganda gained independence from Britain in 1962. The Republic of Uganda is a 
presidential republic with a multiparty political system restored in 2005. The first 
elections under the new multiparty political system were held in 2006. The government 
exercises the executive power; the legislative power is vested in both the government 
and the parliament (formed by the National Assembly); and the President (elected by 
popular vote to five-year term) is both chief of state and head of government. The 
system is based on a democratic parliamentary system with universal suffrage for all 
citizens over 18 years. The unicameral National Assembly is composed of 375 
                                                 
 
 
 
9 Currency equivalents: as of 04 October 2013, 1 EUR = 3,476.45 UGX. 
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parliamentarians; 238 members elected by popular vote, 112 women directly elected, 25 
nominated by legally established special interest groups (army, disabled, youth, and 
labour).10 
 
b) How the political context conditioned the reform  
 
After two and a half decades of war and political instability that followed Uganda’s 
independence in 1962, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime of President 
Museveni that came in power in 1986 spearheaded a period of peace and political and 
economic reforms. However, despite strong support for tax policy and administrative 
reforms, the national political leadership may have undermined tax revenue collection 
through ad hoc decisions on related matters (AfDB 2010).    
 
First, during the early stages of the preparations for the introduction of VAT, there was 
a lack of initial political commitment that undermined URA effectiveness in 
implementing the VAT (Kuteesa, et al. 2009). The government, through the Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) kept a relatively low profile 
during the preparatory phase. The responsibility for managing the reform process and 
sensitising the public and parliamentarians fell disproportionately on the URA. This 
raised doubt about the political commitment to the VAT project. Furthermore, poor 
communication between the MoFPED and the URA contributed to initial administrative 
glitches and fuelled the uncertainty in the trading community about the government's 
precise VAT strategy. In particular, going against the URA advice of avoiding 
additional changes that might disrupt the introduction of VAT, the government 
introduced some additional tax measures in the 1996/97 budget, such as a higher rate of 
duty on imported second hand clothing and increased fuel taxes. This provoked a strong 
reaction from small traders who were to be mainly affected by these cumulative changes 
and from other non‐compliant taxpayers who were not prepared for the additional 
scrutiny required by the self‐accounting VAT mechanism. In September 1996, the small 
traders launched a ‘VAT strike’, which threatened to overturn the reforms (Kuteesa, et 
al. 2009). Despite this initial resistance from the small traders, strong political support 
enabled VAT to take root; the President himself had to intervene to sensitise 
representatives of the trading community in order to dispel fears about the VAT and 
emphasise its advantages on business (e.g. keeping books and records) and the economy 
as a whole. Another key factor that helped to end the strike was the support for VAT by 
larger traders and manufacturers, for whom VAT was seen as a means to reduce their 
cost of doing business. The strike eventually ended in October 1996.  
 
Second, the national political leadership in Uganda has been known over the years to 
intervene on an ad hoc basis on matters touching tax exemptions and tax incentives. In 
particular, many tax incentives and exemptions have been imposed on URA by political 
leaders outside formal tax policy formulation and administration processes (AfDB 
2010). Additionally, there has been a strong influence of vested interests (political and 
economic elites) in the tax incentive regime demonstrated by a gradual extension of the 
                                                 
 
 
 
10 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the World Factbook, Uganda, viewed 24 July 2013, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html. 
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exempt and zero-rated list that tend to benefit elites at the expense of the poor. Overall, 
the tax incentive regime in Uganda, in spite of the associated weak economic rationale, 
has been used as a means of delivering patronage benefits to key interest groups and 
effortlessly indicating commitment to private sector development.11 The President has 
been personally involved in the extensive award of tax incentives and exemptions to 
potential investors on an ad hoc basis (AfDB 2010). However, the political will to 
reduce the many exemptions provided by tax policies has been lacking (Soest 2008). 
 
Overall, the mismanagement/abuse of the tax exemption and incentive regime has a 
great potential to undermine tax reforms. Tax reforms can increase revenue performance 
only if tax exemptions are reduced to a minimum. Moreover, reducing the incidence and 
adverse impact of tax exemptions such as distortions, tax leakages, revenue losses, 
undermining of the tax base and thus the revenue potential and widening the tax gap, 
would require a strong political will to take some bold steps. These include: keeping tax 
exemptions simple and transparent; monitoring data that quantifies the associated direct 
revenue losses (tax expenditures are yet to be assessed and published in Uganda); 
granting exemptions at the end of the filing of tax return so as not to obviate interaction 
of investors with the tax administration; and granting incentives that require regular 
negotiated agreements for renewal.12 
 
4.2 Institutional framework  
 
The table below provides a brief evaluation of the institutional quality in Uganda and in 
some other countries in the east African community (EAC) in different areas such as 
corruption, quality of democracy, state efficiency, etc. 
 
 
Table 3: Institutional Quality, 2006-2011 average 
 Uganda  Rwanda Kenya  Burundi  Tanzania EAC 
Average 
Quality of Democracy       
Voice and Accountability  
(GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
-0.50 -1.27 -0.23 -0.80 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.59 
Democratic Accountability 
(ICRG) (0 to 6 scale), 2006-
2010 average 
2.50  5.32  4.00  
State Efficiency       
Government Effectiveness 
(GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
-0.49 -0.13 -0.54 -1.10 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.55 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 
(0 to 4 scale), 2006-2010 
average 
2  2  1  
Corruption       
Control of Corruption (GI) (-
2.5 to 2.5 scale) 
-0.84 0.17 -0.95 -1.08 
 
-0.41 
 
-0.62 
                                                 
 
 
 
11 “The political economy of tax incentives in low-income countries”, viewed on 31 July 2013, 
ttp://www.ictd.ac/en/commentary/incentives-politicaleconomy. 
12 “The political economy of tax incentives in low-income countries”, viewed on 31 July 2013, 
ttp://www.ictd.ac/en/commentary/incentives-politicaleconomy. 
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Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 
scale) 
2.00  0.64  2.93  
2012 Corruption Perception 
Index (TI) (0-100 scale) 
(Rank among 176 countries) 
29 
(130) 
53 
(50) 
27 
(139) 
19  
(165) 
35 
(102) 
 
Source: World DataBank, Worldwide Governance Indicators; the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG); Transparency International. 
 
 
According to Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2013, a 
substantial portion of respondents agreed that the level of corruption has increased in 
Uganda over the past two years. Moreover, 57% of respondents in Uganda felt that 
political parties and the parliament respectively were extremely corrupt, while 88% and 
73% of respondents felt that the police and public officials/civil servants respectively 
were extremely corrupt.13  
 
In 2009, the URA was ranked as the second and seventh most corrupt public institution 
in Uganda and in the three EAC countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) respectively, 
and corruption still remains a challenge in the country (AfDB 2010, Soest 2008). 
Allegations of large-scale corruption involving senior politicians and government 
officials continuously dominate the news in the country. For example, the alleged theft 
of about USD 20 million of development assistance at the prime minister's office in 
2012 resulted in the suspension of donors' budget support in November 2012 for a 
period of at least six months (AEO 2012). The high incidence of corruption in Uganda 
has undermined the success of VAT reforms in the country and has constituted an 
obstacle to development, by producing a climate of mistrust between the government 
and the taxpayers (AfDB 2010, Soest 2008). Moreover, the low level of political 
commitment to tax compliance has made it difficult to deal with corruption and has not 
permitted URA to enforce taxes effectively (Kuteesa, et al. 2009).  
 
This culture of distrust has, in turn, contributed to low ‘tax morale’ in Uganda and the 
concomitant low levels of tax evasion and avoidance. Tax morale in Uganda is 
undermined by the public perception that due to corruption and mismanagement, there 
is no tax value visibility, i.e. government has not been delivering value for money with 
resources made available for public services delivery. This has reduced the 
accountability and the legitimacy of the public sector regarding taxation and public 
spending. As such, the low tax morale will thereby limit the scope for an increase in the 
fiscal space to meet public service delivery targets; thus undermining the success of tax 
reforms in the country (AfDB 2010).  
 
It appears that the media contributed to a somewhat smooth transition from sales tax to 
VAT. The URA Commissioner General and senior management made weekly press 
briefings and field visits for two months following the VAT introduction in order to get 
prompt feedback from the public. Additionally, special VAT education sessions were 
                                                 
 
 
 
13 Global Corruption Barometer 2013, viewed 31 July 2013;  
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=uganda. 
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held for staff of media organisations to allow for the dissemination of information and 
get the print and electronic media on the side of the URA (Kuteesa, et al. 2009).  
 
Finally, there is an institutionalised consultation process on tax related matters in 
Uganda with the objective to developing a sound tax policy and legislation;  however, 
stakeholders’ recommendations, interests, and opinions (especially the private sector) 
are not consistently evaluated and taken into account during these tax consultations; 
thereby rendering the process moot.  
 
4.3 Social support 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the introduction of VAT in 1996 raised a 
particularly strong opposition from the small traders who felt that they would be 
negatively affected by the introduction of VAT. This was accompanied by a higher rate 
of duty on imported second hand clothing and increased fuel taxes (Kuteesa, et al. 
2009). However, more recent VAT reforms were mainly opposed by civil society due to 
the perception of an unfair tax system and insufficient public expenditure towards the 
poor. In particular, there is no evidence of any concrete initiatives to develop a fiscal 
contract between the government and its citizens whereby the government pledges 
specific socio-economic benefits to justify taxation (AfDB 2010).  
 
The expansion and intensification of basic social services is crucial to achieving state 
legitimacy among the population; however, the government of Uganda continues to 
prioritise infrastructure expenditure in the budget, especially capital spending in the 
energy sector (AEO 2012, AfDB 2010). As a result, the budget allocation of other key 
sectors such as health has been reduced. The healthcare system still remains 
underfunded, particularly in areas such as child and maternal health. Uganda’s maternal 
mortality ratio increased from 435 per thousand live births in 2005 to 438 in 2011, 
considerably above the Millennium Development Goal target of 131. After past 
successes in the fight against HIV, the HIV prevalence rate has increased over the past 
few years, from 6.4% to 7.3% between 2005 and 2011 (AfDB 2010). Notably, the 
2012/13 budget allocation of 7.8% for health was below the 10.0% recommended by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO) (AEO 2012). 
 
Moreover, although Uganda has experienced reduction in poverty levels over the past 
two decades, income inequality has worsened; from 36.5% in 1992/93 to 42.6% in 
2009/10 (Uganda MoFPED 2012). 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, although there is an institutionalised consultation 
process on tax related matters in Uganda, stakeholders’ recommendations, interests, and 
opinions (especially the private sector) are rarely taken into account. This might have 
explained the VAT strike by small traders in 1996 and the social resistance, especially 
from the civil society, to recent VAT reforms in the country.  Furthermore, Uganda is 
characterised by a lack of citizen’s participation in the decision-making process. There 
seems to be a public apathy in demanding accountability, quality public service, 
transparency, etc., mainly due to distrust of government, which is exacerbated by 
illiteracy and a large portion of the population relying on subsistence or small-scale 
agriculture. 
 
4.4 Avoidance, evasion, and informality 
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The low level of tax morale in Uganda has led to the high levels of tax evasion and 
avoidance. In the current decade, revenue collection has stagnated, levelling at 13.4% of 
GDP in 2013 as a result of, among other factors, the inability to curb tax evasion and 
avoidance, and the predominance of the informal economy (i.e. part of the economy 
evading taxes, duties, or laws and regulations) which has been estimated to be as high as 
43% (Kuteesa, et al. 2009). The predominance of a large informal sector that is outside 
the tax net as well as tax evasion and tax avoidance have also been identified as 
contributing to the narrow tax base in Uganda. Tax evasion in Uganda is widespread 
and constitutes “a serious constraint to Uganda‘s ability to raise resources” (Kuteesa, et 
al. 2009, AfDB 2010). 
 
According to Schneider (2012) who estimated the size of the shadow economy, i.e. all 
market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed 
from public and would generally be taxable were they reported to the tax authorities, 
Uganda appears to have the largest size of the shadow economy slightly above the 
average figure for Sub-Saharan Africa (40.5%). 
 
 
Table 4: Size of the shadow economy in % of GDP (2004-2007) 
Rwanda Kenya Uganda SSA 
39.53 31.75 41.48 40.50 
Source: Schneider (2012). 
 
 
The URA's response on tax evasion was first to increase taxpayer education and 
information in order to increase awareness. Second, enforcement action, including field 
spot‐checks on businesses, was carried out which included temporary close of 
recalcitrant traders’ premises. However, due to harassment complaints and petitions 
made to the government by the trading community, these enforcement measures were 
suspended in the late 1990s. This restriction of fair enforcement of non‐compliant 
taxpayers constituted a serious setback to revenue administration and to URA's 
credibility and thus hampered the tax reforms. Subsequently, compliant taxpayers 
complained about the lack of enforcement and the resulting unfairness and called for 
widening of the tax net. URA was thus led to carry out limited but targeted enforcement 
(Kuteesa, et al. 2009).  
 
According to the 2009/10 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS), out of the 
estimated 6.2 million households covered, around 1.2 million (21%) had an informal 
business. Additionally, there were a total of 1.8 million informal businesses with 27% 
of the businesses in the agriculture sector and 24% in trade and services (UBOS 2010). 
The expansion of informal sector in Uganda was mainly explained by the economic 
crises and the civil war in the 1970s and the 1980s, the rising poverty and the effects of 
HIV/AIDS (difficult conditions of living for orphans, substantial medical expenses, etc.) 
(Muwonge, Obwona and Nambwaayo 2007).  
 
In order to tackle the informal sector in Uganda, it has been suggested that the URA 
should bring the informal sector into the tax net by increasing efforts for presumptive 
taxation through detailed sector studies of informal sector firms (Uganda Debt Network 
2008). Additionally, the integration of the informal sector into the tax net would require 
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pursuing supply-side policies such as the increased provision of public services in 
informal markets (such electricity, sanitation, development of market places, etc.) and 
micro-finance schemes. The implementation of demand-side policies such as promoting 
linkages between informal and formal businesses through sub-contracting is also 
important. However, such efforts have yet to be put in place in Uganda to assess their 
efficacy.  
 
4.5 Tax policy and administration 
 
URA is a semi‐autonomous institution set up in September  1991 by URA statute No. 6 
of 1991. The establishment of the URA was spearheaded by the Minister of Finance 
following discussions on revenue administration reform with his Ghanaian counterpart 
during a Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting in 1990 (Kuteesa, et al. 2009). 
With the objective to insulate URA from both bureaucratic and political interference, 
the political leadership in Uganda and donors pushed for the employment of expatriates 
in high level positions of the URA (two Commissioner Generals of URA (1991-1997, 
2001-2004) and several top managers were expatriates) (Kuteesa, et al. 2009, AfDB 
2010, Soest 2008). Major tax reforms began after the establishment of the URA.  
 
At the time of the VAT introduction, conflicts began between the URA and the top 
political leadership, including the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development (MoFPED). The URA staff was suspected to be active in encouraging 
resistance by the general public. Subsequently, prompted by the President, the 
Parliament put the URA Board under the control of representatives selected by the 
Ministry of Finance in 1998; thus curtailing the mandate and administrative autonomy 
of the URA’s Board. Since then, URA has been subjected to close oversight and 
patronage by the political leadership. These conflicts might have fuelled the inability of 
URA to meet revenue targets set by the Ministry of Finance since 1996 (AfDB 2010, 
Soest 2008).  
 
One characteristic of the URA that undermined the success of the VAT reforms has 
been the issue of refunds. Non-timely refunds exacerbated by inadequate refund 
appropriations lead to a building-up of arrears which constrains the cash-flow of 
businesses and created fertile ground for corruption. This issue seriously undermined 
taxpayers' confidence in the VAT system and its credibility; thus exacerbating tax 
evasion and tax avoidance (Kuteesa, et al. 2009). Another detrimental factor for the 
success of tax reform in Uganda has been the widespread culture of corruption that has 
been responsible for low tax shares (AfDB 2010, Soest 2008).  
 
4.6 Economic factors 
 
The economic structure in Uganda remains largely reliant on subsistence or small-scale 
agriculture, non-taxed (informal) activities and small scale trading, and thus 
correspondingly less on high-productivity manufacturing. By nature, agriculture is 
difficult to tax and has been one of the contributing factors to the stagnation of revenue 
over the past decade (AfDB 2010). 
 
Moreover, the most significant tax reforms in Uganda took place in a context of 
economic recovery and development after almost two decades of political turmoil and 
war that left the economy in a state of near collapse (AfDB 2010, Soest 2008). This 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
128 
 
provided an additional impetus for the tax reforms but was not sufficient to sustain 
them.  
 
4.7 External actors 
 
Since 1991, donor involvement in Uganda’s tax administration reform has been strong, 
especially in the areas of human resource management, the autonomy of Uganda’s tax 
authority, and technical support. Overall, the persistent large gap between tax revenues 
and public expenditures framework, has given ample room for international donors to 
exercise considerable influence in Uganda‘s fiscal governance (AfDB 2010, Soest 
2008). 
 
For instance, in addition to their involvement in economic policy, donors participated in 
setting revenue targets. However, it has been argued that donors such as the IMF have 
often set high and sometimes unrealistic revenue targets, and the resulting failure of the 
URA to fulfil these targets has contributed to the tensed relationship between Uganda’s 
government and the revenue authority (Soest 2008). 
 
In addition, tax morale, as discussed previously, was undermined by the public 
perception that public services are predominantly funded with external resources; 
indeed, over the past two decades, external donor support has accounted for about 20% 
to 50% of the public expenditure budget in Uganda. In this context, Uganda‘s Members 
of Parliament have raised the concern that excessive reliance on external funding 
“impinges on the sovereignty of the country and constrains its economic budgetary 
choices”. As a result, they have encouraged the government to reduce the share of aid 
contributions to the national budgets and to set ambitious targets to increase domestic 
resources. Finally, the prospect of the impending substantial oil revenues, if well-
managed, may assist in reducing Uganda’s reliance on external resources and as a 
consequence, redefine the relationship between Uganda and international donors (AfDB 
2010). 
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Annex 1. URA’s Response to the Uganda Case Study 
 
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) continues to strive to be a centre of excellence and 
innovation and therefore values the efforts made to produce the Uganda case study. The 
case study adequately captures the status of implementation of VAT in Uganda in 1996. 
It further enumerates the challenges encountered thereafter. However, since 2005, URA 
has undergone a complete transformation of its processes, systems and people in order 
to address the tax administration challenges mentioned in the case study. It is important 
that the improvements and results arising from the reform initiatives be adequately 
captured in the case study. 
 
The following issues were noted from the Uganda case study: 
 
“The uncharacteristically low efficiency levels may be attributable to a certain number 
of factors such as: the significant number of exemptions given by government to 
businesses over the years; the poor tax compliance culture; the predominance of the 
informal sector and the use of cash in business transactions in the Uganda’s economy; 
the erosion of institutional autonomy and deficiencies in URA’s governance and 
management structures demonstrated for example by the rampant corruption.” 
 
Below are responses on the recent progress made to address the above mentioned 
issues: 
 
Exemptions 
Government has over the years deliberately issued exemptions through the VAT regime 
to support specific sectors of the economy in order to achieve accelerated economic 
development.  For example, the exemption on plant and machinery has resulted in the 
growth of the manufacturing sector. Last year government started a process to review all 
exemptions and as a result, a number of exemption provisions have been retired from 
the VAT regime during the financial year 2013/14. The Ministry of Finance in 
conjunction with Uganda Revenue Authority are due to carry out a full review of the 
exemptions regime in Uganda this year. This study is intended to measure the 
effectiveness and benefits of tax exemptions in the country which will go a long way to 
bringing on board initiatives to address non-compliance and subsequently broaden the 
tax base. 
 
The poor taxpaying culture 
Since 2005, URA embarked on an initiative to address the poor taxpaying culture. 
Every year, URA develops a stakeholder engagement strategy intended to reach out to 
sections of the taxpaying public to provide information, sensitization, training on 
various tax related topics. Over the last eight years, URAs taxpayer education 
programme have been carried out through: business forums for business executives, 
members of parliament, staff of other government institutions, clearing and commission 
agents, school competitions, tax clinics, radio and TV talk shows, newspaper strips and 
pictorials, monthly press briefs, localised meetings, tax hubs to bring services close to 
taxpayers. Further, URA has developed a primary up to tertiary school’s curriculum on 
tax, and URAs services have been made easily accessible to the taxpaying public. 
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The informal sector 
URA is collaborating with various Government agencies for example the Kampala 
Capital City Authority, National Social Security Fund, Uganda Communications 
Commission, Uganda Registration Bureau and Local Governments, to build interfaces 
and share information in order to target taxpayers in the informal sector. Further, URA 
has expanded the Withholding Tax regime in order to collect tax from suppliers that are 
off the tax radar and to follow them up for registration in order to increase the tax base.  
 
Improving compliance 
URA has developed and implemented systems for Customs and Domestic Taxes where 
data on declarations and payments is being captured by taxpayers. The available 
information is regularly matched to identify under reporting of income, under 
declaration of imports as well as non-registered taxpayers. This information is then used 
to enforce compliance. 
The rolled out motor vehicle registration and e-stamp duty services have enabled 
decentralisation of services countrywide resulting into improved turnaround times of 
services offered. Further, information obtained on ownership of properties is used to 
follow up non registered taxpayers as well as track expenditure of non-compliant 
taxpayers. These have been effective avenues for tracking taxpayers who operate using 
cash transactions.   
 
Erosion of institutional autonomy and deficiencies in URA’s governance and 
management structures demonstrated by the rampant corruption 
The transformation of URA that commenced in 2005 primarily started with ensuring 
that URA’s autonomy is secured. The organisation structure was top-heavy which 
encouraged bureaucracy and corruption. This was reviewed and structural levels 
reduced from 19 to 7. This initiative led to the dismissal of up to 500 staff, many of 
whom had poor integrity history. Other integrity initiatives were aimed at addressing 
recruitment processes, instituting disciplinary structures at departmental level, 
simplifying processes and enabling cross functional processing to reduce delays. 
Further, toll free telephone lines were instituted to help capture incidents of corruption 
and staff dismissed are published in the media. Regular surveys are carried out to 
measure public perception on URAs services. 
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THE 2012 PIT AND VAT REFORM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
 
THE 2012 PIT AND VAT REFORM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. SUMMARY 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• To increase tax 
revenue 
 
• To reform the PIT 
and the VAT 
 
• To reduce tax 
benefits 
Mixed 
results 
• The reform was designed under strong financial 
pressures 
 
• An unexpected dramatic increase in public spending 
and deficit, which was the immediate cause of the 
reform, credited by the public to a bad use of public 
resources 
 
• Low government effectiveness 
 
• Insufficient accountability and lack of transparency 
regarding budget policy 
 
• A low quality level of public spending and low social 
spending 
 
• A strong social opposition to the reform fuelled by 
corruption and judiciary scandals related to public 
spending 
 
• The considerable predominance of the executive 
branch among powers 
 
• The politicisation of the judicial power 
 
• The failure of formal negotiations between the 
Government and the rest of actors involved in the 
reform. 
 
• High tax benefits with a strong discrimination across 
sectors, and a high number of specific tax regimes 
 
• The relevance of Export Processing Zones and the 
lack of coordination in Central American countries 
with regard to the end of tax-related implicit export 
subsidies before 2015 
 
• The reform was implemented by a newly elected  
President, whose political party had majority in 
Congress 
 
• The dramatic increase in the President’s popularity, 
due to some measures adopted and the increasing 
social perception that the former President was 
responsible for the expansion of public deficit 
 
• A very negative perception of how public revenue is 
managed. 
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• The decision to allocate 4% of GDP to public 
education, a long-standing social demand  
 
 
1. Economic Outlook 
 
According the World Bank classification, the Dominican Republic (DR) is an upper-
middle income country. Income per head reached US$ 5,530 in 2011, while the Latin 
American (LA) average is US$ 6,836. Those figures amount to US$ 9,796 and US$ 
9,667, respectively, in PPP terms. Since 2000, income per head in constant and PPP 
terms has grown more rapidly in the Dominican Republic than the LA average: 4.5% 
per year vs. 2.9%,. As a matter of fact, the DR is the third fastest growing country in the 
region, after Panama and Peru.  
 
As in other Latin American countries, income distribution is very unequal. According to 
the last data available by the World Bank, the Gini index reaches 47.2 (49.3 in Latin 
America), although following a general trend in the region, income distribution has 
improved in recent years. The Poverty Headcount Ratio at national poverty line (% of 
population) is 42.7% on average of the period 2006/11, higher than the Latin American 
average (37.8%). It must be noted that this ratio has increased significantly during the 
first half of the 2000’s because of the crisis experienced by the country: from 31.9% in 
2000 to 47.8% in 2005. The opposite trend was observed in the second half of the 
decade: this ratio amounted to 40.4 in 2011. 
 
The economy of the Dominican Republic is less oriented to the primary sector than that 
of other countries in the region. The share of this sector in total output reached 6.2% in 
2008/11, almost four points below the LA average, while food exports represented 
23.3% of merchandise exports (37.1% in LA). In fact, the DR economy has been largely 
transformed over the last decades. After the deep crisis experienced in the 1980’s, the 
import-substitution policy was replaced by an export-led model based on Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) and tourism. Broadly speaking, the new policy was successful 
in terms of growth, although the country suffered a severe economic downturn 
generated by a banking crisis in 2003.     
 
Three other characteristics of the DR economy must be highlighted to understand its 
current tax system and future challenges. First, the country has pursued a policy of deep 
integration into the world economy in recent years. Various trade agreements have been 
signed, including the DR-CAFTA (Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade 
Agreement) between the US, the Dominican Republic and five Central American 
countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), which is of 
the utmost importance for the Dominican economy. Second, the aforementioned EPZs 
are very relevant in the DR, representing about half of total exports. According to the 
WTO rules, the tax benefits granted to those zones working as export subsidies must be 
abolished before 2015. Although this deadline has been postponed several times, the 
DR fears that this measure might have a very negative effect on exports and investment. 
Third, the electric sector is a permanent source of trouble for the economy and the 
Government. It is indeed a very inefficient sector, characterised by high generation 
costs, frequent blackouts, illegal connections, etc. It has traditionally been highly 
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subsidised and very costly for the Budget (subsidies amount to about US$1,150 in 
2012), but no Government has seriously tackled so far the challenge to modernising it.        
 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic Outlook 
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
GDP per head. 2011.  (PPP US $) 9,796 9,667 
Gini Index  47.2 49.3 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) (2008/11) 6.2 10.0 
Food exports (% of merchandise exports) (2008/11) 23.3 37.1 
Openness rate (2008/11) 61.8 73.3 
Source: The World Bank 
 
 
Regarding the Dominican Republic’s tax system, it is important to stress that tax 
revenue is significantly lower than the Latin American average. Total tax revenue 
reached 16.3% of GDP in 2006/10, while the Latin American average is 20.2%1. In fact, 
some studies have classified the Dominican Republic as a low tax-effort country: given 
its socioeconomic characteristics, the tax revenue potential is far from being fully 
exploited (Pessino and Fenochietto, 2010; Le et al., 2008 and 2012; Gupta, 2007; 
Alonso and Garcimartín, 2011). In addition, natural-resource revenue is not significant 
in the DR.   
 
On the other hand, tax collection increased in the DR at a much lower speed than the 
LA average since the beginning of the international crisis: 1.5% per year vs. 4.0%. In 
2007, the difference in tax revenue between the DR and the LA average was 2.7 points 
of GDP, while in 2010 it had increased to 5.1. Surprisingly, this has occurred in a period 
during which the DR economy grew faster than the LA average (1.8% per year). In 
other words, the response of tax revenue to economic activity is weaker in the 
Caribbean country.  
 
Table 2. Tax Revenue Statistics (2006/10 average) 
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
Total Tax Revenue (% GDP) 16.3 20.2 
Tax Structure (% of total revenue)   
Indirect Taxes  58.7 49.8 
VAT  27.7 34.5 
Excise Taxes 23.2 9.5 
Direct Taxes 25.1 26.7 
CIT 15.5 17.7 
PIT 5.9 6.8 
Social Contributions 11.5 17.8 
Source: IDB-CIAT 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 However, some researchers have assessed the Dominican Republic’s GDP is highly overestimated, and 
therefore the tax revenue/GDP is actually higher (see Selman and Collado, 2012). 
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Table 3. Tax revenue and GDP. Average annual growth (2008/10) 
 Tax revenue 
(a) 
GDP  
(b) 
Elasticity 
(a/b) 
Dominican Republic 1.28 5.49 0.23 
Latin America (average) 4.05 3.69 1.10 
Source: IDB-CIAT. The World Bank for GDP 
 
 
Regarding the tax structure, indirect taxes amount to 58.7% of total tax revenue (49.8% 
in LA). The most important tax category is the VAT (27.7% vs. 34.5% in LA), followed 
by excises (23.2% vs. 9.5% in LA). On the contrary, the Personal Income Tax (PIT) 
only accounts for 5.9% of total taxes (6.8% in LA). In sum, tax revenue in the DR is 
strongly biased towards indirect taxation.  
 
Finally, it must be noted that, due to trade policy, trade taxes have dramatically fallen 
over time. In 2000, they represented 3.5% of GDP, while in 2010 they had dropped to 
1.05%. The revenue lost by trade taxes has been compensated by an increase of VAT 
and Excises collection. 
 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform 
 
Several minor tax reforms were implemented in the Dominican Republic during the 
2000’s. They were mostly changes in the tax system aimed at increasing revenues rather 
than deep tax reforms, driven by public deficits, the fall in trade taxes, and the 2003 
banking crisis. These changes in the tax system mainly consisted of rates increase and 
the creation of new taxes.  
 
As a consequence, a complex, inefficient, low-yield and unequal tax system has 
developed over time, whose main characteristics can be summarised as follows. First, it 
had a low revenue potential. Second, it was strongly biased towards indirect taxation. 
Third, it was a complex system, plagued with particularities and specific regulations, 
and costly to administer. This was caused by an excessive number of tax benefits. For 
example, specific tax regimes existed for the EPZs, tourism, electricity generation, 
underdeveloped regions, the Haitian border, the cinema industry, textile, renewable 
energies, capital income in the PIT, many products were VAT-exempt, etc. A perverse 
dynamic was generated by this excessively generous tax benefit policy: some sectors 
benefited from it at the expense of others, and this discrimination led to an increasing 
number of sectors claiming and obtaining new tax benefits, thus enlarging the number 
of beneficiaries and reducing even more the tax base. In addition, the rationale and 
efficacy of many tax incentives was not clear. Fourth, as a consequence, tax expenditure 
was very high. In 2010 it represented 5.8% of GDP (4.3% in Latin America). Most of 
the tax expenditure was located in the ITBIS (Impuesto sobre las Transferencias de 
Bienes Industrializados; similar to a value-added tax) (62.3% of total tax expenditure), 
followed by the Tax on Hydrocarbons (10,5%) and the Income (Personal and 
Corporate) Tax, 9.5%. 
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Table 3. Tax expenditure (2011) 
Total (% GDP) 5.8 
VAT (% of total) 62,3 
Tax on Hydrocarbons (% of total) 10.5 
Income (personal and corporate) tax (% of total) 9.5 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
 
 
With respect to the different tax categories, the PIT was a low-yield tax, which was 
mainly due to three reasons. First, the rate schedule design left most taxpayers untaxed, 
while the rest was taxed at low rates. Thus, income exempt was equivalent to 1.82 times 
the income per head of the country, well above the LA, the upper-middle income 
countries’, and the OECD averages (1.41, 0.45, and 0.24, respectively). As a 
consequence, the total number of PIT taxpayers was very low: about 2.0% of total 
population (4.8% in LA; Barreix et al., 2013a). Since the PIT rate schedule was adjusted 
by inflation every year, this effect was not eroded over time.  
 
 
Table 4. PIT: Exempt Income (as a percentage of per capita income). 2010 
Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America Upper-middle 
income countries 
OECD 
182% 141% 45% 24% 
Source: Garcimartin (2012). 
 
 
On the other hand, exemptions and deductions reduced the tax base. Thus, Christmas 
bonus and most capital income were tax exempt, while education expenses were 
deductible. These tax benefits did not only reduce the tax base but were also regressive.  
 
Concerning CIT, although revenue was much higher than that collected by PIT (2.55% 
of GDP vs. 0.90% in 2006/2010), it was clearly below the LA average (3.46%). This 
was due to the large number of tax benefits granted in the DR, which reduced 
dramatically the CIT base. Conversely, the CIT rate in the period 2011/13 (29%) was 
above the LA average, although it is supposed to be dropped to its usual level (25%) in 
2014.  
 
Regarding the VAT, although its share in total tax revenue was significant in 
2006/2010, it was still well below the LA average: 4.5% of GDP vs. 6.8%. And yet the 
VAT rate was clearly higher in the DR: 16% vs. 14.8%. In fact, the VAT C-Efficiency 
ratio (defined as the share of the VAT in consumption divided by the standard VAT 
rate), which measures VAT revenue in terms of final consumption collected by each 
percent point of the standard VAT rate, was clearly lower in the DR: 0.27 vs. 0.45. 
Since this ratio should be equal to one in a context of no exemptions, no reduced rates, 
no evasion, and absolute efficiency of the Tax Administration, these factors explain the 
low efficiency of VAT in this country. The main factors behind the low efficiency of 
this tax were: the high number of exempt products and the fact that exemptions actually 
meant zero rate (exempt products were taxed at a zero rate with right to deduction). 
VAT expenditure amounted to about 22% of potential VAT revenue, while the LA 
average was 18% (Barreix et al., 2013b) 
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Table 5. VAT Outlook 
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
VAT revenue (% of GDP) (2006/10) 4.5 6.8 
VAT rate (2010) 16 14.8 
VAT C-efficiency (2010) 0.27 0.45 
Source: Barreix et al (2013b) 
 
 
2.2 The causes of the reform 
 
Many observers and political and social actors had long recognised that the Dominican 
Republic’s tax system needed a deep reform. Tax revenues were low and a number of 
inefficiencies, distortions, and inequalities had been accumulating over time. However, 
other factors fuelled the reform and conditioned its objectives and design and process. 
 
a) Between 2007 and 2010, total tax revenue decreased by 2.1 points of GDP (while the 
LA average increased by 0.3 point in the same period). Several factors accounted for 
this negative trend: the international crisis (although its impact was less intense in the 
DR), the fall in the CIT rate to 25% in 2007 (although it was later increased to 29%), 
the expansion of tax incentives, the ongoing fall of trade taxes, the elimination of some 
minor taxes, etc.  
 
b) While tax revenue was falling, expenditure was increasing at a rapid pace. Between 
2008 and 2012, total expenditures augmented by 14.2% per year on average. The joint 
effect of these opposite trends was a strong increase in public deficit. In 2004/07 it 
amounted on average to about 0.3% of GDP, while in 2008/12 it raised to 3.9%, and 
estimates of the Central Bank indicate that in 2012 it was well above 6%. This 
generated by late 2012 a severe financial problem for the Government, which had to 
demand assistance to international organisations (IMF, IDB), and an urgent need to 
increase revenue. In fact, this was the main driving force behind the reform. 
 
c) A new President was elected in May 2012. His political party had also won majority 
in Congress, and therefore the reform was feasible from a political point of view.  
 
In sum, the 2012 tax reform was driven by: 1) the financial needs of the Government in 
late 2012 due to a fall in revenues and a strong increase in expenses; 2) the majority in 
Congress of the newly elected President’s political party; and 3) the long-standing and 
clear need to reform the tax system. 
 
 
2.3 Main changes introduced by the reform 
 
The 2012 reform introduced changes in many areas of the tax system.  
 
a) Concerning the PIT, the rate scheduled will not be adjusted by inflation until 2016. 
On the other hand, a dual scheme was introduced, where labour income is currently 
taxed at progressive rates and capital income at flat rates (10%). Finally, the education 
expenses deduction was limited to 10% of taxable income and 25% of exempt income. 
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b) With regard to the VAT, major changes were introduced. First, the standard rate was 
increased to 18% in 2013 and 2014, but it is supposed to return to its former level of 
16% in 2015. However, this is conditioned to the evolution of revenues. A reduced rate 
of 8% was introduced for some products, such as dairy products, coffee, some oils, 
sugar, cocoa, and chocolate. This rate will be raised to 11% in 2014, 13% in 2015, and 
finally to the 16% standard rate in 2016. Finally, many products were no longer tax-
exempt. 
  
c) The CIT rate was set at 29% for 2013, 28% for 2014, and 27% for 2015. 
 
d) Concerning the EPZs, gross income generated by goods and services sold in the 
domestic market will be subject to a 3.5% tax. In addition, companies in commercial 
EPZs will be subject to a 5% tax on gross turnover.  
 
e) Some other changes were introduced in excise taxes, property taxes, vehicles, 
transfer pricing regulation, retailers, tax on assets, etc 
 
As described below, there was a strong social opposition to the reform, including 
demonstration in main cities. This led the Government to eliminate or postpone some of 
the changes initially passed in the reform Law. For instance, some capital income 
remained tax-exempt (such as interest of Central Bank securities), the VAT rate for 
milk, cream, and natural and mineral water was kept at zero, the 10% tax on dividends 
from companies in EPZs was postponed until a similar step is taken by neighbour 
countries, the 1% tax on vehicles was postponed until 2014, etc.  
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1 Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by 
national authorities 
 
The overall revenue effect of the 2012 tax reform was estimated at 1.6% of GDP by the 
Minister of Finance, mainly due to the increase of VAT rate and capital income 
taxation. However, the aforementioned suppression or postponement of some measures 
reduced this ratio to 1% of GDP. In other words, the cost of these changes was quite 
high: 0.6% of GDP or 37.5% of the original goal. Most of this cost came from the 
decision to keep some interest income exempt (about 0.08% of GDP), the derogation of 
taxation on internet purchases (about 0.06%), the postponement of taxation on 
dividends from EPZs (0,02%), the postponement of the 1% tax on vehicles until 2014 
(0.07%), and changes in excise taxes.    
 
In sum, the expected revenue increase generated by the reform was severely cut or 
postponed.  
 
3.2 Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
The tax reform implemented in 2012 in the DR shows mixed results. Some clear 
positive aspects include: 
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a) The dualisation of the Personal Income Tax: labour income is taxed at progressive 
rates and capital income at flat rates. Following other LA countries (Uruguay, Peru, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala), some types of capital income 
(interests, dividends) were taxed for the first time in the DR. This dualisation served to 
overcome the constraint imposed by bank secrecy to tax capital income. 
 
b)  The decision to refrain from adjusting by inflation the PIT rate schedule until 2016. 
This measure will increase the number of taxpayers and will bring the level of exempt 
income closer to LA standards; which, although lower than that of the DR, is high 
compared to other regions. 
 
c)   The limit imposed to the deduction of education expenses. This deduction was very 
costly in terms of revenue and clearly regressive. 
 
d) The reduction of the number of VAT exempt goods and the elimination of the zero 
rate applied to many of them. As seen above, the VAT base was highly eroded by the 
large list of exempt products and services. Although some of these changes can be 
evaluated as negative from an equity point of view, it must be recalled that although the 
poor benefit from exemptions for basic products, the rich benefit as well, and much 
more in absolute terms. In addition, poor people tend to purchase more in informal 
markets where VAT is not applied. On the other hand, as happens in many developing 
countries, some VAT exemptions in the Dominican Republic clearly obeyed to equity 
reasons, but many others did not. 
 
e) The increase of taxation on companies operating in the EPZs.  
 
f) Some other changes related to property and excise taxes 
 
Along with these positive aspects of the reform, some clear negative results can also be 
found: 
 
a) Although major changes were brought to the tax system (mainly the taxation on 
capital income and the reduction of VAT exemptions), the reform remains essentially 
focused on raising revenue by increasing rates, but does not address some of the 
structural problems of the tax system.  
 
b) The overall tax base remains narrow, and there is still room to enlarge it. Many tax 
benefits remain untouched, reducing the potential of the tax system, creating 
inefficiencies, inequalities, making the work of the Tax Administration more difficult, 
etc.  
 
c)  As stated above, the reform that was eventually implemented had been considerably 
watered down compared to the Law initially passed in Congress. Some measures have 
been postponed while others simply eliminated. While some changes can be assessed as 
positive, some others are clearly not (such as taxation on dividends by EPZs’ 
companies). The cost of these changes in revenue terms is quite high. 
 
d) Although it was conceived as a temporary increase (conditioned to the evolution of 
total tax collection), the post-reform VAT rate in the DR (18%) is clearly above the LA 
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average (14.6%) and the upper-middle income countries’ average (about 15.5%). The 
tax system will be further biased towards indirect taxation. 
 
 
In sum, the reform can be characterised by mixed results, since although some major 
and positive changes have been implemented, the tax system has still to face some of its 
traditional structural problems.       
 
3.3 Changes in the tax system 
 
As mentioned above, the 2012 reform was a reform package that affected many taxes. 
Although the most relevant changes were related to PIT and VAT, some other changes 
were applied to CIT, excises, property taxes, etc. 
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform  
 
4.1 Political factors 
 
a) Main structural characteristics of the political regime 
 
In 1961, the Dominican dictator Rafael L. Trujillo was assassinated and after a period of 
political instability and the intervention by the United States, democracy was restored in 
the Dominican Republic in 1966. However, the quality of democracy remained low for 
many years, between 1966 and 1996, during which the presidency was held by J. 
Balaguer. In 1994, the US and the Organisation of American States pressed the country 
to implement extensive institutional and political reforms, which resulted two years 
later in the end of the Balaguer regime.  
Nowadays, the DR is a stable democracy, and although major problems still exist, 
popular support for democracy shows the third highest value in LA, just behind 
Uruguay and Costa Rica. On average, 74% of Dominican citizens believe that 
democracy is the best political system (58.8% in LA). Their country’s democratic 
quality is rated at 6.5 on a 0-10 scale by Dominicans, while the Latin American average 
is 6.0. 
 
 
Table 6. Democracy (2007/10 average) 
 Dominican Republic Latin America (average) 
Percentage of citizens who 
believe that democracy is the 
best political system 
74.0 58.8 
Perception of the democratic 
quality of the country (0-10)  
6.5 6.0 
Source: ECLAC 
 
The Dominican Republic is a representative democratic republic. The President is both 
the head of state and the head of government, and is elected for a four-year term, 
renewable once. The Legislative power is exercised by the National Congress, which 
has two Chambers: the Chamber of Deputies (178 seats) and the Chamber of Senators 
(32 seats). In 2010, the Constitution was reformed, giving more power to the National 
Congress. The most important political parties are the Dominican Revolutionary Party 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
141 
 
(PRD), the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), both social democrats, and the Social 
Christian Reformist Party (PRSC), conservative. Both, the PRD and the PLD, were 
founded by the same person (J. Bosch), who left the PRD in 1973 due to strong 
discrepancies with other leaders of the Party and founded the PLD.  
 
During this process of democratic transformation, which started in 1996, only the first 
two parties have been in power. In particular, L. Fernandez of the PLD has been 
President between 1996 and 2000 and between 2004 and 2012, while H. Mejia (PRD) 
was elected President for the term 2000/04. Both Presidents have supported several 
democratic reforms, fuelled by civil society, international organisations, the United 
States, and the European Union. Elections have generally been free and fair. 
 
In sum, the Dominican Republic is a stable democracy, with stable, strong, and relatively 
independent political parties. However, there are still some shortcomings that reduce the 
democratic quality of the country (BTI, 2012): 
 
a) Patronage has been a traditional characteristic of political parties in the Dominican 
Republic. This has limited the Government's ability to act and has slowed the pace of 
transformation. 
 
b) There is some abuse of State resources by the governing party. 
 
c) The Central Electoral Authority does little effort to enforce laws regarding campaign 
financing and equal access to the media.  
 
d) Business elites (particularly in key industries such as tourism, sugar processing, 
EPZs, etc.) are influential and often receive preferential treatment. Financing to parties 
is used to exert their influence. However, the power of economic elites is less intense 
than in other Latin American countries. 
 
e) Although separation of powers is guaranteed by the constitution, the executive branch 
has always maintained de facto considerable predominance. The President has a strong 
power. In particular, despite recent improvements the judicial sector is not totally 
independent from political influence. As seen below, this issue has had an influence on 
the tax reform. 
 
 
b) How the political context conditioned the reform  
 
The political context in which the reform took place is a key factor. Since 1996, L. 
Fernández has been President of the Dominican Republic during three non-consecutive 
terms: 1996-2000, 2004-2008, and 2008-12. In May 2010, four months after the 
Constitutional reform, the President’s Party (PLD) won the congressional and municipal 
elections, thereby strengthening the president's position at a time when he was at the 
peak of his political career. His Party obtained the majority in both Chambers, while the 
adoption of the new Constitution had been a clear victory for him (it had been described 
as his personal project), the economy was performing better than in neighbouring 
countries, his popularity was high, and he had become a regional leader. His influence 
over the PLD was huge, although he could not run for the Presidency in the 2012 
elections (since this was his second term).  
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The May 2012 elections saw the former Secretary of the Presidency, Danilo Medina, 
elected president. In November, the tax reform was presented, but was becoming very 
unpopular. According to polls, about 80% of the population was against the reform, 
which was strongly criticised by the opposition, civil society, and the business 
community on several grounds. First, the aim of the reform was merely to increase 
taxes. Second, the urgency of the reform was due to an unexpected high deficit, which 
was mainly due to a huge increase in expenses in 2012. This increase was not justified 
and was largely perceived as resulting from populist policies decided by the former 
President in an electoral year. Public spending had actually increased by 4.0% per year 
between 2005 and 2007, while it raised by 29.3% in 2012. This trend was also observed 
in the previous term of L. Fernandez. At the same time, a number of corruption and 
judiciary scandals occurred, fuelling the opposition to the reform.  
  
 
Table 7. Central Government spending increase  
2004/07 (annual average) 17.8 % 
2008 (Presidential elections)  29.6 % 
2008/11 (annual average) 4.0 % 
2012 (Presidential elections)  29.3 % 
Source: Central Bank of the Dominican Republic 
 
 
Yet, President Medina managed to pass the tax reform and overcome the political crisis. 
Several factors helped the President in this regard: 
 
a) The President’s Party (PLD) had majority in Congress. Negotiations with other 
political forces were not necessary. 
 
b) Some elements of the original reform project were eliminated or modified. 
 
c) The public opinion increasingly blamed the former President for the deficit; D. 
Medina was not considered responsible. According to Gallup, by January 2013, just two 
months after the reform, not only was the popularity of President Medina still very high 
(81%) but also much higher than in pre-electoral months. Conversely, the popularity of 
the former President had decreased to 37%.  
 
d) Two measures taken by the President were crucial to overcome the political crisis 
originated by the tax reform and to increase dramatically his popularity. First, an old 
demand of the Dominican civil society was to allocate 4% of GDP to public education. 
That figure was actually in the Law but no Government had made it effective so far. 
President Medina committed to this goal and this 4% of GDP was budgeted. Second, 
the President renegotiated a contract with Barrick Gold (a Canadian company) to exploit 
gold mines. He signed a better agreement for the country (higher royalties paid by 
Barrick Gold), and this increased his popularity to a large extent.  
 
In sum, although the reform was initially very unpopular and could have implied high 
political costs for the President, Medina managed to overcome the situation. However, 
this was made at the expense of certain substantial elements of the reform, which were 
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either modified or abandoned. As mentioned above, this had costly revenue 
implications. 
 
4.2 Institutional framework  
  
Broadly speaking, institutional quality in the Dominican Republic is slightly lower than 
the LA average. The World Bank Governance Indicators (GI) average reaches -0.35 in 
the DR in 2006/10 (in a -2.5/+2-5 scale), while the LA average is -0.2. The 
International Country Risk Guide Index (sum of all components) amounts to 66.5 in the 
former (0-100 scale) and to 63.4 in the latter. While there are some areas where the 
institutional framework is noticeably sounder in the DR (especially political stability 
and absence of violence and conflicts), others are clearly weaker. First, the efficiency of 
the State. The indicator Government Effectiveness (GI) is -0.6 in the DR and -0.2 in LA, 
while the component Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) amounts to 1.0 and 2.0, respectively. 
Second, corruption is clearly higher in the DR. The indicator Control of Corruption (GI) 
is -0.7 in this country and -0.2 in LA, the component Corruption (ICRG) reaches 2.0 in 
the DR and 2.2 in LA (0-6 scale), and the Corruption Perception Index values are 3.0 in 
the DR and 3.4 in LA (0-10 scale). 
 
Table 8. Institutional quality. 2006/2010 average 
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
World Bank Governance Indicators (average) (-2.5 to +2.5 
scale) 
-0.35 -0.20 
International Country Risk Guide index (sum of all 
components) (0 to 100 scale) 
66.5 63.4 
Quality of democracy   
Voice and Accountability  (GI) (-2.5 to +2-5 scale) 0.1 0.1 
Democratic Accountability (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale) 2 4 
Political Stability   
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (GI) (-2.5 
to +2-5 scale) 
0.0 -0.3 
Government Stability (ICRG) (0 to 10 scale) 8.6 7.8 
State Efficiency   
Government Effectiveness (GI) (-2.5 to +2-5 scale) -0.6 -0.2 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) (0 to 4 scale)  1.0 2.0 
How efficient is the State (LB) (1-10 scale). 3.9 5.3 
Corruption   
Control of Corruption (GI) (-2.5 to 2-5 scale) -0.7 -0.2 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale)  2.0  2.2 
Corruption Perception Index (0-10 scale). 3.0 3.4 
Source: The World Bank (Governance Indicators), The Political Risk Service Group (ICRG), 
Transparency International (Corruption Perception Index), and Latinobarometro (LB) 
 
 
In particular, some of the institutional shortcomings observed in the DR conditioned the 
reform:  
 
a)  The low level of the State efficiency.  
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Leaving aside the Tax Administration, which works acceptably well, the low level of 
efficiency observed in some areas of the Administration conditioned the reform. Many 
people did reject a tax-increase reform in a context of a negative perception of the 
public administration and where little improvements had been observed. In other words, 
they opposed the reform not only because it increased taxes, but because this tax 
increase implied more resources given to a State that was perceived as inefficient, and 
to some extent corrupt. Several factors have traditionally explained the low level of the 
State efficiency in the Dominican Republic (UNDP, 2005). First, the strong power of 
the executive branch compared to the other constitutional powers. Second, the spread of 
patronage in the DR political system; political parties have used promotions and jobs in 
the public sector as a means to reward their affiliates. Third, the low level of 
accountability and public control mechanisms. 
 
b) The predominance of the executive branch and the low level of accountability.  
 
Although separation of powers is established by the Constitution of the Dominican 
Republic, the executive branch has always maintained considerable predominance. 
Together with insufficient accountability and lack of transparency, this has resulted in 
an unreliable budget policy. In fact, according to Latinobarometro 2011, the 
transparency of the State is rated at 37 (in a 1-100 scale) by the Dominicans, the lowest 
score in LA (the regional average is ten points higher). 
 
The urgency of the reform was due to the strong deficit of 2012, which was unexpected 
by the public and credited to populist policies and unnecessary expenses made in that 
electoral year. This was a major argument used by many citizens and social groups to 
oppose the reform. In this sense, it is noteworthy that improvements were made to the 
budget process during Fernandez' presidency. His Administration was even lauded by 
the international community for its efficient use of budget resources. However, there 
were few safeguards against a return to inefficient budget practices, and these fears 
came true by the end of that Administration: high cost of election campaigns, very 
costly infrastructure projects, etc. 
 
c)  Insufficient independence of the judicial power 
 
Although the Constitution guarantees the independence of the judicial power, the latter 
has traditionally been politicised and subject to corruption. Some improvements have 
been made in last years, supported by international organisations. In addition, although 
the new Constitution provides a higher degree of autonomy, it also increases the 
potential for increased partisan influence in the selection of Supreme Court and the new 
Constitutional Court judges (BTI, 2012). In fact, the former President was severely 
criticised for trying to exert a greater control of the judicial sector. This accusation 
further lowered his popularity and increased the opposition to the reform.   
  
d) Corruption 
 
Corruption is relatively common among public officeholders. Despite a higher degree of 
public awareness and media coverage, anti-corruption policies have received little 
financial and government backing, prosecution of abuse of office is extremely rare, and 
cases usually do not result in conviction (BTI, 2012). In particular, the Fernández 
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Administration was involved in some corruption scandals, which also fuelled the 
opposition to the tax reform. 
 
e) Social tensions 
 
While no relevant ethnic or religious tensions exist in the DR, leaving aside the Haitian 
minority, social tensions are high as a consequence of a very unequal distribution of 
income and high poverty levels. The Gini Index in the DR is slightly below the LA 
average (47.2 vs. 49.3) but poverty is higher (the Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty line reaches 42.7% of total population in 2006/11; 37.8% in LA). Moreover, 
while poverty has been decreasing remarkably in the rest of LA, it has increased in the 
DR. In addition, unemployment is very high in the DR. The country’s unemployment 
rate is 14.7% in 2006/11, the highest rate in Latin America and about twice the regional 
average (7.1%). 
 
 
Table 9. Poverty, income distribution, and unemployment 
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
Gini index  47.2 49.3 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of 
population) (2006/11) 
42.7 37.8 
Poverty headcount ratio variation: second vs. first half of 
the 2000’s 
3.3 -6.4 
Unemployment rate (2006/11) 14.7 7.1 
Source: The World Bank  
 
 
The overall effect of taxes and social expenditure has not led to a significant reduction 
of inequalities: the Reynolds-Smolenski index (difference between pre and post-tax and 
social expenditure Gini indexes) amounts to only 0.026. This positive effect is totally 
attributed to social expenditure, especially to health and primary and secondary 
education, since social assistance and tertiary education show a much lower contribution 
to reduce inequalities. On the contrary, the tax system is regressive and has a negative 
impact on redistribution. The Kakwani index (difference between the Gini index for 
incomes and the concentration index for tax payments) is -0.0497, while the Reynolds-
Smolenski index reaches -00020. In particular, the PIT is progressive and shows 
redistributive capacity, while the opposite is true for VAT. Since VAT is much more 
relevant in revenue terms, its effect is predominant.  
 
 
Table 10. Progressivity and redistribution of the tax system and social expenditure 
 Progressivity 
(Kakwani index) 
Redistribution 
(Reynolds-Smolenski 
index) 
Tax system and Social expenditure  0.0260 
Tax system -0.0497 -0.0020 
VAT (income) -0.1847 -0.0050 
PIT 0.3951 0.0347 
Social Expenditure 0.4900 0.0280 
Health 0.6601 0.0112 
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Primary and secondary education 0.6452 0.0114 
Tertiary education 0.2776 0.0010 
Social assistance 0.4623 0.0057 
Source: Barreix et al. (2009) 
 
Different institutional and social actors participated actively in the debates and 
negotiations of the reform. First, the Government, whose priority was to increase tax 
collection in order to fill the gap between revenue and expenditures. Although the 
Government tried to reach agreements with other actors and minimise political costs, a 
hard financial constraint had to be faced. Second, social groups which defended a 
progressive reform and rejected an enlargement of the VAT base towards basic 
products. Third, the business community which was far from being an homogenous 
group, not only due to different levels of influence but also because of differences in 
taxation across sectors from which some businesses benefited more than others. The 
financial and banking sector tried to minimise specific measures, such as the new 
taxation on capital income. The beer and rum industries pursued to minimise the impact 
of the reform concerning taxes on their products, which led to some in-fighting between 
rival industries. The telecom industry also tried to resist a higher taxation on this sector. 
Finally, those sectors under special tax regimes, such as tourism or the EPZs, sought to 
keep their privileges. As a consequence of the urgent financial needs of the Government 
and the strong differences among the actors involved, the reform resulted in a 
compromise to overcome the budget crisis, without facing many of the serious structural 
problems of the tax system.  
 
Tax reforms have traditionally been largely debated in the media in the DR, and this 
reform was not an exception. The media gave a wide coverage of the 2012 reform, 
relaying especially the demonstrations and protests that spread all over the country. In 
this sense, it must be noted that freedom of opinion and the press are constitutionally 
guaranteed and generally respected in the DR (BTI, 2012). Although media companies 
(mostly private) are pluralistic, ownership is highly concentrated.   
 
4.3 Social support 
 
Soon after the tax reform Law was passed in Congress, a strong social opposition 
movement started, with big demonstrations organised in the capital Santo Domingo by 
trade unions, social associations, student associations, etc. These demonstrations grew 
as they spread to other cities of the country and also to foreign cities with a large 
Dominican population (New York, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Miami, Madrid, Paris, 
Boston, Barcelona, etc.). The social tension caused by the tax reform grew even more 
when a university student was killed by police. Several factors fuelled this opposition.      
 
a) The timing of the reform 
 
Given the urgent financial needs of the Government, the reform was not negotiated with 
civil society. A few meetings were held at the Economic and Social Council between 
the Government, trade unions, the business community, and social associations, but the 
process failed after some weeks. These groups intended to develop a broader fiscal pact, 
adding other elements to the agenda (such as education and the reform of the electric 
sector), and were therefore demanding a longer period of discussions. But this was 
opposed by the Government who opted for a narrow tax reform within a short period of 
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time. Similarly, the reform was passed in Congress without a big debate; the majority in 
Congress of the ruling Party made this possible. 
 
b) The link between the reform and public spending 
 
As mentioned above, the pressure to increase tax revenue was due to an unexpected 
high deficit, credited by the public to populist policies implemented by the former 
President. As a consequence, the reform started to be perceived as a way to cover an 
unjustified and non-transparent increase in expenditure.  
 
The quality of public spending has traditionally been low in the DR, and its 
improvement is a long-standing social demand in the country. The share of social 
spending is clearly lower than the Latin American average: 46.3% in the 2000’s vs. 
51.1%. As a percentage of GDP it shows one of the lowest values in the region (7.1%). 
This is important, since poverty is higher than the regional average and the last decade 
can be characterised as a period of economic growth but social stagnation. In addition, 
the Dominican Republic is one of the countries where citizens are less confident in the 
quality of public spending (16% vs. 26% in LA). All partly explains the opposition to a 
tax-increase reform, whose immediate cause was a strong, non-transparent, and 
unjustified increase in public spending. 
 
Table 11. Quality of public spending 
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
Social spending (% of total spending) (2000/2010) 46.3 51.1 
Social spending (% of GDP) (2000/2010) 7.1 12.9 
Percentage of population having confidence in  the 
quality of public spending (2011) 
16 26 
Source: ECLAC; Confidence: Latinobarometro 
 
c) Finally, the visible and strong opposition to the reform was facilitated by the growing 
influence and mobilisation capacity of civil society organisations and social movements 
in the Dominican Republic. Other important citizen movements have been observed for 
the elaboration of the new Constitution, or the defence of the environment, etc. 
 
However, the social opposition to the reform was short-lived, and the popularity of the 
President rapidly increased soon afterwards. Although this was due to several factors 
(the elimination or modification of some elements of the original reform project, the 
public perception that the responsible of the deficit was the former President, the 
renegotiation of the contract with Barrick Gold Company), a particular issue largely 
contributed to the social acceptation of the reform: the budget allocation for non-
university education to 4% of GDP, as stipulated by law. This was an old demand of the 
Dominican civil society.  
 
It must be noted that education policy has never been a priority for the different 
Governments of the DR, and this has had negative social consequences. Between 
2006/11, public spending on education represented only 2.2% of GDP, two points 
below the Latin American average. Expenditure per student was only 7.6% of GDP per 
capita in primary education (12.2% in LA) and 6.2% in secondary education (12.8% in 
LA). According to Latinobarometro, only 24% of Dominicans think that education 
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policy had benefited them, and according to UNPD (2005), inequalities in the DR are 
partially due to the strong differences in education across citizens.     
 
  Table 12. Public spending on education 
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
Public spending on education (% of total spending) 
(2006/2011) 
2.2 4.2 
Expenditure per student, primary (% of GDP per capita) 
(2006/2011) 
7.6 12.2 
Expenditure per student, secondary (% of GDP per 
capita) (2006/2011) 
6.2 12.8 
Which of the following public policies have benefited 
you and your family? (education) (*) 
24 32 
Source: The World Bank. (*) Latinobarometro 
 
4.4 Avoidance, evasion, and informality 
 
According to estimates, informal economy in the Dominican Republic is below both, 
the Latin American and the upper-middle income countries’ average (31.4%, 40%, and 
34.1%, respectively). However, much caution must be taken regarding informal 
economy estimates, since they often provide inconsistent results. According to the 
Central Bank, 57.1% of total employment corresponds to the informal sector.  
 
Although informality, evasion, and avoidance are relevant issues for the tax system, this 
was not the case in this particular tax reform. However, some observers have pointed 
out that the increase in VAT rates can expand informality.  
 
Table 13. Informal economy  
 Dominican 
Republic 
Latin America 
(average) 
Lower-middle 
income 
countries 
(average) 
Informal economy (% of GDP). 31.4 40.0 34.1 
Source: Schneider (2012) 
 
 
 4.5 Tax policy and administration 
 
Tax policy has been in a continuous reform process in the DR, creating problems for 
both the Tax Administration and the taxpayers. It has lacked a rationale and consistent 
planning. On the contrary, it has been largely used to develop investment policies and to 
benefit certain sectors or social groups. This hinders any tax reform, since it creates 
reform fatigue in the Tax Administration and for the taxpayers and lack of trust in tax 
reforms.  
 
Regarding the Tax Administration, both Customs and Internal Revenues, are semi-
autonomous bodies. Internal Revenues (the most relevant body in this reform) is a 
modern tax administration, the technical capabilities of the staff are appropriate, and it 
has been modernised following international standards. 
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4.6 Economic factors 
 
The economic factors surrounding the reform are crucial to understand it. The 
stagnation of tax revenues since the start of the international crisis and the rapid 
expansion of public expenditure in recent years resulted in a dramatic increase of the 
public deficit. This was the immediate cause of the reform and conditioned it, since it 
was urgent to raise tax revenues. On the other hand, this dramatic and unexpected 
increase in public deficit fuelled the opposition to the reform. 
 
4.7 External actors 
 
The Dominican Republic is not an aid-dependent country. Aid represented only about 
0.35% of GNI in 2008/11 (1.19 in LA). Nevertheless, external actors played an 
important role in the reform. International organisations (IMF, IDB) provided financial 
and technical assistance and they influenced it to some extent, in terms of the measures 
to be taken and the deadlines to adopt it.  
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THE INTRODUCTION OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX IN RWANDA (2001) 
AND ENSUING REFORMS (2005, 2006) 
 
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX IN RWANDA. 
SUMMARY 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform: 
• To reform the tax 
system  
 
• To introduce a 
value added tax 
Positive both in 
terms of 
revenue 
generated and 
of the process 
of 
implementation 
and 
management 
• Joint political will of public authorities, 
private sector and international 
organisations to implement VAT in 
Rwanda 
 
• Stability of the design of the reform, no 
continuous change across time 
 
• Political stability guaranteeing peace and 
safety within the borders of the country 
 
• Low level of lobbying and corruption 
 
• A unique decision making process 
consisting in a bottom up and multi-level 
consultation of all the concerned actors, 
including the private sector, donors and 
public bodies. 
 
• That decision making process comes up to 
a common conclusion at the end of the day 
and that joint decision pre-conditions the 
consideration of the reform at upper level  
 
• Culture of accountability  
 
• Taxpayers education  
 
• Information as to the use of the revenue in 
terms of spending, including social 
spending 
 
• Low level of corruption facilitated by 
prosecution and heavy punishment in case 
of corruption or mismanagement of public 
funds 
 
• High level of informality but confined to the 
sector of the economy where turnover is 
below the VAT threshold.  
 
• VAT section of RRA initially consisted of 
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fresh graduates specially trained for VAT 
administration purposes and sent across the 
country to explain the new tax to local 
people. 
 
 
 
1. Economic outlook 
 
Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962. It is a small landlocked country of 
Eastern Central Africa bordered by Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. With a population of 10,943 million inhabitants, predominantly 
rural (80%), this country has a density among the highest in Africa (415 Hab. / km2)1. 
Its capital is Kigali, the largest city. Classified by the World Bank as a low-income 
country, Rwanda is a small economy dominated by agriculture (90% of the work force) 
and a country that has suffered in the past especially from the civil war and the 1994 
genocide and. 
 
Rwanda is nowadays a booming economy. According to the 2013 World Bank 'Doing 
Business Report', “Rwanda remains the third easiest place to do business in Sub-
Saharan Africa, after Mauritius and South Africa" and  is ranked 52nd out of 185 
countries, confirming its reputation as the best business destination in east and central 
Africa region.  
 
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic Outlook 
 Rwanda Region  
incl. Rwanda 
(excl. 
Rwanda) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) 
GDP per cap. (PPP US $) (2012) 1,354 1,089.80 
(1,023.75) 
3,550.8 
Gini Index (2011) 50.82 44.10 
(42.42) 
45.2 
Agriculture, (%  GDP) (2006-2010) 34.52 33.68 
(33.47) 
24,35 
Openness (Trade % GDP) 
(2006-2010)  
39.60° 64.48 
(70.70)  
79.43 
Source: The World Bank, AEO (African Economic Outlook). Region consists of Grand Lakes Rwanda 
neighbouring or closely related countries: Burundi, Congo, Uganda and Kenya. 
 
 
As shown in Table 1, Rwanda has a higher GDP per capita than the regional average: 
(1,354 US$ vs. 1,089), but a lower GDP/capita than Kenya (1,761) and well above 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 AEO (African Economic Outlook), 2011. 
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Burundi (560) and Congo (422). Due to that heterogeneity, comparison will be 
conducted with the sole Kenya and Uganda in the rest of the report. 
 
Inequality in Rwanda (as measured by the Gini coefficient) is generally higher than in 
neighbouring countries of the region. The Gini coefficient in Rwanda is 50.8, while the 
average value of the Gini index for Africa is around 43.  
 
Rwanda is also more dependent on the agriculture sector, and less open to international 
trade.  
 
As shown in Table 1bis, the 2012 GDP growth rate was 8%; while the average growth 
rate of the construction industry, for 2011 and 2012 amounts to 19.5%. The construction 
sector is hence a powerful driver of economic activity in Rwanda today. 
 
The share of agriculture in GDP has slightly declined over the period 1999-2012, while 
the share of the industry has been stable and that of services has increased. 
 
The Poverty rate in Rwanda has decreased from 56.7% in 2006 to 44.9% in 2011 
(World Bank). The country however is extensively dependent on international aid 
which represented 30.57% of GDP in 2008 (Institute of Policy Analysis and Research – 
Rwanda (IPAR, 2012.). Enrolment in primary education is much higher than the 
average for Sub-Saharan Africa (+142%). Life expectancy has recovered in the post-
genocide period and is again in line with Sub-Saharan figure, 55 years. 
 
 
Table 1bis – Rwanda Economic Structure 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 
% of GDP (annual growth rate) 
Agriculture 35.56 
(7.7) 
34.84 
(5.0) 
33.69 
(4.7) 
32.15 
(3.0)  
Food Crop 30.20 
(9.4) 
29.59 
(4.9) 
28.71 
(5.0) 
27.43 
(3.2)  
Export Crop 0.92 
(-15.3) 
0.94 
(14.2) 
0.91 
(2.9) 
0.77 
(-9.1)  
Industry 13.75 
(1.3) 
13.94 
(8.4) 
15.13 
(17.6) 
15.03 
(7.3)  
Mining and quarrying 0.50 
(-17.9) 
0.43 
(-10.8) 
0.55 
(49.7) 
0.48 
(-10.1)  
Manufacturing 5.87 
(3.0) 
5.99 
(9.3) 
5.96 
(8.1) 
5.38 
(-2.7)  
Construction 7.20 
(1.3) 
7.31 
(8.8) 
8.33 
(23.6) 
8.89 
(15.2)  
Services 44.78 
(6.2) 
45.53 
(9.0) 
45.77 
(8.9) 
47.59 
(12.2)  
Wholesale & retail trade 12.56 
(4.0) 
12.70 
(8.4) 
12.91 
(10.2) 
13.46 
(12.4)  
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Restaurants & hotels 1.88 
(-5.8) 
1.92 
(7.9) 
1.82 
(3.9) 
1.83 
(7.7)  
Transport, storage, communic. 8.30 
(9.2) 
8.42 
(8.7) 
8.21 
(5.3) 
9.07 
(19.5)  
Adjustments 5.87 
(9.6) 
5.73 
(4.8) 
5.41 
(2.0) 
5.27 
(5.2)  
- Imputed bank service charge -1.37 
(-6.2) 
-1.50 
(17.9) 
-1.82 
(32.1) 
-1.94 
(15.3)  
+ Taxes 7.22 
(6.2) 
7.22 
(7.2) 
7.22 
(8.2) 
7.21 
(7.8)  
     
GDP (growth rate) (6.2) (7.2) (8.2) (8.0) 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Rwanda 
 
 
The tax system in Rwanda basically consists of the following taxes:  
• Personal Income Tax (progressive up to 30%);  
• Corporate Tax (tax rate of 30%);  
• Value Added Tax (tax rate of 18%) with exemptions and zero-rating available in 
certain cases;  
• Other indirect taxes, including excises tax, and;  
• Import and export tariffs. 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution of tax revenue between those taxes, for Rwanda and two 
other countries in the region (Kenya, and Uganda) Table 2bis focuses on the evolution 
of the Rwandan tax structure over the period 2005-2010. 
 
Indeed, Rwandan figures might usefully be compared with figures for neighbouring 
countries, especially Kenya and Uganda which are also part of the present study. The 
three countries have in common, if we focus on IMF data for 2008, that indirect taxes 
surpass direct taxes in the mobilisation of domestic revenue – see Table 2. However 
they differ in their global capacity to mobilise public resources since tax revenue 
reaches 19% of GDP in Kenya against only 13.5% in Rwanda and 11.9% in Uganda. 
 
 
Table 2. Tax revenue Statistics 
Country Rwanda(2008-
2010) 
Kenya 
(2008) 
Uganda 
(2008--2010) 
 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
 13.5 19.0 11.9 
Tax Structure (% of total revenue) 
Direct taxes 38.0  30.0 31.3 
Indirect  
Taxes 49.0 - 50.9 
 
44.0 
 
60.0 - 22,5 
of which VAT 
(2010) 30.9 
 
29.5 
 
14.2 
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Foreign trade 13.0 - 6.7 
 
26.0 
 
10.0 - 47,7 
Other 0.00 - 4.4 n.a. n.a. 
TOTAL  100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: IMF and local governments 
 
 
Table 3. Distribution of tax revenue between various taxes (2005-2010) 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Direct taxes 29.2  32.6  35.1  35.8  36.8  38.1  
Goods and services 47.8  48.6  49.1  47.0  49.7  50.9  
of which VAT 33.3  33.9  34.6  33.9  33.7  30.9  
Foreign trade 21.7  15.3  11.6  12.3  10.1  6.7  
Other 1.3  3.5  4.1  4.7  3.4  4.4  
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
   Source: Government of Rwanda 
 
 
Regarding Rwanda more specifically, in 2005, the taxes on goods and services - which 
include Value Added Tax (VAT) but also Excises tax and Patents - represented 51% of 
Rwandan tax revenue. Within that figure, VAT accounted for the largest part. Over the 
period 2005-2010, the share of VAT declined although goods and services remained the 
main source of tax revenue. Also remarkable are the continuously increasing share of 
direct taxes and the decreasing importance of tariffs. 
 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform. 
 
Prior to 2001, the indirect tax in Rwanda, next to excises tax, mainly consisted in a 
turnover tax called the ICHA (Impôt sur le chiffre d’affaires); its rate was 15%.  That 
tax was basically a levy on the providers of services and on the production sector but 
retailers mainly escaped the tax, which resulted in a rather narrow tax base. Moreover 
the government needed extra revenue.  
 
According to various sources, including IMF and various interviewees, the main 
deficiencies of the Rwandan tax system at the end of the 1990’s were mainly due to: 
 
- An economy largely dominated by subsistence agriculture and informality; 
- A poor taxpaying culture among taxpayers; 
- Disintegration of collection points with customs and non-fiscal revenues 
collected under the finance ministry; 
- Absence of a single taxpayer register and a single taxpayer account; 
- Out-dated laws and other legal instruments; 
- No/limited enforcement measures for tax defaulters; 
 
2.2. The causes of the reform. 
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The objectives of the tax reform were twofold: to collect extra revenue and to broaden 
the tax base.  
The Government and international organisations agreed that the introduction of VAT 
was the best tax policy option. Indeed, introducing VAT was not only a way to reach 
the objective of the Rwandan authorities but it was also a way of signalling the 
modernisation of the country to the international community, especially to foreign 
investors. 
 
Apart from the need to adopt a VAT in order to modernise the tax system, some other 
immediate drivers fuelled the reform, mainly the urgent need to increase revenues and 
the assistance provided by the IMF. 
 
2.3. Main changes introduced by the reform. 
 
The VAT rate was initially set at 15% identical to that of the former ICHA which it 
replaced, but was rapidly augmented to 18%, where it stood. Due to the structure of the 
population and the need to avoid excessive counter-distributive aspects of VAT, a VAT 
registration threshold was fixed at 20.000.000 RwF (40.000 US$), and never increased 
since then. Below that threshold, traders are exempt of registration; moreover, basic 
products like food and other socially important goods (mainly due to technical reasons) 
were also exempted. 
 
In 2000, prior to the adoption and introduction of VAT, a reform of the Rwanda 
Revenue Authority (RRA) had taken place, in view of making it a clearly autonomous 
body. For the administration of VAT specifically, a new body of staff was hired, 
consisting mainly of fresh graduates who then received a special training within the 
RRA, with the help of two foreign consultants, before being sent to various parts of the 
country to explain the reform and proceed to the registration of potential VAT-payers. 
 
The RRA has been further reorganised in order to facilitate audits and information 
sharing. In particular, the VAT and Income Tax sections have been merged and 
redefined according to the size of the taxpayers, e.g. a section deals with Large 
Taxpaying Organisations (LTO).  
 
Next to those organisational changes, the introduction of VAT itself was a dramatic 
change for Rwandan traders since a lot of people previously not subject to the ICHA 
were now subject to the new tax. Therefore, the RRA and other key actors launched a 
campaign to convince the population of the interest of paying the new tax and of 
registering as VAT-payers when appropriate. The media played a key role in this 
campaign, relaying the actions of the Private Sector Federation (PSF), which in Rwanda 
also includes the agriculture sector. 
 
Further improvements of the tax itself were introduced since 2001, especially upon 
suggestions of the PSF. One of the major changes was the facilitation of the access to 
refund payments (refunds are now quicker and less subject to auditing when 
unnecessary) while payments to the administration might be shortly delayed so that 
VAT registration provides cash to many VAT-payers.  
 
 
3. Evaluation 
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3.1. Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by national authorities 
 
Rwandan authorities consider the introduction of VAT as a real success when compared 
to the former ICHA. Indeed, (1) Revenue has been increased dramatically and the 
number of taxpayers as well; and (2) The buy-in of the various actors and of the 
population leads to revenue generation sometimes higher than expected.  
 
This is illustrated by Figure 1 and Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. ICHA and VAT Collection  
(1998-2010) 
Years Total revenue 
collected 
(1998 = 100) 
Achieved VAT 
collection as % of 
target 
1999 100.00   
2000 98.19   
2001 100.09   
2002 118.64   
2003 140.05   
2004 174.20   
2005 199.17 103.2 
2006 253.78 106.9 
2007 289.85 111.7 
2008 360.61 113.4 
2009 501.20 104.2 
2010 543.44 102.2 
                                Source: Government of Rwanda 
 
 
Figure 1 – ICHA, VAT and TOTAL revenue 
 
Source: Based on statistics by the government of Rwanda 
 
 
However, the upward trend has been reduced since 2008. As shown in Table 5, that 
slower increase, and even decrease since 2010, confirms that while the share of the 
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budget in the GDP is rather stable, the share of revenues within the budget is increasing 
over time thus pointing to a larger reliance on domestic resource mobilisation.  
 
In proportion of those revenues, VAT revenue peaked in 2007 but declined thereafter. 
That contrasts the observation that the introduction of VAT in 2001 whipped up the 
share of that tax in the total amount of tax revenue of the country (in the sense that the 
return of VAT was higher than the one of ICHA). This does not necessarily mean that 
VAT efficiency has decreased but it may reflect the higher vulnerability of VAT to 
changes in the world’s economic climate. 
 
 
Table 5. Fiscal magnitudes (1999-2010) - ratios 
Year VAT/REV REV/BUDG BUDG/GDP 
1999 0.2053 0.3854 0.2868 
2000 0.2014 0.4043 0.2503 
2001 0.2980 0.4389 0.2491 
2002 0.3136 0.4610 0.2603 
2003 0.3216 0.4726 0.2539 
2004 0.3349 0.4176 0.2773 
2005 0.3138 0.4917 0.2599 
2006 0.3283 0.5167 0.2308 
2007 0.3376 0.4784 0.2582 
2008 0.3321 0.5647 0.2419 
2009 0.3161 0.4403 0.2581 
2010 0.2609 0.4962 0.2825 
       Source: Government of Rwanda and own calculations 
 
 
 3.2. Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
The Rwandan VAT is similar to other standard VAT systems whereby the firms collect 
revenue in the name of the RRA and are then refunded of – or credited for – the VAT 
that they have paid upstream. Two criteria are often regarded as important for the 
assessment of the tax, its efficiency and its equity.  
 
a) VAT efficiency and the VAT gap (GDP) 
 
VAT efficiency in revenue terms might be measured for Rwanda and compared with 
similar figures for neighbouring countries also investigated in the present study. 
Therefore we compute the VAT Revenue to GDP ratio for Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda 
but we focus on the latter two which share in common an identical standard VAT rate of 
18%; VAT rate in Kenya is smaller. 
 
We observe that for the same rate of the tax, Rwandan VAT to GDP ratio exceeds the 
corresponding figure for Uganda of 0.0172 signalling a better efficiency of the 
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Rwandan VAT; the difference comes from the many more exemptions and zero ratings 
in Uganda.  
 
b) The C-Efficiency and the VAT gross compliance ratio 
 
Alternative measures of VAT efficiency are the C-efficiency and the VAT gross 
compliance ratio. The C-Efficiency computes the ratio between VAT revenue collected 
and total consumption expenditures, and divides that ratio by the standard VAT rate.  
This a simple way to assess the effectiveness of the VAT in raising revenue and to 
provide an indicator of the departure of the actual VAT collection from a perfectly 
enforced tax levied at a uniform rate on all consumption, with no exemptions  
sometimes called a potential VAT collections. The C-efficiency will be 100% if the 
VAT is a broad based, single tax rate, and perfectly enforced; such an ideal situation 
also requests that the VAT administration be effective and that the taxpayers are 
compliant (the measure thus refers to tax morale too). The VAT gross compliance ratio 
is similar to the C-efficiency ratio except that it uses private consumption instead of all 
consumption expenditures. 
 
Figures for both measures are reported in Table 6 which shows that Rwanda's VAT 
efficiency is far above that of Uganda . 
 
 
Table 6. C-Efficiency and Gross Compliance Ratio in Rwanda and 
neighbouring countries (2010) 
Country 
 
 
VAT rate C-Efficiency 
 
 
Gross 
Compliance 
ratio 
Rwanda 18 39.01 46.47 
Kenya 16 40.63 49.84 
Uganda 18 11.02 12.32 
             Source: official statistics and own calculations 
 
c) Equity 
 
From an equity point of view, VAT is often held as regressive since every consumer 
bears the tax at the same rate whatever his or her income may be. In the case of 
Rwanda, that objection has been met through the exemption of small establishments 
with a small turnover and the exemption of basic consumption goods as well.  
 
d) Informality 
 
The impact of VAT on the size of informality in the Rwandan economy is unclear. We 
note however that the penetration rate of VAT is higher in the city of Kigali and in 
urban areas than in rural parts of the country.  
 
Table 7 below reveals that nearly half of the establishments are located in the Kigali 
area, the urban part of Rwanda. And among those establishments, more than half (51%) 
are registered at the Rwanda Revenue Authority as VAT-taxpayers. Moreover the 
Kigali located registered VAT-payers represent nearly 57% of Rwandan VAT-
registered establishments. On the contrary, in more rural non-Kigali areas, only 31% of 
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the establishments are registered as VAT-payers. Comparison of Kigali and non-Kigali 
figures helps understand the large share of informality in the Rwandan economy.   
 
 
Table 7. VAT penetration in Rwandan districts and assessment of informality 
Area Total Registered Non-Reg Reg/Total Reg/TotReg 
KIGALI 6137 3148 2989 0.5130 0.5698 
SOUTHERN 2432 675 1757 0.2775 0.1222 
WESTERN 1990 781 1209 0.3925 0.1414 
NORTHERN 1408 501 907 0.3558 0.0907 
EASTERN 1911 420 1491 0.2198 0.0760 
NON-KIGALI 7741 2377 5364 0.3071 0.4302 
TOTAL 13878 5525 8353 0.3981 1 
Source: Rwanda Census and own computation 
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform 
 
4.1. Political factors. 
 
Institutionally, Rwanda is a presidential republic with a multi-party system. The 
President is both head of state and head of government and is directly elected for a 7-
year term, renewable once. The government exercises the executive power and the 
legislative power is vested in both the government and the parliament. There is a two-
chamber legislature, comprising a 26-member upper house, the Senate, and an 80-
member lower house, the Chamber of Deputies (Representatives). Senate members 
serve 8-year terms and 8 are appointed by the president. Twelve are elected 
representatives of the 11 provinces and the city of Kigali. Four are designated by the 
RPF2-dominated Forum of Political Organisations, and two are academics elected by 
state and private universities. Deputies to the lower house include 53 people elected by 
local elections, among them 24 have to be women, two elected by the National Youth 
Council, and one by the federation of the associations of disabled people. Political 
parties are banned from denoting themselves as specifically aligned with the Hutu or 
Tutsi communities, but the Tutsi-orientated RPF is allowed to operate. 
 
Rwanda is trying to shake off its image associated with the 1994 state-sponsored 
genocide; the government argues the country is now stable. 
 
Rwanda has institutionalised a unique decision making process characterised by, 
 
• a strong political will to develop the country 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 RPF is an acronym for Rwandan Patriotic Front  is the current ruling political party of Rwanda, led by 
President Paul Kagame. It governs in a coalition with other parties. In the parliamentary election held on 
30 September 2003, the party won (as part of the ruling coalition) 33 out of 53 seats. Paul Kagame was 
also elected as President in the same year. 
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• a bottom-up systematic (institutionalised) consultation process, involving all 
stakeholders including donors (from sector working groups to budget support 
groups or Swap groups, to joint sector reviews), that results in transparency, 
accountability, and trust in government, which are factors favourable to an efficient 
tax reform.   
 
These two elements are supplemented by the following ones 
• a continuous sensitisation of the population on tax reforms.  
• taxpayer education (if necessary implemented in national school curricula) 
accompanied with high quality customer services. and  
• visible quality public services (investment in social spending). 
 
These positive factors highly valued by interviewed people contrast with the value of 
the democracy index for Rwanda. That value amounts to 3.36 and rank 132 for 2012 
(table 8), which is below the average figure for Sub-Saharan Africa where it amounts to 
4.32, and also below similar figures for neighbouring Uganda and Kenya3. Interestingly 
if we disentangle the index – see Table 8 – we observe that, compared with its 
neighbours, Rwanda performs well in terms of Functioning of the Government, but 
poorly in terms of political pluralism and participation.  
 
 
Table 8. Political factors disentangled, Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda (2012) 
Country Rank 
Overall 
score 
Elections, 
Pluralism 
Gov. 
Functioning 
Political 
Particip. 
Political 
Culture 
Civil 
Liberties 
Rwanda 132 3.36 0.83 4.64 2.22 5.00 4.12 
Kenya 104 4.71 3.92 4.89 4.44 5.63 5.29 
Uganda 94 5.16 5.67 3.57 4.44 6.25 5.88 
Source: The Economist (2012). 
 
The following aspects of the Rwandan political context have conditioned the reform by 
creating a conducive environment:  
• an efficiently functioning government, as illustrated by Table 8, and  
• a population little involved in partisan political game, as also illustrated by Table 
8,  
• a clearly president dominated majority party, see note 2 above, allied with  
• the stakeholders’ participating decision making process depicted above jointly 
create an environment which favours (or at least helps explaining since it is 
correlated with) the success of tax reforms in Rwanda. 
 
4.2. Institutional framework 
 
Regarding institutional quality, three positive features are worth mentioning. First, the 
stability and absence of violence; second, the government effectiveness; and third, the 
control of corruption.  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012), Democracy index 2012 - Democracy at a standstill. 
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Regarding the last item, figures from the World Bank, the African Economic Outlook 
and Transparency International all testify of the good performance of Rwanda. In 
particular, according to the African Economic Outlook, Rwanda is the third least corrupt 
country in Africa, after Botswana and Mauritius. 
 
 
Table 9. Institutional quality, 2006/2010 average   
 Rwanda Kenya Uganda SSA° 
World Bank Governance Indicators 
(average) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
-0.44 -0.70 -0.58 -0.65 
International Country Risk Guide 
index (sum of all components) (0 to 
100 scale) 
n.a. 56.2 54.4 56.5 
Quality of democracy     
Voice and Accountability  (GI) (-
2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
-10.26 -0.23 -0.50 -0.56 
Democratic Accountability (ICRG) 
(0 to 6 scale) 
n.a 5.3 2.5 3.4 
State Efficiency     
Government Effectiveness (GI) (-
2.5 to +2-5 scale) 
-0.17 -0.54 -0.49 -0.76 
Political stability and absence of 
violence (GI)  
-0.38* -10.28 -10.09 -0.55 
Regulatory quality (GI) -0.45 -0.18 -0.18 -0.71 
Rule of Law (GI) -0.50 -0.99 -0.40 -0.71 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) (0 to 
4 scale) 
n.a 2.0 2.0 1.2 
Corruption     
Control of Corruption (GI) (-2.5 to 
2-5 scale) 
0.12 -0.96 -0.83 -0.58 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale) n.a. 0.7 2.0 2.0 
African Economic Outlook (best = 
6.2) 
5.3 2.7 2.9 - 
Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index  
(rank in SSA) (rank in the World) 
53  
(4)(50) 
27 
 (33)(139) 
29  
(30)(130) 
- 
- 
 
 
As observed in the latest Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 
2012) on the Rwandan situation: “Rwanda benefits from strong and relatively well-
functioning institutions, with very low levels of corruption (an outcome that is certainly 
related to the government’s non-tolerance policy)”. In addition, that organisation ranks 
Rwanda number 5, with a score of 5.6 on 7 for the country “Public trust in politicians”. 
The same rank appears for the item “Favouritism in decisions of government officials”. 
Moreover that publication ranks Rwanda 4th for “Wastefulness of government 
spending”, co-3rd for “Number of procedures required to start a business” and 2nd for 
“Burden of government regulation”. 
 
All these features contribute to creating a conducive environment for popular buy-in to 
tax reforms and thus to their effectiveness. 
 
As shown in Table 9, Rwanda performs better than other countries in terms of 
governance but poorer in terms of voice and accountability. It is important to note that 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
163 
 
Rwanda is a well-functioning country but with a decision making participation process 
limited to technicalities. 
 
A relevant issue refers to the decision making process which characterises the unique 
Rwandan governance system. Any proposal of reform is usually submitted first to a 
panel composed of representatives of various public and private stakeholders. It is then 
followed by a consultation process aimed at reaching a collective agreement. The 
process then follows the normal legislative process. In tax matters, the public sector is 
represented by the RRA and the ministries of finance and economic planning, the 
ministry of trade, and the ministry of agriculture. The main private sector organisation is 
the PSF which in Rwanda, as already mentioned, also voices for the agriculture sector. 
In the case of the VAT reform, this participatory process has largely contributed to 
gaining the adhesion of the population to the new tax system, together with taxpayers' 
education campaigns at school and transparent information on the use of tax revenue.  
 
4.3. Social support 
 
Social support is facilitated by a more visible and transparent use of revenue generated 
by the tax reforms. In that respect, access to adequate information on budget allocations 
as well as on achievements is essential. 
 
Therefore, the structure of the budget by field of expenditure, especially the share of 
expenditures dedicated to social sectors, is presumably a good illustration of social 
support to government policy and reforms. In Table 10 we report figures excerpted from 
the 2013-2014 budget concerning transfers to districts. We observe that the largest parts 
go to education, health and social protection. Figures decided by the authorities are 
otherwise remarkably stable. 
 
Table 10. Share of social expenditures in the 2013-2014 and subsequent budgets  
Items 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 
Education 43.9 43.8 42.3 
Health 12.4 10.7 10.7 
Social Protection 10.7 11.3 11.7 
Youth, Sp., Culture .5 .6 .8 
Private sector dev. 5.7 5.2 5.1 
Agriculture 2.9 3.0 3.1 
Water + sanitation 1.4 1.4 1.3 
Transp. infrastruct. 4.6 4.9 5.0 
Total in RwF 229,476,906,793 269,116,098,940 306,825,763,304 
Source: Government of Rwanda, own calculations.  
 
Education is a key factor to form responsible citizens and thus to increase their tax 
compliance and support to tax reforms. In terms of educational attainment, as indicated 
in Table 11, only few people among the more than 25y old have reached tertiary 
education compared to neighbouring countries. Presumably this is partially due to the 
1994 genocide and its consequences. Notice that in the secondary school the attendance 
by girls slightly surpasses that by both genders, though the contrary occurs at the level 
of tertiary education. 
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Table 11. Educational attainment (%) of people of 25y and more 
 Rwanda Kenya Uganda 
Primary (highest 
level attained) 
• total 
• girls 
 
 
27.01 
25.17 
 
 
40.65 
42.53 
 
 
24.46 
20.76 
Secondary (idem) 
• total 
• girls 
 
3.36 
3.50 
 
.63 
.43 
 
3.09 
1.69 
Tertiary (idem) 
• total 
• girls 
 
.68 
.51 
 
2.00 
1.24 
 
2.62 
2.00 
            Source: Barro and Lee (2010), Educational attainment for total population. 
 
 
A series of indexes regarding various aspects of policies for social inclusion are 
proposed by the World Bank; we report the aggregate figures for that index in the first 
line of Table 12, along with a similar index for public sector management and 
institutions and the global aggregate index called Country and Policy Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA). If we look at the first row of the Table we see that Rwanda 
performs better than both its neighbours and the aggregate over Sub-Saharan African 
countries (SSA).  
 
 
Table 12. Indicators of social support 
 Rwanda Kenya Uganda SSA 
Soc. inclus. 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.2 
Public sector 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.9 
CPIA 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.2 
       Source: World Bank, IDA 
 
Poverty is high in Rwanda (poverty ratio was 44.9% in 2011. 
 
4.4. Avoidance, evasion, and informality 
 
According to Schneider’s figures on informal economy which cover evasion, but also 
the various forms of avoidance, the informality as a percentage of total GDP reaches 
39.53% in Rwanda, slightly below the average figure for Sub-Saharan Africa (40.5%). 
 
 
Table 13. Indicator of informal economy (2004-2007) 
Rwanda Kenya Uganda SSA 
39.53 31.75 41.48 40.50 
       Source: Schneider (2012) 
 
 
The relatively low Rwandan figures might be explained by the low level of corruption 
and by the fact that the economy is essentially rural and based on small size agriculture 
(especially based on coffee and tea).  
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Rwandan informality is mostly composed of legal and subsistence activities which, 
combined to low corruption, didn't prevent conducting a smooth VAT introduction and 
management process. 
 
 
4.5. Tax policy and administration 
 
Indicators related to government effectiveness in Table 9 provide a good picture of the 
quality of the Rwandan administration in general. In addition, when it comes to the 
burden of customs procedure, Rwanda has been ranked in 6th position by the latest 
Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum which attributed  a grade 
of 5.60 (on a scale  from 1 = extremely inefficient to 7 = extremely efficient) for the 
efficiency of the Rwandan tax authorities it . In comparison, average score for Sub-
Saharan Africa is of 3.78. 
 
4.6 Economic factors 
 
The Rwandan economy is still extensively based on agriculture. Although this 
specialisation pattern limits the potential of a value-added tax, it has not been a major 
constraint in the introduction of the VAT in Rwanda. 
 
4.7. External actors 
 
It is clear that external actors play a role in Rwandan tax policy, in particular donors and 
the East African Community (EAC). 
 
Donors still play a key role in the fiscal policy of Rwanda. However, although the share 
of aid in the Rwandan budget still amounts to 36.6 % (figures for the budget 2013-
2014), it is declining over time; the country needs and wants to be less aid-dependent 
and  more self-reliant (Aid Flows ODA: 1278 USD million in 2011). 
 
As a member of the EAC, Rwanda's tax policy is also largely influenced by the key 
orientations decided at that level. Indeed, EAC is a customs union which calls for 
further harmonisation of the tax system, at least as far as external trade relations are 
concerned. 
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THE VALUE-ADDED TAX REFORMS IN KENYA IN THE PAST DECADE 
(SINCE 2003, UNDER THE NARC GOVERNMENT) 
 
 
VAT REFORMS IN KENYA IN THE PAST DECADE 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• Ensuring equity 
 
• Further widening 
the tax base 
 
• Promoting 
investment 
 
• Reducing the tax 
compliance burden. 
Mixed 
results  
 
• A dominant power political system, where state 
mechanisms are clearly under the personal control of 
the President.  
 
• Government control of state resources and institutions. 
 
• Elite dominance and patronage politics 
 
• Elite capture of fiscal governance 
 
• Poor timing of the reforms 
 
• Low institutional quality and lack of good economic 
governance. 
 
• Lack of taxpaying culture and tax morale. 
 
• Social perception that institutions were serving the 
country’s elite rather than the people.  
 
• Serious integrity concerns within the Parliament. 
 
• Lack of public trust in the government. 
 
• Tax system is perceived as unfair. 
 
• No legitimacy of the public expenditure 
 
• No institutionalised consultation process 
 
• Wide stakeholders participation, although public 
participation still remains a challenge 
 
• Withholding of information by the government hampers 
consultation process and public participation. 
 
• A large informal sector. High levels of tax avoidance 
and tax evasion. 
 
 
 
1. Economic outlook 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
168 
 
 
The Republic of Kenya is one of the 5 countries in the East African Community (EAC)1 
surrounded by Tanzania in the South, Ethiopia in the north, Uganda in the west, the 
Indian Ocean to the east, South Sudan in the north-west, and Somalia in the north-east. 
According to the 2009 Kenya population and housing census, it had a density of 
66persons/km2 and about 43% of the total population is below age 15 (KNBS 2012). 
Nairobi, Kilindini and Mombasa which are predominantly urban have high population 
densities of 4, 515; 4,493 and 4,144 persons per square kilometres respectively (Oisebe 
2011). Like all countries in the EAC, the population in Kenya is predominantly rural, 
representing 76% as of 2012 compared to the average of 81% in the EAC. 
 
In 2012, with a gross national income (GNI) per capita of US$840, Kenya was 
classified as low-income country according to the World Bank’s estimates. Its gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2012 was US$862, well above the EAC average 
of US$577.80 and the highest in the region. 
 
The overall poverty was estimated at 45.9% in 2005. Income inequality for Kenya, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, suggests that income inequality is relatively high in 
the country (Wambugu and Munga 2009). According to the World Data Bank WDI, the 
Gini index in Kenya was 47.68 in 2005, the second highest unequal economy after 
Rwanda (50.82). For instance, between 1998 and 2002, the poorest 20% of the 
population received only 6% of the national income, while the richest 20% took 49%. 
This high income disparity would somewhat explain the comparatively narrow tax base2 
and the low tax compliance among the low income groups, including the informal sector 
(ABD 2011b).  
 
The per capita GDP in Kenya has been growing at an average annual rate of 2.6% since 
2006. The real GDP growth was 4.5% in 2013 and is projected to reach 5.2% in 2014 
(AEO, 2013). 
 
 
Table 5. Macroeconomic outlook 2013 
 Kenya Average SSA 
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), 2011 1 710 3 550.8 
GINI index, 2005 47.7 45.2 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), 2006/10 25.97% 24.35% 
Openness rate (2006/10) 65.65% 79.43% 
Source: World DataBank, World Development Indicators. 
 
With respect to output structure, Kenya has a large modern and diversified economy 
compared to other EAC countries. Agriculture and forestry accounted for 25.9% of 
                                                 
 
 
 
1The East African Community (EAC) is the regional intergovernmental organisation comprised of the 
Republics of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Uganda.  
2The narrow tax base in Kenya is demonstrated by the fact that 830 taxpayers contribute about 75% of all 
domestic tax revenue and that, with a population of close to 40 million people at the end of 2007, the total 
number of registered taxpayers was about 860,000 (ADB 2011a). 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
169 
 
GDP in 2012. The contribution made to GDP by agriculture and forestry increased from 
22.3% in 2008 to 25.9% in 2012, while that made by manufacturing decreased from 
10.8% to 9.2%. The overall industry sector represented approximately 15.4 of the GDP 
in 2012. Kenya’s manufacturing sector mainly engage in processing agricultural, metal, 
electrical and chemical products and fast consumer goods. The country also refines 
crude petroleum into petroleum products mainly consumed in the domestic market. The 
expanding informal sector also engages in small-scale manufacturing of household 
goods, motor vehicle parts and farm tools (AEO, 2013; KNBS, 2013). Agriculture is the 
second largest contributor to Kenya’s GDP after the service sector.3 This sector 
accounted for approximately 47.5% of the 2012 GDP volume and its dominant segment 
is wholesale and retail trade, repairs (KNBS, 2013). Kenya’s main agricultural produce 
include cereals (maize and wheat), horticulture, industrial crops (sugar cane and 
pyrethrum), permanent crops (coffee and tea) and livestock products (AEO, 2013). 
 
The main types of taxes in Kenya are direct taxes (individual income tax and corporate 
tax) and indirect taxes (value added tax (VAT), excise duty, and customs duty). The 
income tax for individuals is levied on a graduated scale at rates which vary between 
10% and 30%. The corporate income tax is levied at a rate of 30% on all incorporated 
companies in Kenya and at the rate is 37.5% for non-resident companies. The standard 
VAT rate is 16%. Exports are zero-rated and there is a special rate of 12% which 
applies for industrial fuel and electricity. Some goods and services such as unprocessed 
agricultural products and financial services are exempt (EC EuropeAid 2011). 
 
In Kenya, taxation remains the single largest source of government budgetary resources. 
Between 1995 and 2005, tax revenue represented 80% of total government revenue 
(including grants).  Between 2006 and 2011, the contribution of tax to total government 
recurrent revenue (excluding grants) has averaged 93% (EC EuropeAid 2011). The tax-
to-GDP ratio in Kenya is one of the highest in the EAC with average tax revenue of 
19.8% of GDP between 2009 and 2013. According to the African Development Bank 
(2011b), in the past three decades, Kenya’s tax system has performed better than 
average in the continent with respect to the tax-to-GDP ratio. The central government 
cumulative revenue collection for FY 2010/11 represented 24.2% of GDP. Total 
revenue collection is expected to reach 25.7% of GDP in 2012 and 25.1% of GDP in 
2013 (AEO, 2013). Since the incorporation of the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) in 
1995, the ratio of tax revenue to GDP has gradually climbed from 14 % in 1995/96 to 
22 % in 2009/10 (EC EuropeAid 2011).  
 
Between 1995 and 2011, the highest tax contribution came from income tax which 
represented on average 38% of total tax revenue during that period. It was followed by 
VAT which accounted for 27.3% of total tax revenue and then excise duties and import 
duties with respective contribution to total tax revenue of 17.2% and 12.2% during this 
period. The tax with the fastest annual growth (in nominal terms) during the same 
                                                 
 
 
 
3The service sector in general covers government activities, communications, transportation, finance, and 
all other private economic activities that do not produce material goods. The agriculture sector includes 
farming, fishing, and forestry. The industry sector includes mining, manufacturing, energy production, 
and construction.  
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period was VAT, which grew 13.2% per year on average while the income tax revenues 
grew by 12.4% annually. 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
Kenya’s tax system has undergone more or less continual reform over the last twenty years. 
The process of tax reforms in Kenya was a gradual process rather than a ‘big bang’ 
approach4. The gradual approach was probably adopted because Kenya’s political and 
economic environment was not conducive to the big bang. On the policy side, a value-
added tax was introduced, rate schedules have been rationalised and simplified, and external 
tariffs were brought in line with those of neighbouring countries in East Africa. At the same 
time, administrative and institutional reforms have taken place. 
 
There are two main epochs in the reform of tax policies and administration in Kenya:   
 
1) The first epoch generally corresponds to the Tax Modernisation Programme (TMP) 
that was launched in 1986 and whose implementation was gradual and lasted for about a 
decade. Key policies objectives under the TMP included: raising and maintaining 
revenue as a ratio of GDP at 24% by 1999/2000; expanding the tax base; rationalizing 
the tax structure to make it more equitable; reducing and rationalizing tax rates and 
tariffs; reducing trade taxes and increasing them on consumption to support investment; 
and sealing leakage loopholes (ABD 2011b).  
 
2) The second epoch was the Revenue Administration Reform and Modernisation 
Programme (RARMP), launched in 2005 with the aim of modernising and enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of KRA, notably through increased use of ICT. New 
instruments were introduced such as the Integrated Tax Management System, e-
Registration, Personal Identification Numbers, and Electronic Tax Registers (ETRs) for 
VAT registered taxpayers, etc. 
 
It is worth noting that the introduction of ETRs as a sales control instrument raised fierce 
opposition from business people who complained against the implementation costs. They 
managed to mobilise considerable support, including from members of Parliament, but the 
resistance was overcome. 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform. 
 
The patronage politics, and ultimately corruption, that characterised Kenya’s political 
institutions in the 1980s and early 1990s, crippled the tax system in the form of undue 
exemptions and corruption-based tax evasion.5 This resulted in substantial fiscal deficits 
and raised the need for measures to tighten tax administration. The establishment of 
KRA in 1995 as a semi-autonomous government agency responsible for revenue 
administration was mainly a means to tackle these challenges. KRA was expected to 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 UNU-WIDER (2005), Tax reform experience in Kenya 
5Example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ruling elite siphoned billions of shillings of public 
resources through tax exemptions as well as through a famous scheme known as the Goldenberg scandal, 
where pre-export financing and export compensation were paid for fake exports (ADB 2011a). 
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insulate the tax system from the rampant corruption that then pervaded the public 
administration system. There are concerns among civil society that KRA exists mainly 
to respond to the demands of IMF and World Bank. Indeed, the establishment of KRA 
was one of the IMF conditionalities for the resumption of financing (ADB 2011a).  
 
Unfortunately, competition among political constituencies for control of the tax system 
as an instrument for patronage continued. This was manifested by frequent changes to 
KRA leadership during first decade after its launch (ADB 2011a). 
 
Although revenue collection has continued to grow after the introduction of KRA, a 
great number of business procedures remained manual, lengthy, cumbersome and 
susceptible to manipulation and abuse during the period of the TMP. Additionally, 
during that period, the KRA had yet to operate as a fully integrated organisation as 
various tax units, Income Tax, VAT, and Customs, were still operating in silos (ADB 
2011a). These challenges actuated the second phase of tax reforms in Kenya. The 
second phase of the tax policies and administration reform process is the Revenue 
Administration Reform and Modernisation Programme (RARMP), which was launched 
in FY2004/05 by the new KRA top management appointed by the NARC government 
(2003-2007).  
 
Under the sales tax system which was introduced in 1973, the tax base was narrow and 
was confined to sale of goods at manufacturing and importation level. The VAT was 
introduced under the TMP in 1990 with the main objective to increase revenue through 
the expansion of the tax base. When first introduced, VAT was levied at a standard rate 
of 17% which then rose to 18% before eventually declining to 15%, and then stabilizing 
at 16%, and a 0% rate for some goods (ABD 2011b). The initial phases of the VAT was 
very complex consisting of 15 rates with the highest being 210%.  
 
A year after the introduction of VAT, the number of rates was reduced to eight with the 
maximum rate of 100% (see table below). The goal of the continuing rationalisation of 
rates and the lowering of the VAT ceiling was to reduce tax evasion and make local 
products more competitive. Other objectives of the rationalisation of rates were to 
eliminate misclassification, simplify tax administration, encourage voluntary 
compliance, control smuggling, and minimize the request for exemptions (Karingi and 
Wanjala 2005). 
 
 
Table 6. Rationalisation process for VAT rates in Kenya 
Year No. of rates Rates (%) Standard rate (%) 
1989/90 15  17 
1990/1 9 0, 5, 18, 30, 45, 50, 80, 100, 150 18 
1991/2 8 0, 5, 18, 25, 35, 50, 75, 100 18 
1992/3 6 0, 3, 5, 18, 30 and 50 18 
1993/4 4 0, 5, 18 and 40 18 
1994/5 4 0, 5, 18 and 30 18 
1995/6 4 0, 6, 15 and 25 15 
1996/7 3 0, 8, and 15 15 
1997/8 3 0, 10, and 17 17 
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1998/9 4 0, 10, 12 and 16 16 
1999/00 4 0, 10, 13 and 15 15 
2000/1 4 0, 10, 16 and 18 18 
2001/2 4 0, 10, 16 and 18 18 
2002/3 4 0, 10, 16 and 18  18 
2003/4 3 0, 10, and 16 16 
2013 2 0 and 16 16 
Source: (Karingi and Wanjala 2005), except 2013. 
 
 
After the introduction of the VAT Act 2013, which came into operation on 
2nd September, 2013, the number of VAT rates was further reduced to two, namely: 
16% for all goods and services not listed in the exempt and zero rated schedules and 0% 
for goods and services listed in the second schedule.6  
 
Although tax reforms in Kenya under the TMP, in particular the administrative reforms 
(e.g. lower tax rates, PIN etc.) aimed at eliminating avenues for evasion and corruption, had 
led to improved productivity of direct taxes, there were still considerable revenue leakage in 
the administration of VAT (ADB 2011a). 
 
2.2. The causes of the reform. 
 
The reform package introduced in 2003 largely came about from a change in 
government, specifically the coming to power of the NARC government for which 
economic recovery was the top priority. One of the main reasons for undertaking tax 
reforms in Kenya was to reduce inequality in the country and create a sustainable tax 
system that could generate adequate revenue to finance public expenditures (Karingi 
and Wanjala 2005). 
 
When the NARC government under President Kibaki came to power in 2003, it 
introduced a package of tax reforms with the following objectives: ensuring equity; 
further widening the tax base; promoting increased investment; and reducing the tax 
compliance burden. In general, tax policy was shifted towards greater reliance on 
indirect taxes as opposed to direct taxes. Consumption taxes were argued to be more 
favourable to investments and hence growth. Additionally, as above-mentioned, the 
RARMP was launched in FY2004/05 by the new KRA top management appointed by 
the new NARC government in 2003. The objective of the RARMP was to achieve a tax 
system that was sustainable in the face of changing conditions domestically and 
internationally (Karingi and Wanjala 2005, ADB 2011a). 
 
2.3. Main changes introduced by the reform. 
 
Since its introduction in 1990, VAT has been presented as the “tax of the future” in line 
with the country’s objective of reducing reliance on direct taxes as well as diminishing 
                                                 
 
 
 
6 The Kenyan Revenue Authority, Value Added Tax Act 2013, World Bank, Data, viewed 20 February 
July 2014, http://www.kra.go.ke/index.php/vat2013/faqs. 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
173 
 
the role of trade taxes (Karingi and Wanjala 2005). Additionally, its broad-based 
characteristic, its capacity to extract taxes from the “hard-to-tax” informal sector 
operators, and its ability to generate substantial and predictable revenues, also 
contributed to the general opinion of VAT being a “tax of the future” (Moyi and Ronge 
2006). Since its inception, the VAT legislation has seen a number of minor 
amendments; however, the VAT bill 2011constituted the most drastic overhaul of the 
current VAT Act.  
 
Key changes to tax policy made by the NARC government (2003-2008) and coalition 
(power-sharing agreement) government (2008-2013) were as follows:  
 
From 2003, given that the high and wide range of rates was thought to have led to 
widespread misclassification and other methods of tax evasion (see table above), the 
number of VAT rates was reduced to three with the highest rate set at 16% (Eissa and 
Jack 2009).  
 
In addition, the system of VAT withholding was first introduced in Kenya in late 2003 
and applied to government agencies that purchased goods and services subject to VAT. 
This measure was put in place to address the concern that the government, through these 
agencies, was paying VAT-inclusive prices to suppliers, who were not necessarily 
remitting the revenue to the KRA. Subsequently other purchasers were brought into the 
withholding regime, and in 2004-05 there were about 2000 so-called VAT withholding 
agents, i.e. purchasers who were required to withhold VAT. During that year, about 
40% of VAT revenue was collected from these agents (Eissa and Jack 2009). 
 
In June 2006, the threshold turnover for VAT was increased from KShs 3 million 
(approximately 26,165 EUR)7 per annum to KShs 5 million (approximately 43,609 
EUR) per annum with a view to reducing the compliance burden for three quarters of 
registered taxpayers who: either file nil returns, or whose turnover is not substantial. 
Additionally, certain supplies were zero rated (e.g. wheat flour, nappies, agricultural 
tractors, treatment and supply of water by local authorities, computer equipment and 
parts etc.) (ABD 2011b).  
 
On 1 January 2008, VAT on rent charged on non-residential property was introduced 
after being initially introduced and abandoned in 2001due to resistance from taxpayers 
(ADB 2011a). 
 
There have also been reforms in the form of tougher penalties, to discourage late VAT 
returns, failure to issue VAT invoices and failure to keep proper accounting records. 
However, due to issues such as corruption and weak controls in the administration of 
the VAT refund system, measures have introduced to tighten verification and 
eliminating backlogs of claims. However, the refund system is still problematic in 
Kenya (Moyi and Ronge 2006). 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
7Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 114.71KES. 
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More recently, a new VAT Act was enacted on 2nd September, 2013. The main 
objective of the VAT Act 2013 is to improve the business climate by eliminating 
inappropriate processes that have led to high tax compliance costs and burdens for 
business, thereby hindering investment activities and economic growth in Kenya. The 
administration of VAT was also reduced through the elimination of numerous rebate 
schemes that were plaguing the old VAT law, thus reducing disputes between the 
revenue authority and the business community.8 
 
Overall, VAT in Kenya has been the choice instrument for dealing with exceptional 
circumstances and financing of unexpected expenditures. VAT has also been used to 
revamp Kenyan industries, stimulate economic activities and to encourage local 
production within specific sectors especially through the zero-rating system (Karingi 
and Wanjala 2005). 
 
Other reforms in the broader tax reform package included the widening of the income 
tax bands by 5% in 2004/05.  
 
In a further attempt to reach the informal sector income earners, an advanced tax 
payable for drivers and conductors of passenger service and commercial vehicles was 
introduced in 2006/07. A turnover tax applicable for businesses with an annual turnover 
of below KShs 5 million (approximately 43,609 EUR) was introduced in 2008 aiming at 
reducing the compliance cost for small businesses. The rate of tax is 3% of gross 
receipts. In 2008/09, the VAT Act was amended to exempt taxpayers who are subject to 
the turnover tax (ADB 2011a). 
 
Under the Revenue Administration Reform and Modernisation Programme (RARMP) 
launched in FY 2004/05, whose goal is to transform “KRA into a modern, fully 
integrated and client-focused organisation”, the modernisation of the tax administration 
was spearheaded by an ICT-driven strategy with three main initiatives: the Integrated 
Tax Management System (ITMS) for domestic revenue with the e-registration available; 
the electronic tax registers (ETRs) for use by VAT registered taxpayers and to ensure 
full remittance of VAT by retailers, which KRA introduced from 1 January 2005; and 
the Simba 2005 system (S2005S) for customs operations.9 
 
The aim of the ICT-driven modernisation strategy of KRA was to enhance efficiency 
and effectiveness of KRA’s operations. Moreover, the organisational structure was 
streamlined through for instance, the merger of the various tax departments into the 
Domestic Tax Department and the creation of the large taxpayer office (LTO). The 
relative success of KRA in rapidly implementing the reforms of the tax system since 
                                                 
 
 
 
8 The Kenyan Revenue Authority, Value Added Tax Act 2013, World Bank, Data, viewed 20 February 
July 2014, http://www.kra.go.ke/index.php/vat2013/faqs. 
9It is important to note that the introduction of ETRs was the object of resistance through strikes and street 
demonstrations in major towns in the country and is the subject of ongoing court battles between KRA 
and Traders. Similarly, the introduction of Simba 2005 system has been strongly resisted, mainly due to 
allegations of collusion between customs officials and importers, with the aim to dodge their tax liability 
(Moyi and Ronge 2006). 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
175 
 
2003/04 could not have been feasible if the politics of patronage and corruption were 
still rampant (ADB 2011a). 
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1. Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by national authorities 
 
As previously mentioned the tax-to-GDP ratio in Kenya is one of the highest in the 
EAC with average tax revenue of 19.6% of GDP between 1995 and 2011 and has 
performed better than average in the continent in the past three decades. Resiliently, the 
tax-to-GDP ratio in Kenya has been registering a good performance over the years even 
in the midst of poor governance and weak economic performance. Specifically, the 
implementation of the RARMP was successful in reversing the decade long decline in 
the tax-to-GDP ratio during the period 2004-2007 (see figure below) (ABD 2011b). 
 
 
Figure 2: Tax to GDP (%) 
 
 
Source: The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), 2013. 
 
The VAT was introduced under the TMP in 1990 with the main objective to increase 
revenue through the expansion of the tax base. In the first two or three years following 
its introduction, VAT was the largest contributor of tax revenue, with a peak 
contribution of 39.4% in 1991/92. By 1994/95, revenues from VAT had declined to 
22.5% of total tax revenues, but thereafter rose to 30% in 2000/01 before dropping to 
25.9% in 2007/08. According to the literature, the initial increase in the VAT’s share of 
tax revenue was mainly explained by the move to widen its coverage, but thereafter, 
reached a plateau. The decline in VAT collections can be explained by VAT waivers 
given by the government in years of drought, famine and other natural disasters, and 
revenue lost from incentives and exemptions offered to firms operating in Kenya’s 
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) (ADB 2011a). Nevertheless, in terms of individual taxes, 
the tax with the fastest annual growth (in nominal terms) between 1995 and 2011 was 
VAT, which grew 13.2% per year on average while the income tax revenues grew by 
12.4% annually. 
 
The theoretical literature provides two sets of indicators of VAT performance that allow 
comparison across countries: the "C-efficiency ratio" and the "VAT gross compliance 
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ratio". The C-efficiency ratio is calculated as the ratio of VAT revenue collection as a 
percentage of total consumption expenditure10 divided by the standard VAT rate. This a 
traditional measure of the effectiveness of the VAT in raising revenue and an indicator 
of the departure of the VAT from a perfectly enforced tax levied at a uniform rate on all 
consumption, with no exemptions. In other words, the C-efficiency ratio implicitly 
compares the revenue actually collected from VAT with that which would be raised if 
VAT were perfectly enforced and levied at a uniform rate, equal to the standard rate, on 
all consumption, and with no exemptions (potential VAT collections). As such, the 
C-efficiency will be 100% if the VAT is a broad-based, single tax rate, and perfectly 
enforced. Intuitively, any departures from a C-efficiency of 100% would stem from two 
sources: the extent to which the VAT differs in design from a uniform tax on all 
consumption with no exemptions and the extent to which its implementation is 
imperfect11. However, it is important to note that a VAT closer to 100% does not 
necessarily mean a better VAT; indeed although the C-efficiency can be increased, for 
example, by denying VAT refunds to exporters, or by introducing exemptions for 
intermediate goods, this will have the effect of undermining the role of the VAT as a tax 
on domestic consumption. 
 
The VAT gross compliance ratio is similar to the C-efficiency ratio except that the 
compliance ratio relates VAT collections to private consumption expenditures rather 
than aggregate consumption expenditures.  
 
The figure below shows the two efficiency measures, C-efficiency ratio and VAT gross 
compliance ratio, for Kenya between the fiscal years 2007 and 2011. The overall trend 
in Kenya during that period is toward a consistent increase in the VAT performance, in 
spite of a significant drop in VAT efficiency in 2008/09 coinciding with the spillovers 
of the global financial crisis. The average C-efficiency and VAT compliance ratio 
during that period were 39.7% and 48.5% respectively in comparison to a World 
average C-efficiency of 51% (Bird and Gendron 2011). Compared to Rwanda and 
Uganda in the East Africa Community, Uganda appears to be a low performer on both 
measures. In Rwanda, the average C-efficiency and VAT compliance ratio were 22.8% 
and 27.8% respectively between 2002 and 2009 compared to 11.7% and 13.4% in 
Uganda between 2004/05 and 2011/12. 
 
The high performance of VAT in Kenya as per the C-efficiency ratio may be explained 
by the RARMP launched in 2005 which aimed at modernising and enhancing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of KRA, notably through the increased use of ICT with new 
instruments introduced such as: the Integrated Tax Management System, e-Registration, 
Personal Identification Numbers, and Electronic Tax Registers (ETRs) for VAT 
registered taxpayers. This high VAT performance might also be explained by the 
inefficiency in the administration of VAT refunds in the country. 
                                                 
 
 
 
10This refers to final consumption expenditure aggregated over government, households, and non-profits 
(Keen 2013). A C-efficiency ratio of, say, 20%, implies that if the standard VAT rate is increased by one 
percentage point, the shares of the VAT revenues in total consumption expenditure is expected to increase 
by 0.2 percentage point. In general, the higher the ratio, the better is the performance of the VAT.   
11This is linked to two interrelated factors, i.e. the level of tax compliance (tax morale) and the 
effectiveness of the tax administration (Martinez-Vazquez and Bird 2010). 
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Figure 3: Evolution of the C-efficiency ratio and VAT gross compliance ratio in 
Kenya 
 
 
 
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), Statistical Abstract 2012, Table 31 (a); Table 167 
(a). 
 
 
3.2. Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
Overall, despite the above-average performance of the Kenya’s VAT system, there is 
potential to increase tax revenue collection as a percentage of GDP by reducing the tax 
gap (ADB 2011a). Specifically, the VAT performance has been undermined by the 
difficulty to improve tax compliance in a fast growing and profitable, but, increasingly 
complex informal sector where the tax evasion remains particularly high. Furthermore, 
tackling the informal sector in Kenya has been hampered by populist politics seeking to 
shield some constituencies of potential taxpayers from their tax obligations (ADB 
2011a). According to the 2013 Kenya economic survey, the informal sector constitutes 
75% of the working population. Informal sector workers in wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants accounted for 60.7% of all workers in the sector. The second 
largest employer was manufacturing which absorbed 19.4% of the informal sector 
labour force (KNBS, 2013). 
 
The VAT performance is also constrained by the wide range of tax exemptions and tax 
incentives (mainly exemptions given on withholding tax and the zero rating of VAT 
payable for goods and services procured by public bodies and privileged institutions) 
given by the government of Kenya in spite of fact that empirical studies on tax 
exemptions and incentives have confirmed that, not only they are not important in 
attracting foreign investment, but they create distortions and result in the loss of tax 
revenues. In addition, the socio-economic rationale for VAT zero rating has been 
questioned given that it often does not result in lower consumer prices for the targeted 
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beneficiaries but rather would likely benefit business people as windfall profits (ADB 
2011a, TJN-A & AAI 2012).  
 
According to the Economic Secretary, Geoffrey Mwau, Kenya is losing over KShs 100 
billion (or approximately 860 million EUR)12 a year from all tax incentives and 
exemptions and most of these losses come from VAT exemptions. This would amount 
to around 3.1% of GDP. In March 2011, the Treasury Permanent Secretary argued that 
revenue foregone from VAT exemptions alone amounted to KShs 60 billion (or 
approximately 516 million EUR) a year. In that regard, the VAT bill 2011 is expected to 
include comprehensive amendments in order to minimize revenue losses linked to 
exemptions (TJN-A & AAI 2012).  
 
Furthermore, the discretionary granting of tax incentives and tax exemptions without 
open criteria as well as the lack of monitoring have assimilated them into favours for the 
elite and the well connected. Poor tax morale and the inability to curb tax evasion and 
corruption are other contributing factors hampering the VAT performance (ADB 
2011a). 
 
Moreover, KRA remains relatively inefficient in the administration of VAT refunds, 
especially refunds for zero-rated transactions. It has been argued that the elapsed 
number of business days for VAT refunds is 60 days and this delay can be as long as 
120 days. The time taken to pay refunds is relatively long when compared to South 
Africa (21 days). In this context, exemptions are widely granted as a matter of 
administrative expediency, thus further threatening the legitimacy of the VAT system 
(Moyi and Ronge 2006, ADB 2011a).  
 
A survey of taxpayers revealed that taxpayers described the procedures for appeals, 
exemptions, remissions, and refunds as ‘very poor’ and ‘unfair’. A main impediment to 
the speedy refund of excess payments is that such transfers are treated under the budget 
as expenditures, not as negative revenues; as such it means that the Parliament must 
pass an appropriation bill with funds earmarked for VAT refunds. Moreover, further 
delays are incurred due to frequent disagreement between the KRA and the Treasury 
over the size of refunds required (Eissa and Jack 2009).  
 
In order to improve the VAT refund system in Kenya, it has been suggested to 
implement an automatic VAT refund system except in cases where there are serious 
concerns over fraud determined on a basis of risk assessment. Additionally, given that 
the amount of unpaid VAT refunds is estimated at billions of shillings (approximately 
KShs 25 billion), the private sector, through the Kenya Private Sector Alliance 
(KEPSA), estimated that the accrued amount should earn interest to avoid double 
standards in the treatment of taxpayers (Eissa and Jack 2009).13 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
12Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 114.71KES. 
13Standard Media, Kenya “Private sector wants KRA tax refunds to accrue interest”, viewed 30 August 
2013; https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000081345&story_title=Kenya--Private-sector-
wants-KRA-tax-refunds-to-accrue-interest. 
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Another challenge is related to different rates of tax for various goods and services 
which complicate taxpayers’ understanding of their tax obligations. In addition, the 
deduction of input tax is rendered complex by the fact that not all input tax would 
qualify for deduction. This complexity increases chances of errors and likely explains 
the low level of compliance (Moyi and Ronge 2006). 
 
It has also been suggested that there are significant levels of tax evasion in the VAT 
system,  in particular, under declarations remain a big issue and a large number of small 
businesses in the informal sector still remain outside of the tax net because of corruption 
(ADB 2011a). 
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform 
 
Kenya gained its independence from Britain in December 1963. In 1964, the Republic 
of Kenya was formed with Jomo Kenyatta, the leader of the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU), as the first ever president and Oginga Odinga as vice-president. After 
being re-elected in 1974, Kenyatta died in office in 1978 and was succeeded by Vice-
President Daniel Arap Moi who stayed in office until 2002.  
 
The landslide victory of the National Rainbow Alliance Coalition (NARC) at the 2002 
general elections put an end to the uninterrupted rule of the Kenya African National 
Union (KANU) party which had been in power since independence in 1963. The 2002 
elections were the freest and fairest elections so far and were also notable for the near 
absence of violence. 
 
4.1. Political factors. 
 
a) Main structural characteristics of the regime 
 
We will analyse here the main structural characteristics of the political regime (during 
the period under consideration – i.e. before the adoption of the new Constitution in 
2010), paying particular attention to the role of various actors in the budget process 
through which most of the changes to the VAT structure were made. 
 
The Kenyan constitutional system is based on a strong presidential regime. As a matter 
of fact, Jomo Kenyatta had encouraged the legislature to create the position of president 
that would grant him considerable executive powers. The presidential characteristics of 
the regime have been reinforced by successive constitutional amendments since 1969 to 
produce a very powerful presidency as each subsequent president sought to tighten his 
control and increase his influence (Chitere, et al. 2006). As a result, presidential 
authority grew relentlessly, in spite of regular calls from opposition parties to curtail the 
extensive powers of the President. 
 
The President is elected directly for a 5-year term through direct elections. The 
Constitution provides the Presidency with vast executive powers: the President is both 
Head of State and of government and he also controls the administration, he is 
commander in chief of the army and has wide-ranging prerogatives with regard to 
maintaining order. 
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As a matter of fact, the Executive has dominated Kenyan politics since independence 
and the ability of Parliament to control the Executive has thus been very limited. 
 
The new Constitution adopted in 2010 significantly reduces the formal powers of the 
Executive, including that of the President. New constraints include the fact that all 
major presidential appointments, from the cabinet to the judiciary, must now be 
approved by Parliament, and the president can no longer suspend or dissolve the 
National Assembly. Moreover, the president can now be impeached by Parliament. 
 
Until the adoption of the new Constitution in 2010, the Parliament was uni-cameral and 
consisted of 210 elected members, 12 nominated members representing special interests 
appointed by the President according to the parliamentary strength of the political 
parties, and two ex officio members without voting rights. Under the 2010 Constitution, 
the Parliament is bi-cameral, composed of the National Assembly (349 members plus 
the ex-officio Speaker) and the Senate (67 members plus the ex-officio Speaker). Both 
the MPs and Senators are directly elected by citizens and serve a 5-year term. 
 
i) Low institutional quality in the political field 
 
Because of patronage and weak institutionalisation of political parties, the Parliament 
remains submissive to the Presidency (Hanson 2008). Parliament has little power to 
address public grievances and is generally seen as paying more attention to self and 
vested interests. In turn, this may compromise national interests by challenging and 
watering down proposed reform-focused legislation (DAI 2012). Indeed, observers 
noted in 2006 that Parliament meets only twice per week and rarely passes any laws 
(BTI 2012). 
 
After having been officially a one-party state for more than a decade, political pluralism 
was re-introduced in Kenya in 1991 (with the first multiparty elections in1992); the 
opposition has little power in the government. The pervasive state control of the 
Kenyatta and Moi Presidencies had severe economic implications, due to the wide-scale 
patronage and corruption associated with their established dominant power political 
systems.  
 
Kenya has a highly fragmented political party system which makes it difficult for MPs 
to agree on crucial matters of policy or principle. This partly explains why no major tax 
policy reforms were undertaken during the past decade. 
 
Political parties in Kenya have been institutionally weak and ineffective, largely based 
on ethnic loyalty and patronage networks rather than a sound doctrine or ideology. They 
have failed to articulate socio-economic or any other democratically acceptable 
ideological cleavages and have tended to articulate interests on the basis of ethnicity 
(Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2010). Electoral campaigns are generally centred on the 
exploitation of ethnic differences and the search for a winning coalition formula (DAI 
2012). Issues-based politicking is still rare, as are policy-based parties and platforms. 
Political parties are, in consequence, relatively empty vessels, symbols of transient 
coalitions rather than aggregations of political beliefs and interests. 
 
A common practice in Kenya is the so-called "party-hopping" (i.e. moving from one 
party to the other) which also contributes to the multiplication of political parties and 
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the ensuing fragility of the political landscape. There are more than 50 different political 
parties in Kenya, of which approximately 20 are "relevant". 
 
ii) The budget process 
 
The Kenyan Parliament has become increasingly engaged in the budgetary process 
though such involvement often remained at an early stage. The Treasury, under the 
guidance of the Presidency, remains nevertheless lead financial agency.  
 
Under the old Constitution, most of the decisions concerning budget preparation and 
expenditure management were left to the Executive. The executive made all the 
decisions, including when to report and how much information was to be made 
available to both Parliament and the public (Kirira 2011). 
 
Although Parliament approved taxes, rates and expenditure proposals, this was only a 
formality as its role was reduced to one of ritual approval. The Parliament could only 
amend what was proposed and had no power to influence the manner in which resources 
were mobilised and allocated (Kirira 2011). In particular, Article 48 of the Constitution 
prohibited the Parliament from introducing bills related to money and from imposing 
taxes or altering the tax code unless it reduces taxes. This provision has often been used 
or misused to curtail parliamentary control over the legislative process. Bills have been 
dismissed too easily on the grounds that they have money implications (Chitere, et al. 
2006). 
 
Moreover, public budgeting has been used as a political tool to reward and punish MPs, 
who because of their low emoluments and allowances were easy to compromise. This 
encouraged corruption. Because of such abuses, the general public supported the 
legislature in its struggle to wrest control of public finances from the executive, 
especially following the emergence of the Anglo-leasing scandal in 2004. In response to 
mounting pressure, the 2004/2005 budget law recognised the need to get the Parliament 
more involved in public financial management. It was enacted by the 10th Parliament as 
the Fiscal Management Act of 2009. Many of these changes were later incorporated into 
the new Constitution which enabled the transfer of key public finance responsibilities 
from the executive to the legislature. The new legal framework thus strengthens the role 
of the Parliament which now has constitutional authority to increase or reduce tax rates 
without the recommendation of the President. 
 
However, a major constraint concerns the limited capacity and knowledge of MPs on 
many technical public finance issues and the inability of most MPs to understand and 
get involved throughout the budgetary process. The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 
was the first to address the problem in the early years of the Eighth Parliament (1997-
2002) by organising annual workshop for MPs to explain the meaning and impact of the 
budget and of proposed changes in the tax code with the hope that such information 
would improve the annual budget debate (Barkan and Matiangi 2009). 
 
Another key initiative aimed at assisting and building capacity of MPs in the budget 
process was the creation of the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO), which was formally 
established by the 2009 Fiscal Management Bill. The PBO is a non-partisan 
professional office of the National Assembly whose primary function is to provide 
timely and objective information and analysis concerning the budget and economy. The 
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Office provides technical support on matters relating to Public Financial Management 
(PFM) and financial oversight to all Members of Parliament. It has been a valuable tool 
for the Fiscal Analysis and Appropriations Committee in the budget making and budget 
oversight processes. 
 
As regards the transparency and openness of the budgetary process, Kenya does 
moderately well among those in East Africa on budget oversight and engagement but 
could do a lot more to bring citizens into the process (Martini 2012). Kenya scores 49 
out of 100 in the 2012 Open Budget Index14 (unchanged compared to 2010), which 
indicates that the government provides the public with only some information on the 
national government’s budget and financial activities during the course of the budget 
year. The Open Budget Survey 2012 finds that opportunities for public participation in 
the budget process in Kenya are limited. This makes it challenging for citizens to hold 
the government accountable for its management of public revenues. 
 
b) How the political context conditioned the reform 
 
As mentioned above, the considered period for the case study covers the two terms of 
the Kibaki presidency (2002-2007, 2007-2013). Interestingly, both mandates were led 
by coalition governments characterised by tensions and infighting.  
 
 
The presidential campaign had raised high expectations for a new style of leadership. 
The NARC had promised to tackle corruption and the many other urgent problems of 
the country, such as unemployment and high crime rates. Kibaki pledged to finalise the 
constitutional reform process, to draw up an economic recovery programme, to privatise 
non-performing companies, to restore law and order with a promise of zero tolerance on 
corruption.  However, hopes rapidly evaporated as the coalition fell apart after only two 
years in office (due to disagreements on power-sharing as well as failure to agree on a 
constitutional reform aiming at reducing the President’s power and creating a post of 
Prime Minister with executive functions). In addition, the Kibaki administration was 
soon caught up with new corruption scandals (notably the Anglo-Leasing scandal). As a 
result, Kibaki failed to achieve almost all of his targets and promises as most reforms 
were stalled and business-as-usual continued. In particular, there were no major tax 
policy reforms during that period, although the government did undertake a key reform 
of the tax administration through the RARMP (see above) mainly because of huge fiscal 
deficits and pressure from donors 
 
The disputed elections in late December 2007, between Kibaki (PNU) and Odinga 
(ODM), were largely an ethno-political struggle for the presidency. Irregularities by the 
Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) spurred outbreaks of violence across the country 
on an unprecedented scale, with an estimated 1300 people killed and 650 000 displaced. 
With the backing of the international community, a power-sharing agreement was 
eventually brokered (National Accord and Reconciliation Act - 2008), whereby Kibaki 
                                                 
 
 
 
14 Open Budget Survey 2012 – Kenya – http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-
KenyaCS-English.pdf. 
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remained president while the post of Prime Minister with the authority to coordinate and 
supervise the execution of government function was created for Odinga. 
 
Despite severe challenges and heavy infighting, the so-called "grand coalition" 
remained formally intact until the end of the term. The government focused its efforts 
on addressing the causes of the crisis, reconciling communities, and preventing future 
conflicts in the country. A major constitutional reform process was conducted, leading 
to the adoption of a new Constitution in August 2010.  
 
For the first time, the new Constitution lays full legal principles and institutional 
foundations that should lead to "the end of the combination of elite collusion, 
ethnically-based patronage politics, concentration of power, corruption, impunity and a 
political culture that embeds and rationalises this behaviour" (DAI 2012). 
 
As mentioned above, no major tax policy reforms were undertaken throughout the past 
decade in Kenya. Instead, changes and improvements of the tax system were made 
through the annual budget process. Up until the very recently adopted VAT Bill (August 
2013), reform of the VAT structure in Kenya also followed a similar piecemeal 
approach through amendments to the Budget Law. 
 
4.2. Institutional framework 
 
The table below provides a brief evaluation of the institutional quality in Kenya and in 
some other countries in the east African community (EAC) in different areas such as 
corruption, quality of democracy, state efficiency, etc. 
 
Table 7. Institutional Quality, 2006-2011 average 
 Uganda  Rwanda Kenya  Burundi  Tanzania EAC 
Average 
Quality of Democracy       
Voice and Accountability  
(GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
-0.50 -1.27 -0.23 -0.80 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.59 
Democratic Accountability 
(ICRG) (0 to 6 scale), 2006-
2010 average 
2.50  5.32  4.00  
State Efficiency       
Government Effectiveness 
(GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
-0.49 -0.13 -0.54 -1.10 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.55 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 
(0 to 4 scale), 2006-2010 
average 
2  2  1  
Corruption       
Control of Corruption (GI) (-
2.5 to 2.5 scale) 
-0.84 0.17 -0.95 -1.08 
 
-0.41 
 
-0.62 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 
scale) 
2.00  0.64  2.93  
2012 Corruption Perception 
Index (TI) (0-100 
scale)(Rank among 176 
countries) 
29 
(130) 
53 
(50) 
27 
(139) 
19  
(165) 
35 
(102) 
 
Source: World DataBank, Worldwide Governance Indicators; the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) Transparency International. 
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a) Widespread corruption 
 
The fight against corruption was a major theme in Kibaki’s 2002 campaign and was 
perceived as a radical shift from the increasingly corrupt one-party rule that had been 
established after independence. Although there have been significant improvements, 
lack of political will and leadership seems to be largely responsible for failure to 
effectively tackle corruption, despite the rhetoric and political bickering over corruption 
(Martini 2012). 
 
The new administration’s commitment to fight corruption was demonstrated through the 
adoption of several laws designed to curb corruption (e.g. Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act, Public Officer Ethics Act, Public Procurement and Disposal of 
Assets Act). Among other things, this new legal framework led to the re-launch of 
Kenya’s Anti-Corruption Agency (KACC) and required MPs and civil servants to 
provide evidence of their source of income. In addition, Kibaki appointed the well-
known anti-corruption activist John Githongo, from Transparency International Kenya, 
to the new position of Permanent Secretary of Anti-Corruption in the President’s Office. 
 
However, within two years of coming to power, the new administration was caught up 
with new corruption scandals (notably the Anglo‐Leasing scandal, which was the 
largest of a string of corruption scandals relating to national security). Githongo's 
investigations found evidence of the complicity of a number of senior politicians, but no 
prosecutions followed and, in January 2005, Githongo resigned and went into exile. 
 
The major governance indicators indicate that there has been a slight improvement over 
the past decade. Indeed, the anti-corruption legal framework is considered robust as 
reflected by the country’s score of 85 according to Global Integrity 201115. According 
to both Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s 
Governance Indicators, but Kenya still scores relatively poorly on both these 
measurements:  
 
Kenya has a Corruption Perception Index score of 2.7 out of 10, which is 27% worse 
than the average for all Corruption by Country. In 2011, the country was ranked 154 out 
of the 182 countries assessed by Transparency International (TI). Kenya’s ranking in the 
Corruption Perception Index 2012 improved to 139 out of 174 economies according to 
TI. This corruption index shows that Kenya has improved 15 places between 2011 and 
2012, the best improvement Kenya has achieved in the fight against corruption. 
 
The World Bank has recorded other governance improvements, including progress in 
terms of ‘government effectiveness’ (from a score of 28.3 in 2002 to 36.0 in 2011) and 
in relation to ‘voice and accountability’ (from 25.5 in 2002 to 40.4 in 2011). 
 
Kenya has improved slightly, mainly because of changes brought about by the new 
Constitution. In particular, the recently launched devolution process creates 
opportunities for a new local governance system in Kenya. The devolution provides 
                                                 
 
 
 
15Global Integrity Report – Kenya 2011,http://www.globalintegrity.org/report/Kenya/2011. 
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each of the 47 counties with their own executive and legislative branches of local 
government which will be responsible for agriculture, transportation, trade licenses, 
sanitation, pre-primary education, village polytechnics and most health facilities. While 
overall policy in these areas will still be drawn up by the national government, counties 
will be in charge of implementation and service delivery. The impact of devolution on 
local governance and corruption the in the country remains at the moment an open 
question. There have indeed been recent concerns raised by the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission of Kenya (EACC) of devolving corruption trends to the new 
system of governance16. 
 
According to the Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2013, 33% 
of respondents agreed that level of corruption has increased in Kenya over the past two 
years. According to the perceptions of Kenyan citizens, 53% and 68% of respondents in 
Kenya felt that political parties and the parliament respectively were extremely corrupt 
while 95% and 59% of respondents perceived the police and public officials/civil 
servants respectively as corrupt or extremely corrupt. The police is consistently 
perceived as the most affected by corruption (scoring 4.8 on a 1 to 5 scale), followed by 
Parliament (4.0 in 2013).17 
 
The Kenyan economy is suffering heavily from the consequences of corruption. In 
2010, the Ministry of Finance indicated that Kenya was losing about one third of its 
annual national budget to corruption (i.e. in 2010 about USD$ 4 billion). The cost of 
corruption is also a serious deterrent to potential investors and a major impediment for 
existing and new businesses (21% of the companies interviewed within the framework 
of the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness report 2011-2012 identified 
corruption as the top obstacle for doing business in the country. This is consistent with 
findings from the World Bank and IFC Enterprise survey 2007, in which 38% of the 
companies surveyed reported corruption to be a major constraint to their operations) 
(Martini 2012). 
 
Widespread corruption has further eroded public trust in political institutions and has 
worn the fiscal contract between the citizens and the State. According to the 2008 
Afrobarometer, 49% of household respondents in Kenya believed that all or most tax 
officials are involved in corruption. The Eastern African Bribery Index conducted in 
2011 also indicated that citizens have a 30% likelihood of being asked for a bribe when 
interacting with tax officials. 
 
b) Patronage and the power of the elites 
 
The political trends are driven by the interests of three distinct but inter-related actors -- 
the top political leaders; the strata of political elites who share certain common interests; 
and ethnic groups (DAI 2012). In general, reforms have been hard to pass because of 
the strong influence of anti-reformists, including with regard to tax reforms. 
                                                 
 
 
 
16"EACC raise alarm on devolving corruption", http://www.news24.co.ke/MyNews24/EACC-raise-alarm-
on-devolving-corruption-20131024  
17Global Corruption Barometer 2013, viewed 15 October 2013;  
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=kenya 
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Kenya is characterised by a high degree of elite persistence. This can be demonstrated 
by analysing the personal and professional background of the successive presidents 
(Bedasso 2012). Kenya's two former First Families and the family of President Mwai 
Kibaki are among the biggest landowners in the country. According to the latest figures 
from Forbes magazine, the current President Uhuru Kenyatta (son of Kenya's first 
president Jomo Kenyatta) is classified among the 40 wealthiest people in Africa, heir to 
some of the largest land holdings in Kenya. He owns at least 500 000 acres of prime 
land spread across the country. Kenyatta and his family also own Kenya's largest dairy 
company, as well as stakes in popular television station K24 and a commercial bank in 
Nairobi, among other interests18. 
 
Moreover, there is a strong collusion between the political and the economic elites. The 
wealthiest business people in Kenya are mostly politicians or people who are close to 
the government in one way or another. A system of patrimonial state has thus been 
established and maintained since Kenya's independence by the successive Presidents. 
Through the informal establishment of patron‐client networks, clients were rewarded 
with land, state contracts and other preferential treatment in exchange for their loyalty. 
African business elite, predominantly from the Kikuyu ethnic group, emerged alongside 
businessmen of Indian origin (Sundet, Moen and Barasa 2009). 
 
The composition of elites constituting the dominant coalition has kept changing with 
every presidential transition. With power concentrated in the hands of the executive, the 
presidency has always been the key player of the dominant coalition. The tribal mix of 
the dominant coalition is always aligned with the ethnicity of the president. 
 
4.3. Social support 
 
The level of social support, or lack thereof, to the reform was mainly due to low tax 
awareness and low tax compliance, as well as a relatively passive civil society on tax 
matters. 
 
a) Income and regional inequalities 
 
Kenya’s poverty level is estimated to have declined from 47% in 2005, to between 34 to 
42% today (the imprecise estimates are due to the fact that there has been no household 
poverty survey since 2005-06). Kenya has made significant gains in making basic 
education accessible broadly (primary enrolment rates are now almost universal). There 
has also been some progress on child health. Maternal health and child nutrition 
however remain a challenge. 
 
As in other countries, poverty in Kenya is much deeper and much more pronounced in 
rural and remote regions, which have also been historically neglected, reflecting 
Kenya’s unbalanced geographical development (World Bank 2013). 
                                                 
 
 
 
18  The Kenyan Daily post, viewed 15 October 2013, http://www.kenyan-post.com/2013/06/exclusive-list-
of-50-richest-families.html. 
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Kenya also has a high degree of income inequality. A study in 2004 showed that the 
country’s top 10% households control 42% of total income while the bottom 10% 
control less than 1% (Odhiambo 2004). 
 
Political patronage in Kenya’s public spending is believed to have increased economic 
and regional inequalities, because Kenya’s political system concentrates power in the 
hands of the president and his political allies (Okello and Gitau 2006). 
 
Corruption, lack of transparency and accountability and an inefficient public 
administration continue to undermine the quality of the public services. Consequently, 
when voters realise elected officials aren’t willing or able to address their concerns 
about social and economic inequality, this leads them to distrust institutions. In turn, 
this attitude of defiance impacts tax compliance. A recent study pointed that in Kenya, 
individuals who are more satisfied with government provision of infrastructure, such as 
roads and electricity, are 10% more likely to have tax compliant attitude than those who 
are one unit less satisfied (Fjeldstad, Sjursen and Ali 2013). 
 
b) Lack of a pro-active civil society 
 
Kenya has a vibrant civil society. There are a significant number of social and self-help 
organisations, as well as organisations with sector expertise in various areas (human 
rights, environment). The main civil society organisations actively involved in taxation 
policy debates are: National Taxpayers Association, Consumers Federation of Kenya, 
and Tax Justice Network Africa.  
 
However, civil society lacks coherence and a strong and consistent public voice. 
Outside the capital, the building of networks is limited due to financial and 
infrastructural issues. Moreover, civil society is mainly reactive and appears to have lost 
its agenda setting capacity (DAI 2012). Civil society hasn't therefore played a major 
role during the reform process. 
 
The issue of local funds (notably the Local Authority Transfer Fund19 and the 
Constituency Development Fund20) has created an unprecedented public debate that has 
raised the tax awareness of ordinary Kenyans in the past years. Some observers have 
argued that local funds were developed in Kenya in an attempt to re-legitimise the col-
lection and disbursement of tax revenue by the state (TJN-A 2009). 
                                                 
 
 
 
19The Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) was established in 1999 through the LATF Act No. 8 of 
1998, with the objective of improving service delivery, improving financial management, and reducing 
the outstanding debt of local authorities. LATF transfers 5% of central income tax revenues to local 
authorities to supplement revenues raised locally through land taxes (rates), single business permits and 
other sources. 
20 The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was established through the CDF Act of 2003in view of 
designed to supporting constituency-level, grass-root development projects. The Law provides that the 
government must set aside at least 2.5% of its ordinary revenue for disbursement under the CDF 
programme. 
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4.4. Avoidance, evasion, and informality 
 
According to Schneider, the informal sector in Kenya is quite large at 31.75% of GDP. 
Between 1999 and 2007, the shadow economy in Kenya represented on average an 
estimated 33.2% of GNP, compared to 40.1% in Rwanda, and 42.3% for Uganda 
(Schneider 2012). 
 
Table 8. Size of the shadow economy in % of GDP (1999-2007) 
Rwanda Kenya Uganda SSA 
40.1 33.2 42.3 40.50 
Source: Schneider (2012). 
 
This being said, it is estimated that the informal sector in Kenya accounts for 77% of 
job creation (IEA 2012). The informal sector is a fast growing segment of Kenya's 
economy and offers a great opportunity to expand the tax base. A study by 
Parliamentary Budget Office in 2010 (PBO 2010) showed that the potential GDP of the 
informal economy has been increasing over time. Between 2002 and 2008, the potential 
GDP of the hidden economy increased steadily every year from 7.58% in 2002 to 
16.61% in 2008; with corresponding increase in tax potential as a percentage of GDP up 
from 2.52% in 2002 to 7.66% in 2008. This implies a continuously expanding 
underground economy which has the potential to increase the revenue flows but which 
have been otherwise left out of the tax net. 
 
Tax evasion by the informal sector is particularly high, essentially because informal 
businesses do not fill in tax returns. In 2010, it was estimated that more than KShs 200 
billion (around EUR 1.731 billion)21 had been lost in three years due to government’s 
inability to tax the informal sector. KRA lost KShs 63.5 billion, KShs 69.73 billion and 
KShs 79.27 billion in 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively to the informal sector. 
 
Although there is significant tax potential in taxing the informal sector, this doesn't 
seem to have been a major driver of the reform. More efforts seem to have been put on 
the "easy-to-tax" sectors, including through VAT. 
 
Although some attempts have been made by the Kenyan government to bring the 
informal sector into the tax net, notably through the establishment in 2007 of a 
presumptive tax regime (named Turnover Tax), there still seems to be major obstacles 
preventing the taxation of the informal sector (including the small size of businesses as 
well as mistrust and weak structural dialogue between the informal sector and 
government) (IEA 2012). 
 
A key aspect to look at in this regard is the "Ease of Paying Taxes" indicator. According 
to the World Bank report "Doing Business 2014", Kenya has a poor ranking of 166 out 
of 189 economies on the ease of paying taxes. Firms in Kenya make on average 41 tax 
payments a year, spend 308 hours a year filing, preparing and paying taxes, and pay 
                                                 
 
 
 
21 Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 114.71KES. 
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total taxes amounting to 44.2 % of profit. Because of this, it is difficult and costly to pay 
taxes in Kenya, and large share of economic activity end up in the informal sector. 
 
Some observers argue that a more systematic use of ICT and stronger coordination 
within the KRA could significantly improve the identification and taxation of the 
underground economy. 
 
4.5. Tax policy and administration 
 
The establishment of the Kenya Revenue Authority in 1995 was a major improvement 
to protect the tax system from the rampant corruption that then pervaded the public 
administration system.  
Thanks to a relatively strong legal framework and an adequately staffed and resourced 
national tax collection agency, the KRA has rapidly and successfully implemented 
reforms of the tax system since 2003/04. KRA has met most of its strategic goals and 
objectives.  
 
However, in practice the law is not enforced uniformly. Poor tax collection methods 
have resulted in substantial funds being lost annually in uncollected tax revenue. 
Furthermore, there are regular reports of tax evasion and high-level government 
officials using their positions and influence to obtain tax exemptions for themselves or 
their relatives (Martini 2012). The patronage and corruption that became marked 
features of Kenya's political institutions in the 1980s and 90s inevitably infected the tax 
system in the form of undue exemptions and corruption-based tax evasion. 
 
In 2002, a study by the KRA on VAT compliance found that the compliance ratio was 
only 55 per cent. Simplifying the tax system and improving tax administration by 
strengthening the KRA were part of the recommendations for revenue enhancement. 
 
Besides the exemption rule, KRA has also failed to apply taxation law in the informal 
non-licensed sector. As a result, huge incomes in the informal sector go untaxed. 
 
4.6 Economic factors 
 
During the first ten years after independence, growth rates were high, averaging 6.6%. 
The macro-economic and fiscal performance severely deteriorated throughout the late 
1980s and 1990s. The average economic growth rate between 1992 and 2001 was -
0.3%. 
 
A central concern for the Kenyan authorities was to compensate revenue losses resulting 
from the reduction in and removal of import and export tariffs. This was all the more 
necessary as Kenya had to deal with large and chronic fiscal deficits. 
 
The persistence of these deficits has been attributed to the fact that expenditures have 
increased faster than revenue as a share of GDP due to limited budgetary resources, and 
possibly an inelastic tax system. As noted by a study in 2003, "neither tax policy nor tax 
administration managed to mobilise additional resources on a sustainable basis…to 
bring down the deficit, it was imperative that the government improve domestic revenue 
mobilization while keeping public expenditures under control" (Muriithi and Moyi 
2003). 
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Following the 2002 general elections, the NARC government made economic recovery 
one of its top priorities. To this end, it undertook several economic and tax reforms, 
with the objective of creating a sustainable tax system that could generate adequate 
revenue to finance public expenditures 
 
The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, which was 
implemented by the new regime from 2003 to 2007, was successful in reversing the 
economic decline of the past two decades. The country’s economic growth rate jumped 
from 0.6% in 2002 to 7% in 2007. However, the post 2007 election violence and onset of 
the global financial crisis resulted in a slump in GDP growth in 2008, to 1.75%. 
 
4.7. External actors 
 
The role and influence of external actors in terms of fiscal governance is not very 
important. In that regard, it can be argued that external actors did not play a crucial role 
during the reform process. This being said, a number of tax administration reforms had 
been largely encouraged by the IMF in the 1990's as part of its support programme (e.g. 
creation of KRA). There are even concerns among civil society that KRA exists mainly 
to respond to the demands of IMF and World Bank. 
 
One of the reasons why the role and influence of external actors is limited is because Kenya 
has gradually moved out of aid dependency and of donor supported programmes. Over the 
past twenty years, Kenya's reliance on ODA has been minimal. Aid flows received by 
Kenya as a percentage of GDP ranged from a low 0.6% to a peak of 2.9% between 1989/90 
and 2007/08. This is partly due to the fact that international development organisations 
largely disengaged from Kenya during the 1990s. Following the IMF’s 1997 embargo 
on aid to Kenya, several donors including the EU, have periodically suspended their aid 
to Kenya due to the wide-scale corruption and ensuing impunity. The EU has notably 
urged Kenya to formulate an effective anti-corruption policy. 
 
Kenya's access to international credit, especially from India and China, has provided an 
alternative source of development financing, together with an increasing reliance on 
domestic tax revenues. 
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THE INTRODUCTION OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX IN ARMENIA (1992) 
AND SUCCESSIVE REFORMS 
 
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE VALUE ADDED TAX IN ARMENIA. 
SUMMARY 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• To reform the tax 
system  
 
• To introduce a 
value added tax 
• Mitigated 
both in terms of 
revenue 
generated and of 
the process of 
implementation 
and management 
• A powerful elite 
 
• High level of lobbying and corruption 
 
• Low quality of the decision making 
process  
 
• Lack of culture of accountability  
 
• Low degree of tax morale 
 
• High level of informality is a constraint to 
the operation of a VAT system. 
 
 
 
1. Economic outlook 
 
Armenia is a landlocked lower middle income country in South Caucasus. It recovered 
its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union in1991. It is bordered by Turkey to 
the west, Georgia to the north, Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijan to the east, 
and Iran to the south. Armenia is a small country comparable to the size of Belgium but 
with only 2,969 million inhabitants (World Bank, 2012). Noticeably, Armenia has a 
relatively large diaspora (estimated at 8 million people) across the world especially in 
Russia, France, and the United States. Moreover 139,000 Armenians live in Nagorno-
Karabakh where they form a majority. 
 
Armenia is a unitary, multi-party, democratic country with an old cultural and religious 
heritage. Indeed, the Kingdom of Armenia was established in the 6th century BC; it 
became the first state to adopt Christianity as its religion in the beginning of the 4th 
century. 
 
The Government of Armenia holds European integration as a key priority in its foreign 
policy. In practice, Armenian leaders have been divided between partisans of stronger 
links with the European Union and partisans of the traditional privileged relation with 
Russia. In fact, in September 2013, Armenia has decided to join the Russian-led 
Eurasian Customs Union. 
 
Table 1 provides an economic overview of the country. Armenian GDP per capita is 
lower than the average corresponding statistics for the region, which is mainly driven 
upward by Azerbaijan. In terms of distribution of income – see the Gini index – 
Armenia is more egalitarian than its neighbours. The Armenian economy is also more 
dependent on the agriculture sector and less open to international trade. 
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Table 1. Macroeconomic Outlook 
 Armenia Region  
Western South 
Caucasus 
Azerbaijan 
 
 Georgia 
 
GDP per cap. (PPP US $) (2012) 5,789.00 7,105.32 10,062.00  5,465.00 
Gini Index (2011) 30.86 35.30 33.71  41.34 
Agriculture (%  GDP) (2006-
2010) 
19.52 12.08 6.58  10.13 
Openness (Trade % GDP) 
(2006-2010)  
60.10 78.13 86.79  86.49 
Source: The World Bank. Region of Western South Caucasus consists of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia; among the last two, Georgia, like Armenia, is a lower middle income country and Azerbaijan an 
upper middle income country. 
 
GDP per capita is influenced by the following two factors:  
 
• a declining trend in the population which reduces the denominator of the GDP 
per capita and thus pushes statistics upward;  
 
• the fact that around 30% of Armenian GDP is due to remittances from the 
diaspora.  
 
According to the Central Bank of Armenia, in the first half of 2008, cash remittance 
inflows rose by 57.5% and amounted to 668.6 million US$ or 15% of GDP for that six 
months period. Those figures however only represent officially registered cash 
remittances through Armenian commercial banks; other sources point out that 
comparable sums are transferred through non-bank systems. In 2007, cash remittances 
through bank transfers had reached a peak of 1.32 billion US$. Most of those 
remittances are used for consumption purposes. Based on more recent information, 
individuals transferred $82.5 million in January-February 2011, compared with $119 
million in the same period in 20101. 
 
The Armenian Gini Coefficient is 30.86, slightly lower than the regional average and 
neighbouring countries of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which points to an increasing 
equality of income. In addition, poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line is 35% 
in 2011, representing a significant reduction compared to 48.3% in 2001. However, 
although poverty has decreased in the early 2000s, it remains high and has started 
increasing again since the beginning of the crisis in 2008 (27.6% in 2008, 34.1% in 
2009, and 35.8% in 2010). 
 
Table 1bis. Armenia 2000 – 2012 
Year GDP 
Million current 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Life 
expectancy  
Total 
population 
                                                 
 
 
 
1 http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/economy/12703.html,. 
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US$ at birth Million 
hab. 
2003 2,807 33.80 72 3.04 
2004 3,577 37.79 73 3.03 
2005 4,900 36.16 73 3.01 
2006 6,384 32.84 73 3.00 
2007 9,206 30.23 73 2.99 
2008 11,662 30.86 73 2.98 
2009 8,648 n.a. 74 2.97 
2010 9,260 31.30 74 2.96 
2011 10,138 n.a. 74 2.96 
2012 9,910 n.a. n.a. 2.97 
                  Source: The World Bank 
 
 
The tax system in Armenia basically consists of the following taxes:  
 
• Personal Income Tax (10% for monthly taxable income up to 80,000 Drams 
(144.00 US$); and 20% plus a payment of 8,000 Drams (14.40 US$) for taxable 
income between 120,000 and 320,000 Drams (1,892 US$) for monthly taxable 
income above 80,000 Drams;  
• Corporate Tax (tax rate of 20% since July 1st, 2001);  
• Value Added Tax, introduced in 1992 (tax rate of 18%) with exemptions and 
zero-rating available in certain cases,  
• Other indirect taxes, including excises tax, and,  
• Import and export tariffs (customs). 
 
 
Table 2 compares the tax structure of Armenia with that of Georgia and Azerbaijan.  
 
 
Table 2. Tax revenue Statistics 
Country Armenia 
(2011) 
Azerbaijan 
(2008) 
Georgia 
(2012) 
Government revenue (% of GDP) 
 22.10 45.53 28.22 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 
 17.32 - 23.80 
Tax Structure (% of total revenue) 
VAT (rate) 50.23 (20.00) 20.35 (18.00) 45.57 (18.00) 
Profit 14.95 49.83 12.77 
Income 12.41 11.10 26.46 
Excises 6.00 6.89 9.89 
Property 0.00 1.97 3.45 
Land 0.00 0.54 -  
Customs 5.54 - 1.35 
Source: IMF and local governments 
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We see that in both Armenia and Georgia, the share of VAT in tax revenue dominates 
that of other taxes. Table 3 further documents on the evolution and distribution of the 
Armenian tax structure since the early stage of recovered sovereignty. We see an 
increased trend in the share of both government budget and revenue; and within that 
latter category, an upward movement in the share of VAT. 
 
Indeed, between 1995 and 2011, public expenditures gained 5 percentage points in 
share of GDP, going up from 18 to 23.3% of GDP, an extra burden entirely supported 
by VAT which increased from 3.26 to 8.7% of GDP and from 30.38 till 50.23% of tax 
revenue.  
 
Adamyan (2011) identifies the strengths and threats of the Armenia tax system, putting 
in the former group coherence and low rates, and in the latter, low tax collections, high 
tax evasion and risk of corruption. The author then suggests a programme of tax reform 
that could have the following goals: to provide enough revenue, to redistribute the tax 
burden between large businesses and SMEs, to improve voluntary compliance, to 
expand the use of IT in tax administration, and to upgrade the risk based audits. 
Implementation of such a reform could require use of e-filing and e-billing, especially 
for VAT, and reduction, simplification and consolidation of tax reports. Eventually, 
further tax reforms could enlarge application of e-filing and e-billing systems, introduce 
e-payments, transmission of presumptive taxes to the general taxation regime and 
creating a unified tax to replace personal income tax and social contributions. 
 
 
Table 3. Tax structure in Armenia (1995-2011) 
 1995 2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Budget 
% GDP 
including 
18.00 16.66 16.71 22.01 21.96 22.55 23.33 
Revenue 
% GDP 
10.73 14.76 13.57 17.41 16.63 17.17 17.32 
Including 
% Rev. 
       
VAT 30,38 43,77 48,19 51,23 48,65 50,79 50,23 
Profit 42,59 13,35 15,33 13,90 15,45 13,10 14,95 
Income 12,21 8,81 8,77 8,67 11,55 12,46 12,41 
Excises 4,29 17,14 12,68 7,41 8,18 8,10 6,00 
Property 0,47 0,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Land 3,08 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Customs 4,85 5,69 5,45 6,03 4,81 4,95 5,54 
Source: Government of Armenia and own calculations.  
  
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform. 
 
Rather than aiming at simply unravelling deficiencies in the existing tax system, the 
Government of Armenia called for the establishment of a tax system for an economy 
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moving from a centrally planned to a market economy. This implied building a state and 
creating a tax system to support that state. 
 
Such a challenge was common to other countries in similar economic transition. 
Therefore it is not surprising to see that most European or South-Caucasian ex-
communist countries adopted VAT about at the same time, as illustrated by Table 4. 
Indeed, almost all ex-USSR countries introduced VAT in 1992, thus one year after the 
collapse of the USSR. Moreover, the same high rate of 28% was adopted in all 
countries, with the noticeable exception of the three Baltic countries which adopted a 
lower rate. However, some years later (1999) all the standard rates lay in the 18-20% 
interval; at present they are comprised between 12 and 21%. 
 
 
Table 4. Adoption of VAT by ex-USSR / CIS countries 
Country Year of  
VAT 
introduction, 
Standard  
rate at 
introduction 
Standard 
rate in 
1999 
VAT 
% 
GDP 
1997 
Standard 
rate in 
2010-
2011 
South Caucasus     
Armenia 1992 28% 20% 4 20% 
Azerbaijan 1992 28% 20% 4 18% 
Georgia 1992 28% 20% 4 18% 
Kazakhstan 1992 28% 20% 7 12% 
Kirgiz 1992 28% 20% 6 20% 
Tajikistan 1992 28% 20% 2 20% 
Turkmenistan 1993 28% 20% 8 20% 
Uzbekistan 1992 30% 18% 8 20% 
Eastern Europe not EU      
Belarus 1992 28% 20% 10 18% 
Moldova 1992 28% 20% 10 20% 
Ukraine 1992 28% 20% 8 20% 
Eastern Europe in EU     
Estonia 1992 10% 18% 10 20% 
Latvia 1992 14% 18% 9 21% 
Lithuania 1994 18% 18% 9 21% 
Russia      
Russia 1992 28% 20% 4 18% 
Source: Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Indicators in Transitional Countries. Barents Group LLC, except 
2011, USAID. 
 
Deficiencies still exist which call for regular improvement of the VAT in Armenia. As 
mentioned in the previous section, Adamyan (2011) identified low tax collections, high 
tax evasion and risk of corruption, as key deficiencies.  
 
2.2. The causes of the reform. 
 
The introduction of VAT in 1992 responded to the need for the government to mobilise 
domestic resources for the financing of the newly created state.  
 
2.3. Main changes introduced by the reform. 
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In Armenia, VAT was initially based on the origin principle with a standard rate of 
28%. The choice for the origin principle was due to the proximity and type of trade 
relation with Russia; however very quickly Armenia shifted to the destination principle 
which characterises VAT in advanced regions of the world. The rate of 28% was high 
but similar to that of most CIS countries. Very quickly also the rate was reduced to 
20%. 
 
VAT registration is compulsory for businesses whose turnover exceeds 58.35 million 
drams (approximately 156,000 US$). Below that threshold businesses are subject to a 
3.5% turnover tax.  
 
The VAT base was initially, and still is, rather narrow due to many exemptions of 
sectors, taxpayers and goods. Until recently, the Armenian government could allow tax 
exemptions to taxpayers, either individual or corporate, provided that the government 
decision was approved by a committee within the Parliament. 
 
Zero rating primarily applies to export of goods and to supplies of services which are 
ancillary to those exports. But it also applies to advertising, consulting, engineering, 
legal, accounting, translation, data processing, banking, financial and insurance services 
provided to non-residents (Armenia Pocket Tax Book, 2010)2. 
 
Exempt transactions include, 
 
• most financial operations and transactions carried out by banks and lending 
organisations 
• tuition for secondary, professional and high schools 
• education material 
• sales of veterinary medicines, chemicals used in agricultural production, 
fertilizers, and agricultural plants and seeds 
• services related to the care of children, disabled, invalids, and nursing homes 
• sales of newspapers and magazines 
• insurance and reassurance operation, services related to pension insurances 
• supply of goods and services relating to the implementation of approved 
humanitarian assistance and charitable projects 
• supply of ownership rights in an entity or business, as well as transactions for 
the reorganisation of a transaction or business. 
 
Additionally VAT on imports might be deferred for up to 2 years. 
 
Despite the introduction of a more modern legislation, the narrowness of the tax base is 
still problematic, partially due to interferences of the local elite. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
2 Armenia Pocket Tax Book (2010) is jointly published by the Armenia State Revenue Committee and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
200 
 
Refund of VAT is still a debated issue in Armenia. According to Armenia Pocket Tax 
Book (2010) “when input tax for a reporting period exceeds output tax for the period, 
the excess input tax is carried forward and applied against VAT payable in future 
reporting periods. (…) Refunds are permitted only for purchases and importations that 
are directly related to zero-rated transactions (…) obtaining a refund can be a time 
consuming process (since) there is no liability for the government if it does not issue 
VAT refunds on a timely basis (and) it may be easier to have the excess credit applied 
against other tax liabilities, although confirming entitlement to a credit may still be a 
challenge”. 
 
Control is conducted in the framework of “inspections” aiming at checking particular 
data rather than in the more general framework of modern audits despite attempts in that 
direction. 
 
Those attempts confirm that the legislation is mostly adequate but that implementation 
does not actually follow, basically due to the heritage of Soviet bureaucracy. 
 
Administration of VAT is the responsibility of Armenia State revenue Committee 
initially under the authority of the Minister of Finance, but now an independent body de 
jure directly under the authority of the Prime Minister. The chairman of the State 
revenue Committee stated that the organisation “is currently involved in active reforms 
to create a more transparent and effective tax and customs administration” (Armenia 
Pocket Tax Book, 2010). That statement reveals the leeway of the Committee as long as 
it is limited to technical aspects. It also reveals a peculiarity of the Armenian system 
with tax and customs fluctuating between separated and aggregated bodies. 
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1. Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by national authorities 
 
As stated above, the objective of the introduction of VAT in Armenia and of subsequent 
reforms was to collect revenue for the funding of the state. With respect to that goal 
results are poor.  
 
Indeed, if we examine again the figures portrayed in Table 4 above for the end of the 
last century, the high rate of VAT actually contributes only a very small fraction of 
GDP, which is after all the sum of all value added, for the three countries of Western 
South Caucasus. As a consequence, we observe for those countries a low efficiency in 
terms of GDP (see Table 5).3 In sharp contrast, results are better for ex-USSR republics 
located in Eastern Europe.  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
3 Efficiency is measured using the formula 
 
/Effective VAT Collection GDP
Efficiency
Vat Rate
=  
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Table 5 combines figures of Table 4 with figures taken from Davoodi and Gregorian 
IMF WP (2007) that provide data for the VAT revenue to GDP ratio. Additionally they 
compute tax buoyancy statistics for VAT, direct taxes and total taxes but we only 
reproduce results for VAT and total taxes revenue buoyancy. These latter statistics 
measure the elasticity of tax revenue to GDP. A buoyancy smaller than one means that, 
when the GDP goes up by one per cent, tax revenue goes up by less than one per cent, 
so that revenue to GDP ratio goes down. For the authors, that figure captures the impact 
of both tax policy (base effect with an unchanged administration) as well as tax 
administration (efficiency in raising one additional monetary unit from the same base 
with an unchanged tax policy). 
 
  
Table 5. VAT in ex-USSR / CIS countries (cont.) 
Country Standard 
rate in 1999 
VAT % 
GDP 1997 
VAT 
Efficiency 
1998 
VAT % 
GDP 
1998-
2004 
VAT 
Revenue 
buoyancy 
1998-
2004 
Total 
Tax 
Revenue 
buoyancy 
1998-
2004 
South Caucasus      
Armenia 20% 4 0.20 6.6 0.97 0.93 
Azerbaijan 20% 4 0.22 5.1 1.39 1.19 
Georgia 20% 4 0.19 5.3 1.41 1.22 
Kazakhstan 20% 7 0.36 4.7 1.04 1.34 
Kirgiz 20% 6 0.29 6.1 1.27 1.02 
Tajikistan 20% 2 0.08 4.3 1.65 1.12 
Turkmenistan 20% 8 0.42 5.8 1.01 1.01 
Uzbekistan 18% 8 0.38 6.2 0.76 0.88 
Eastern Europe not EU       
Belarus 20% 10 0.48 8.3 0.97 0.99 
Moldova 20% 10 0.50 9.2 0.99 0.96 
Ukraine 20% 8 0.42 5.1 0.59 0.83 
Russia       
Russia 20% 4 0.21 4.3 1.04 1.08 
Average 20% 6.25 0.31 6.1 1.09 1.05 
Source: Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Indicators in Transitional Countries. Barents Group LLC; 
Davoodi and Grigorian (2007) 
 
Commenting on figures for Armenia compared to other CIS countries, Davoodi and 
Gregorian note that (1) Armenia has revenue buoyancies that are below average for 
VAT (0.97 against 1.09), direct (0.55 against 1.08) and total taxes (0.93 against 1.05); 
and (2) in Armenia, VAT has the highest buoyancy, followed by total taxes and direct 
taxes.  
We can also measure efficiency by the use of the revenue to GDP ratio and the 
computation of statistics in line with the efficiency frontier approach. Practically, the 
question is the following: Is the 6.6 value of the VAT revenue to GDP ratio observed 
over the 1998-2004 period in Armenia an efficient outcome? The answer is negative 
according to that approach, since countries in similar conditions in terms of standard 
VAT rate, perform better; however, if we limit the comparison to South-Caucasus 
countries, Armenia becomes a benchmark.  
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Therefore, we may suggest that there is a problem of under-collection of VAT revenue 
common to all countries of the CIS region. Comparing actual ratios with the benchmark 
ratio we can measure the possible deficit of gap of efficiency. 
 
We can repeat that exercise using USAID data for 2010-2011 – see Table 6. We first 
note that among the countries of South Caucasus which levy VAT at 20%, Armenia 
performs well, exhibiting the highest VAT collection to GDP ratio. However, if we add 
Moldova and Ukraine which also have a standard rate of 20%, then Armenia is 
dominated. We may do the same observation for VAT Efficiency. 
 
 
Table 6. VAT in ex-USSR / CIS countries (cont.) 
Country VAT 
% 
GDP 
1997 
VAT 
Efficiency 
1998 
VAT 
% 
GDP 
1998-
2004 
Standard 
rate in 
2010-
2011 
VAT 
% 
GDP 
2010-
2011 
Gross 
compliance 
ratio 2010-
2011 
VAT 
Efficiency 
2010-
2011 
South Caucasus       
Armenia 4 0.20 6.6 20% 8.2 50.9 0.41 
Azerbaijan 4 0.22 5.1 18% 3.1 49.0 0.17 
Georgia 4 0.19 5.3 18% 11.4 76.3 0.63 
Kazakhstan 7 0.36 4.7 12% 3.0 50.3 0.25 
Kirgiz 6 0.29 6.1 20% 6.9 40.1 0.35 
Tajikistan 2 0.08 4.3 20% 7.3 39.3 0.37 
Turkmenistan 8 0.42 5.8 20% n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Uzbekistan 8 0.38 6.2 20% 6.0 65.7 0.30 
Eastern Europe not EU       
Belarus 10 0.48 8.3 18% 5.9 58.2 0.33 
Moldova 10 0.50 9.2 20% 12.6 64.5 0.63 
Ukraine 8 0.42 5.1 20% 9.2 70.6 0.46 
Russia        
Russia 4 0.21 4.3 18% 5.5 56.8 0.31 
Average 6.25 0.31 6.1 - 7.2 53.9 0.36 
Source: Same as for Table 5, plus USAID and own calculations 
 
 
We can still measure efficiency using a C-Efficiency statistics. Notice that from a 
technical point of view, the appellation C-Efficiency is mostly used when the 
denominator consists of all consumption expenditures. But different approaches in the 
literature use different magnitudes for the denominator: GDP as in Table 5 and 6 for 
what we name Efficiency – see the formula in the footnote –, private consumption or 
overall consumption of the public and the private sector together. In the penultimate 
column of Table 6 we report what is usually called Gross Compliance Ratio and where 
GDP is substituted with Private Consumption in the denominator of the formula. With 
that formula the efficiency of Armenian VAT appears to decline, perhaps due to a larger 
part of informality and financing through remittance from abroad, in that item of 
Armenian national accounts – see below. 
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All those three measures are provided in Table 7 but for the sole Armenia and in an 
across time perspective. 
 
Actually the comparison of the measures has been made difficult by the fact that, 
presumably due to the importance of remittances from the diaspora in the GDP figures, 
it may be that consumption exceeds GDP – actually remittance is mainly used to 
finance consumption activities, including health services. Rather it is noticeable that all 
the three measures produce an increasing trend in C-Efficiency between 1995 and 2008. 
Then, due to the financial crisis and its consequences, especially serious for Armenia, 
C-Efficiency declined before resuming. The decline in the statistics for 2009 might be 
explained by a shift of consumption to non-market delivered goods and services. 
 
 
Table 7. C-Efficiency in Armenia (1995-2010) 
Year Total 
Cons. 
% GDP 
Private 
Cons. 
% GDP 
VAT 
revenue 
% GDP 
VAT 
Efficiency 
GDP 
VAT 
Efficiency 
Total C.  
VAT 
Efficiency 
Priv. C.  
1995 1.17 1.06 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.15 
2000 1.09 0.97 0.06 0.32 0.30 0.33 
2005 0.86 0.75 0.07 0.33 0.38 0.43 
2008 0.93 0.81 0.10 0.51 0.55 0.62 
2009 0.85 0.73 0.07 0.37 0.43 0.50 
2010 0.87 0.75 0.08 0.40 0.46 0.53 
      Source: Government of Armenia and own calculations 
 
All in all we may conclude that due to the many zero-rated goods and services, and 
exemptions as well, VAT fails to reach its objective of fair financing of the state. The 
question then is whether this failure has been reinforced by factors related to Armenian 
culture and attitude towards the state. We will examine that in section 4 below. 
 
3.2. Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
Efficiency and equity are the two main criteria used in economic literature to assess a 
tax reform. 
 
That first criterion has been extensively discussed in the previous (sub-) section, using 
various statistics (see above).  
 
Equity can be measured using the Gini Indexes which provide information on the 
inequality of the distribution, a specific view of equity. Such statistics have been 
computed in Table 1 above. 
 
The equity issue however might not be isolated from that of poverty. Regarding 
especially VAT we refer to Brown (2003) – reproduced here as Table 8 – who 
concludes that “VAT exempt purchases make up an increasing share of total purchases 
from the first through the fourth quintile, with a drop in share from the fourth to the fifth 
quintiles. This benefit to better off families is likely to be due in large part to the VAT 
exemption on higher education”. 
 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
204 
 
That result confirms the usual statement that VAT is often held as counter-distributive 
since every consumer bears the tax at the same rate whatever his or her income may be. 
Moreover it is in line with the absence of distributive concerns in Armenian tax 
decisions. 
 
 
Table 8. VAT exempt share of purchases and excise tax burden on purchases by 
weighted per capita income quintiles. 
 Share of purchases 
exempt from VAT 
Excise tax burden on 
purchases 
Quintiles N 
Income 
index Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
1 678 100.00 0.080 0.085 0.032 0.062 
2 684 211.06 0.088 0.079 0.025 0.043 
3 701 334.42 0.093 0.073 0.024 0.035 
4 716 545.80 0.098 0.076 0.025 0.035 
5 712 1731.19 0.086 0.086 0.026 0.036 
Source: Brown (2003) 
 
Finally, the impact of VAT on the size of informality in the Armenian economy is 
unclear.  
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform 
 
4.1. Political factors. 
 
Institutionally, Armenia is a republic with a multi-party system. However the political 
field seems to be actually dominated by an economic, political and social elite. As a 
result, a certain political apathy can be observed among ordinary Armenian citizens.  
 
The power of the elites (i.e. the domination of a group of people active in both business 
and politics) is a real concern for Armenia. Addressing members of the leading 
Armenian business association, Armenian President Sarkisian said on November 9, 
2011, that "Business must be consistently separated from the state system and the 
authority (…) instead, the state should keep learning to fully respect the interests of 
every citizen and entrepreneur." He said this would be part of a radical "transformation" 
of Armenia, which would serve as a "long-term guarantee of our further economic 
growth and development." Government connections have long been essential for 
engaging in large-scale entrepreneurial activity in Armenia, resulting in an effective 
monopolisation of lucrative sectors of its economy by wealthy entrepreneurs close to 
the ruling establishment.4  
 
Apathy is set forth by BTI (2010) who underlines that “over much of the last decade, 
the Armenian population got used to flawed elections, economic inequality and a lack of 
                                                 
 
 
 
4 http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia_president_vows_end_to_oligarchs/24386822.html 
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democratic governance. Over time, the population has become increasingly disengaged 
from politics and gripped by a pronounced and widespread state of apathy. This apathy 
and the related onset of public mistrust have become the most significant obstacles to 
meaningful political change and economic development in the country”. And BTI 
(2012) adds “Despite electoral and constitutional reforms over the past two years, the 
country’s political system remains rigid and closed, and seriously impeded by 
entrenched corruption and political patronage.” 
 
The Economist (2012) provides an overall democracy index as well as its 
disaggregation.5 Using that information, a distinction can be made between four types 
of democracy, respectively full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and 
authoritarian regimes. Armenia is ranked 114th over 167 countries in terms of quality of 
its democracy and listed as a hybrid regime; Georgia is 93rd and also a hybrid regime 
while Azerbaijan is 139th and deemed to be an authoritarian regime. Details are given in 
Table 9. Noticeably, among those three countries of Western South Caucasus, Armenia 
has its worst rank for political culture, which can be partly attributed to the political 
apathy mentioned above. As a consequence people have little expectation from the state 
and there is little popular adhesion to government policy, which harms effectiveness of 
tax reforms.  
 
 
Table 9. Political factors disentangled, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (2012) 
Country Rank 
Overall 
score 
Elections, 
Pluralism 
Gov. 
Functioning 
Political 
Particip. 
Political 
Culture 
Civil 
Liberties 
Armenia 114 4.09 4.33 3.21 3.89 3.13 5.88 
Azerbaijan 139 3.15 2.17 1.79 3.33 3.35 4.71 
Georgia 93 5.53 8.25 3.21 5.00 5.00 7.35 
Source: The Economist (2012) 
 
 
4.2. Institutional framework 
 
It can be argued that the main cause of Armenia low efficiency in VAT collection lies in 
the domination of an elite and resulting apathy of citizens, which in turn produce tax 
evasion and avoidance. 
 
 
Table 10. Institutional quality, 2006/2010 average 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
World Bank Governance Indicators (average) 
(-2.5 to +2.5 scale) 
-0.29 -0.81 -0.17 
International Country Risk Guide index (sum 
of all components) (0 to 100 scale) 
60.60 64.70 - 
Quality of democracy    
Voice and Accountability  (GI) (-2.5 to -0.82 -1.25 -0.23 
                                                 
 
 
 
5 The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012), Democracy index 2012 - Democracy at a standstill. 
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+2.5 scale) 
Democratic Accountability (ICRG) (0 to 6 
scale) 
2.70 1.50 - 
State Efficiency    
Government Effectiveness (GI) (-2.5 to 
+2-5 scale) 
-0.18 0.74 0.15 
Political stability and absence of violence 
(GI)  
0.01 -0.56 -0.83 
Regulatory quality (GI) 0.29 -0.40 0.35 
Rule of Law (GI) -0.43 -0.82 -0.30 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) (0 to 4 scale) 1.00 1.00 - 
Corruption    
Control of Corruption (GI) (-2.5 to 2-5 
scale) 
-0.63 -1.07 -0.18 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale) 1.50 1.50 - 
Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index  
(rank in East. Eur. & Centr. Asia)(rank in 
the World) 
34 
(108/174) 
(9/19) 
27 
(139) 
(15) 
52 
(51) 
(1) 
 
 
Two particular aspects are worth highlighting: the low value for government 
functioning and for bureaucracy quality. Those particularities of Armenia might be 
related to the high degree of corruption in the country and the perceived low 
performance of the government in the fight against that phenomenon. According to 
Transparency International, Armenia ranks modestly 108th over 174. 
 
One could argue that power in the hands of the elites, combined with massive political 
apathy, low government and bureaucracy quality as well as insufficient fight against 
corruption, partly explain low tax morale and tax compliance, resulting in low tax 
revenues.  
 
The amount of tax expenditures is not published in Armenia, making the VAT less 
transparent, especially given the problem of the numerous and arbitrary allowed 
exemptions; that feature enlarges the room for lobbying. Moreover, taxpayers do not 
question the tax benefits generated by the numerous exemptions in the VAT system see 
also IFC (2011) . 
  
4.3. Social support 
 
The above-mentioned political apathy also explains the weak social support to tax 
reforms, which in turn causes low tax morale and high tax evasion. 
 
It should be noted that trade unions are weak in Armenia, as well as civil society 
organisations in general. That is both a cause and a consequence of the mentioned social 
apathy. 
 
4.4. Avoidance, evasion, and informality 
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Tax morale in Armenia is low. Although such phenomenon is not proper to Armenia it 
seems to have an especially large dimension in that country. 
 
That confirms McGee (1999) whose contribution “summarizes the results of interviews 
conducted in Armenia to determine the reasons why Armenians evade the payment of 
taxes. The two main reasons the author found were that tax evasion is easy because 
there is no mechanism in place to collect taxes and there is a widespread feeling that 
people do not owe anything to the government because the government does not do 
anything for them”. 
 
Twelve years later, a report on the costs of tax compliance in Armenia, states that 
“under-reporting is the most popular way to evade taxes” IFC (2011). 
 
As a conclusion IFC recommends that  
 
• “The tax system in Armenia needs to undergo reforms in order to reduce the 
share of unreported income (…) increase the level of compliance with tax (…)”  
• “to improve the efficiency and fairness of tax administration (…) may do more 
to encourage voluntary tax compliance”.  
 
Table 11 summarises some of the main reasons behind tax evasion in Armenia 
 
 
Table 11. Most popular ways and main circumstances for tax evasion 
(% of taxpayers) 
Most popular ways Main circumstances 
Reason Companies Individual 
entrepr. 
Reason Companies Individual 
entrepreneurs 
Underreporting 52.4 51.7 Fallibility of 
legislation 
55.2 56.6 
Payment of 
unofficial 
salary 
26.0 16.5 Unofficial 
agreements 
with control 
25.7 20.9 
Overstate of 
costs 
7.6 9.6 Bad control 
system 
8.1 10.3 
Use of fiction 
firm 
7.4 15.0 Incompetence 
of control 
7.7 3.6 
Abuse of 
privileges 
5.1 4.8 Small amount 
of penalties 
2.6 6.4 
Source: IFC (2011) 
 
 
Schneider's indicator of informality points to a lower level of informality in Armenia 
than in Azerbaijan and Georgia, but those figures are still very high. The average value 
for lower middle income countries, to which belong both Armenia and Georgia, 
amounts to 39.00; world average is 31.94.  
 
 
Table 13. Indicator of informal economy (2004-2007) 
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
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45.34 60.20 67.18 
         Source: Schneider (2012) 
 
 
4.5. Tax policy and administration 
 
As emphasised in IFC (2011), “improving the efficiency and fairness of tax 
administration (…) may do more to encourage voluntary tax compliance”.  
 
The merging of the customs and internal revenue administration in the early 2000’s has 
created a larger administration which still suffers from some bad practices and 
deficiencies. 
 
In contrast an important move to less arbitrary decisions occurred at the end of the 
1990’s when the power to grant VAT exemptions was removed from a joint caucus of 
the Government and the budget committee of the parliament and reserved to the 
legislative power as a whole acting through a law. 
 
4.6 Economic factors 
 
Due to the particular mode of functioning of the Armenian society, it makes no real 
sense to disentangle economic factors from political ones. Nevertheless, such a 
disentangling is a necessity for the effectiveness of the actual tax system now and in the 
future, as well as for the effectiveness of future tax reforms.  
 
We have mentioned earlier that the Armenian President recognised the importance of 
such phenomenon stating on November 9, 2011, that "Business must be consistently 
separated from the state system and the authority".  
 
In addition, other specific features of the economic structure of Armenia have 
influenced the process of VAT in that country. In particular, the relatively larger share 
of the agriculture sector (almost 20% of GDP) compared to neighbouring Azerbaijan 
and Georgia (around 7 and 10% respectively), and the limited openness of Armenia 
(trade amounts to 60% of GDP against 87 and 86% for the neighbouring countries). 
Moreover Armenia trade is mainly with Russia. 
 
The socio-political structure explains many tax exemptions. The importance of 
agriculture has led to the submission of that sector to VAT since 2008 (above a 
threshold), which is very positive and lacks in many developing countries. Originally, 
Armenian VAT obeyed the origin principle but then turned to the destination principle: 
indeed the application of the origin country raised a serious issue for that country, a net 
importer, when we know that VAT is mainly levied at border entrance.  
 
4.7. External actors 
 
Being a member state of CIS still continues to be an influential factor in Armenia and 
has had an impact on the design of VAT in Armenia, especially in the initial stages of 
the newly independent state. This doesn’t circumvent the influence of the European 
Union in later years. Moreover, introduction and reforms of VAT in Armenia benefited 
from the technical support of international organisations like USAID, the IMF, the 
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World Bank and the EBRD. While the EBRD provided advice especially for issues 
concerning small companies, the IMF and the World banks have been pressing Armenian 
authorities with respect to VAT refund and to the publication of tax expenditures 
respectively. The importance of the elites is also at stake on the agenda of some 
international organisations. 
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THE VALUE-ADDED TAX REFORMS IN THE PHILIPPINES SINCE 2005 
(UNDER THE ARROYO ADMINISTRATION 2001-2010) 
 
VAT REFORMS IN THE PHILIPPINES SINCE 2005. SUMMARY 
Main objectives Evaluation Factors conditioning the reform 
• To maximize 
revenue mobilisation  
 
• To assist the 
government in 
balancing its budget 
and sustaining the 
provision of basic 
social services.  
Mixed results • After initial resistance from the President, her 
leadership was essential. 
 
• A tremendous influence of the Congress 
 
• Risk of capture of political parties by 
economic/business elites. Economic elite tends to be 
political elite. 
 
• Political clans and dynasties. 
 
• An elastic economic and political agenda. Elite 
dominance and patronage politics 
 
• Lack of effective political parties with a long term 
vision of national development. 
 
• The Parliament remains vulnerable to abuse by vested 
interests. Lack of public confidence and trust in 
Parliamentarians. 
 
• Low institutional quality: high levels of corruption and 
low levels of accountability. 
 
• Lack of adequate, transparent, consultation process,  
 
• High levels of inequality and poverty 
 
• Importance of a very active and strong civil society 
 
• No legitimacy of the public expenditure 
 
• Threat of a fiscal crisis 
 
• Participation and support of vocal civil society groups, 
the academia, donors, and the business community 
 
• High levels of tax avoidance and tax evasion. 
 
• Inefficiencies in the court system 
 
• The Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of 
Customs tend to be characterised by perennial resource 
and capacity constraints and they are perceived quite 
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negatively by the public 
 
 
1. Economic Outlook 
 
The Republic of the Philippines is an island country located in South-eastern Asia, and 
bounded on the north by Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, on the south by the Celebes Sea, on the 
west by Vietnam and the South China Sea, on the Southwest by the Sulu Sea, and on the east 
by the Philippine Sea. The population of the Philippines is young, with people aged between 
15-64 years making up 62% of the population in 2012, while those under 15 make up 35% of 
the population.60 The distribution of the population is almost equal in rural (51%) and urban 
areas. 
 
In 2012, with a gross national income (GNI) per capita of US$2,470, the Philippines was 
classified as lower middle income country according to the World Bank. Its gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita in 2012 was US$2,588, well below the East Asia & Pacific region 
average of US$5,178. 
 
The poverty incidence, i.e. the proportion of the population below the poverty line was 
estimated at 27.9% during the first semester of 2012.  If we compare this figure with the 2006 
and 2009 first semester figures estimated at 28.8% and 28.6%, respectively, poverty remained 
more or less unchanged. 
 
The per capita GDP in the Philippines has been growing at an average annual rate of 3.0% 
since 2005. The real GDP growth was 3.6% in 2011 and reached almost 7.0% in 2012. 
Although the Philippine economy felt the full brunt of the global financial crisis in 2009, the 
economic growth was sustained by the strong performance of the services sector as well as the 
stimulus programme implemented by the government that fuelled higher government 
consumption and investments. By industry, economic growth in the economy is propelled by 
the services and industry sectors which grew by an average of 5.7% and 4.7% respectively 
between 2005 and 2012, compared to 4.8% for the manufacturing sub-sector within the 
industry sector and 1.8% for the agriculture, fishery & forestry sector. It is interesting to note 
that agriculture shrank by 0.2% in 2010 due to the lingering effects of the El Niño 
phenomenon.61 
 
 
Table 9. Macroeconomic outlook 2013 
 Philippines East Asia & Pacific 
region 
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), 2011 4 119.3 5 117.3 
                                                 
 
 
 
60The World Bank, Data, viewed 02 September 2013, http://data.worldbank.org/. 
61Department of Finance, 2010 Annual Report, viewed 03 September 2013, http://www.dof.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/DOF_AR_2010.pdf 
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GINI index, 2009 42.98 39.5 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), 2006/10 12.70% 19.88% 
Openness rate (2006/10) 78.97% 109.66% 
Source: World DataBank, World Development Indicators. 
 
 
The main types of taxes in the Philippines are direct taxes (individual income tax and 
tax) and indirect taxes (value added tax (VAT), excise duty, and import duty). The income 
for individuals is levied on a graduated scale at rates which vary between 5% and 32%. The 
corporate income tax is levied at a rate of 30% on both domestic and resident foreign 
corporations. The standard rate of VAT is 12% of the gross selling price or gross receipts, 
with a threshold of PhP1.92 million per annum (approximately 32,939 EUR)62 under RR 
No. 16-2011, effective January 1, 2012. Specifically, the “sale of goods or properties” is 
subject to 12% VAT; VAT is also imposed on “goods brought into the Philippines” and on 
the “sale or exchange of services” at a VAT rate of 12%. The Philippine VAT laws also 
provide for transactions subject to 0% rate or VAT exempt.63 
 
CIT and VAT are the two main components of tax revenue in the Philippines, with VAT 
accounting for about 31.9% of total tax revenue and 3.9% of GDP and CIT accounting for 
about 28.1% and 3.5% respectively in 2011. They are followed by PIT (16.1% of total tax 
revenue and 2.0% of GDP), excises (7.3% and 0.9%), and import duties (3.5% and 0.4%). 
 
Tax revenue collected recovered gradually since 2009 (see table below). The tax to GDP 
ratio increased from 12.1% of GDP in 2009 to 12.8% of GDP in 2012, as higher collections 
for CIT, PIT, and VAT compensated for declines in excises and import duties. However, 
the tax ratio has yet to reach its pre-crisis level of about 13.5% of GDP; this is partly 
explained by a reduction in the CIT tax rate and PIT relief measures (see sections below). 
Going forward, recently approved reform of “sin” taxes (alcohol and tobacco excises) will 
raise tax collections by about 0.3% of GDP in 2013, while excises on petroleum products 
are expected to fall due to lack of inflation indexation of specific rates, while lower tariff 
rates on continuing trade liberalisation is expected to reduce import duties (IMF 2013). 
 
 
 
Table 10. Tax revenues, 2000-2013 
Year Tax revenues, PhP. 
Billion 
Tax revenues, 
Growth Rate (%) 
Tax effort (% of 
GDP)
64 
                                                 
 
 
 
62Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 58.08PHP. 
63Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Republic of the Philippines, viewed 03 September 
2013,http://www.bir.gov.ph/home.htm. 
64Tax effort is calculated by dividing a country’s actual tax collection by an estimate of how much tax it 
should be able to collect given the structural characteristics of its economy. For instance, the tax effort can be 
assessed as taxes as a share of GDP; African Economic outlook, viewed 03 September 2013, 
http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/in-depth/public-resource-mobilisation-and-aid/the-state-of-public-
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2000 460.03 7.0% 11.8% 
2001 493.61 8.2% 12.7% 
2002 507.64 1.6% 12.1% 
2003 550.47 9.8% 12.1% 
2004 605.0 9.6% 11.81% 
2005 705.6 16.1% 12.4% 
2006 859.9 22.5% 13.7% 
2007 932.9 8.3% 13.54% 
2008 1 049.2 11.8% 14.13% 
2009 981.6 -5.8% 12.77% 
2010 1 093.6 35.7% 12.15% 
2011 1 202.1 9.9% 12.38% 
2012 1 361.1 13.2% 12.88% 
2013* 1 607.87 18.1% 13.51% 
Source: Department of Finance (DoF), Figures for 2013 are projection, midpoint for range projections. 
 
 
2. Description of the reform 
 
2.1 Major deficiencies existing prior to the tax reform 
 
The VAT was introduced under the 1986 Tax Reform Package and was implemented at a 
10% rate in 1988 to replace a number of sales taxes on goods. Subsequent efforts to expand 
the VAT base to enhance its efficiency became extremely difficult as sectors falling outside 
the VAT net lobbied Congress to keep them exempt (specifically professionals, especially 
lawyers and doctors). Due to a weak tax reform law in 1997 (RA 8424), a changing output 
structure with growing sectors lightly taxed, tax leakages estimated at 8% of GDP, and 
persistent difficulties in tax administration, the government tax effort (defined here as tax 
receipts as a share of GDP) began a downward shift, from 17% in 1997 to 12.4% in 2004 
(Bernardo and Tang 2013).   
 
The stimulus spending implemented after the late 1990s’ Asian crisis increased the 
government’s budget deficit, which coupled with persistent decline in tax and revenue 
effort, raised concerns over fiscal sustainability and its threat to macroeconomic stability. 
Government attempts to drastically curtail expenditure to rein in the deficit and avoid a debt 
spiral were not successful. Furthermore, given risks to macroeconomic stability from weak 
government finances, businesses held off new investments and the economy became stuck 
in what analysts regarded as low-level equilibrium (Bernardo and Tang 2013).  
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
 
resource-mobilisation-in-africa/tax-effort/.  It is also defined as the ratio between actual revenue and tax 
capacity, where tax capacity represents the maximum tax revenue that could be collected in a country given 
its economic, social, institutional, and demographic characteristics (Pessino and Fenochietto 2010). 
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Given the circumstance surrounding the assumption of office by President Macapagal-
Arroyo, her first term was marred by legitimacy issues. The situation made it very hard for 
her to push any reform, especially one that would raise people’s tax burden. In addition, she 
was seen as using all means necessary to stay in power, employing populist measures that 
worsened the fiscal deficit (e.g. her refusal to increasing electricity tariffs). As a result, 
governance, particularly in terms of indicators of political stability, control of corruption, 
and the rule of law, worsened.  
 
On 24 August 2004, on day after the Philippine Daily Inquirer, bannered the headline “UP 
economists warn of RP crash in 2 years”, the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the 
first time acknowledged that the country was “in the midst of a fiscal crisis.” Soon, the 
basic policy objective was to raise P80 billion in revenues from a number of new measures 
to enable the government to balance the budget by 2010. 
 
2.2 The causes of the reform 
 
The Reformed VAT Law (RVAT Law) or RA No. 9337 implemented on November 1, 
2005 and effective on February 1, 2006 found its origin in a report titled “The Deepening 
Crisis: The Real Score on Deficits and the Public Debt” released by eleven professors from 
the University of the Philippines (UP) School of Economics that drew attention to the 
declining state of the economy in the wake of the growing public sector deficit and rising 
debt. President Arroyo had already drawn attention to the government’s worsening fiscal 
and debt problems in her state of the nation address before Congress in July 2004 after the 
May election (Dios, et al. 2004).  
 
According to the UP paper, the fiscal crisis, triggered by uncontrolled public debt, stemmed 
from the falling government revenue, including tax collection and tax effort since 1997, and 
from substantial losses incurred by government owned and controlled corporations 
(GOCC). The continuous decline in revenue and tax effort (from 17% of GDP in 1997 to 
12.5% in 2003), even during periods of moderate economic growth, has been attributed to 
rampant tax evasion abetted by a corrupt revenue bureaucracy. Other contributing factors 
have been the excessive grant of incentives and exemptions and the Congress’ 
susceptibility to lobbying, as illustrated by VAT exemptions given to doctors, lawyers (and 
law firms), and show-business (Dios, et al. 2004). 
 
At the end of 2003, the national government’s total debt amounted to 3.36 trillion pesos or 
approximately 78% of GDP, split almost equally between foreign and domestic liabilities. 
The consolidated total public sector outstanding debt65 was estimated at more than 130% of 
GDP. As a result, investment and growth had remained sluggish over the past years; 
                                                 
 
 
 
65The total public sector debt includes the National Government debt as well as the liabilities of government-
owned or -controlled corporations, which are strictly speaking not obligations of the national government 
(Dios, et al. 2004). 
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creditors feared the risk of default on government debt and the risk of losing money; 
investors faced the prospect of freezing their investments in view of the looming crisis. In 
such context, an increase in global interest rates would render debt servicing extremely 
difficult and thus curtail subsequent domestic or foreign credit, thereby precipitating a crisis 
such as that Argentina or Turkey experienced. A more urgent consequence of the growing 
public sector deficit and rising debt was the inability of the government to fund its 
programmes when almost 30% of annual spending was allocated to debt service and 
roughly half went to paying salaries and operating expenses (Dios, et al. 2004). 
 
Between 1997 and 2003, the national government’s debt rose by PhP2.01 trillion, from 
PhP1.35 trillion to PhP3.36 trillion.66 The significant contributing factors to the 
Philippines’ ballooning debt are described in the table below:  
 
 
Table 11. Accounting for the increase in debt 1997-2003 
 Amount PhP. billion % distribution 
Increase in the national government debt 2009.45 100 
Due to national government deficits 855.69 42.6 
Due to exchange-rate change (as peso depreciates, 
debt help in foreign currency increases) 
377.54 18.8 
Due to non-budgetary accounts (e.g. bailouts of 
government corporations) 
320.55 16 
Due to assumed liabilities and lending to 
corporations (off-book items, government-owned or 
-controlled corporations) 
428.1 21.3 
Increase in cash 27.54 1.4 
Source: (Dios, et al. 2004). 
 
When proposing solutions to the impending crisis, the UP paper stressed the necessity to 
ensure that the sacrifice demanded by these solutions be fairly apportioned. One of these 
proposed solutions was to “raise revenues by closing off tax-loopholes, updating existing 
taxes, passing new revenue measures, and reallocating spending "through specific measures 
such as: indexation of specific taxes on tobacco and alcohol; additional two-peso excise on 
petroleum; raising registration fees on motor vehicles; reducing the Countrywide 
Development Fund (CDF) allocations (i.e. discretionary funds or pork barrel) of legislators 
by half;67 and increase VAT rate from 10 to 12% and expand coverage.  
 
This latter proposal was considered superior to other revenue-raising proposals because of 
two reasons: its uniformity and transparent implementation would reduce discretion and the 
                                                 
 
 
 
66 Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 58.08PHP. 
67These are budget allocations aiming at providing benefits to all electoral districts in the Philippines, which 
are often collectively expressed as “pork-barrel” (Noda 2011). 
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scope for corruption; and its neutrality would minimise economic distortion caused by 
taxation (Dios, et al. 2004). Additionally, according to Department of Finance (DOF) 
estimates, VAT appeared the only remaining measure that promised enough new money to 
make a dent on the budget deficit; approximately PhP35 billion would be raised from the 
existing VAT base for a 2% rate hike (Bernardo and Tang 2013). 
 
Overall, the threat of a fiscal crisis and the ensuing economic collapse and the absence of 
workable alternatives facilitated the VAT reform process, speeding up consensus building 
with members of Congress, the business community, and civil society gravitating toward 
the VAT (Bernardo and Tang 2013). 
 
2.3 Main changes introduced by the reform 
 
The VAT was introduced in the Philippines in 1988 through Executive Order (EO) No. 273 
(approved on July 27, 1987 and effective January 1, 1988) to replace numerous taxes on 
goods and services. The main objective of the VAT introduction was to simplify tax 
administration and make the tax system more equitable. 
 
The Reformed VAT Law (RVAT Law) or RA No. 9337 was implemented on November 1, 
2005 as part of a broad revenue mobilisation package and of fiscal measures aimed at 
putting the public sector deficit and debt on a sustainable path in order to revive the fiscal 
condition of the government, foster economic growth and alleviate poverty. The RVAT 
Law aimed to expand the coverage of VAT and raised the VAT rate from 10% to 12% after 
meeting certain conditions. The VAT rate increase took effect only on February 1, 2006 via 
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 7-2006 
(NTRC 2011, IMF 2013). 
 
RA No. 9337 was enacted to help the government balance its budget and to sustain the 
provision of basic social services through a substantial increase in revenue collection. It 
was designed to effectively broaden the tax base and limit exemptions. Other reform 
measures in the RA No. 9337 were devised to plug the leaks in the existing VAT system; to 
strengthen the government’s cash flow and to simplify the VAT administration. These 
include the 70% cap on input VAT; the spreading of the input VAT claim on capital goods 
which exceed PhP1 million (about 17,221.5 EUR68) (net of VAT component) to 5 years; 
the removal of the 1.5% presumptive input VAT on public works contractors; the 
imposition of a uniform 5% final withholding VAT on government purchases of goods, 
services and public works contracts; and the elimination of exemptions for petroleum 
products, coal and natural gas, domestic transport of passenger by air and sea, among others  
(NTRC 2011).  
 
Furthermore, RA No. 9337 introduced non-VAT reforms. In particular, the corporate 
income tax (CIT) rate was increased from 32% to 35% but was later reduced to 30% 
                                                 
 
 
 
68Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 58.08PHP. 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of 
growth – Study  
 
217 
 
effective January 1, 2009. It also removed the income tax exemption of government-owned 
or controlled corporations (GOCCs) and instrumentalities except the Government Service 
and Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS), Philippine Health Insurance 
Corporation (PHIC) and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). Furthermore, 
the gross receipt tax on royalties, rentals of property, real or personal, profits from 
exchange and all other items treated as gross income of banks and non-bank financial 
intermediaries was increased from 5% to 7%. The rationale for these provisions is to share 
the tax burden between individuals and corporations given that the burden of the VAT is 
ultimately borne by the consumers (NTRC 2011). 
 
Finally, several tax policy measures were implemented in 2009 aimed at reducing the tax 
burden. In particular, as above-mentioned, the CIT rate was reduced to 30% and VAT on 
electricity transmission was replaced by a franchise tax. With regard to PIT, general 
exemptions (allowances) were raised and minimum wage earners were exempted in mid-
2008; in that regard, it is important to note that the PIT tax rate schedule has been 
unchanged since 2000, but the income brackets, defined in nominal pesos, have not been 
updated since 1997. As a result, some taxpayers moved to higher income brackets over time 
because of inflation. 
 
No major tax policy change occurred during 2010−12 (IMF 2013). 
 
 
3. Evaluation 
 
3.1 Evaluation with respect to the objectives expected or stated by 
national authorities 
 
As above-mentioned, the principal objectives of the enactment of the RA No. 9337 were to 
maximise revenue mobilisation to assist the government in balancing its budget and 
sustaining the provision of basic social services. These objectives were to be achieved 
through: broadening the tax base; rationalising exemptions; plugging the leaks in the 
existing VAT system; strengthening the government’s cash flow and simplifying the VAT 
administration (NTRC 2011, IMF 2013). 
 
The RVAT Law has had an impact on revenue performance, on the economy and on the 
government’s fiscal condition, especially during the period 2004-2010 (NTRC 2011). 
 
With respect to the revenue performance, total VAT revenues more than doubled from 
PhP156.67 billion (or 2.7 billion EUR)69 in 2005 (pre-RA No. 9337 regime) to PhP330.78 
billion (or 5.7 billion EUR) in 2010. There was a sharp increase in VAT collection of both 
the Bureau of Internal revenue (BIR) (60.42%) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) 
                                                 
 
 
 
69Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 58.08PHP. 
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(72.74%) in 2006, which was attributable to the first full year implementation of RA No. 
9337, and the increase from 10% to 12% of the VAT rate (see table below). 
 
 
Table 12. VAT revenues and growth rates: 2004-2010 (Amounts in Billion Pesos) 
Year VAT Revenues Growth Rate (%) 
 BIR BOC Total BIR BOC Total 
2004 80.22 58.88 139.1 -2.92 11.81 2.81 
2005 87.86 68.81 156.67 9.52 16.86 12.63 
2006 140.93 118.87 259.8 60.4 72.75 65.83 
2007 145.01 129.02 274.03 2.9 8.54 5.48 
2008 140.32 156.33 296.65 -3.23 21.17 8.25 
2009 168.29 133.9 302.19 19.93 -14.35 1.87 
2010 173.28 157.5 330.78 2.97 17.63 9.46 
Source: BIR and BOC (NTRC 2011). 
 
 
The upward trend in the BIR VAT revenue collection was interrupted in 2008 when 
collection dropped by 3.23% due to, among other factors, the increased input tax claims by 
importers and taxpayers with capital expenditures of more than PhP1 million (about 
17,221.5 EUR70) in 2007. Likewise, the decline in the BOC VAT revenue in 2009 was 
mainly explained by the reduction in the value of imports by 20.04% specifically the lower 
crude oil imports; the stronger peso; and lower tax payment by the government through the 
tax expenditure fund (TEF)  (NTRC 2011). 
 
Overall, the passage of RA No. 9337 (i.e. broadened tax base, increased rate and the 70% 
cap on input VAT in 2005) and its full implementation in 2006 appears to have been 
successful in generating revenue. This is illustrated by the significant increase of the share 
of VAT in total tax revenue from a 22% - 23% level to a range of 28% to 30% (see table 
below)  (NTRC 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Share of VAT revenue to total tax revenues: 2004-2010 (Amounts in Billion 
Pesos) 
Year Total VAT Revenues Total Tax Revenues % Share to Total 
2004 139.01 598.01 23.25 
2005 156.67 705.62 22.20 
2006 259.8 859.87 30.21 
2007 274.03 932.93 29.37 
                                                 
 
 
 
70Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 58.08PHP. 
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2008 296.65 1,049.19 28.27 
2009 302.19 981.62 30.78 
2010 330.78 1,093.64 30.25 
Source: BIR and BOC (NTRC 2011). 
 
 
Furthermore, the theoretical literature provides two sets of indicators of VAT performance 
that allow comparison across countries: the "C-efficiency ratio" and the "VAT gross 
compliance ratio". The C-efficiency ratio is calculated as the ratio of VAT revenue 
collection as a percentage of total consumption expenditure71 divided by the standard VAT 
rate. This a traditional measure of the effectiveness of the VAT in raising revenue and an 
indicator of the departure of the VAT from a perfectly enforced tax levied at a uniform rate 
on all consumption, with no exemptions. In other words, the C-efficiency ratio implicitly 
compares the revenue actually collected from VAT with that which would be raised if VAT 
were perfectly enforced and levied at a uniform rate, equal to the standard rate, on all 
consumption, and with no exemptions (potential VAT collections). As such, the 
C-efficiency will be 100% if the VAT is broad-based, with a single tax rate, and perfectly 
enforced. Intuitively, any departures from a C-efficiency of 100% would stem from two 
sources: the extent to which the VAT differs in design from a uniform tax on all 
consumption with no exemptions and the extent to which its implementation is imperfect. 
 
The VAT gross compliance ratio (VATGCR) is similar to the C-efficiency ratio except that 
the compliance ratio relates VAT collections to private consumption expenditures rather 
than aggregate consumption expenditures.  
 
The tables below summarise the VAT efficiency ratios and the VAT gross compliance 
ratios in the Philippines between 2004 and 2010.  
 
 
 
Table 14. VAT efficiency ratio: 2004-2010 (Amounts in Billion Pesos) 
Year VAT 
Revenues 
(BIR + BOC) 
Ratio of VAT Revenue to VAT Efficiency with Respect to 
  GDP Consumption 
Expenditure 
GDP 
“VAT efficiency 
ratio” 
Consumption 
Expenditure 
“C-efficiency 
ratio” 
2004 139.1 2.86% 3.62% 28.55% 36.23% 
                                                 
 
 
 
71This refers to final consumption expenditure aggregated over government, households, and non-profits 
(Keen 2013). A C-efficiency ratio of, say, 20%, implies that if the standard VAT rate is increased by one 
percentage point, the shares of the VAT revenues in total consumption expenditure is expected to increase by 
0.2 percentage point.  In general, the higher the ratio, the better is the VAT performance.   
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2005 156.67 2.88% 3.64% 28.78% 36.44% 
2006 259.8 4.31% 4.31% 35.90% 44.92% 
2007 274.04 4.12% 5.20% 34.35% 43.37% 
2008 296.65 4.00% 4.96% 33.36% 41.35% 
2009 302.19 3.94% 4.66% 32.79% 38.83% 
2010 330.78 3.89% 4.67% 32.38% 38.95% 
Source: BIR, BOC, Bureau of the Treasury (BTr), and National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) 
(NTRC 2011). 
 
 
Prior to RA No. 9337, the VAT efficiency ratio was about 29% using GDP as the VAT 
base. Since its full implementation in 2006, the VAT efficiency ratio improved to almost 
36% although it continuously declined over the years until it reached about 32% in 2010. A 
similar pattern is observed in the case of the C-efficiency ratio. Some factors likely 
explaining the decline include the complicated tax administration of the VAT and the 
passage of certain measures that have hampered the VAT revenue potential such as the 
abolition of the 70% cap and the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 201072, as well as the 
effects of the global financial crisis (NTRC 2011). 
 
For comparison sake, it is interesting to note that the average VAT efficiency and C-
efficiency ratios in Asia and the Pacific region are 35% and 58% respectively, while the 
average C-efficiency ratio on advanced and emerging markets is 50%, although with big 
variations. Moreover, the New Zealand Goods and Services Tax (GST), which is often held 
as a model VAT, has efficiency ratio of 65%. Consequently, the Philippines’ VAT 
efficiency and C-efficiency ratios are still below the Asia and the Pacific regional average 
and far from New Zealand’s ratios (NTRC 2011). 
 
 
Table 15. VAT gross compliance ratio: 2004-2010 (Amounts in Billion Pesos) 
Year VAT Revenue (BIR 
+ BOC) 
Private Consumption VAT Gross Compliance 
Ratio 
2004 139.1 3,346.72 41.56% 
2005 156.67 3,772.25 41.53% 
2006 259.8 4,229.50 51.19% 
2007 274.04 4,611.88 49.52% 
2008 296.65 5,281.07 46.81% 
2009 302.19 5,674.97 44.37% 
2010 330.78 6,192.86 44.51% 
                                                 
 
 
 
72Article 7 of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2010states that: “The senior citizens shall be entitled to the 
grant of twenty percent (20%) discount and to an exemption from the value-added tax (VAT), IF 
APPLICABLE, on the sale of the goods and services covered by Section 1 to 6 of this Article, from all 
establishments for the exclusive use and enjoyment or availment of senior citizens.” 
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Source: BIR, BOC, Bureau of the Treasury (BTr), and National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) 
(NTRC 2011). 
 
 
The VAT gross compliance ratio (VATGCR) reached 51% after the full implementation of 
the RVAT in 2006 as compared to prior to RVAT. However, VATGCR deteriorated 
beginning 2007 until it settled to 44.5% in 2010 (NTRC 2011). 
 
The figure below shows the two efficiency measures, C-efficiency ratio and VAT gross 
compliance ratio, for the Philippines between 2004 and 2010. 
 
 
Figure 4: Evolution of the C-efficiency ratio and VAT gross compliance ratio 
 
Source: BIR, BOC, Bureau of the Treasury (BTr), and National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) 
(NTRC 2011). 
 
 
In conclusion, it can be noted that the RVAT regime has been in general more efficient than 
pre-RVAT regime in spite of the fact that it remains below the recorded average in Asia 
and the Pacific region. The highest efficiency ratio recorded in 2006 has been explained by 
the fact that the VAT base was broadened; VAT-registered taxpayers are limited to 70% 
input VAT credit and the rate was increased from 10% to 12%. From 2007 onwards, the 
declining efficiency can be explained by the enactment of several measures exempting 
certain transactions from the coverage of VAT and the elimination of the 70% cap on input 
VAT73 (NTRC 2011). 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
73 The 70% cap on creditable input VAT imposed by RA 9337 was repealed by the Republic Act (RA) No. 
9361 signed by the President and published in the newspapers on November 28, 2006, effective December 13, 
2006; viewed 03 September 2013; 
http://www.punongbayan-araullo.com/pnawebsite/pnahome.nsf/section_docs/XV634V_5-12-06. 
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With respect to the overall objective of the RVAT Law to reduce the public sector deficit 
and debt to a sustainable level in order to revive the fiscal condition of the government, 
foster economic growth and alleviate poverty, it can be observed that the budget deficit to 
GDP ratio dropped from 3.84% in 2004 to an almost balanced budget in 2007. It gradually 
went up to 0.92% in 2008 and skyrocketed to 3.89% of GDP in 2009; this latter increase 
mainly attributed to the lower overall tax collection and the higher spending policy of the 
government in order to mitigate or cushion the impact of the global financial crisis. 
 
Likewise, the national government (NG) debt went down from 95.36% in 2004 to 63.12% 
in 2007. The NG debt was at 61.88% of GDP in 2010 (NTRC 2011). Furthermore, the NG 
has instituted various poverty reduction programmes out of the tax revenue, a major source 
of which is the VAT. Examples of such programmes include the Pantawid Pamilyang 
Pilipino Programme or 4Ps which is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) programme under 
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). It aims to eradicate extreme 
poverty in the Philippines by investing in health and education particularly in ages 0-14. 
The DSWD also implemented other social programmes funded under the “Katas ng VAT” 
initiatives such as a one-time PhP500 (or around 8.5 EUR)74 subsidy to qualified senior 
citizens and lifeline users of electricity; scholarships and loans to students, wives and 
relatives of transport workers; rehabilitation of areas damaged by typhoons; and upgrading 
of public hospitals, among others. 
 
3.2 Evaluation with respect to standards of tax reforms 
 
Overall, in spite of the good performance of the Philippines’s VAT system, there is still 
room to increase tax revenue collection as a percentage of GDP by reducing the tax gap75 
mainly due to the failure to collect taxes from the informal sector and to the large revenue 
losses from providing tax exemptions. According to the National Statistics Office, there 
were about 10.5 million informal sector operators identified in the 2008 Informal Sector 
Survey of the Philippines, which represented about 30% of the total labour force. Of the 
10.5 million informal sector operators, 41.3% were engaged in agriculture, hunting and 
forestry while operators in wholesale and retail trade accounted for around 29.6% and those 
in transport, storage and communications, about 10%.76 
 
With respect to the incentive system, foregone revenue through the system of tax incentive 
and exemptions in the Philippines is thought to be substantial not only because of the 
generosity of the incentives but also due to opportunities for abuse. The Philippines’ tax 
                                                 
 
 
 
74Currency equivalents: as of 15 October 2013, 1 EUR = 58.08PHP. 
75The tax gap is the amount of tax liability faced by taxpayers that is not paid on time; in other words, it is the 
difference between taxes owed and taxes voluntarily paid on time due to nonfiling of returns, underpayment 
of reported taxes, and underreporting of income. 
76National Statistics Office, Republic of the Philippines, viewed 03 September 2013; 
http://www.census.gov.ph/content/informal-sector-operators-counted-105-million-results-2008-informal-
sector-survey. 
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system is characterised by a generous and complicated regime of tax incentives. Incentives 
are currently granted by 13 investment promotion agencies without oversight from the 
Department of Finance (DoF), and include income tax holidays, a 5% tax on gross income 
earnings (in lieu of all national and local taxes), and exemptions from VAT and import 
duties (IMF 2013). It is estimated that there are around 180 laws that provide tax 
incentives; however, there is a number of bills currently before Congress seeking to 
rationalise incentives (IMF, 2012). 
 
More recently, the Filipino government’s objective in the area of revenue maximisation has 
been to raise the revenue to GDP ratio to 18% by 2016 (from 14.3% in 2012) and the tax 
ratio to 16% (from 12.8%). In a context of low revenue to GDP ratio compared with 
neighbouring countries, and the need for significant additional revenue to finance large 
spending gaps for education, health, and infrastructure while maintaining fiscal 
sustainability, the government must push forward the fiscal strategy implemented to boost 
revenue mobilisation as well as push forward administrative reforms to underpin policy 
efforts (IMF 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, tax collections have improved in relation to GDP since 2009, mainly due to 
higher income taxes and VAT collection which compensated the decline in excises and 
import duties collections. The increase in income taxes and VAT collections stems from 
two factors: economic growth and improvements in tax administration, given no other 
major tax policy changes were made in that period (IMF 2013).  
 
 
4. Factors conditioning the reform  
 
4.1 Political factors 
 
The Republic of the Philippines gained its independence from the United States on 4 July 
1946.  
 
The 20-year authoritarian rule of President Ferdinand Marcos, characterised by rampant 
corruption, political mismanagement, and crony capitalism, ended in 1986 when the 
"People Power movement" forced Marcos into exile and installed Corazon Aquino as the 
new president. After facing several coup attempts against her government, she was 
succeeded as President by Fidel Ramos in 1992. Joseph Estrada was elected president in 
1998 and was replaced by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who was sworn into the presidency in 
January 20, 2001 following Estrada's impeachment on corruption charges and another 
"People Power movement" who demanded his resignation.  
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After her first term (2001-2004), President Gloria Arroyo was elected to a full six-year 
second presidential term in the controversial May 2004 Philippine elections,77 and was 
sworn in on June 30, 2004. Benigno Aquino III, son of former President Corazon Aquino, 
was elected to a six-year term as president in May 2010. 
 
a) Main structural characteristics of the regime 
 
The Republic of the Philippines is a presidential republic where the Executive branch 
consists of the President and the Vice-President, both elected by direct popular votes for a 
six-year term. The President appoints the Cabinet, which consists of various departments 
headed by secretaries, to assist in the administration of the functions of the government. 
The Legislative branch is made up of the Upper House (the Senate) headed by the Senate 
President and the Lower House (House of Representatives) led by the Speaker (bicameral 
Congress or Kongreso). The members of both Houses are elected by direct popular vote 
every three years. The main institution of the Judicial branch is the Supreme Court headed 
by the Chief Justice. 
 
The peaceful uprising against President Marcos in February 1986 (the so-called "People 
Power" or EDSA revolution) led to the restoration of a democratic government in the 
Philippines after 20 years of authoritarian regime. However, the democratic process in the 
Philippines is also fragile, and its flaws are deep, as seen in elite dominance, institutional 
weakness, and widespread abuse of the highest public offices (Dressel 2011). 
 
The 1987 Constitution, one of the longest in the world, was enacted under President 
Corazon C. Aquino who succeeded Marcos. It sets out a catalogue of liberal, civil, and 
social rights almost unmatched in the region. The most important aspect of the political 
reform was the restoration of the presidential system of government based on the principles 
of separation of powers and checks and balance among the three branches of government. 
As a matter of fact, the Philippines was one of the first countries in the region to create 
strong agencies of accountability to monitor other branches of government. 
 
The President is elected by a direct vote of the people for a term of six years and is not 
eligible for re-election. Executive power is held exclusively by the President who has 
control over government appointments and exercises important power over the bureaucracy 
as head of the government. The President is shouldered by a vice-president who is elected 
in the same manner (not necessarily belonging to the same party) and who may also serve 
as a member of the cabinet. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
77The 2004 Presidential Election was marred with vote-rigging allegations. These allegations against President 
Arroyo gained momentum one year after the May 2004 election, when on June 10, 2005, audio recordings 
surfaced that allegedly proved that President Arroyo ordered the rigging of the national elections for her to 
win by around one million votes (Bernardo and Tang 2013). 
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The President's constitutional powers are vast, although they are not as strong as under the 
Marcos regime. Indeed, in order to avoid past abuses, the Constitution of 1987 contains 
many clauses creating mechanisms of checks and balances. In particular, the president 
cannot abolish Congress, he/she cannot rule indefinitely under emergency powers, he/she is 
prohibited from owning any company that does business with the government, the 
president's spouse cannot be appointed to any government post, etc.  
 
The Philippines has a bicameral legislature modelled on the US system whereby the 
Congress is divided into two houses: the House of Representatives (250 members elected 
by legislative district) and the Senate (24 members elected at national level through the 
party-list system). Although there is a clear separation of powers and political institutions 
in the Philippines, policy-making and implementation is largely shaped by political 
considerations between the executive and legislative branches of government. Indeed, the 
president has to rely on coalition building to permanently secure majorities in both 
chambers and push a legislative agenda through (BTI, 2012). In many policy areas, the 
President has to seek for compromise with the Congress. Through offering compromises in 
the policy area where one is dominant, each player seeks concessions from the opponent in 
other areas where the opponent is dominant. This “compromise exchange”, deriving from 
the switch of dominant players in different areas, is made possible by the constitutional 
framework and weak party discipline (Kawanaka, 2010). 
 
The Philippine legislature has strong powers, including that of passing laws as well as the 
national budget (the so-called annual General Appropriations Act). According to the 
Constitution, the Congress, and particularly the House of representatives, has the exclusive 
power to tax and to appropriate. However, in law and in practice, it is in fact the executive 
branch that has the "power of the purse" (PIDS, 2009) and the President holds 
extraordinary powers vis-à-vis the Congress in budgetary matters. 
 
First, the President has exclusive right to propose a budget, while the Congress can only 
reduce or reallocate appropriations in the proposed budget. There is no discussion in 
plenary when the budget proposal is introduced in either of the Houses, as the proposal is 
directly sent to the Appropriations and Finance committees. Second, thanks to the veto 
power conferred by the Constitution, the President can return legislation with which he/she 
doesn't agree to the House where it originated. Article IV, Section 27 indeed provides that 
“The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an 
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which 
he does not object”. As a matter of fact, this article has been used several times by various 
Presidents to overrule the amendments introduced by the Congress, in order to retain the 
budget that they had initially proposed, including on tax matters. Third, another important 
instrument through which the President exercises his/her authority over the Parliament in 
the context of budget approval is through the use and threat of re-enacted budgets. The 
Constitution indeed foresees the case where, “If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress 
shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the 
general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and 
shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the 
Congress.” This means that if Congress fails to pass the General Appropriations Act in 
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time, the government can simply use the same budget it used in the previous year, thus 
giving the President more leeway in the execution of the budget to reallocate funds to 
priority programmes, due to the resulting increased discretion in the use of funds, 
particularly in capital outlay items (Blondal, 2010). This possibility was particularly used 
by the Arroyo administration in order to put pressure on the Congress to agree on the 
budget proposals and limit expenditures. 
 
b) How the political context conditioned the reform 
 
The VAT reform benefitted from strong backing of the President. As a matter of fact, 
presidential leadership was determinant factor in the design and legislative process of the 
VAT reform.  
 
In January 2001, following the impeachment of former President Estrada, Gloria 
Macapagal-Arroyo (vice-president at the time) was named President to serve out Estrada’s 
remaining three-year term. In 2004, Arroyo ran for the presidential elections in order to 
seek a direct mandate from the people (the Constitution allows the election of a person who 
has succeeded as president and has served no more than four years). She won the elections 
by a margin of over one million votes against her contender. But the congressional 
canvassing was quite contentious and allusions of cheating were rapidly made. The latter 
gained momentum, with the so-called "Hello Garci" scandal in June 2005: audio recordings 
between Arroyo and a member of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which 
allegedly proved that Arroyo had ordered the rigging of the presidential elections. On June 
27, 2005, Arroyo admitted to having inappropriately spoken to a COMELEC official, but 
she denied influencing the outcome of the elections, claiming she had won fairly. 
 
From the very beginning of her mandate, the "Hello Garci" scandal put President Arroyo in 
political difficulty. She lost a big deal of legitimacy and massive street protests were led 
against her. Moreover, several key members of her cabinet resigned and urged Arroyo to do 
likewise.  
 
This was only the first of a series of political and economic challenges that President 
Arroyo had to face during her presidency, including massive street protests, four successive 
impeachment charges in Congress and two failed military uprisings; as well as an unstable 
economy and a burgeoning fiscal crisis. She has been arguably the most unpopular 
president of the Philippines and is today under hospital arrest, charged with allegations of 
plunder and electoral fraud. 
 
However, despite this difficult political context and problems regarding her administration, 
it is generally acknowledged that Arroyo has done a lot to lift the country out of the 
financial crisis, including through economic reforms and the improvement of tax collection. 
 
Concerning the RVAT, observers agree that the reform would not have been possible 
without the strong involvement of President Arroyo who strongly backed the reform. As a 
matter of fact, President Arroyo's strong character has been a key factor in passing several 
needed but unpopular fiscal measures such as the elimination of VAT exemptions, and the 
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increase of VAT rate, the increase in excise taxes for alcohol and tobacco, the increase in 
power tariffs. 
 
The RVAT reform process was also guided by the successful game-playing of president 
Arroyo in order to build a coalition around her. Although the reform was not popular in the 
Senate, she managed to get key members on board, and notably Senator Ralph Recto, the 
chair of the Ways and Means committee who played a key role throughout the process. His 
championship was indeed crucial for obtaining parliamentarians' support for the measure. 
Senator Recto made a strong campaign in favour of the reform, to such an extent that he 
was later labelled as "the Father of RVAT" to many Filipinos, which considerably affected 
his public image and cost him his re-election as Senator. 
 
4.2 Institutional framework  
 
The table below provides a brief evaluation of the institutional quality in the Philippines 
and in the East Asia & Pacific region in different areas such as corruption, quality of 
democracy, state efficiency, etc. 
 
Table 16. Institutional Quality, 2006-2011 average 
 Philippines East Asia & 
Pacific region 
(2011)
78
 
Quality of Democracy   
Voice and Accountability  (GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) -0.08 0.08 
Democratic Accountability (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale), 2006-
2010 average 
5  
State Efficiency   
Government Effectiveness (GI) (-2.5 to +2.5 scale) -0.03 -0.06 
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) (0 to 4 scale), 2006-2010 
average 
3  
Corruption   
Control of Corruption (GI) (-2.5 to 2.5 scale) -0.78 0.00 
Corruption (ICRG) (0 to 6 scale) 2  
2012 Corruption Perception Index (TI) (0-100 scale) (Rank 
among 176 countries) 
35 (105)  
Source: World Data Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/); 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG.aspx); Transparency 
International. 
 
a) Persistent corruption 
 
Corruption is a pervasive and long-standing problem in the Philippines. The political 
system is regularly plagued by corruption scandals that involve politicians at all levels – 
                                                 
 
 
 
78Developing only. 
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from the President to members of opposition parties. Practically every government has had 
to struggle with the problem (Nawaz and Bridi, 2008). 
 
The country ranked 105 out of 176 countries in Transparency International’s 2012 
Corruption Perceptions Index (with a score of 34/100). According to the Global Corruption 
Barometer 2013, the two sectors most prone to corruption are public officials/ civil 
servants, and the police.  
 
The high incidence of corruption in Philippines is a significant obstacle to good governance 
and has undermined the success of tax reforms in the country.  In particular, the Philippines 
suffer from rampant tax evasion and complicit corruption in the revenue collection 
agencies. 
 
As mentioned above, President Arroyo’s government has been accused of corruption 
almost from its inception and she has been considered the most corrupt president in the 
Philippines (Nawaz, and Bridi, 2008). A total of six corruption scandals have been exposed 
during the Arroyo Administration, costing an estimated 7.3 billion pesos (or around EUR 
125.5 million) (IBON, 2008). It is estimated that the Philippines lost about USD 138 billion 
(or around EUR 102.2 billion) between 2001 and 2010 (Arroyo presidency) due to illicit 
activities such as corruption and tax evasion.79 
 
As an effort to tackle the problem of tax evasion, the new administration under President 
Aquino has launched high-profile campaigns against tax evaders or smugglers. In 
particular, the Run After Tax Evaders (RATE) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; the Run 
After The Smugglers (RATS) of the Bureau of Customs; and the Revenue Integrity 
Protection Service (RIPS) of the Finance department. As a result there have been some 
improvements in the citizen perception of corruption, with 40% of the households 
considering the government efforts in fighting corruption as 'effective' or 'very effective' 
(compared to 28% in 2010).80 
 
 
b) Weak institutionalisation of political parties 
 
Party institutionalisation in the Philippines remains weak and underdeveloped. Political 
parties are personality-based organisations revolving around interpersonal alliances rather 
than on issues, ideologies, and party platforms. They are anchored on family and 
clientelistic relationships and serve as mechanisms for patronage politics to perpetuate 
vested interests (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009).  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
79http://www.business-anti-corruption.org/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/philippines/corruption-
levels/tax-administration.aspx 
80 Global Corruption Barometer 2013 http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=philippines 
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Most of the parties in the Philippines come and go in concurrence with presidential 
elections. Actually, parties do not select candidates, but are instead formed by the 
presidential candidates themselves as vehicles for their own campaigns (Nawaz, and Bridi, 
2008). In that sense, parties have been described as “temporary political alliances”, or “fan 
clubs” of politicians (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009). New parties are created by 
presidential candidates at every election time, and many disappear afterwards. As a result, 
politicians often change their affiliations depending on the winner of the elections, and the 
phenomenon of party-hopping is thus recurrent in the Philippines.  
 
After the democratisation in 1986, the number of parties increased drastically, but they are 
not stable and there are no dominant parties. As a matter of fact, a lack of legislative 
framework for strengthening political parties has led to a party system dominated by 
personalities and patronage (Nawaz, & Bridi, 2008). It has been argued that the presidential 
system, with an overly powerful presidency undermines the development of parties and 
enables the president to control the members of Congress, especially the House of 
Representatives.  
 
This has notably been the case in the VAT reform process, during which President Arroyo 
has exercised strong pressure and influence over the Congress, and particularly the Lower 
House. Some even argue that this influence over Parliamentarians has been a key factor. 
 
While the President exercises a certain authority over parliamentarians of the Lower House, 
the influence he/she has over Senators is much more challenging, and each senator seems to 
act more independently. One of the explanations is that senators are elected by nationwide 
ballot and hence pay much attention to their images in the media for nationwide popularity, 
where they are in more direct "competition" with the President. As a matter of fact, most 
Presidents had been serving as Senators beforehand. 
 
4.3 Social support 
 
a) The power of elites 
 
There are a myriad of interest groups in the Philippines. However, only those representing 
dominant economic interests enjoy access and influence in the formal political system. It 
can be argued that the feasibility of the RVAT reform was largely conditioned by the 
limited room of manoeuvre that the President and fellow Senators had with respect to the 
demands emanating from elites and pressure groups. 
 
Contemporary Philippine politics is indeed characterised by the domination of a handful of 
traditional elites composed of landowners, big businessmen and industrialists. As a matter 
of fact, families rather than political parties still reign in the Philippines. Some of the elite 
families have dominated since the Spanish colonial era that ended in the late 1800s. The 
latter continue to control large chunks of the economy. The tendency for the same names to 
dominate major industries can be partly attributed to government regulations that continue 
to allow key players to enjoy quasi monopolies and protection. 
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Moreover, there are strong collusion of interests between the business elite and political 
elites. For instance, the twenty-four members of the Senate are usually drawn almost 
entirely from old, prominent families. It is said that probably not a single person who 
occupied a chair in the senate or in the house has been known to be poor, even if political 
aspirants tended to identify themselves with the poor.81  This is mainly due to the exorbitant 
cost of running a political campaign which means that elections are often won by whoever 
can mobilise the highest amount of financial support. Since there are no limitations on the 
amount of personal donations to candidates and parties, this leads to a system which creates 
dependencies on rich campaign contributors, reinforces the power status quo and 
encourages corruption by politicians once they are in office (Nawaz, and Bridi, 2008).  
 
Given the “clientelist” nature of the party system, the president is also dependent on local 
elites for electoral mobilisation. Through congress, the bastion of local power in the 
national government, local elites bargain with the president for access to state resources in 
exchange for legislative and electoral support. 
 
The role and strong influence of business elites has been a key blocking force in tax 
reforms in the Philippines. The most striking example concerns the recent introduction of a 
long-debated "sin tax" which applies progressive increases to the taxation of alcohol and 
tobacco. After several years of blockage and fierce opposition, led by a powerful lobby 
which included members of parliament representing tobacco-growing regions as well as 
powerful cigarette and alcohol companies, the sin tax was eventually adopted in January 
2013 thanks to strong political will from the President and massive popular support. 
 
b) Popular support 
 
Given the urgent financial needs of the Government, and despite criticisms emanating from 
certain civil society organisations, the reform benefitted from large popular support. As a 
matter of fact, the RVAT was mainly driven by the looming fiscal crisis. The need to 
overcome and avoid a fiscal crisis has actually been a major factor for the adoption of the 
VAT reform in 2005. There has indeed been a strong consensus between various 
stakeholders on the need to address the looming crisis. The threat of crisis and the absence 
of workable alternatives made the reform an easier sell (i.e. the pain of higher taxes is much 
less than the pain of economic collapse), speeding up consensus building with members of 
Congress, the business community, and civil society gravitating towards the VAT. 
 
Most of the discussions and negotiation on the reform took place in the context of the 
Congressional hearings during which civil society groups, think tanks, academia, the 
business community, and even donors, made statements of support, advocacy pieces, or 
promises of more aid. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
81 Philippine Politics - A Politics of Power?  http://www.impactmagazine.net/v41n04/coverstory.html 
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c) The link between the reform and public spending 
 
Several civil society organisations criticised the VAT reform on the ground that it was a 
regressive tax which would negatively and disproportionately impact the poor. This was 
backed by a study by the National Tax Research Centre, whose evidence was used by 
militant and leftist groups to claim that the VAT was anti-poor. 
 
The Government responded with several measures to cushion the poor, including by 
committing to spend a portion of the revenue proceeds from the VAT reform on funding 
priority infrastructure projects and boosting social spending. This link between the reform 
and increased public spending in priority sectors contributed to gathering public support. 
 
The media also played an important role throughout the several months during which the 
process lasted. As mentioned above, the campaign was triggered by a group of highly 
respected economists from the University of the Philippines School of Economics who had 
published a paper on the “deepening crisis” and the need to urgently raise revenues by 
“closing off tax-loopholes, updating existing taxes, passing new revenue measures, and 
reallocating spending.” One of the key measures suggested in the paper was the increase of 
the VAT rate from 10% to 12%. And it is indeed around this key proposal that the debate 
eventually revolved. 
 
4.4 Economic factors 
 
The Philippines have recorded persistent fiscal deficits for the past two decades, which 
have been a key source of the macroeconomic instabilities and remained a critical 
constraint to growth. The country went through serious fiscal and public debt distress 
during 2002–2005, resulting in sovereign credit downgrades and difficulties in accessing 
foreign capital. Foreign investors were reluctant to invest in the Philippines at that time also 
due to the political crisis the country was experiencing.  
 
When Arroyo came to power, revenues were very low, and the country was on a verge of a 
fiscal crisis with a huge foreign debt. The most important cause of the deficits in recent 
years has been weak revenue generation, in particular tax collection (ADB, 2007). The 
decline in the tax effort followed the post-Asian crisis years of 1999–2005. Part of the 
reason for the decline in tax effort could be traced to lower profitability/losses of many 
businesses that were still feeling the impact of the Asian financial crisis. In addition, some 
provisions of the Comprehensive Tax Reform Package of 1997, which allowed significant 
exemptions to big corporations and high-income individuals, also contributed to the decline 
in the tax effort. Moreover, there were serious weaknesses in tax administration (ADB, 
2007). Between 2002 and 2004, the government averted fiscal crisis mostly by severe 
expenditure restraint (Blondal, 2010). 
 
As soon as she was elected in 2004, President Arroyo recognised the gravity of the looming 
fiscal crisis and the need to put fiscal consolidation on the reform agenda. The election of 
Arroyo marked a major turning point for budget policy in the Philippines. She made 
restoring fiscal discipline and sustainability a key priority of her presidency. She 
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acknowledged that the country was on the verge of a “fiscal crisis” and identified the 
budget deficit as the “most urgent problem” and asked Congress to pass revenue measures 
that would raise 80 billion pesos annually and balance the budget by 2010. 
 
The RVAT reform therefore constituted the centrepiece of the tax reform programme and 
its most important revenue generating measure to avoid a looming fiscal crisis. 
 
4.5 Informality, avoidance, and evasion 
 
Tax evasion is a major issue in the Philippines, particularly as regards the CIT and VAT. 
 
Between 1997 and 2004, just before the reform, the BIR’s tax effort trended downwards 
from a peak of 13% to a low of 9.9%. It is estimated that the decline in tax revenue was 
attributable to three factors: (i) shift in tax policy, (ii) change in economic structure, and 
(iii) increase in tax evasion (PIDS, 2002). In 1998, tax evasion accounted for 98% of the 
decline in the tax effort, although this had dropped to 46.2% in 2001 (Vicente, 2006). 
 
Reports suggest that uncollected taxes between 1998 and 2002 was highest among 
corporate taxpayers (representing a tax gap of 38%), followed by tax leakage from VAT 
(representing around 30% of the potential tax due). 
 
Another reason for the fall in tax effort is the proliferation of tax incentives to various 
industries and business activities. 
 
4.6 External actors 
 
A number of external actors have played a role in putting pressure on the Government in 
order to reform its tax system.  
 
In particular, because of continuous public deficit, international rating agencies 
downgraded the sovereign credit, urging the Government to improve credit outlooks and to 
reduce barriers and rates on investments.  
 
The IMF had also urged the government to consider raising the VAT rate. As a matter of 
fact, the Philippines have persistently followed the IMF's advice and policies to receive 
structural adjustment loans. 
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has also played a key role in supporting the 
government efforts to achieve fiscal consolidation, including through support for specific 
measures, including power rate adjustments and increased taxes. The ADB was among the 
first development partners to openly acknowledge the importance of the RVAT reform, 
which was a critical reform underpinning its 2005–2007 country strategy and programme 
with the Philippines. ADB support for fiscal consolidation contributed to the Philippines' 
recent macroeconomic stability and to the broader enabling environment for economic 
growth (ADB, 2008). 
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5. EFFECTIVENESS AND FEASIBILITY OF TAX REFORMS: 
LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The case study reports have described a number of tax reforms, evaluated them  with respect to 
Governments’ goals and selected international standards, and analysed the drivers and 
constraints faced by reformers. While each reform under study has its own peculiarities, there 
are some commonalities that help us understand why certain tax reforms succeed while others 
fail. This is the goal of this part of the study; in particular, to investigate the feasibility and 
effectiveness of tax reforms through an operational analysis. 
 
Before developing this analysis, several substantial points and definitions need further 
clarification. First, a tax reform will be understood in this context as a significant change in the 
tax system, i.e. a noticeable shift from the status quo. A number of indicators to quantify that 
change are proposed. Although a precise operational definition based on these indicators could 
be provided to assess whether or not a tax reform has taken place, this would be arbitrary82. For 
that reason, we believe it is preferable to leave this assessment in the hands of the analyst, 
eventually supporting his/her evaluation with the proposed indicators. Naturally, various 
analysts may differ in their assessments, but any strict operational definition would also be 
controversial. 
 
On the other hand, it can also be argued that a tax reform is a continuum of changes, and that it 
is therefore somewhat artificial to restrict the analysis to a particular period of time. In some 
cases, the reform period is very clearly delimited, notably when it has been conducted within a 
very precise timeframe, and then that reform stops. In others, the reform consists of a 
continuum of small changes. However, even in this case, the focus on a specific “period” or 
“sequence” can be useful for analytical purposes. Naturally, an explanation with regard to the 
choice of the period must be provided by the analyst. 
 
Second, a tax reform can be considered effective if the actual changes brought to the tax system 
are close to the targeted changes. In other words, the closer the results between actual changes 
and targeted changes, the more effective is the reform. It is important to highlight that 
effectiveness will not be understood in this context in terms of the relation between the means 
and ultimate goals of the reform (efficiency), but between targeted and actual changes in the 
tax system. For example, our analysis will not assess whether the introduction or modification 
of a particular tax benefit aimed at increasing investment has been effective in that regard, but 
rather whether or not the tax reform has been successful in actually changing tax benefits as 
initially targeted. Needless to say, it is sometimes difficult to know the real targets and 
objectives of tax reforms. 
                                                 
 
 
 
82 For example, we could say that a reform has taken place if at least three of the indicators show a significant 
variation in the pertinent aspects of the tax system. But by doing this, two kinds of problems arise. First, the 
traditional problem of a yes/no answer based on a threshold. Second, the fact that different operational definitions 
would be required for tax reforms with different targets related to different tax figures.  
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The feasibility of tax reforms is related to the set of factors that are expected to impact on its 
effectiveness. Hence, feasibility will be analysed through an operational multi-factor approach, 
consisting in identifying and evaluating those factors that influence the effectiveness of tax 
reforms. Therefore, a yes/no answer must not be expected from this analysis on feasibility. 
These factors have been grouped in three categories: the scope, the context, and the process of 
the reform. The first one refers to the depth and direction of a tax reform. The second one is 
related to those factors that shape the framework in which the reform takes place, while the 
third one deals with the organisation of the reform process, which in turn can influence its 
context.  
 
 
This analysis is composed of three main parts. The first one is devoted to the analysis of the 
factors that shape the feasibility of tax reforms, conditioning their effectiveness, grouped as 
mentioned above. The second part includes an operational proposal to investigate and evaluate 
the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Finally, this proposed analytical lens is applied 
to the nine case studies of this research in the third part, allowing to draw some commonalities 
regarding the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms.  
  
 
2. The effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms: the determinants 
 
As indicated above, a tax reform is considered as effective in this investigation if actual 
changes in the tax system are close to the targeted changes: the closer the results, the more 
effective is the reform. On the other hand the feasibility of tax reforms will be analysed 
following an operational multifactor approach. Therefore, the aim consists of identifying and 
evaluating those factors that, by influencing the feasibility of a given tax reform, condition its 
effectiveness. These factors have been selected in the literature, and from the analysis of the 
nine case studies of this investigation. They have been grouped in three categories: the design, 
the context, and the process of the reform.  
 
 
2.1 The scope of the reform 
 
The depth and direction of a tax reform clearly condition its effectiveness. The hypothesis in 
this respect is that, other things equal, a reform that implies a significant tax increase is likely 
to be less effective than neutral or tax-cut reforms. The reason is simple, a significant tax 
increase implies net losers, and therefore opposition tends to grow. On the other hand, if the tax 
system becomes more equitable as a result of the reform, social support is likely to grow and 
opposition debilitated.    
 
 
2.2 The context of the reform 
 
Various factors shape the context surrounding a tax reform, and influence its effectiveness. 
Most of them are not individually crucial for a reform to be effective, but they help to 
understand why a given tax reform is more likely to succeed. Furthermore, some factors can 
have simultaneous opposite effects as regards effectiveness, so the net impact is ambiguous and 
reform-specific.  
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The following list of factors is divided into three groups: political, institutional, and socio-
economic factors. It must be noted, however, that this classification is to some extent arbitrary, 
since some political or economic factors are also institutional factors, and therefore they could 
be included as institutional aspects.  
  
 
1. Political factors 
 
Political factors include structural and contextual aspects. Structural factors such as: 
 
- The political regime. The political regime can affect the number of powerful actors 
involved in reforms (autocratic vs. democratic; parliamentary vs. presidential; 
unicameral vs. bicameral), the preference for the status quo (for instance, autocratic 
regimes tend to have a greater interest for the status quo); and the convergence of 
interests (autocratic vs. democratic; parliamentary vs. presidential; open vs. closed lists; 
number of electoral circumscriptions, etc.).  
 
Since the political regime can influence the determinants of feasibility in different 
directions, the overall result on feasibility is ambiguous. For example, an autocratic 
regime reduces the number of powerful actors and increases common interests among 
them, and therefore a reform is more likely to be effective, but at the same time it fuels 
the preference for the status quo.  
 
- The balance of power between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. If power 
is concentrated in one branch, the number of powerful actors decreases, and reforms are 
more easy to pass since agreements are more likely to be reached between a limited 
number of actors. But on the other hand, a more concentrated distribution of power can 
also increase the preference for the status quo.  
 
- Elites. Elites tend to show a strong preference for the status quo (especially regarding 
tax reforms) and often have the power to block reforms83. Therefore, tax reforms are 
less likely to be effective in a context where elites are neither responsive nor 
accountable. 
 
- The financing of political parties. If private funds represent a large proportion of 
political parties' finance, then the number of relevant actors and therefore agreements 
are more difficult to be reached. On the other hand, the preference for the status quo can 
be reinforced or weakened, depending on the interests of funders.  
 
- The structure and modus operandi of political parties. The structure and functioning of 
political parties can also affect the number of powerful actors, the preference for the 
status quo, and the convergence of interests. If political parties are homogenous groups, 
then the number of relevant actors is reduced, compared to a context with strong and 
numerous factions inside political parties and with no voting loyalty. Similarly, a 
context with many political parties increases the number of actors and different 
                                                 
 
 
 
83  See for example, Bird (1989, 1992a, and 1992b) or Gomez-Sabaini and O’Farrell (2009). 
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interests. But, again, many parties and factions within parties can reduce the preference 
for the status quo.  
 
With regard to contextual political factors, the following can be mentioned: 
 
- A change of the political regime. This clearly fuels reforms (including tax reforms), 
since a change of the political regime is likely to imply changes in other aspects84. At 
the same time, political changes tend to increase the convergence of interests of 
powerful actors, whose number can increase (or decrease), making agreements more (or 
less) difficult to be reached. For example, a deep change of the political system that 
benefits from large social support may also amplify the preference for reforms, making 
convergence of interests more likely.      
 
- Majority in the Parliament. Majority in the Parliament can facilitate tax reforms in three 
ways: 1) fewer powerful actors are involved and therefore agreements are easier to be 
reached; 2) the Parliament is less likely to block the reform; and 3) it can also reduce 
the preference for the status quo, since the political costs of the reform for the 
Government can be lower. 
 
- The ideology of the existing Government compared to previous Governments. If the 
ideology of the ruling party differs from that of previous Governments, then the 
preference for the status quo will be reduced. The bigger this difference, the more 
intense is the preference for reforms. 
 
- A new ruling party. If the new Government belongs to a political party that never ruled 
the country or that has not ruled it for a long time, then this demonstration effect is 
expected to be more intense, and so will be the preference for reforms. 
 
 
2. Institutional factors 
 
- Corruption and transparency. Corruption tends to generate mistrust in governments, and 
consequently in reforms85. Therefore, the preference for the status quo is more likely to 
be reinforced in highly corrupt societies. The same applies to (the lack of) transparency. 
But, on the other hand, participation tends to increase as transparency grows, thus 
augmenting the number of actors involved in negotiations and reducing the feasibility 
of tax reforms.  
 
- Use of public resources. A bad use of public resources and government waste or 
inefficiency reduce the probability of tax reforms (especially if the reform implies a tax 
increase), since it generates mistrust in governments, and consequently in reforms. In 
                                                 
 
 
 
84 See for example, Bates (1989), Ascher (1989), Mahon (2004), and  Durand and Thorp (1998). 
85  Some works show that corruption has a negative impact on the capacity of the tax system to collect revenues: 
Ghura (1998), Gupta et al. (2004), Gupta (2007), Pessino and Fenochietto (2010), Le et al. (2008 and 2012), and 
Drummond et al. (2012) 
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general, reforms seem less likely to occur in a context where the political class has a 
bad reputation, since it fuels the preference for the status quo86.   
 
- The administration, including the tax administration. The tax administration and other 
administrative bodies (the judicial system, customs — if separated from the internal 
revenue administration—, cadastres, etc.) can facilitate of hinder a tax reform in two 
ways. On the one hand, the autonomy, quality, and efficiency of these administrative 
bodies condition the implementation of reforms. On the other hand, they can be active 
actors (and not mere executers) in the negotiation process, with power to influence the 
result.   
 
- Culture of negotiation and participation. On the one hand, a culture of negotiation or 
consultation can increase the feasibility of tax reforms by creating the space to reach 
agreements. However, a culture of participation can also reduce feasibility to a certain 
extent, since more actors with different interests are involved, making agreements and 
consensus-building more difficult. On the contrary, social apathy can increase the 
probability of adopting tax reforms (including unpopular reforms), since it reduces the 
number of actors involved in negotiations. 
 
- Informality, evasion, and avoidance. High levels of informality, evasion, and avoidance 
can undermine tax reforms in two ways: 1) the preference for reforms can be weaker, 
since the number of alternative reforms is lower; and 2) these factors can be used as an 
excuse by the opponents to the reform, reinforcing their position. 
 
 
3. Socio-economic factors 
 
- Social cohesion. Social cohesion, understood as the absence of strong economic, ethnic 
or other type of tensions in a given society, favours tax reforms since it fosters the 
convergence of interests and facilitates agreements. In very unequal societies, 
characterised by significant ethnic or other group differentiation, common interests are 
less evident and abundant, and therefore reforms are less likely to occur.  
 
- Education. A more educated population tends to be more demanding concerning public 
policies. This fuels the preference for reforms. But on the other hand, a more educated 
population tends also to be more participative, thus increasing the number of actors 
involved (directly or indirectly) in negotiations and hindering reforms. 
 
- Major change of the economic system. Deep transformations of the economic system 
prior to the reform (e.g. from a planned to market economy; from a closed to an open 
economy) clearly fuel tax reforms. At the same time, they tend to increase the 
convergence of interests of powerful actors, whose number can increase (or decrease), 
making agreements more (or less) difficult to be reached.  
                                                 
 
 
 
86 For example, Ascher (1989) and Bates (1989) have pointed out that tax reforms tend to be perceived as 
threatening even by those who, in fact, stand to benefit, owing largely to limited trust in government. Prichard 
(2010) and Keen (2012) also relate trust in government to tax reforms through a process of bargaining.  
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- General economic and budget situation. Economic and fiscal crises reduce the 
preference for the status quo and can also foster the convergence of interests.87  
 
- Tax policy consistency. Numerous and inconsistent changes in the tax system can 
create tax fatigue for taxpayers and the tax administration, thus fuelling the preference 
for the status quo and reinforcing the opposition to the reform.88 
 
 
 
2.3 The process of tax reforms 
 
A tax reform process will be understood in this document as the succession of activities and 
decisions made by reformers in view of achieving their objectives and bringing the planned 
changes to the tax system. Reformers will be defined as the political and institutional actors 
responsible for designing and implementing the tax reform.  
 
The main elements that characterise a reform process include: 1) the participants in the process; 
2) the timing of the process; 3) the issues addressed; and 4) the organisation of discussions and 
negotiations.   
 
1. Participants 
 
- Number of participants in negotiations and discussions. In principle, a higher number of 
participants in the negotiation process can be detrimental to tax reforms, since it makes 
agreements more difficult to reach. Therefore, other things equal, incorporating more 
participants to the reform process can be detrimental to tax reforms. 
 
- Typology of participants. Yet, on the other hand, a greater number of participants can 
facilitate the convergence of interests through a well conducted negotiation process. In 
this sense, the effect of incorporating  actors to the process will depend on their 
characteristics:  
 
a) Actors that can block the reform. They must necessarily be incorporated to 
discussions and negotiations.  
 
b) Weak opponents. Since they are already weak, there is no gain in incorporating them 
to the reform process. On the contrary, their position will likely be reinforced 
 
c) Strong opponents, without capacity to block the reform but with capacity to 
undermine it (for example by influencing actors with capacity to block the reform, or 
increasing the opposition by other actors). This is a very case-specific group. If their 
inclusion in negotiations and discussions decreases their strength and/or the divergence 
of interests, the reforms will be more likely to be passed if they are included   
                                                 
 
 
 
87 See for example, Castanheira et al. (2012) 
88See for example, Shekidele (2009) or IMF (2009). 
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d) Supporters of the reform. Their inclusion in the reform process will facilitate the 
reform, since their position and that of the reformer will be reinforced, and they will 
counterbalance the opponents’ position.  
 
In sum, if the typology of participants is biased against the reform and reinforces the 
opponents’ position, then the reform is less likely to be effective.  
 
 
- The participation of independent experts’ commissions. Independent commissions 
playing a role in the design of the reform can increase its effectiveness by debilitating 
opposition and fostering the convergence of interests. But if their recommendations 
diverge from the reformer’s targets, the opposite will be true. Therefore, independent 
commissions will have a positive effect on the effectiveness of the reform as long as 
their recommendations are made public and are in line with the reformer’s targets.   
 
- External actors. Cooperation agreements with international organisations or foreign 
governments, regional trade agreements, technical assistance, and international aid can 
foster tax reforms by reducing the preference for the status quo if these actors seek to 
promote tax reforms, especially if these agreements include conditionality on tax issues. 
But on the other hand, foreign aid can be a substitute for domestic taxation, reducing 
government incentives to implement tax reforms. It can also happen that a general 
perception of donors being behind a reform may create resistance in the public and 
hinder the reform. 89 
 
 
2. Timing 
 
- Moment of the electoral mandate. The effectiveness of a reform process will be higher 
if its timing reduces the number of opponents to the reform and reinforces the position 
of the reformer and weakens that of the opponents. In this sense, the electoral moment 
seems to be crucial. A tax reform formulated at the beginning of the electoral mandate 
is more likely to be effective, since the political costs of reforms are lower, the 
preference for reforms is higher, and opponents are weaker.  
 
- Popularity of the Government. A tax reform is more likely to be effective if it is 
formulated in a moment of high popularity of the Government of after having adopted 
some popular measures.  
 
- A prior reform of the tax administration. A reform of the tax administration (if 
necessary) can influence the tax reform by shaping the strength of reformers and rivals 
and the relevance of external constraints to the reform 
 
- A previous information campaign to taxpayers. Similarly, a previous information 
campaign to taxpayers can condition the strength of reformers and rivals.      
                                                 
 
 
 
89 Empirical research does not provide a clear-cut answer in this respect (see for example, Alonso et al., 2013)  
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3. Issues  
   
- Separation of issues. Issues to be discussed and negotiated in a tax reform condition its 
effectiveness. The debate and negotiation on some specific issues may poison the 
negotiation on all the others. If such controversial issues are separated from the reform, 
it is more likely to be effective. For example, the negotiation of the general lines of the 
reform can be separated from that of more specific issues, so the latter does not block 
the former.  
 
- Issues not directly related to the reform. If issues that are not crucial to the reform but 
that can increase the number of opponents and/or reinforce their position are excluded, 
the effectiveness of the reform process increases. On the contrary, if issues that 
decrease the opposition to the tax reform, reinforce potential allies, and favour the 
convergence of interests are included in the reform process, its effectiveness will likely 
grow90. This refers not only to issues directly related to the tax reform, but also to other 
issues that can indirectly reinforce the reformer’s position: changes in other areas of 
public policy.   
 
4. Organisation 
 
- Information availability. Among other factors, participation in tax reforms depends on 
the information available. More publicly available information is likely to increase the 
awareness and the number of participants, and therefore it tends to reduce the 
effectiveness of the reform, since it makes agreements more difficult to reach. But on 
the other hand, information conditions the role of potential opponents and supporters to 
the reform. Therefore, the overall effect of the amount of available information is 
ambiguous. If more information implies more (less) opposition and/or less (more) 
support, then the effectiveness of the reform is likely to be lower (higher).  
 
- The institutionalisation of the consultation and negotiation process. On the one hand, 
institutionalisation tends to increase the number of participants. On the other, if 
opponents are numerous, homogenous, and strong, the institutionalisation of the reform 
will likely increase their opposition, since it facilitates their task. If opponents are not 
numerous, not homogenous, and weak, the institutionalisation of the reform (although 
perhaps not necessary) reinforces the reformer’s position by increasing legitimacy. If 
there aren't many opponents to the reform, but that they are strong, the 
institutionalisation of the reform favours the reformer’s position by reinforcing allies. 
Therefore, the overall effect of the institutionalisation of the process is ambiguous.  
 
- Transparency of the process. The effectiveness of the reform is likely to be higher if 
issues that reinforce the reformer’s position, increase the number of allies, and weaken 
opponents are open to transparent negotiations and discussions. If most popular issues 
of the reform are discussed openly, then the number of allies is likely to increase and 
the position of the reformer reinforced. On the contrary, open and transparent 
                                                 
 
 
 
90 See for instance, Prichard (2010) and Keen (2012).  
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discussions on issues facing strong opposition are likely to weaken the reformer’s 
position. On the other hand, the position of opponents is undermined if issues that they 
would prefer to hide to the rest of actors are made visible by open and transparent 
negotiations. In sum, the effect of transparency of the decision-making process is 
ambiguous, since it depends on the issues at stake, and therefore on the type of reform.   
 
- Bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Actors affected by tax reforms usually try to 
obtain benefits or to lessen their individual impact (for example, through exemptions). 
Since their position in the case of powerful actors is reinforced in bilateral negotiations, 
multilateral negotiations can counterbalance particular positions and reduce the demand 
for privileges, and therefore limit the risk of watering down the reform and foster the 
convergence of interests. But on the other hand, multilateral negotiations will reinforce 
or weaken rivals and allies according to their characteristics (how numerous, 
homogenous, and strong they are).   
 
- The number and organisation of negotiation forums. The number and organisation of 
negotiation forums can affect the effectiveness of the reform. To include all issues in a 
single forum or simultaneous forums may reduce or increase the effectiveness of 
reforms, since it can make agreements more difficult or easier to reach, depending on 
the type and scope of the reform. On the other hand, if agreements reached in one 
forum limit the results of another one, effectiveness can be higher, since it can be easier 
to reach agreements (it can reduce the divergence of interests). For example, 
negotiations on a reform of tax benefits can be organised by first agreeing on the need 
to reduce tax expenditures (or to keep them stable), and then discussing the 
redistribution of tax benefits in other forum (i.e. the agreement reached in the first 
forum becomes an formal constraint to the second one; see below). 
 
- Formal and legal restrictions. Some formal and legal restrictions can limit the space for 
the opposition to reforms and weaken opponents’ position. For example, a fiscal 
responsibility law or the compulsory publication of tax expenditures can reduce the 
demand for exemptions and privileges. In addition, formal and legal restrictions can 
protect the reform from future changes than could undermine it. For example, 
tightening the system to grant tax benefits (such as that any non-general change must be 
neutral in terms of revenue, that they must appear only in the tax legislation, etc.). 
 
 
3. An operational proposal to investigate and evaluate the effectiveness and feasibility of 
tax reforms. 
 
3.1 The evaluation of the effectiveness of tax reforms 
 
As stated above, a tax reform will be characterised as a significant change in the tax system, 
irrespective of the direction of that change (i.e. no evaluation as to whether the change has 
improved or worsened the tax system). To define this concept in practical terms, indicators 
measuring changes in the tax system must be selected. Some possible indicators are presented 
below, but three remarks must first be made in this respect. First, this list is by no means 
exhaustive; it simply identifies a number of possible areas influenced by tax reforms. The set of 
indicators used to evaluate changes in the tax system is reform-specific: it depends on the type 
of reform. Second, the application of some indicators to real tax reforms is not automatic; an 
evaluation must carefully be made by the investigator, taking into account other factors than 
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can influence the results of the reform (a higher efficiency of the tax administration, economic 
growth, trade agreements, etc). Third, the evaluation must be made only with regard to the 
targeted changes. For instance, if the reform is targeted at introducing a new tax, and that a 
reform of the tax administration is required to this end, the latter is just a side-effect of the 
evaluated reform, not a change that contributes to the result of this evaluation. It could 
eventually be considered as a positive side-effect, but that is all. Naturally, it would be different 
if we are dealing with a reform targeted at changing the tax administration. Obviously, it can be 
difficult in some cases to assess whether a certain change is a targeted change or a side-effect.  
 
Two types of indicators can be used to evaluate the depth of a tax reform: output and input 
indicators. In principle, output indicators would suffice, since they reflect better whether or not 
changes in the tax system are real, but depending on the targets and type of the reform under 
study, and since data and studies are usually scarce, it seems preferable to take both types of 
indicators into account.  
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• Change in revenue: in absolute terms and in the tax revenue/GDP ratio (total and 
specific tax revenue). 
 
• Change in the tax structure. 
 
• Change in the progressivity and redistributive capacity indexes (such as the Kakwani 
and Reynolds-Smolenski indexes, distribution of the tax burden by income groups, etc.) 
 
• Change in the tax-related efficiency indicators. For example, the C-efficiency ratio and 
the VAT gross compliance ratio in the case of the VAT, or the CIT and the PIT 
efficiency ratio proposed by USAID in the case of the CIT and the PIT, respectively.  
 
• Change in tax expenditures.  
 
• Change in evasion, avoidance, and the informal economy 
 
• Change in the number of taxpayers 
 
 2.  Input indicators: 
 
• Introduction of a new tax.  
 
• Changes in the number of taxes 
 
• Changes in tax bases: exemptions, taxed sectors and types of income, substitution of 
turn over by value added taxes, etc. 
 
• Changes in rates: level, rate schedule, number of rates, etc.  
 
• Changes in specific tax regimes: small firms, agriculture, etc. 
 
• Operational changes: tax refund system, withholding system, etc. 
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• Changes in the legal framework: simplification of tax-related laws, penalties, etc. 
 
• Changes in the tax administration: legal framework, human resource management, 
investment, risk control and inspection methods, structure, etc. 
 
The evaluation of a tax reform must follow two steps: 
 
a) First, one should determine whether or not a targeted change in the tax system can be 
considered as a proper reform. As stated above, different analysts can differ in their 
assessments, but this would also happen if a strict operational definition were used, which in 
addition would differ across types of reforms. 
 
b) Actual changes in the tax system must be compared to targeted changes.  
 
Then, three possibilities arise. First, the targeted changes are substantial enough to be 
considered as a real tax reform, and the actual changes that took place are close to those that 
were foreseen; therefore, the reform is effective. Second, the targeted changes correspond to a 
real reform, but no significant changes have taken place or they have, but they differ 
significantly from the original targets; therefore the reform has been ineffective. Third, targeted 
and actual changes do not correspond to a real reform; therefore, effectiveness is irrelevant. As 
stated above, it can be difficult sometimes to know exactly the intended targets of a tax reform. 
 
 
3.2 The evaluation of the feasibility of tax reforms 
 
Many factors condition the feasibility of tax reforms. Although these factors are related to 
different fields, some commonalities seem to emerge from the analysis above regarding the 
channels through which these factors influence tax reforms. These channels, which are linked 
to the actors involved in the reform, the distribution of power, and their behaviour, can be 
categorised as follows:  
 
a) The number of actors involved in reform91: other things equal, as the number of actors 
involved increases, it becomes more difficult to reach agreements and build consensus. 
Reforms then tend to be less effective (at least in the sense we interpret it in this 
document). The number of actors does not necessarily equal the simple addition of 
actors, since their strengths differ. Formal actors must be distinguished from real actors. 
Actors can be political actors (the Government, the Parliament, political parties, etc), 
social and economic groups (the business community, trade unions, social 
organisations, etc.), administrative actors (the tax administration, etc), and external 
actors (international organisations, donors, etc.).  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
91 For the different elements in this categorisation see for instance, Tsebelis (2002), Bird (1989, 1992a, 1992b), 
Gomez-Sabaini and O’Farrell (2009), Ardanaz and Scartascini, (2012) or Castanheira et al. (2012).  
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b) Convergence of interests: other things equal, the effectiveness of reforms increases as 
actors share more interests in common92. Again “common interests” must be analysed 
in terms of the strength of actors. A convergence of interests between the Government 
and the business community makes tax reforms more likely to be effective than a 
convergence of interests between less powerful actors.    
 
c) Preference for the status quo: a tax reform is likely to be less effective if the preference 
for the status quo (especially of the most powerful actors) is very strong. Conversely, if 
there is a marked preference for change or the preference for the status quo is less 
intense, tax reforms are likely to be more effective.  
 
d) The strength of rivals. If opponents to the reform are powerful rivals, then the task of 
the reformer is more difficult, and the reform is likely to be less effective.  
 
e) Allies. If the reformer has numerous and/or powerful allies, then the reform is likely to 
be more effective.  
 
In sum, each factor above seems to influence the effectiveness of a tax reform through these 
five channels. It is important to note that factors can have opposite effects on the effectiveness 
of tax reforms by influencing these channels in different directions. For example, an autocratic 
regime usually implies fewer actors involved, therefore facilitating the effectiveness of 
reforms, but it also tends to imply a stronger preference for the status quo, which on the 
contrary hinders reforms.  
 
Broadly speaking, it seems that tax reforms are less feasible in highly heterogeneous societies 
(more actors involved and divergence of interests) and where powerful actors show a strong 
preference for the status quo. Naturally, a shared preference for the status quo, and therefore a 
low degree of tax reform effectiveness, can be due to a high degree of social satisfaction with 
the current tax system.  
 
Our proposal is to investigate how all those factors influence the feasibility and effectiveness of 
particular tax reforms. To this end, we link the various factors to the five channels identified 
above (i.e. number of actors involved; convergence of interests; preference for the status quo; 
strength of rivals; allies). Each factor can have a positive or a negative effect with respect to 
each channel. Naturally, not all factors have an influence in all channels, and the total effect of 
a given factor in a particular reform is not the simple addition of their effect in all channels, 
since not all channels have the same influence. We present below quantitative and qualitative 
indicators that can be applied to the different factors.    
 
 
A) The scope of the reform 
 
1) Tax revenue variation 
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, convergence of interests 
                                                 
 
 
 
92 In the analysis of real tax reforms it is sometimes difficult to know the real interests and strength of actors. 
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Indicators: variation in the tax/GDP ratio 
Expected impact: A tax reform that increases taxes has a negative impact in terms of 
effectiveness because it tends to strengthen the preference for the status quo and hinder the 
convergence of interests. 
 
2) Distributive impact 
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, allies. 
Indicators: variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes. 
Expected impact: A tax reform that increases the progressivity and redistributive capacity of 
the tax system is expected to have a positive impact in terms of effectiveness because it tends 
to weaken rivals and to foster alliances. 
 
 
 
B) The context of the reform 
 
B.1. Political factors 
 
3) The political regime.  
 
Channels of influence: number of actors, preference for the status quo, convergence of interests 
Indicators: The Combined Polity Score (difference between the democracy and autocracy 
indexes) in the Polity IV dataset of the Center for Systemic Peace93.  
Expected impact: In more democratic regimes, it is expected that the number of powerful 
actors involved in tax reforms are numerous, thus making the convergence of interests more 
difficult, while reducing the preference for the status quo.  
 
4) The balance of power between the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary.  
 
Channels of influence: number of actors, preference for the status quo 
Indicators: The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset of the Center for Systemic 
Peace94. 
Expected impact: if power is more concentrated in the executive, the number of powerful 
actors is expected to decrease and the preference for the status quo to increase. 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
93 The Combined Polity Score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score; it ranges 
from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Democracy is conceived as three essential elements: 
the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders; the existence of institutionalised constraints on the exercise of power by the 
executive; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens. It discriminates among Western parliamentary and 
presidential systems. Autocracy is also defined operationally. Therefore, although imperfectly, this combined 
score captures how the political regime is linked to the channels that shape the effectiveness of reforms. 
94 The Xconst indicator accounts for Executive Constraints (Decision Rules). Operationally, it refers to “the extent 
of institutionalised constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or 
collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups". 
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5) Elites.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, strength of rivals 
Indicators: Democratic accountability in ICRG and the Gini index (World Bank). 
Expected impact: non-responsive and accountable elites are expected to favour to a greater 
extent the preference for the status quo and to increase the strength of rivals. 
 
6) Financing of political parties.  
 
Channels of influence: number of actors, preference for the status quo 
Indicators: Private financing to political parties is regulated and limited? 
Expected impact: If private funds are neither regulated nor limited, then the number of relevant 
actors increases, while the preference for the status quo can be reinforced or weakened, 
depending on the interests of funders.  
 
7) The structure and modus operandi of political parties.  
 
Channels of influence: number of actors, preference for the status quo, convergence of 
interests. 
Indicators: Different indicators have been proposed to measure political parties’ polarisation95. 
Further research would be needed to select one or several indicators.   
Expected impact: Numerous and heterogeneous political parties increase the number of 
relevant actors and make the convergence of interests more challenging, while they can also 
reduce the preference for the status quo.  
 
8) Change of the political regime  
 
Channels of influence: number of actors, preference for the status quo, convergence of interests 
Indicators: The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset of the Center for Systemic 
Peace96. 
Expected impact: a change in the political system is expected to facilitate the convergence of 
interests and the preference for the status quo, while the number of powerful actors increases or 
decreases depending on the direction of the change.      
 
9) Majority in the Parliament.  
 
Channels of influence: number of actors, preference for the status quo, strength of rivals 
Indicators: Majority in the Parliament (yes/no). 
Expected impact: Majority in the Parliament is expected to decrease the number of relevant 
actors, weaken rivals, and reduce the preference for the status quo. 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
95 For example, Esteban and Debraj (1994), Duclos et al. (2004), Klingemann and  Wessels, (2002) or Alvarez and 
Nagler (2004).  
 
 
96 The Durable Indicator measures regime durability, defined as the number of years since the most recent regime 
change. 
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10) The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments.  
 
Channels of influence: the preference for the status quo 
Indicators: the reforming party differs from previous ruling parties (yes/no);. 
Expected impact: if the reforming party differs from previous ruling parties, then the 
preference for the status quo is expected to be reduced.  
 
11) A new ruling political party.  
 
Channels of influence: the preference for the status quo 
Indicators: the reforming party has never ruled the country or has not ruled it for a long time 
(yes/no). 
Expected impact: if the reforming party has never ruled the country or has not ruled it for a 
long time, then the preference for the status quo is expected to be reduced.  
 
 
B.2. Institutional factors 
 
12) Corruption and transparency.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, number of actors 
Indicators: the Corruption Perception Index. 
Expected impact: Corruption and lack of transparency are expected to reinforce the preference 
for the status quo and decrease the number of actors.  
 
13) Use of public resources 
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo 
Indicators: Government Effectiveness in the Governance Indicators (TWB); (Social spending 
as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources); IDA Resource Allocation 
Index (TWB). 
Expected impact: a better use of public resources is expected to reduce the preference for the 
status quo. 
 
14) The quality of the tax administration and the administration in general.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, number of actors 
Indicators: Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG); Quality of Public Administration in CPIA (TWB); 
Burden of Customs Procedure (TWB). 
Expected impact: a low-quality tax administration and administration in general favours the 
preference for the status quo. On the other hand, the number of actors will increase if the 
administration is also an active participant in the reform process (and not mere executers). 
 
15) Culture of negotiation and participation.  
 
Channels of influence: number of actors, convergence of interests 
Indicators: further research is needed in this respect.  
Expected impact: a culture of negotiation and participation is expected to increase the number 
of actors and facilitate the convergence of interests. 
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16) Informality, evasion, and avoidance.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, strength of rivals 
Indicators: evasion and avoidance estimates; Schneider informal economy estimates Expected 
impact: Informality, evasion and avoidance are expected to increase the preference for the 
status quo and the strength of rivals. 
 
 
B3.Socio- Economic factors 
 
17) Social cohesion.  
 
Channels of influence: convergence of interests 
Indicators: The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG, and the Gini index (World 
Bank). 
Expected impact: social tensions are expected to drive down the convergence of interests 
 
18) Education.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, number of actors 
Indicators: Average Year of Total Schooling (Barro and Lee Educational Attainment for 
Population Aged 15 and Over). 
Expected impact: a more educated population is expected to reduce the preference for the 
status quo and to increase the number of involved actors.  
 
19) Major change of the economic system.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, convergence of interests 
Indicators: major changes in the economic system (yes/no) 
Expected impact: major changes in the economic system are expected to reduce the preference 
for the status quo. They are also expected to increase the convergence of interests. 
 
20) General economic and budget situation.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, convergence of interests 
Indicators: Budget deficit in the pre-reform years.  
Expected impact: Economic and fiscal crises are expected to reduce the preference for the 
status quo and to foster the convergence of interests.  
 
21) Tax policy consistency.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, strength of rivals 
Indicators: Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior to the analysed 
reform 
Expected impact: Numerous changes in the tax system are expected to increase the preference 
for the status quo and opposition. 
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C. The process of tax reforms 
 
C.1. Participants 
 
22) Number of participants involved in the reform process 
 
Channels of influence: number of participants 
Indicators: institutionalisation of the process incorporating a wide range of participants 
(business associations, trade unions, social associations, etc.)? (yes/no) 
Expected impact: the institutionalisation of the process is expected to increase the number of 
participants. 
 
23) Typology of participants.  
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, allies to the reformer, convergence of interests 
Indicators: further research is needed 
Expected impact: If the typology of participants is biased against (or in favour of) the reform, 
then it reinforces the opponents’ position (or the allies' position). It will also undermine (or 
facilitate) the convergence of interests.  
 
24) Independent commissions.  
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, convergence of interests 
Indicators: participation of independent commissions playing a role in the design of the reform 
and making their recommendations available to the public? (yes/no). 
Expected impact: If their recommendations are in line with the reformer’s targets, then the 
opponents’ position is expected to be weakened and the convergence of interests strengthened.   
 
25) International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid.  
 
Channels of influence: preference for the status quo, number of actors. 
Indicators: financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no); conditionality in this agreement regarding the reform (yes/no); commitment 
made to international organisations or donors regarding tax reforms (yes/no); technical 
assistance received from donors or international organisations regarding the tax reform 
(yes/no); ODA as a percentage of GDP. 
Expected impact: international agreements are expected to reduce the preference for the status 
quo and to increase the number of actors. With respect to foreign aid, the effect is ambiguous 
regarding the preference for the status quo. 
 
 
C.2. Timing 
 
26) Beginning of the electoral mandate 
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, preference for the status quo 
Indicators: did the reform process start in the beginning of the electoral mandate? (yes/no) 
Expected impact: A reform process started in the beginning of the electoral mandate is 
expected to reduce both the strength of rivals and the preference for the status quo.  
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27) Popularity of the Government  
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, preference for the status quo 
Indicators: popularity rates when the reform process started 
Expected impact: a reform process started at a time when the Government benefits from high 
popularity is expected to reduce both the strength of rivals and the preference for the status 
quo.  
 
28) Tax administration reform  
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, preference for the status quo 
Indicators: a tax administration reform prior to the tax reform (yes/no) 
Expected impact: a tax administration reform, if necessary, is expected to reduce the strength 
of rivals and the preference for the status quo.  
 
29) Information campaign  
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, allies, preference for the status quo 
Indicators: a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens (yes/no) 
Expected impact: Information campaigns are expected to reduce the strength of rivals, to 
mobilise allies, and reduce the preference for the status quo.  
 
 
 
C.3. Issues  
   
30) Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations 
 
Channels of influence: convergence of interests 
Indicators: Separation of negotiations on the general lines of the reform from negotiations of 
more specific aspects (yes/no) 
Expected impact: this separation is expected to facilitate the convergence of interests. 
 
31) Issues not directly related to the reform 
 
Channels of influence: convergence of interests, strength of rivals, allies, preference for the 
status quo. 
Indicators: did the reform include some specific changes not directly related to the reform 
(changes in public spending, earmarking, other aspects of the tax system, etc.)? were these 
measures popular or unpopular? 
Expected impact: issues that increase the opposition to the reform are expected to reinforce 
rivals and fuel the preference for the status quo. Issues that are popular are expected to weaken 
the opposition to the tax reform, reinforce potential allies, and favour the convergence of 
interests.   
 
 
C.3. Organisation 
 
32) Information availability 
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Channels of influence: number of participants, strength of rivals, allies. 
Indicators: was information on the impact of the reform made available? (yes/no) 
Expected impact: The expected impact is ambiguous. In principle, more information implies 
more potential participants. But on the other hand, it will gather social support or, on the 
contrary reinforce rivals, depending on the design of the reform.  
 
33) The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations.  
 
Channels of influence: number of participants, strength of rivals, allies. 
Indicators: has the reform process been institutionalised through formal discussions and 
negotiations? (yes/no) 
Expected impact: The expected impact is again ambiguous. In principle, institutionalised 
participatory processes implies more participants. But on the other hand, it will reinforce or 
weaken rivals and allies according to their characteristics (depending on how many, 
homogenous, and strong they are).  
 
34) Transparency of the decision-making process.  
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, allies. 
Indicators: has the decision-making process been open and transparent? (yes/no) 
Expected impact: The expected impact is again ambiguous. Transparency will reinforce or 
weaken rivals and allies according to the design of the reform. Open and transparent 
discussions on issues facing strong opposition are expected to reinforce the opponents’ 
position.  
 
35) Bilateral or multilateral negotiations.  
 
Channels of influence: strength of rivals, allies, convergence of interests. 
Indicators: has the reform been negotiated and discussed through bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations?  
Expected impact: multilateral negotiations are expected to counterbalance particular positions 
and reduce the demand for privileges, fostering the convergence of interests. But on the other 
hand, it will reinforce or weaken rivals and allies according to their characteristics (depending 
on how many, homogenous, and strong they are).  .   
 
36) The number and type of negotiation forums.  
 
Channels of influence: convergence of interests. 
Indicators: has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums? Did 
agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)  
Expected impact: The expected impact of the number of forums is ambiguous, since depending 
on the type and scope of the reform, a single forum can facilitate agreements by a give-and-
take process, but it may happen that some issues block the whole process. On the other hand, if 
agreements reached in a forum limits the results of other one(s), it is expected to increase the 
convergence of interests, since extreme positions are weakened. 
 
37) Legal restrictions.  
 
Channels of influence: convergence of interests, strength of rivals. 
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Indicators: Are tax expenditures published? Is there a fiscal responsibility law?  
Expected impact: Legal constraints are expected to weaken opponents’ position and foster the 
convergence of interests, since they limit the position of the opponents to the reform. 
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Table 1. Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Template 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  - -   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    + + 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) - + -   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) - +    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   +  +  
Gini index   -  -  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) + ?    
The structure and modus operandi of political parties (further research needed)  - + -   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? - -   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) + +  +  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  +    
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  +    
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) + -    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  +    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  +    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)      
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) ? +    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) ? +    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) ? +    
Culture of negotiation and participation (further research needed)  -  +   
Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
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Evasion and avoidance estimates  -  -  
Schneider informal economy estimates   -  -  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   +   
Gini index    -   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) - +    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  + +   
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP)  + +   
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform)  -  -  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) -     
Typology of participants (further research needed)    ? ? ? 
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no)   ? ?  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) - +    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) - +    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no)  +    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP - ?    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no)  +  +  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  +  +  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no)  +  +  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no)  +  + + 
Issues      
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Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no)   +   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no)  +  + + 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) -   ? ? 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) -   ? ? 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)     ? ? 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?)   - ? ? 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    ?   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    +   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   + +  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   + +  
Note: a (+)/(-) sign means that the expected  impact of that particular factors on the tax reform feasibility and effectiveness is positive/negative, while a “?” means that it 
cannot be stated a priori, since it depends on the type of reform and the participants’ characteristics.  In the “yes/no” factors the evaluation is made with respect a “yes” 
answer; in indicators, the evaluation is made according to their value: the higher the more positive or negative the effect. The Combined Polity Score (The political regime) 
ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic); The Durable Indicator Score (Change of the political and/or economic system) is defined as the number of 
years since the most recent regime change; The Xconst Indicator Score (The balance of power) is scaled from 1 (unlimited authority of the executive) to 7 (executive parity or 
subordination) ; The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators (social cohesion) range from 0 (strong tensions) to 6 (low tensions);  Voice and Accountability (elites) ranges 
from -2.5 (low) to +2.5 (high); The Corruption Perception Index (corruption and transparency) ranges from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low); The Government Effectiveness 
indicator  (use of public resources) ranges from -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high); Bureaucracy Quality (from 0 – low- to 4 - high), Quality of Public Administration (from 1-low to 6-
high), and Burden of Customs Procedure (from 1 -extremely inefficient to 7 -extremely efficient (Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general) 
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4. An application to the case studies 
 
Before applying this methodology to the nine case studies analysed in this research, it must be 
emphasised that the results obtained must be read with extreme caution. First, because the nine 
case studies constitute a very limited sample; the conclusions that can be drawn from this 
analysis therefore rest on a weak ground and would need to be completed by further cases. 
Second, because of the inherent limitations of several of the indicators used in this analysis to 
quantify the potential factors that can influence tax reforms. Third, because of the lack of 
information regarding certain factors.  
 
 
4.1 Effectiveness 
 
Based on the set of indicators described above, a number of preliminary results emerge as 
regards the effectiveness of tax reforms (see Annex I for details). First, all case studies in this 
research correspond to proper tax reforms, since they implied significant targeted changes in 
the tax system. Second, three of these reforms (in Uruguay, Rwanda, and the Philippines) are 
considered as clearly effective, since the actual changes that were made were close to those that 
were initially targeted. Third, three cases (Paraguay, Morocco, and Uganda) are clearly 
negative, since the actual changes that were made differ to a large extent from the original 
goals. Finally, the remaining three (Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Armenia) are generally 
positive even though there are significant differences between the actual and targeted changes.  
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Table 2. Effectiveness in the nine cause studies. Summary Table 
 Paraguay Uruguay Morocco Uganda Dominican 
Republic 
Rwanda Kenya Armenia The 
Philippines 
Reform 
(targets) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Effective No Yes No No Mixed results 
but mostly 
effective 
Yes Mixed results 
but mostly 
effective 
Mixed 
results but 
mostly 
effective 
Yes 
Comments Although the PIT 
was finally 
introduced in 2012, 
the reform was not 
effective compared 
to the original goals 
of the reform. 
   Some of the 
changes 
initially passed 
in the reform 
Law were later 
eliminated or 
postponed 
 The reform 
was 
moderately 
effective, since 
there is a 
significant 
potential to 
increase VAT 
revenue.  
The reform 
was effective 
in the early 
years of the 
reform, but 
subsequent 
reforms were 
not.  
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4.2 Feasibility 
 
4.2.1. Channels of influence 
 
The application of this methodology to the nine case studies allows us to identify a number 
of commonalities regarding the channels of influence and the factors that condition the 
feasibility of tax reforms. Table 3 below shows the main findings with respect to the 
channels of influence. More detailed analysis of the values of each indicator and the whole 
set of results for each case study is presented in Annex I.  
 
A first interesting finding is that the number of actors seems to be irrelevant for tax 
reforms. In all case studies its influence is expected to be negative or is unclear, but no link 
is found between the success/failure of the reform and the amount of powerful actors. Thus, 
the number of actors is expected to have a negative impact in reforms that turned out to be 
successful (Uruguay and the Philippines), moderately successful (the Dominican Republic, 
Armenia, Kenya), and in failed reforms (Paraguay). This result is remarkable because it 
implies that involving more and diversified actors in the negotiation of the reform (e.g. civil 
society, private sector, business associations, etc.) does not necessarily make agreements 
more difficult to reach. Quite the opposite, this suggests that seeking to involve as many 
potential supporters as possible can be helpful, since there does not seem to be a trade-off 
between the potential positive effects of incorporating more actors (which increases 
legitimacy, transparency, etc.) and the complexity of dealing with a high number of 
participants involved. 
 
On the contrary, two of the three clearly successful reforms (Uruguay and the Philippines) 
have in common the positive role played by the channel “preference for the status quo” 
(which in this case means preference for change), while in Rwanda the influence of this 
channel is not clear. In the three failed reforms this channel plays a negative role, while it 
played a positive role in Armenia in the early years of the reform (the years when the most 
positive aspects of the reform took place) and negative afterwards (when the reform 
stagnated).  
 
A similar result is found regarding “convergence of interests” and “rivals”. Both channels 
of influence play a positive role in two of the three clearly successful reforms (Uruguay and 
Rwanda), while in the Philippines this effect is not clear, and in the three failed reforms 
both effects are mostly negative. In the mixed-results reforms the effect of these channels is 
negative or unclear.  
 
Finally, the channel of influence “allies” is mostly positive in clearly successful reforms, 
but it is unclear or negative for the rest of the cases     
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Table 3. Feasibility in the nine case studies. Channels of influence. Summary table 
 Clearly successful reforms Mixed results but mostly successful Failed reforms 
 Uruguay Rwanda The 
Philippines 
Dominican 
Republic 
Kenya Armenia Paraguay Morocco Uganda 
Number actors Negative Unclear Negative Negative Negative N/U (1) Negative Unclear Unclear 
Preference SQ Positive U/N (1) Positive Unclear Unclear P/N (1) U/N (1) Negative Negative 
Conv. Interests Positive P/U (1) Unclear Negative Unclear Unclear U/N (1) P/N (1) Unclear 
Rivals Positive Positive Unclear Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Allies Positive Positive Unclear Negative Unclear Negative Negative Unclear Unclear 
(1) Positive (negative or unclear) in the early years of the reform but negative (positive or unclear) later 
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4.2.2. Factors 
 
Since our analysis suggests that the channel “number of actors” seems to be irrelevant, it 
has been disregarded for the analysis of factors. By doing so, it is possible to evaluate some 
factors in addition that otherwise could not be evaluated, since no clear expected impact 
could be stated a priori (they have a positive expected influence in one channel and 
negative in another one).   
 
As shown in table 4, not all factors seem to be relevant. In particular, a tax reform is more 
likely to be feasible and effective if it has a favourable design (a neutral or tax decreasing 
reform). According to our results, this turns out to be the case in two out the three 
successful reforms (Uruguay and Rwanda in the early years of the reform). But the opposite 
is not true, since unfavourable designs can be found in successful reforms (the Philippines) 
or mostly successful reforms (the Dominican Republic). Our findings suggest that, since 
reforms that increase taxes tend to face stronger opposition, it may be necessary to 
complement them with other measures in order to shape and nurture a reform-supportive 
context and process. Such measures can include for example, improving transparency and 
accountability (such as in Rwanda), making a better use of public resources and/or 
increasing social spending (e.g. Dominican Republic) or encouraging consensus building 
(e.g. Philippines). This type of "counterbalance" measures were mostly absent in the three 
failed reforms of our sample (i.e. Paraguay, Morocco, and Uganda). The opposition to 
reform that increases taxes will likely be exacerbated if taxpayers perceive it as socially 
unfair (e.g. Uganda, Dominican Republic). 
 
With respect to the context of the reform, except in Uruguay, it had a negative or mixed 
impact on all tax reforms analysed. But it is worthy to note that in the two other successful 
cases (Rwanda and Philippines) an adequate reform process was followed. In other words, 
while the reform in these two countries did not have a more favourable context than in 
other less successful reforms, the process followed was more appropriate.  
 
 
Regarding the different aspects of the context and the process of the reform, the following 
results can be highlighted. 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Contextual factors 
 
a) Political factors 
 
Broadly speaking, the political context matters in a tax reform, since it tends to be more 
positive in successful reforms and more negative in failed reforms. But not all political 
factors are relevant. The effect of the political regime is unclear, since it is a priori 
ambiguous: an autocratic regime can increase common interests among powerful actors, but 
at the same time it can fuel the preference for the status quo.  Regarding the financing of 
political parties, our analysis is limited by lack of information. However, three political 
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factors seem to be relevant: “majority in the parliament”, “ideology of the Government” 
(compared to previous Governments), and “balance of power”. If the ruling party has a 
majority in the Parliament and if its political orientation clearly differs from that of 
previous Governments, then the reform is more likely to be successful (Uruguay, the 
Philippines, Armenia, and to a lesser extent Rwanda, Kenya, and the Dominican Republic 
vs. Paraguay, Morocco, and to a lesser extent Uganda). On the other hand, countries where 
power is well balanced (notably thanks to sound institutionalised constraints on the 
decision-making powers of chief executives) have clearly or mostly produced successful 
reforms (Uruguay, the Philippines, Kenya, Armenia, and the Dominican Republic), while 
reforms have failed in countries with an unbalanced distribution of power (Morocco, 
Uganda, and Paraguay). 
 
On the contrary, a change in the political regime does not have a clear effect on tax 
reforms. Changes have occurred both in countries where the reform was successful 
(Rwanda, Kenya, Armenia) and in countries where it was a failure (Paraguay and Uganda). 
It seems that political regime changes favour reforms (by increasing the demand for 
change) but they do not suffice to make them real. 
 
Regarding elites, they are scarcely responsive and accountable in almost all countries of 
this sample, and then no firm conclusions can be drawn. However, it seems that when the 
elites have sufficient power to block reforms, a stronger impulse is required in other 
contextual areas, and the process through which the reform is pushed forward becomes 
more important. This was notably the case in the Philippines (economic crisis and a 
relatively adequate reform process); in Rwanda (systemic change and a relatively adequate 
reform process); in Armenia in the early years of the reform (deep political and economic 
transformation), or in the Dominican Republic (economic crisis). On the contrary, the 
economic boom that Paraguay experienced after the reform process was launched lessened 
the need to implement a tax reform and thus to overcome the resistance of the elites. To 
some extent, this also happened in Morocco.  
 
 
b) Institutional factors 
 
In general, the institutional framework does not have a clear effect on the feasibility of tax 
reforms, although it must be remarked that some institutional aspects of political nature 
have been categorised as political factors. In particular, corruption is high in all countries 
analysed, except Uruguay and to a lesser extent Rwanda, and therefore no sound 
conclusions can be drawn. The same applies to informality, evasion, and avoidance, since 
they are high in all countries of the sample. The effect of the “use of public resources” and 
the “quality of the administration” is mostly unclear, but more information and indicators 
would be needed in this respect.  
 
 
c) Socio-economic factors 
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According to our findings, a number of economic factors seem to be irrelevant, in particular 
“social cohesion” and “major change of the economic system”. Regarding social cohesion, 
it is low in almost all countries of this sample, and then no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Changes in the economic system have occurred in successful reforms (Rwanda), 
moderately successful reforms (Armenia), and failed reforms (Uganda). These changes 
seem to fuel tax reforms, but they do not suffice to make them sustainable over time.  
 
On the other hand, there are socio-economic factors that seem to influence tax reforms; in 
particular, “economic and fiscal crisis” and “education”. Countries where there is a 
relatively educated population have clearly or mostly produced successful reforms 
(Uruguay, the Philippines, Kenya, Armenia, the Dominican Republic), while reforms have 
failed in countries with a less educated population (Morocco and Uganda). With regard to 
fiscal crisis, they tend to fuel tax reforms (Uruguay, the Philippines, the Dominican 
Republic), while a sound fiscal balance tends to hinder them (Paraguay and Morocco).  
 
 
4.2.2.2 The process 
 
a) Participants: independent commissions 
 
There is insufficient information to evaluate the influence of independent commissions in 
tax reforms. However they were present in both, successful (Uruguay) and failed (Morocco 
and Uganda) reforms. 
 
Regarding international agreements and/or support, they were found in clearly successful 
reforms (Rwanda and the Philippines), in mostly successful reforms (Dominican Republic 
and Armenia), and in failed reforms (Paraguay, Morocco and Uganda). External actors can 
support the tax reform in various ways: through agreements that imply specific 
commitments by the government with regard to the tax reforms, and/or through technical 
assistance. In most cases, the role of external actors is rather limited, and domestic factors 
are much more relevant. Informality, evasion, and avoidance were high in all countries of 
the sample.  
 
 
b) Timing 
 
Broadly speaking, the timing of a tax reform process conditions its results. In particular, 
processes that are initiated at the beginning of the electoral mandate are found in clearly 
successful reforms (Uruguay and the Philippines), and in mostly successful reforms (the 
Dominican Republic), while the process of two out of the three failed reforms did not start 
in the beginning of the electoral mandate (Morocco and Uganda). The process of successful 
reforms also tends to be launched during periods of high popularity of the Government or 
the President (the Philippines and Uruguay). However, information was not available to 
reach sound conclusions in this respect. An information campaign also tends to have a 
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positive influence on the success of a tax reform (Uruguay and Rwanda vs. Paraguay or 
Morocco). In fact, in some cases the lack of information led to a misunderstanding of the 
reform that increased opposition (the Dominican Republic and Uganda).  
 
On the contrary, a prior reform of the tax administration does not seem to be a crucial 
factor, since it took place both in successful reforms (Uruguay and Rwanda) and in failed 
reforms (Paraguay and Morocco). This implies that a tax administration reform (if 
necessary) can be a necessary condition but it does not guarantee of the success of ulterior 
tax reforms.  
 
c) Issues 
 
The separation of issues in the reform process (i.e. negotiations on the general lines of the 
reform are separated from negotiations on more specific aspects) seems to have a positive 
influence on the reform. This separation of issues was made in successful reforms (Uruguay 
and the Philippines), while it was not in failed reforms (Paraguay and Morocco). While 
sound conclusions cannot be made due to lack of information, it seems that efforts aimed at 
linking the tax reform to other policy aspects (e.g. increase in social spending, earmarking, 
etc) seem to have a positive influence on the results of the reform. This linkage was made 
in successful reforms (Uruguay, the Philippines, and in some aspect Rwanda) and in 
moderately successful reforms (Dominican Republic), while it was absent in failed reforms 
(Paraguay, Morocco, and Uganda).         
   
d) Organisation 
 
The institutionalisation of the reform process does not have a clear effect. On the one hand, 
some successful reform processes have been institutionalised (Uruguay and Rwanda). On 
the other hand, the institutionalisation of the reform increased its opposition in a moderately 
successful reform (the Dominican Republic). Finally, institutionalisation can also be found 
in a failed reform (Morocco). On the contrary, transparency of the decision-making process 
seems to condition the feasibility of a tax reform. The three clearly successful reforms have 
followed a transparent decision-making process, while no such transparency was ensured in 
the three failed reforms. Furthermore, all the three moderately successful reforms were 
conducted through an institutionalised reform process, albeit non-transparent decision-
making process. In other words, the institutionalisation of the process seems to be positive 
as long as the decision-making process is transparent. This was clearly the case in Rwanda 
and Uruguay. On the contrary, although the process was institutionalised (at least in some 
stages) in Morocco, Kenya, Armenia, and the Dominican Republic, decisions were not 
made in a transparent manner, which hindered reforms and increased opposition (the 
Moroccan reform is very revealing in this respect). 
 
No sound conclusions can be made with respect to “bilateral vs. multilateral negotiations”. 
Multilateral negotiations were led in successful reforms (Uruguay and Rwanda), in some 
moderately successful reforms (Kenya and Armenia) but also in failed reforms (Morocco). 
Again, it seems that the effect of this factor is conditioned to the transparency of the 
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decision-making process (Uruguay and Rwanda vs. Paraguay). Regarding the effect of the 
number and type of forums, the effect is unclear. One successful reform (Uruguay) was 
characterised by the juxtaposition of several forums where the agreements reached in one 
limited others, but this also occurred in a failed reform (Paraguay), although in this case in 
a non-transparent decision-making process. As regards the other two clearly successful 
reforms, there is not enough information available. In Morocco (failed reform), discussions 
took place in several forums but the agreements reached in one did not constrain the other 
forums. In the Dominican Republic (moderately successful reform), all discussions took 
place in one single forum, but this forum did not imply any limitation for ulterior 
negotiations (in fact that forum was a failure; negotiations stopped due to strong differences 
between the Government and the rest of actors). For the rest of cases, information is not 
sufficiently available. 
 
Finally, with respect to legal restrictions in the negotiation process (a fiscal responsibility 
law-type, publishing of tax expenditures), results are not clear, mainly because no hard 
constraints really existed in any of these nine tax reforms. 
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Table 4. Channels and factors that seem to affect the feasibility of tax reforms. Summary 
Channels Preference for the status quo 
Convergence of interests  
Strength of rivals 
Allies (the effect is less clear) 
Factors  
Contextual factors  
Political factors Balance of power 
Majority in the Parliament 
The ideology of the Government (compared to previous Governments) 
A new ruling political party 
Institutional factors  
Socio-economic 
factors 
Education  
Economic and fiscal crisis 
The process  
Timing Moment of the electoral mandate 
Information campaign 
Issues Separation of issues in the reform process (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform from negotiations on more specific aspects) 
Links between the reform and some other aspects (increase in social 
spending, earmarking, etc. ) (the effect is less clear) 
Organisation Transparency of the decision-making process 
Institutionalisation if the decision-making process is transparent 
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Table 5. Impact of factors conditioning the feasibility and effectiveness of tax reforms. Summary  
 Clearly successful reforms Mixed results but mostly successful Failed reforms 
 Uruguay Rwanda The 
Philippines 
Dominican 
Republic 
Kenya Armenia Paraguay Morocco Uganda 
Scope Positive P/N (1) Negative Negative NA NA NA Unclear Neutral 
          
Context Positive Negative Mixed Negative Mixed Mixed Negative Negative Negative 
Political  Positive Negative Positive Negative Unclear P/U (1) Negative Negative Negative 
The political regime  Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear 
The balance of power  Positive Negative Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative Negative 
Elites Unclear Negative Negative Negative Negative Unclear Negative Negative Negative 
Financing of political parties  Unclear NA Unclear Negative NA NA Negative NA NA 
Change of the political regime  Negative Positive Negative Negative Positive P/N(1) Positive Negative Positive 
Majority in the Parliament  Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative Positive 
The ideology of the Government  Positive Negative Positive Negative Negative P/N(1) Negative Negative Negative 
A new ruling party Positive Negative Positive Negative Negative P/N(1) Negative Negative Negative 
Institutional Positive Unclear Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Corruption and transparency  Positive Unclear Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Use of public resources Positive Unclear NA Negative Unclear Unclear Negative Unclear Unclear 
Quality of the administration Unclear NA Unclear Unclear Unclear Negative Negative Unclear Unclear 
Informality, evasion, and avoidance Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Socio-economic Positive Negative Unclear Unclear N/U (1) Positive P/N (1) U/N (1) Unclear 
Social cohesion Unclear Negative Negative Unclear Negative Positive Unclear Unclear Negative 
Education  Positive Negative Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative 
Major change of the economic system Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative Negative Positive 
General economic and budget situation Positive NA Positive Positive N/P (1) NA P/N (1) P/N (1) NA 
Tax policy consistency  NA NA Negative Negative NA NA NA NA NA 
          
Process Positive Positive Positive Mixed Unclear Negative Mixed Mixed Negative 
Participants Positive Positive Unclear Positive NA Unclear Unclear Positive Positive 
Independent commissions  Positive NA Unclear Unclear NA NA Unclear Positive Positive 
International agreements, etc. Unclear Positive Positive Positive NA Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Timing Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative Positive Negative Negative 
Beginning of the electoral mandate  Positive Negative Positive Positive Negative Negative Positive Negative Negative 
Popularity of the Government  Positive NA Positive Positive NA NA NA NA NA 
Tax administration reform  Positive Positive Unclear Neutral Negative Positive Positive Positive Negative 
Information campaign  Positive Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive 
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Issues Positive Negative Positive N/U (1) NA Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Separation of issues  Positive Negative Positive Negative NA Negative Negative Negative NA 
Issues not directly related to the reform Positive Negative Positive N/P (1) NA Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Organisation Positive Positive Unclear Negative Unclear Negative Negative Unclear Negative 
Information availability  Positive Positive Positive Unclear Negative Negative Negative Negative Unclear 
Institutionalisation  Positive Positive Negative Negative Positive Positive Negative Positive Unclear 
Transparency of the process  Positive Positive Positive Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Bilateral vs. multilateral negotiations Positive Positive - Negative Positive Positive Negative Positive Unclear 
Number and organisation of forums Positive Unclear - Negative Unclear Unclear Positive Negative Unclear 
Legal restrictions Negative Unclear Negative Unclear Negative Negative Negative Unclear Negative 
(1) Positive (negative or unclear) in the early years of the reform but negative (positive or unclear) later 
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ANNEX I. EVALUATION OF THE CASE STUDIES 
 
 
PARAGUAY 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objective of the reform (with respect to the PIT): to introduce a PIT in 2003. It was not 
introduced until 2012, with major differences with respect to its original design. 
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• PIT revenue: about €2 million were collected in 2012. The expected annual revenue in 
the future amounts to €40 million, which only represents 0.2% of GDP. 
 
• No studies available on the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the new tax 
 
• Number of taxpayers: The number of taxpayers in 2012 (the PIT law came into force in 
August) was only 20,000. A total of 40,000 are expected to be recorded in 2013, when 
the tax will be operative the whole year. That figure represents only 0.6% of the total 
population 
 
2.  Input indicators: 
 
• Tax base: The PIT that was eventually introduced in 2012 has major differences 
compared to its original design: it is a tax on savings, rather than a tax on income, since 
all personal and family expenses are deductible. Income is consolidated on a territorial 
basis, while expenses are integrated on a universal basis. Pensions are exempt from the 
PIT, but social contributions are deductible. Some types of capital income are taxed 
(some interest income, capital gains, 50% of dividends). 
 
• Rates: The tax rate schedule is very generous. The 10% top rate is applied to incomes 
13 times above the income per head of the country. The 8% rate will be applied in the 
future (once the transition period has ended) to incomes 4 times above the income per 
head of the country.  
 
• Operational changes: The tax is paid on an annual basis; there are neither withholdings 
nor tax prepayments, and therefore no monthly revenues are collected. 
 
 
Evaluation: it can be argued that the introduction of the PIT in Paraguay constitutes a proper 
tax reform, since it implies a new tax that, although not very significant from a quantitative 
point of view, represents the first step towards taxing personal income. However, while some 
positive results were achieved,  the reform was not effective compared to its original goals : 
low revenue, a design closer to a tax on savings than on personal income, a very limited 
number of taxpayers, no monthly revenues, etc. 
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the 
expected result is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Paraguay 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  NA NA   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    NA NA 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) 8 8 8   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 7 7    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   -0,3  -0,3  
Gini index   52,4  52,4  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NO NO ? 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? 11 (in 2003) 11 (in 2003)   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) NO NO  NO  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
NO (1) 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
NO (1) 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 2.1 2.1    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  -0,9    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  44%    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  NA    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 1 ? 1    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) NA NA    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 3.8? 3,8    
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Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
Schneider informal economy estimates   39%  39%  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=5 RT=6   
Gini index    52,4   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 7 7    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  NO NO   
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP) (2000/03 vs. 2004/11)  
-1,8 
+1.0 
--1,8 
+1.0   
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform)  
NA  NA 
 
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) NO     
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no)   
NO? NO? 
 
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
YES YES    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) YES YES    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 YES    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 0,8 0.8?    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  NA  NA  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 NO (2)  NO NO 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of  
growth – Study  
 
 
273 
   
Issues      
Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  NO   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
NO   NO NO 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
NO   NO NO 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   NO NO 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  BILAT. BILAT. BILAT. 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    SEVERAL   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    YES   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   NO NO  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO NO  
(1): The answer is correct for the 2003 attempt to implement the tax reform. In the attempt in 2008 the answer must be yes 
(2) There were some informative meetings and workshops supported by the EU, but they were celebrated long after the process started and their scope was very limited 
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URUGUAY 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objective of the reform (with respect to the PIT): to introduce a real PIT in replacement of 
a set of taxes on different categories of personal income.   
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
- Change in revenue: The estimated impact of the reform was -0.6% of GDP but total 
tax revenue actually grew by 0.6% of GDP between 2007 and 2008. Personal 
taxation revenue increased from 0.9% of GDP in 2006 to 1.5% in 2007, and 2.4% in 
2008 (when the new tax was fully effective). PIT revenue in Uruguay is currently 
one the highest in Latin America 
 
• Change in the tax structure: The share of direct taxes in total revenue grew from 
19.7% in 2000/07 to 22.6% in 2008/10, while that of personal income taxation 
increased by 3.6%. 
 
• Change in the progressivity and redistributive capacity indexes: The overall effect 
of the changes implemented in taxation on consumption and personal income 
showed that only the wealthiest 20% of households had less disposable income after 
the reform, while the other 80% had more disposable income. The pre-reform tax 
system was regressive and showed a negative distributive capacity with regard to 
the joint effect of taxation on personal income and consumption, while the opposite 
was true after the reform. Regarding the single impact of the Personal Income Tax, 
progressivity and redistributive capacity also improved. The effective tax rates of 
the richest taxpayers increased (compared to the former tax on salaries), while that 
of the poorest decreased. Eighty per cent of the total PIT revenue was credited to the 
wealthiest 20% of taxpayers. Progressivity increased significantly (the Kakwani 
index raised by 0.19 points). The redistributive capacity also improved (a 0.02 
increase of the Reynolds-Smolenski index).     
 
• Change in evasion, avoidance, and the informal economy. The deep transformation 
of the Tax Administration prior to the reform has enabled a remarkable reduction of 
evasion. According to official estimates, while in 2002/03 VAT evasion amounted 
to 20/30%, it has currently fallen to about 14%. 
 
• Change in the number of taxpayers: The total number of PIT taxpayers in Uruguay 
currently amounts to 14.0% of total population, while the Latin American average is 
3.9%. 
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2.  Input indicators: 
 
• Introduction of a new tax. A PIT was introduced in 2006/07 
 
• Changes in the number of taxes: The overall tax system was simplified to a large 
extent. Many small, costly, and inefficient taxes were eliminated. 
 
• Changes in tax bases: The PIT introduced in Uruguay followed a dual scheme 
(labour income is taxed at progressive rates and capital income at flat rates) that has 
been later imitated by other Latin American countries  
 
• Changes in rates: Labour income rates in the PIT introduced in Uruguay were 
progressive (from 0% to 25%), while capital income was taxed at 3% (interests on 
more-than-one-year deposits in national currency and more-than-three-year bonds 
and other securities), 5% (interests on less-than-one-year deposits), 7% (dividends) 
or 12% (other types of capital income). Exempt income was very similar to the 
upper middle-income countries’ average (0.6-0.8 times the income per head of the 
country), remarkably lower than the Latin American average (1.4 times). Yet, the 
top rate (25%) was applied to incomes 12 times above the income per head of the 
country, clearly above both the Latin American and the upper middle-income 
countries’ averages (about 9 and 6 times, respectively). 
 
 
Evaluation: the introduction of the PIT in Uruguay has brought a significant change in the 
tax system, and can therefore be considered as a real tax reform. In addition, all in all, the 
reform has been effective, i.e. the results achieved are close to those that were intended. 
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of growth – Study  
 
 
276 
   
Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the 
expected result is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Uruguay 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  NEUTRAL NEUTRAL   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    K=+0.19; 
RS= +0.02 
K=+0.19; 
RS= +0.02 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) 10 10 10   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 7 7    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   1  1  
Gini index   45  45  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NO NO ? 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 21 (in 
2006) ? 
21 (in 2006) 21 (in 2006) 
  
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) YES YES  YES  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
YES 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
YES 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 7.2 7.2    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  0,5    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  68%    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  NA    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 2? 2    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) NA NA    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 4? 4    
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Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
Schneider informal economy estimates   52%  52%  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=6 RT=5   
Gini index    45   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 8 8    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  NO NO   
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP)   
-3,1 -3,1 
  
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 NA  NA  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  YES YES  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
NO NO    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) NO NO    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 YES    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 0,14 0.14?    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  NA but high  NA but high  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 YES  YES YES 
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Issues      
Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  YES   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 YES  YES YES 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
YES   YES YES 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
YES   YES YES 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   YES YES 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  MULT. MULT. MULT. 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    SEVERAL   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    YES   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   NO (1) NO  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO (2) NO  
 
(1) Tax expenditures started to be published after the reform,  
(2) There is not any fiscal responsibility law in Uruguay, but the approached followed by the Government in the negotiations within the ruling coalition resembled a fiscal 
responsibility law 
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MOROCCO 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objective of the reform: to reduce the number of VAT rates and to cut and rationalise its 
use and exemptions.  
 
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• Change in revenue: VAT revenues rose by 13.8% per year between 2001 and 2006 
(the pre reform years), while they increased by 16.5% per year between 2006 and 
2011. However, most of this acceleration was due to import VAT collection (3.6%), 
while domestic VAT collection was accelerated at a similar rate than final 
consumption (1.1% and 0.8%, respectively). 
 
• Change in the progressivity and redistributive capacity indexes: no significant 
changes seem to have occurred. In 2001, the effective VAT rate for the poorest 20% 
was 3.9%, while it only increased to 5.2% for the richest 20%. In 2007, it 
augmented to 4.7% for the poorest and decreased to 5.1% for the richest. This 
implies that the VAT was slightly progressive before the reform and mostly neutral 
after. The Reynolds-Smolenski index (difference between pre and post-tax Gini 
indexes) became slightly negative after the reform 
 
• Change in the tax-related efficiency indicators. The C-Efficiency ratio increased 
significantly after the reform: from 0.37 in 2000/05 to 0.54 in 2006/11, but the 
reasons behind this result are unclear. The VAT reform (elimination of exemptions 
and reclassification of products) does not seem to have contributed to the higher 
VAT efficiency observed since 2005. Actually, the opposite can be said. The 
increase in VAT efficiency seems to have been caused by  other factors: 
improvements in the Tax Administration, lower evasion and fraud levels, data errors 
in VAT revenues or consumption, etc.   
 
• Change in tax expenditures: VAT expenditures grew from 1.54% of GDP between 
2003/05 (the pre-reform years) to 1.9% (the post-reform years).  
 
  
2.  Input indicators: 
 
• Changes in tax bases: VAT exemptions have not been reduced but their upward 
trend has stopped after the reform. 
 
• Changes in rates: the number of rates has not been reduced. Some exemptions have 
been eliminated, but many others still exist. As a matter of fact, the reform has 
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produced mixed results. There have been some advances, but Moroccan VAT is still 
plagued with lack of a clear rationale in exemptions and tax benefits. There are still 
many reduced rates.   
 
• Changes in specific tax regimes: Morocco’s VAT is very generous with some 
sectors (notably agriculture). However, it has been recently announced that 
agriculture (particularly big farms) will be taxed as from 2014, but the details are 
not known yet.   
 
• Operational changes: A positive result of the reform is that the reimbursement 
period for companies has been reduced from six to three months in 2008 and a new 
mechanism that facilitates reimbursement for qualified companies (according to 
their tax compliance records and other characteristics) is being introduced. 
 
 
Evaluation: The 2005 VAT reform as targeted can be considered a tax reform, since it 
implied a reduction in the number of VAT rates and a deep rationalisation of exemptions. 
Yet, the reform has not been very effective. The first goal (i.e. to cut the number of rates) 
has not been achieved yet, while the second (to rationalise exemptions and the use of 
reduced rates) has only been partially achieved. In fact, a new VAT reform is currently 
under discussion. 
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral the expected 
result is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Morocco 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  NA NA   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    RS=-0.25. 
 Decrease in 
Progr. 
RS=-0.25.  
Decrease in 
Progr. 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) -6 -6 -6   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 3 3    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   -0,8  -0,8  
Gini index   41  41  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NA NA 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 40 (in 
2005)? 
40 (in 2005) 40 (in 2005) 
  
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) NO NO  NO  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
NO 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
NO 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 3.3 3.3    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  -0,2    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  NA    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  NA    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 2? 2    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) NA NA    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 4.3? 4,3    
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Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
Schneider informal economy estimates   35%  35%  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=4.5 RT=5   
Gini index    41   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 4.4 4.4    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  NO NO   
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP) (2002/04 VS. 2005/08)  
-2,7 
+0.7 
-2,7 
+0.7   
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 NA  NA  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  YES YES  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
YES YES    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) YES YES    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 YES    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 1.5 1.5?    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  NA  NA  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Issues      
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Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  NO   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
NO   NO NO 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
YES   YES YES 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   NO NO 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  BOTH BOTH BOTH 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    SEVERAL   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    NO   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   YES YES  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO NO  
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UGANDA 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objectives of the reform: to introduce a value added tax (in 1996) with the aim to increase 
revenue generation and expand the tax base 
 
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• The anticipated VAT yield to reach the regional norm of 5% of GDP did not occur. The 
highest yield of 4% of GDP was reached in 2005/06. 
• Expansion of the tax base to include all goods and services by moving away from the 
Sales Tax and the Commercial Transactions Levy (CTL). 
• Consistent decrease in the VAT performance as measured by the C-efficiency and VAT 
compliance ratio. 
• No studies available on the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the new tax. 
 
2.  Input indicators: 
 
• The VAT was introduced in Uganda in 1996. 
• Tax base: the introduction of the VAT widened the sales and CTL tax base to include 
all goods and services. 
• Rates: a standard rate of 17% was initially chosen to keep the new tax revenue neutral 
in the short term. In 2005, the VAT rate was increased to 18% with most basic goods 
and services exempted or zero-rated as an attempt to protect the poor. 
• Operational changes: the VAT threshold was initially set at UShs 20 million (or 
approximately 5,755 EUR)97; subsequently, it was increased from to UShs 50 million 
(or approximately 14,385 EUR) in order to reduce the burden of administering an 
excessively large VAT register. 
 
Evaluation: it can be argued that the introduction of the VAT in Uganda is a tax reform, since it 
implies a new tax. However, although some positive results were achieved, the reform was not 
effective when compared to its original goals: low revenue, gradual extension of the exempt 
and zero-rated lists, poor tax compliance culture, predominance of the informal sector, and use 
of cash in business transactions in the Uganda’s economy. 
                                                 
 
 
 
97 Currency equivalents: as of 04 October 2013, 1 EUR = 3,476.45 UGX 
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the 
expected result is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Uganda 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)   Neutral Neutral  
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    NA NA 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) -3 -3 -3   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 3 3    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   -0,6  -0,6  
Gini index   44,3  47,3  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NA NA 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? 3 (in 1996) 
5 (1996/10) 
3 (in 1996) 
5 (1996/10)   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) YES YES  YES  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
NO 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
NO 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 2.5 2.5    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  -0,5    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  NA    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  3.9    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 1.9 ? 1.9    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) 3? 3    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 3.3? 3,8    
Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
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Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
Schneider informal economy estimates   42.3%  42.3%  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=3.2 
RT=2.7 
  
Gini index    44,3   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 4.6 4.6    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  YES YES   
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years   NA NA   
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 NA  NA  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  YES YES  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
YES YES    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) YES YES    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 NO    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 13.3 13.3    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  NA  NA  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 YES  YES YES 
Issues      
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Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  NA   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
YES   YES? YES? 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
YES   YES? YES? 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   NO NO 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  MULT. MULT. MULT. 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    SEVERAL   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    NA   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   NO NO  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO NO  
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THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objective of the reform (with respect to PIT and VAT): To increase tax revenue, to improve 
the design of both taxes, and to reduce tax benefits  
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• Change in revenue: The overall revenue effect was estimated to reach 1.6% of GDP by 
the Minister of Finance, mainly thanks to the VAT rate increase and capital income 
taxation. However, the suppression or postponement of several measures in the initial 
design of the reform reduced this amount to 1% of GDP. In other words, the cost of 
these changes was quite high: 0.6% of GDP or 37.5% of the original goal. 
 
• Change in the number of taxpayers: The taxation on some types of capital income (for 
the first time in the DR), and the decision to not adjust the PIT rate schedule to inflation 
until 2016 have enlarged the number of taxpayers, but no official estimates are 
available so far. 
 
  
2.  Input indicators: 
 
• Changes in tax bases: a dual scheme was introduced in the PIT, where labour income is 
currently taxed at progressive rates and capital income at flat rates (10%). Education 
expenses deduction was limited to 10% of taxable income and 25% of exempt income. 
Many VAT exempt products have become taxable after the reform. 
 
• Changes in rates: the PIT rate schedule will not be adjusted by inflation until 2016 (it 
was traditionally adjusted every year). The standard VAT rate was increased to 18% in 
2013 and 2014, while in 2015 it will return to its former level of 16% (conditioned to 
the evolution of revenues). A reduced rate of 8% was introduced for some products that 
were previously exempt. This rate will be raised to 11% in 2014, 13% in 2015, and 
finally to the 16% standard rate in 2016. 
 
Evaluation: Although some observers have pointed out that the reform resembles a low-level 
reform of the past, a number of major changes in the tax system were sought: mainly the 
taxation on capital income and a strong reduction in VAT exemptions.  
 
Compared to the official objectives, the results in terms of effectiveness are mixed. Some of 
the changes initially passed in the reform Law were later eliminated or postponed. Some 
capital income was kept exempt, the VAT rate for some products was kept at zero, the 10% tax 
on dividends from companies in Export Processing Zones was postponed, etc. As a 
consequence, the expected revenue increase generated by the reform was severely cut or 
postponed (0.6% of GDP or 37.5% of the original goal).  
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the expected result 
is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. The Dominican Republic 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  1.6% GDP 1.6% GDP   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    NA NA 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) 8 8 8   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 6 6    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   0,1  0,1  
Gini index   47  47  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NO NO ? 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? 16 (in 2012) 16 (in 2012)   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) YES YES  YES  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
NO 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
NO 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 2.8 2.8    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  -0,6    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  46%    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  NA    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 1? 1    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) NA NA    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 4.? 4,4    
Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
Schneider informal economy estimates   31%  31%  
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Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=5 RT=5   
Gini index    47   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 7.4 7.4    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  NO NO   
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP)   
-3,4 -3,4 
  
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 ABOUT 6 (1)  ABOUT 6  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  NO? NO?  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
YES YES    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) YES YES    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 YES    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 0,3 0.3?    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  ABOUT 80%  ABOUT 
80% 
 
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Issues      
Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  NO   
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Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 YES (2)  YES YES 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
NO   NO? NO? 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
YES   YES YES 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   NO NO 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  MULT. MULT. MULT. 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    ONE   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    NO   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   YES YES  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO NO  
  
(1) See Selman, E. (2012):Incremento de impuestos en contexto, CREES  
(2) After the reform was passed, a very popular increase in public education expenditure took place  
 
  
Study on the feasibility and effectiveness of tax policy changes to support inclusiveness and sustainability of  
growth – Study  
 
 
292 
 
  
RWANDA 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objectives of the reform: to introduce a value added tax (in 2001) with the aim to increase 
revenue generation and expand the tax base 
 
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• Since 2005 at least, collected VAT revenue exceeds 100% of targeted figures. 
 
• VAT revenue exceeds revenue from its predecessor, the ICHA tax, a levy on sales. 
 
• Good VAT performance as measured by the C-efficiency and VAT compliance 
ratio. 
 
• No studies available on the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the VAT. 
 
2.  Input indicators: 
 
• The VAT was introduced in Rwanda in 2001. 
 
• Tax base: the introduction of the VAT widened the tax base and the number of 
registered taxpayers. 
 
• Rates: a standard rate of 15% was initially chosen to keep the new tax revenue 
neutral in the short term; but rapidly the VAT rate was increased to 18% with most 
basic goods and services exempted or zero-rated as an attempt to protect the poor. 
 
• The VAT threshold was initially set at 40,000,000 RwF (or approximately 20,000 
US$) and never changed.. 
 
Evaluation: it can be argued that the introduction of the VAT in Rwanda is a tax reform, 
since it implies a new tax. Compared to the original goals, the reform was effective: in 
particular, actual revenue generated is larger than what was expected and the system is 
remarkably stable. 
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the 
expected result is not clear. 
 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Rwanda 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio) 
 Neutral in the 
original 
design/tax 
revenue increase 
later 
Neutral in the 
original 
design/tax 
revenue 
increase later 
  
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    NA NA 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) -4 -4 -4   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 2.4 2.4    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   -1,3  -1,3  
Gini index   50,8  50,8  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NA NA 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? 7 (in 2001) 7 (in 2001)   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) YES YES  YES  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
NO 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
NO 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 3.4 3.4    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  -0,75    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  NA    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  3.5    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
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Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) NA NA    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) NA NA    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 5.2? 5.2    
Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
Schneider informal economy estimates   40.4%  40.4%  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   NA   
Gini index    50,8   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 3.1 3.1    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  
YES YES 
  
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP)   
NA NA 
  
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 NA  NA  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  NA NA  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
YES YES    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) YES YES    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 YES    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 20.3 20.3    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  NA  NA  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax  YES  YES  
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reform?) (yes/no) 
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 YES  YES YES 
Issues      
Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  NO   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
YES   YES YES 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
YES   YES YES 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   YES YES 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  MULT. MULT. MULT. 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    SEVERAL   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    NA   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   NO NO  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   YES YES  
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KENYA 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objectives of the reform: reform package introduced in 2003 with the aim to ensuring 
equity, further widening the tax base, promoting increased investment, and reducing the tax 
compliance burden. The VAT reform of 2003 was one priority of the reform package; it 
consisted of reducing the number of VAT rates from four to three, with the highest rate set 
at 16%. Since its inception, the VAT legislation has seen a number of minor amendments. 
The recently adopted VAT bill constituted the most drastic overhaul of the current VAT 
Act.  
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• The tax with the fastest annual growth (in nominal terms) between 1995 and 2011 
was VAT, which grew by 13.2% per year on average while the income tax revenues 
grew by 12.4% annually. 
 
• Between the fiscal years 2007 and 2011, the overall trend in Kenya was toward a 
consistent increase in the VAT performance, in spite of a significant drop in VAT 
efficiency in 2008/09 coinciding with the spillovers of the global financial crisis. 
The average C-efficiency and VAT compliance ratio during that period were 39.7% 
and 48.5% respectively in comparison to a world average C-efficiency of 51%. 
 
• No studies available on the progressivity and redistributive capacity of the new tax. 
 
2.  Input indicators: 
 
• Changes in the number of tax rates and reduction of the standard rate. 
 
• Rates: The initial phases of the VAT were very complex with 15 rates. From 2003, 
given that the high and wide range of rates was thought to have led to widespread 
misclassification and other methods of tax evasion, the number of VAT rates was 
reduced to three with the highest rate set at 16%. 
 
• In June 2006, the threshold turnover for VAT was increased from KShs 3 million 
per annum to KShs 5 million per annum with a view to reducing the compliance 
burden for three quarters of registered taxpayers who either file nil returns, or whose 
turnover is not substantial. 
 
• Operational changes: The system of VAT withholding was first introduced in 
Kenya in late 2003 and applied to government agencies that purchased goods and 
services subject to VAT. Subsequently other purchasers were brought into the 
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withholding regime, and in 2004-05 there were about 2000 so-called VAT 
withholding agents, i.e. purchasers who were required to withhold VAT. 
 
 
Evaluation: it can be argued that the VAT reform in Kenya in 2003 is a tax reform, since it 
implies changes in the number of tax rates and a decrease of the standard rate. Compared to 
the original goals of the reform, broadly speaking the reform was effective, although there 
is potential to increase tax revenue collection as a percentage of GDP by reducing the tax 
gap. Specifically, the VAT performance is undermined by the difficulty to improve tax 
compliance in a fast growing and profitable (but increasingly complex) informal sector, 
where tax evasion remains particularly high. Furthermore, tackling the informal sector in 
Kenya tends to be hampered by populist politics seeking to shield some constituencies of 
potential taxpayers from their tax obligations.   
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the 
expected result is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Kenya 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  NA NA   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    NA NA 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) 7.7 7.7 7.7   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 6.4 6.4    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   -0,2  -0,2  
Gini index   47,7  47,7  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NA NA 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? 1 (in 2003) 1 (in 2003)   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) YES YES  YES  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
NO 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
NO 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 2.1 2.1    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  -0,6    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  NA    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  3.7    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 2 ? 2    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) 3.5? 3.5    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 3.3? 3,3    
Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
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Schneider informal economy estimates   33%  33%  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=2.9 
RT=3.8 
  
Gini index    47,7   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 7 7    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  
NO NO 
  
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP) (2000/02 vs. 2008/11)  
2,0 
-5.1 
2,0 
-5.1   
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 NA  NA  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  NA NA  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
NA NA    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) NA NA    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 NA    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 4,5 4.5?    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  NA  NA  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Issues      
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Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  NA   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 NA  NA NA 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
NO   NO NO 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
YES   YES YES 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   NO NO 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  MULT. MULT. MULT. 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    SEVERAL   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    NA   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   NO NO  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO NO  
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ARMENIA 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objectives of the reform: to introduce a value added tax (in 1992). 
 
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
• VAT yield in terms of GDP is low but continuously increasing between 1992 and 2008, 
from 3% to a peak of 10%. 
 
• VAT efficiency increased from 0.15 in 1995 to 0.53 in 2008, in terms of private 
consumption. 
 
• Share of purchases exempt from VAT increases from 8% in the first quintile to 9.8 in 
the fourth. 
 
2. Input indicators: 
 
• The VAT was introduced in Armenia in 1992. 
 
• The Tax base is erratic due to many privileges granted to specific products, groups or 
individuals. This practice is however declining. 
 
• Rates: a standard rate of 28% was initially set to keep the new tax in line with the 
financial needs of the new country and the rates applied by its counterparts in other CIS 
member states. It was later reduced to 20%. 
 
• The VAT system in general is erratic in Armenia. 
 
 
Evaluation: it can be argued that the introduction of the VAT in Armenia is a tax reform, since 
it implies a new tax. It is however moderately effective. On the one hand, one can observe an 
upward trend in terms of GDP share and of efficiency indicators, from 1992 until 2008. On the 
other hand, although apparently in decline, tax privileges granted to some social groups 
continue to undermine both the revenue and the process of VAT in Armenia. 
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the expected 
result is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. Armenia 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  NA NA   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    NA NA 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score ) (1991/94 vs. 1995/08) 7 
3 
7 
3 
7 
3   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 5 5    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   -0,6  -0,6  
Gini index   30,8  30,8  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
NA NA 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? 1 (in 1992) 1 (in 1992)   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) YES YES  YES  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no) (early 90’s vs. following 
years)  
YES/NO 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no). (early 90’s vs. following years)  
YES/NO 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 2.5 2.5    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  -0,3    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  NA    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  4.3    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 1? 1    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) NA NA    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 2.8? 2.8    
Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
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Evasion and avoidance estimates  NA  NA  
Schneider informal economy estimates   45.3%  45.3%  
Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=5.4 RT=5   
Gini index    30,8   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 10.4 10.4    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  
YES YES 
  
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP)   
NA NA  
 
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 NA  NA  
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  NA NA  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
YES YES    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) YES YES    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 YES    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 8.4 8.4    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  NA  NA  
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Issues      
Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines   NO   
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of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
NO   NO NO 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
YES   YES YES 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   NO NO 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
  MULT. MULT. MULT. 
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    SEVERAL   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)    NA   
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   NO NO  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO NO  
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THE PHILIPPINES 
 
The evaluation of the effectiveness of the tax reform 
 
Objectives of the reform: The basic policy objective was to raise an extra PhP 80 billion 
(approx EUR 1.3 bn) in annual revenues from a number of new measures (the main one being 
the increase of the VAT rate) to enable the government to balance the budget by 2010. More 
specifically, the RVAT Law aimed to expand the coverage of VAT and raise the VAT rate 
from 10% to 12%. 
 
 
1.  Output indicators: 
 
- Change in revenue:  With respect to the overall objective of the RVAT Law to reduce 
both the public sector deficit and debt to a sustainable level, it can be observed that the 
budget deficit to GDP ratio dropped from 3.84% in 2004 to an almost balanced budget 
in 2007. It gradually went up to 0.92% in 2008 and skyrocketed to 3.89% of GDP in 
2009.  
 
- Changes in the tax structure: Significant increase of the share of VAT in total tax 
revenue from a 23% in 2004 to 30% in 2010. Total VAT revenues more than doubled 
from PhP 156.67 billion (or 2.7 billion EUR) in 2005 (pre-reform) to PhP 330.78 
billion (or 5.7 billion EUR) in 2010. 
 
- Change in the tax-related efficiency indicators: Since its full implementation in 2006, 
the VAT efficiency ratio improved to almost 36% although it continuously declined 
over the years until it reached about 32% in 2010. A similar pattern is observed in the 
case of the C-efficiency ratio. 
 
2.  Input indicators: 
 
- The RVAT Law broadened the VAT base 
 
- The rate was increased from 10% to 12% 
 
- VAT-registered taxpayers are limited to 70% input VAT credit  
 
- Reduced exemptions 
 
Evaluation: It can be argued that the RVAT in the Philippines is a tax reform, since it 
broadened the tax base and increased VAT revenues. Overall, the RVAT Law appears to have 
been successful in generating extra revenue. 
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Factors: An indicator in red means an expected negative impact according to its value; in blue, positive; in black or “?”, neutral or the expected 
result is not clear. 
Factors conditioning the effectiveness and feasibility of tax reforms. The Philippines 
 Channels of influence (expected impact) 
Factors 
Number 
of actors  
Preference for 
the status quo 
Convergence 
of interests 
Strength of 
rivals 
Allies to the 
reformer 
The scope of the reform           
Tax revenue targeted variation (variation in the tax/GDP ratio)  Increase Increase   
Distributive impact (variation in progressivity and redistribution indexes)    NA NA 
The context of the reform      
Political factors      
The political regime (The Combined Polity Score )  8 8 8   
Balance of power (The Xconst Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) 6 6    
Elites      
Voice and accountability (GI)   0,0  0,0  
Gini index   43,0  43,0  
Financing of political parties (Private financing to political parties is regulated and 
limited?) 
YES YES? 
   
Change of the political regime (The Durable Indicator Score in the Polity IV dataset ) ? 18 (in 2005) 18 (in 2005)   
Majority in the Parliament (yes/no) YES YES  YES  
The ideology of the Government compared to previous Governments  (does the 
reforming party differ from previous ruling parties (yes/no)  
YES 
   
A new ruling party (has the ruling party  never ruled the country or has not ruled it for 
a long time (yes/no).  
YES 
   
Institutional factors      
Corruption and transparency (Corruption Perception Index) 2.5 2.5    
Use of public resources      
Government Effectiveness  (GI)  0.0    
Social spending as a percentage of total spending (national and regional sources)  NA    
Resource Allocation Index (IDA)  NA    
Quality of the tax administration and the administration in general      
Bureaucracy Quality (ICRG) 3? 3    
Quality of Public Administration (CPIA) NA NA    
Burden of Customs Procedure (WEF) 3? 3    
Informality, evasion, and avoidance      
Evasion and avoidance estimates  High (1)  High (1)  
Schneider informal economy estimates   40.3%  40.3%  
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Socio-economic factors      
Social cohesion      
The Ethnic and Religious tensions indicators in ICRG   ET=5 RT=3   
Gini index    43,0   
Education (Average Year of Total Schooling ; Barro & Lee) 8.6 8.6    
Major change of the economic system (has a major change of the economic system 
occurred?) (yes/no)  
NO NO 
  
General economic and budget situation: Budget deficit/surplus in the pre-reform years 
(% of GDP)   
-4.2 -4,2  
 
Tax policy consistency (Number of tax reforms (presented as such) in the decade prior 
to the analysed reform) 
 Failed reforms 
in the past 
 Failed 
reforms in 
the past 
 
The process of the reforms      
Participants      
Number of participants involved in the reform process (institutionalisation of the 
process incorporating a wide range of participants (business associations, trade unions, 
social associations, etc)) (yes/no) 
YES 
    
Independent commissions (participation of independent commissions playing a role in 
the design of the reform and making public their recommendations) (yes/no) 
  NO? NO?  
International agreements, technical assistance, and foreign aid      
Financial agreements signed with international organisation in the years prior to the 
reform (yes/no) 
YES YES    
Conditionality or commitment  in this agreements regarding the reform (yes/no) YES YES    
Technical assistance from donors or international organisations regarding the tax 
reform (yes/no) 
 YES    
ODA as a percentage  of GDP 0.5 0.5    
Timing      
Beginning of the electoral mandate (did the reform process started in the beginning of 
the electoral mandate?) (yes/no) 
 YES  YES  
Popularity of the Government (popularity rates when the reform process started)  Relatively high  Relatively 
high 
 
Tax administration reform (was the tax administration reformed prior to the tax 
reform?) (yes/no) 
 NO  NO  
Information campaign (was a sound information campaign to taxpayers and citizens 
implemented?)  (yes/no) 
 NO  NO NO 
Issues      
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Separation of issues in discussions and negotiations (negotiations on the general lines 
of the reform were separated from negotiations on more specific aspects?) (yes/no) 
  YES   
Issues not directly related to the reform (did the reform included some changes not 
directly related to the tax reform (changes in public spending, earmarking, etc.)?) 
(yes/no) 
 YES  YES YES 
Organisation      
Information availability (has information on the impact of the reform made available?) 
(yes/no)) 
YES   YES YES 
The institutionalisation of discussions and negotiations (has the reform process been 
institutionalised through formal discussions and negotiations?) (yes/no) 
NO   NO NO 
Transparency of the decision-making process (has the reform process been open and 
transparent?) (yes/no)  
   YES YES 
Bilateral or multilateral negotiations (has the reform been negotiated and discussed 
through bilateral or multilateral negotiations?) 
     
The number and organisation of negotiation forums      
Has the reform been negotiated and discussed in one or several forums?    ONE   
Did agreements reached in a forum limit the results of other forums? (yes/no)       
Legal restrictions      
Are tax expenditures published? (yes/no)   NO NO  
Is there some kind of fiscal responsibility law? (yes/no)   NO NO  
(1) It is estimated that about USD 138 billion were lost between 2001 and 2010 due to illicit activities such as corruption and tax evasion.  
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The objective of this study has been to investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of tax 
reforms in developing countries. It has not been focused on the technical design of tax reforms, 
but on the political and institutional drivers and constraints that can condition their success or 
failure. This implies to analyse the politics, the institutional framework, and the socioeconomic 
context of tax reforms. Needless to say, the design and technical details of tax reforms matter, 
and they have also taken into account. 
 
Nine different tax reforms have been identified as case studies to investigate the drivers and 
constraints that condition tax reforms. The analysis builds on existing studies on each particular 
reform under consideration as well as other available literature, political and institutional 
analyses, statistical data and indicators. Field missions were also conducted in the nine 
countries. The analysis has been implemented following a comparative structure.  
 
In order to ensure comparability, the case studies have been selected according to the following 
criteria: geographic distribution; comparable reforms; non natural-resource rich countries; 
country size and population; development level; tax-effort and tax-revenue determinants; and 
consultation with tax experts in the different regions. The final selection has comprised tax 
reforms implemented in two South American countries (Uruguay and Paraguay); one Asian 
country (the Philippines); three sub-Saharan African countries (Uganda, Rwanda, and Kenya); 
one Southern Neighbourhood country (Morocco); one Eastern neighbourhood country 
(Armenia); and one Caribbean country (the Dominican Republic).  
 
Although each reform under study has its own specificities, it has been possible to find identify 
a number of commonalities that help us understand why some reforms are feasible and 
effective while others are not. In this sense, a tax reform has been considered as effective if the 
actual changes brought to the tax system are close enough to the targeted changes. In other 
words, effectiveness must not be understood in this context in terms of the relation between the 
means and ultimate goals of the reform, but between targeted and actual changes in the tax 
system. The feasibility of tax reforms has been related to the set of factors that are expected to 
impact on its effectiveness. Hence, it has been analysed through an operational multifactor 
approach, consisting in identifying and evaluating those factors that influence the effectiveness 
of tax reforms. These factors have been grouped in three categories: the scope, the context, and 
the process of the reform. The first one refers to the depth and direction of a tax reform. The 
second one is related to those factors that shape the framework in which the reform takes place, 
and the third one deals with the organisation of the reform process.  
 
Various factors condition the context of a tax reform and influence its effectiveness. Most of 
them are not individually crucial for a reform to be effective, but they help to understand why a 
given tax reform is more likely to succeed. These factors have been divided into three groups: 
political, institutional, and economic factors. Regarding the tax reform process, its main 
elements have been grouped in four categories: participants, timing, issues, and the 
organisation of discussions and negotiations.   
 
Using the set of indicators proposed in this study to evaluate the effectiveness of tax reforms, 
the following results have emerged. First, all case studies in this research correspond to proper 
tax reforms, they all implied significant targeted changes in their respective tax system. Three 
of these reforms (in Uruguay, Rwanda, and the Philippines) can be considered as clearly 
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effective, since actual changes that were brought to the tax system were close enough to the 
intended and targeted changes (Uruguay, Rwanda, and the Philippines). On the contrary, three 
cases appear to be clearly negative, since actual changes differ to a large extent from the 
original goals (Paraguay, Morocco, and Uganda). The remaining three present mixed results, 
and can be considered as mostly positive even though significant differences exist between the 
actual and targeted changes (the Dominican Republic, Kenya, and Armenia).   
 
According to our findings, not all factors seem to be relevant for the success of tax reforms. In 
particular, a tax reform is likely to be more effective if it has a favourable design (i.e. a reform 
that is neutral or that reduces tax) but the opposite is not true, since unfavourable designs can 
be found in successful reforms (the Philippines) or mostly successful reforms (the Dominican 
Republic). This suggests that since reforms that increase taxes tend to face stronger opposition, 
it may be necessary to complement them with other measures in order to shape and nurture a 
reform-supportive context and process. In fact, the three successful reforms in our sample 
showed more adequate reform processes than the rest. 
 
Broadly speaking, the political context matters in a tax reform, since it tends to be more 
positive in successful reforms and more negative in failed reforms. But not all political factors 
equally decisive. The effect of the political regime is unclear, since it is a priori ambiguous: an 
autocratic regime can increase common interests among powerful actors, but at the same time it 
can fuel the preference for the status quo. Regarding the financing of political parties, our 
analysis is limited by lack of information. However, three political factors seem to be relevant: 
“majority in the parliament”, “ideology of the Government” (compared to previous 
Governments), and “balance of power”. If the ruling party has a majority in the Parliament and 
if its political orientation clearly differs from that of previous Governments, then the reform is 
more likely to be successful (Uruguay, the Philippines, Armenia, and to a lesser extent 
Rwanda, Kenya, and the Dominican Republic vs. Paraguay, Morocco, and to a lesser extent 
Uganda). On the other hand, countries where power is well balanced have clearly or mostly 
produced successful reforms (Uruguay, the Philippines, Kenya, Armenia, and the Dominican 
Republic), while reforms have failed in countries with an unbalanced distribution of power 
(Morocco, Uganda, and Paraguay). 
 
In general, the institutional framework does not have a clear effect on the feasibility of tax 
reforms, although it must be remarked that some institutional aspects of political nature have 
been categorised as political factors.  
 
A number of socio-economic factors seem to be irrelevant, in particular “social cohesion” and 
“major change of the economic system”. On the contrary, there are socio-economic factors that 
seem to influence tax reforms; in particular, “economic and fiscal crisis” and “education”. 
Countries where there is a relatively educated population have clearly or mostly produced 
successful reforms (Uruguay, the Philippines, Kenya, Armenia, the Dominican Republic), 
while reforms have failed in countries with a less educated population (Morocco and Uganda). 
With regard to fiscal crisis, they tend to fuel tax reforms (Uruguay, the Philippines, the 
Dominican Republic), while a sound fiscal balance tends to hinder them (Paraguay and 
Morocco).  
 
Regarding the process of the reform, broadly speaking the timing of a tax reform process 
largely conditions its results. In particular, processes that are initiated at the beginning of the 
electoral mandate are found in clearly successful reforms and in mostly successful reforms, 
while the process of two out of the three failed reforms did not start in the beginning of the 
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electoral mandate. The process of successful reforms also tends be launched during periods of 
high popularity of the Government or the President. However, information was not available to 
reach sound conclusions in this respect. An information campaign also tends to have a positive 
influence on the success of a tax reform (Uruguay and Rwanda vs. Paraguay or Morocco).  
 
The separation of issues in the reform process (i.e. negotiations on the general lines of the 
reform are separated from negotiations on more specific aspects) seems to have a positive 
influence on the reform. This separation of issues was made in successful reforms, while it was 
not in failed reforms. While the lack of information prevents us from drawing sound 
conclusions in this respect, it seems that that efforts aimed at linking the tax reform to other 
policy aspects (e.g. increase in social spending, earmarking, etc) seem to have a positive 
influence on the results of the reform. Such a linkage was made in successful reforms 
(Uruguay, the Philippines, and in some aspect Rwanda) and in moderately successful reforms 
(Dominican Republic), while it was absent in failed reforms (Paraguay, Morocco, and 
Uganda).     
   
The institutionalisation of the reform process does not have a clear effect. On the one hand, 
some successful reform processes have been institutionalised (Uruguay and Rwanda). On the 
other hand, the institutionalisation of the reform increased its opposition in a moderately 
successful reform (the Dominican Republic). Finally, institutionalisation can also be found in a 
failed reform (Morocco). On the contrary, transparency of the decision-making process seems 
to condition the feasibility of a tax reform. The three clearly successful reforms have followed 
a transparent decision-making process, while no such transparency was ensured in the three 
failed reforms. Furthermore, all the three moderately successful reforms were conducted 
through an institutionalised reform process, albeit non-transparent decision-making process.  
 
No sound conclusions can be made with respect to “bilateral vs. multilateral negotiations”. 
Multilateral negotiations were led in successful reforms (Uruguay and Rwanda), in some 
moderately successful reforms (Kenya and Armenia) but also in failed reforms (Morocco). 
Again, it seems that the effect of this factor is conditioned to the transparency of the decision-
making process. Regarding the effect of the number and type of forums, the effect is unclear. 
One successful reform (Uruguay) was characterised by the juxtaposition of several forums 
where the agreements reached in one limited others, but this also occurred in a failed reform 
(Paraguay), although in this case in a non-transparent decision-making process. As regards the 
other two clearly successful reforms, there is not enough information available. In Morocco 
(failed reform), discussions took place in several forums but the agreements reached in one did 
not constrain the other forums. In the Dominican Republic (moderately successful reform), all 
discussions took place in one single forum, but this forum did not imply any limitation for 
ulterior negotiations (in fact that forum was a failure; negotiations stopped due to strong 
differences between the Government and the rest of actors). There is lack of information in the 
rest of cases. 
 
Finally, with respect to legal restrictions in the negotiation process (a fiscal responsibility law-
type, publishing of tax expenditures); results are not clear; mainly because no hard constraints 
existed in any of these nine tax reforms.    
 
However, particular caution must be taken regarding the interpretation of results obtained in 
this research. First, because the nine cases selected constitute limited sample, and therefore the 
conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis rest on a weak ground and would need to be 
completed by further cases. Second, because of the inherent limitations of several of the 
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indicators used in this analysis to quantify the potential factors that can influence tax reforms. 
Third, because of the lack of  information regarding certain factors. Further investigation is 
required to obtain sounder conclusions.  
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